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I.

[2.1]

Introduction To Estate Planning & Professional Responsibility Issues

A.

[2.2]

General Comments - A Few Suggestions

1.

[2.3]

Challenges

The challenges of estate planning are as complex as any area of the law, probably more so because ofthe breadth
and complexity of our contemporary society. The lawyer who undertakes to represent a married couple may have the
pleasure of representing a happily married couple with loving children, or, on the other hand, a couple that is secretly
planning to dissolve their marriage. The husband and wife may be struggling with various problems, such as with children,
step-children, and in-laws. The family life story is a never ending opportunity for great happiness and depressing tragedy.
The estate planning lawyer is expected to work through this minefield and attempt to find solutions to the family's problems
which are also the client's problems.

2.

[2.4]

Compassion

The lawyer who works in this area ofthe law must have the compassion of a sociologist or a family counselor. A
knowledge of people and of methods of motivating them to complete the estate planning process is especially important.
One of the most difficult aspects of the lawyer'S counselor role is an understanding of the client's situation, both as an
individual and as a member of a family, particularly for the effect the estate administration process has on the people
involved.

3.

[2.5]

Advocates & Intermediary

Estate planners sometimes play the role ofadvocate, but more often act as an intermediary (e.g., in representing one
spouse in an antenuptial agreement, in representing one side in a contested estate, or in a trust construction proceeding).
In the adVisor/intermediary role, attorneys tend to look to the overall best interest of the entire family when
recommending a course of action to clients. In considering the best interest of the family, lawyers work to retain family
harmony by avoiding future disputes and by minimizing taxes over a series of deaths. The estate planning lawyer may be
called upon to assist the family in the settlement of a deceased client's estate. There are times when the estate planning
lawyer needs to act as an intermediary among family members. This is even more important when having separate counsel
for every family member could mean added expense and complication. In all of these situations, it is imperative that
the lawyer identify the lawyer's clients. Hence, client identification problems are the root of client complaints against
lawyers.

4.

[2.6]

The Purpose of These Materials

These materials present a starting point for discussing professional responsibility issues in representing the family
through the estate planning cycle. These materials are separated into several categories-a review ofthe applicable Rules
of Professional Conduct, the problems of representing husbands and wives, a continuing examination of the problems of
representing disabled clients, representing a client's child or parent, etc. The separation ofareas for study is for the reader's
convenience. Families do not present their problems in nice, neat packages; the package is loose fitting, sometimes just
waiting to unravel.

II.

[2.7]

Review of the Rules (and Comments) of Professional Conduct

A.

[2.81

The Adoption of the Rules of Professional Conduct

1.

[2.91

Kentucky Rules

Since 1990 Kentucky lawyers have been guided by Kentucky's version ofthe American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. The Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct ("Kentucky Rules" or "Rules") are a part of
the Rules of the Kentucky Supreme Court-specifically, Supreme Court Rule 3.130.

2.

[2.10]

Application of Rules and Comments

Before the estate planner considers the various points reviewed in this chapter it is crucial to have an understanding
of the Kentucky Rules and the Comments that have specific applicability to the estate planner. A detailed examination of
Rules and Comments that have direct applicability to the estate planning lawyer are produced below. The estate planner is
encouraged to read the following in light of the author's emphasis added to particular parts of the Rules and Comments as
well as the author's views of additional lessons that may be learned from these Rules and Comments.

A-I

B.

[2.11]

First Rule for Consideration

1.

[2.12]

Rule 1.4. Communication

(a) A lawyer should keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and protJptly comply
--1
with reasonable requests for information.
!

(b) A lawyer should explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation.

2.

[2.13]

Comment

The more pertinent Comments for the estate planning lawyer are as follows:
[1] The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the
objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the
client is willing and able to do so....

3.

[2.14]

Lesson to be Learned From Rule 1.4

The lawyer learns from this Rule and Comment that the lawyer has an affirmative obligation to explain the estate
planning process, and to explain the objectives in terms the clients are most likely to understand. Whether the lawyer
achieves the objective with words or phrases or with diagrams, flow charts or a synopsis of documents, the obligation
remains the same - the effective estate planning lawyer must find a way to explain the objectives to be achieved and to take
appropriate steps to obtain their client's informed consent.

C.

[2.15]

Second Rule for Consideration

1.

[2.16]

Rule 1.5. Fees

(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. Some factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness
of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) The likelihood that the acceptance ofthe particular employment will preclude other employment
by the lawyer;
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee should
be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after
commencing the representation.

2.

[2.171

Comment

The more pertinent Comments for the estate planning lawyer are as follows:
Basis or Rate of Fee
[1] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an
understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however,
an understanding as to the fee should be promptly established It is not necessary to recite all the
factors that underlie the basis ofthe fee, but only those that are directly involved in its computation.
It is sufficient, for example, to state that the basic rate is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or an
estimated amount, or to identify the factors that may be taken into account in finally fixing the fee.
When developments occur during the representation that render an earlier estimate substantially
inaccurate, a revised estimate should be provided to the client. A written statement concerning the
fee reduces the possibility ofmisunderstanding. Furnishing the client with a simple memorandum or
a copy of the lawyer's customary fee schedule is sufficient if the basis or rate of the fee is set forth.
(Emphasis added).

A-2

3.

[2.18]

Lesson to be Learned From Rule 1.5

Lawyers have an ethical obligation to explain to clients the basis for the fees that will be charged for the valuable
services that the lawyer will render. In the lawyer's engagement letter it is appropriate to include a discussion regarding
conflicts, fees and expenses. Experience has shown that the failure to obtain a written fee understanding "up front" puts
the lawyer at significant risk; hence, avoid the risk-eomply with the Rule!

D.

[2.191

Third Rule for Consideration

1.

[2.20]

Rule 1.6. Confidentiality of Information

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents
after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).

2.

[2.21]

Comment

The more pertinent Comments for the estate planning lawyer are as follows:
[1] The lawyer is part ofajudicial system charged with upholding the law. One ofthe lawyer's functions
is to advise clients so that they avoid any violation of the law in the proper exercise of their rights.
[2] The observance ofthe ethical obligation ofa lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information ofthe
client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation ofthe client
but also encourages people to seek early legal assistance.
[3] Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine what their rights are and
what is, in the maze of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. The common law
recognizes that the client's confidences must be protected from disclosure. Based upon experience,
lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.
[4] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain confidentiality
of information relating to the representation. The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully
and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter.
[5] The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of law, the attorney-client
privilege (which includes the work product doctrine) in the law of evidence and the rule of
confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial
and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to
produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations
other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. The
confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also
to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such
information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. See
also Scope.
[6] The requirement of maintaining confidentiality of information relating to representation applies to
government lawyers who may disagree with the policy goals that their representation is designed to
advance.

3.

[2.22]

Lesson to be Learned From Rule 1.6

The lawyer learns from this Rule and these Comments that the lawyer, as a professional, has an affirmative
obligation to observe a rule ofsilence, confidentiality. In order to achieve the objective ofsecrecy, the lawyer must be able
to identify his or her client to ensure that the client's confidentiality is preserved. For example, ifthe lawyer is representing
the husband, then the lawyer must consider the potential problems that may occur ifthe lawyer also represents the wife. If
the lawyer represents both the wife and the husband, how will the lawyer deal with their common expectation of privacy?
The lawyer has an affirmative obligation to explain to clients the lawyer rules of confidentiality and how the lawyer
will apply the rules of privacy. The lawyer must decide what disclosures will be made and under what circumstances.
Generally, the lawyer has a choice: confirm with the clients that the lawyer will maintain all confidences or confirm that the
lawyer is authorized to disclose the confidences of one spouse to the other spouse. If the laWyer will disclose confidences
ofeither spouse to the other, then the lawyer needs to inform the lawyer's clients about the possible risks ofsuch disclosure.
If, on the other hand, the lawyer is to maintain a couple's secrets confidential, then the lawyer needs to explain that the
problems of conflicts and the fact that the lawyer might be required to withdraw before disclosing a client's confidences
because a continuing joint representation may be inimical to the best interests of both clients.
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E.

[2.231

Fourth Rule for Consideration

1.

[2.241

Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest: General Rule

(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to
another client, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship
with the other client; and

(2) Each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client ifthe representation of that client may be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests,
unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and

(2) The client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in a single
matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the
common representation and the advantages and risks involved
(Emphasis added).
2.

[2.251

Comments

The more pertinent Comments to the estate planning lawyer are as follows:
Loyalty to a Client
[1] Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client. An impermissible conflict
of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation should
be declined. If such a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer should
withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved and the
lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after representation, whether the lawyer may continue to
represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9. See also Rule 2.2(c). As to whether a clientlawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see Comment to Rule 1.3
and Scope.

[3] Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carty out
an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or
interests. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the
client. Paragraph (b) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself preclude the
representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it
does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer'S independent professional judgment in
considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf
of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client wishes to accommodate the other
interest involved.
Consultation and Consent
[4] A client may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph
(a)(1) with respect to representation directly adverse to a client, and paragraph (b)(1) with respect
to material limitations on representation of a client, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude
that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved
cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis ofthe client's consent.
When more than one client is involved, the question of conflict must be resolved as to each client.
Moreover, there may be circumstances where it is impossible to make the disclosure necessary to
obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one
of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an
informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent.

Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service

[9] A lawyer may be paidfrom a source other than the client, if the client is informed ofthat fact and
consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer s duty ofloyalty to the client. See
Rule 1.8(f). ...
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Other Conflict Situations
[12] Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be
called upon to prepare wills for severalfamily members, such as husband and wife, and, depending
upon the circumstances, a conflict ofinterest may arise. In estate administration the identity of the
client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the
fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. The lawyer
should make clear the relationship to the parties involved.
(Emphasis added).

3.

[2.261

Lesson to be Learned From Rule 1.7

The lawyer learns from this Rule and these Comments that the estate planning lawyer has very delicate issues
with which to deal. For example, sometimes a conflict between spouses is not obvious, such as the first marriage where the
couple's children are from that same marriage. The lawyer may have a situation where a conflict is more obvious, such as
where the couple are now celebrating their second or third marriage, each spouse has children from a previous marriage,
and some, but not all, ofthese children are involved in the family business; there is no antenuptial agreement; there is a lot
ofmoney; one spouse dominates the other spouse; one spouse is paying the lawyer's fee, etc. There are some who take the
position that a conflict in this situation is so obvious that one lawyer may not represent the husband and wife. Therefore, the
estate planning lawyer should carefully consider clients' expectations, anticipate the clients' concerns, and be prepared to
advise the married clients regarding their rights, The lawyer must obtain their joint consent before the lawyer may proceed.
Finally, we note that it is permissible for the lawyer's client to pay the family lawyer to render estate planning services
for the client's parents or other family members. It is permissible for the client's employer to pay for the client's estate
planning services, all subject to the same ethical precept-lack of interference between the "real" client and the lawyer.

F.

[2.271

Fifth Rule for Consideration

1.

[2.281

Rule 2.1 Advisor

In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid
advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral,
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation.

2.

[2.291

Comments

The more pertinent Comments to the estate planning lawyer are as follows:
Scope ofAdvice
[1] A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer s honest assessment. Legal
advice often involves unpleasantfacts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront.
In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain the clients morale and may put advice in as
acceptable aform as honestypermits. However, a lawyer should not be deterredfrom giving candid
advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.
[2] Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where practical
considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant. Purely technical legal
advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral
and ethical considerations in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral
and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the
law will be applied.
[3] A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely technical advice. When such a request
is made by a client experienced in legal matters, the lawyer may accept it at face value. When such
a request is made by a client inexperienced in legal matters, however, the lawyer's responsibility as
advisor may include indicating that more be involved than strictly legal considerations.
[4] Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be within the domain of another profession.
Family matters can involve problems within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical
psychology or social work; business matters can involve problems within the competence of the
accounting profession or offinancial specialists. Where consultation with a professional in another
field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a
recommendation. At the same time, a lawyer's advice at its best often consists of recommending a
course of action in the face of conflicting recommendations of experts.
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Offering Advice
[5] In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked by the client. However, when a
lawyer knows that a client proposes a course of action that is likely to result in substantial adverse
legal consequences to the client, duty to client under Rule 1.4 may require that the lawyer act if the
client's course of action is related to the representation. A lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate
investigation of a client's affairs or to give advice that the client has indicated is unwanted, but a
lawyer may initiate advice to a client when doing so appears to be in the client's interest.
(Emphasis added.)

3.

r2.301

Lesson to be Learned From Rule 2.1

The estate planning lawyer learns from this Rule that the lawyer should advise her client(s) of pertinent legal
rights, and do the "right thing." The lawyer must encourage the client to avoid infringing upon the rights of others. Further,
attempts to cover up a problem or to assist or deny a spouse information about the spouse's legal rights of inheritance is
inappropriate because it creates a different set ofproblems. Finally, sometimes the proposed estate plan is so repulsive that
the estate planning lawyer should elect to resign in order to voice the lawyer's discontent.

G.

r2.311

Sixth Rule for Consideration

1.

r2.321

Rule 2.2 Intermediary

(a) A lawyer may only act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) The lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications ofthe common representation,
including the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-client privileges, and
obtains each client's consent to the common representation;
(2) The lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms compatible with the
clients' best interests, that each client will be able to make adequately informed decisions in the
matter and that there is little risk ofmaterial prejudice to the interests of any ofthe clients ifthe
contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and
(3) The lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be undertaken impartially
and without improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client concerning the decisions to
be made and the considerations relevant in making them, so that each client can make adequately
informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or if any ofthe conditions
stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to
represent any of the clients in the matter that was the subject of the intermediation.

2.

r2.331

Comment

The more pertinent Comments to the estate planning lawyer are as follows:
This Rule explicitly recognizes the special role ofthe lawyer acting as an intermediary, to be distinguished
from joint representation as an advocate.
[1] A lawyer acts as intermediary under this Rule when the lawyer represents two or more parties
with potentially conflicting interests. A key factor in defining the relationship is whether the parties
share responsibility for the lawyer's fee, but the common representation may be inferred from
other circumstances. Because confusion can arise as to the lawyer's role where each party is not
separately represented, it is important that the lawyer make clear the relationship, and obtain the
client's consent, preferably in writing.
[2] The Rule does not apply to a lawyer acting as arbitrator or mediator between or among parties who
are not clients ofthe lawyer, even where the lawyer has been appointed with the concurrence of the
parties. In performing such a role the lawyer may be subject to applicable codes of ethics, such as
the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint Committee of the
American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association.
[3] A lawyer acts as intermediary in seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an
amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which
two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in
which two or more clients have an interest, arranging a property distribution in settlement of an
estate or a marital division or mediating a dispute between clients. The lawyer seeks to resolve
potentially conflicting interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. The alternative can be
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that each party may have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility in some situations of
incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, all
the clients may prefer that the lawyer act as intermediary.
[4] In considering whether to act as intermediary between clients, a lawyer should be mindful that if
the intermediation fails the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. In some
situations the risk of failure is so great that intermediation is plainly impossible. For example, a
lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients between whom contentious litigation is
imminent or who contemplate contentious negotiations. More generally, ifthe relationship between
the parties has already assumed definite antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be
adjusted by intennediation ordinarily is not very good.
[5] The appropriateness ofintennediation can depend on its fonn. Forms of intermediation range from
informal arbitration, where each client's case is presented by the respective client and the lawyer
decides the outcome, to mediation, to common representation where the clients' interests are
substantially though not entirely compatible. One form may be appropriate in circumstances where
another would not. Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both
parties on a continuing basis and whether the situation involves creating a relationship between the
parties or terminating one.
[6] In some circumstances a lawyer will undertake representation of a party in litigation or negotiation,
and be forced to deal with an unrepresented party. For example, the lawyer representing a spouse in
a divorce case may deal with the unrepresented spouse within the limits of Rule 4.3. The fact that
the lawyer negotiates with the unrepresented spouse does not make the lawyer an intermediary, or
subject the lawyer to the special rule of disqualification contained in Rule 2.2{c).
Confidentiality and Privilege
[7] A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of intermediation is the effect
on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. In a common representation, the
lawyer is still required both to keep each client adequately informed and to maintain confidentiality
of information relating to the representation. See Rules 1.4 and 1.6. Complying with both
requirements while acting as intermediary requires a delicate balance. If the balance cannot be
maintained, the common representation is improper. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the
prevailing rule is that as between commonly represented clients the privilege does not attach. Hence,
it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any
such communications, and the clients should be so advised.
[8] Since the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented clients, intermediation
is improper when that impartiality cannot be maintained. For example, a lawyer who has represented
one ofthe clients for a long period and in a variety ofmatters might have difficulty being impartial
between that client and one to whom the lawyer has only recently been introduced.
Consultation
[9] In acting as intennediary between clients, the lawyer is required to consult with the clients on
the implications of doing so, and proceed only upon consent based on such a consultation. The
consultation should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected
in other circumstances.
[10] Paragraph (b) is an application of the principle expressed in Rule 1.4. Where the lawyer is
intermediary, the clients ordinarily must assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each
client is independently represented.
Withdrawal
[11] Common representation does not diminish the rights of each client in the client-lawyer relationship.
Each has the right to loyal and diligent representation, the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in
Rule 1.16, and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning obligations to a fonner client.

3.

r2.341

Lesson to be Learned From Rule 2.2

These Comments speak for themselves-lawyers may represent multiple clients, including a family, a husband
and wife, a client's business and the owners of the business, etc. However, multiple representations require additional
safeguards. The lawyer may represent multiple clients and assist them to develop the "right" answer for their situation;
however, the estate planning lawyer has the affirmative responsibility to explain the lawyer's actions, and the advantages
ofthat action. Unfortunately, too many times the explanation is done on an after-the-fact basis. It is better for the lawyer to
get in front ofthe issue and to discuss the risks and the advantages to multiple clients before proceeding with the planning
for their estates. The lawyer needs to obtain the clients' consent, and then assist them to implement an estate plan that most
meets their joint and mutual needs. The lawyer must explain the implications ofthe common representation, including the
advantages and risks involved The lawyer should advise multiple clients that she needs to work through the problems
of their complex relationship, including the fact of marriage. Further, the estate planning lawyer may represent both the
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husband and wife because the lawyer is providing for a joint resolution to joint marital problems. The effective estate
planner works to create fixed rights so as to avoid unnecessary confusion and acrimony. In many situations the lawyer will
need to help the client create an economic incentive for another client to do the right thing, such as agree in writing not to
renounce the first spouse's will. The lawyer needs to create plans that will more likely than not provide comfort and solace
to those who are left behind and attempt to make everyone feel good about the couple's life together. The lawyer's duty to
explain multiple issues and obtain client consent is simply no longer an option.

III.

[2.351

Husband & Wife Representation Problems

A.

[2.361

An Introduction to the Problems

1.

[2.371

General

As society has experienced dramatic social change, the estate planning lawyer has become more attuned to
client identification problems especially when representing husbands and wives. Whether the heightened concern is the
result of the higher divorce rate with many second and third marriages, or multiple children of combined families, or the
financial and social independence of both spouses, the fact remains that the estate planning lawyer is now required to
devote significant thought to the big issue: "May I represent this couple"? While there are some who believe that a joint
representation ofhusbands and wives is, or should be, prohibited, the estate planning lawyer is cautioned that it is far better
for the lawyer to gain an understanding ofthe nature ofthe joint client relationship and measure the mutuality of interest of
the spouses. Upon the lawyer's disclosure ofrepresentation issues, e.g., confidentiality, the lawyer may properly determine
if there exists a mutuality of interest so that the lawyer may act as an advocate for the couple's family issues. When two
people are married, the fact of their marriage does not create a per se conflict between them.
2.

[2.381

The Concept of Marital Unity

When examining the issues of representing spouses, it is important to emphasize that the marital relationship,
while arising in contract, is generally recognized as something more thanjust a commercial relationship.

a.

[2.391

Avoidance of Duplication of Services and Fulfilling Expectations

As the ethics rules serve fundamental societal goals, they should be interpreted to permit the delivery of legal
services without excessive cost or duplication ofservices. Furthermore, the lawyer is expected to fulfill client expectations.
Hence, the use of a single lawyer is the preferred course of action especially if the need for separate counsel is not clearly
obvious. If an issue of disclosure or independence arises in unclear cases, the resolution must be guided by reasonable
client expectations.

b.

[2.401

Acknowledging Marital Commitment

Most importantly, in the marital context the rules of ethics do not operate independently of the obligations that a
husband and wife have voluntarily created by the very nature oftheir marriage. It is altogether reasonable and appropriate
for the estate planning lawyer to believe that a husband and wife already know that they have a fiduciary obligation to each
other, not only with regard to their mutual obligations ofmarital fidelity, but also with regard to the economic transactions
that relate to their property rights. The Rules of Professional Conduct cannot ignore the fact that husbands and wives, by
virtue oftheir marital commitments, have undertaken obligations to each other, and have already imposed upon themselves
obligations ofhonesty, disclosure and communication. The estate planning lawyer is not the person who is imposing these
requirements, the husband and wife have voluntarily undertaken a commitment to each other and they have accepted the
fact that their relationship is "special." It is inappropriate for the lawyer to put the marriage at risk by assuming that the
spouses will fail to honor their marital commitments. Simply stated, the marital relationship imposes fiduciary and fidelity
obligations on a husband and a wife, and the married couple have an affirmative obligation to disclose to one another
their property interests and to express, openly and candidly, their intent with respect to the disposition of their property.
The estate planning lawyer may help the husband and wife better understand their property rights, but the estate planning
lawyer does not have an ethical obligation to suggest that a husband and wife cannot or should not trust each other or their
survivor.

B.

[2.411

Conflicts Between the Spouses

1.

[2.421

Identify the Client

a.

[2.431

Explaining the Risks and Advantages of Joint Representation

After a review of the Rules and Comments, a lawyer is better prepared to identify the client and to fulfill
professional responsibilities. If the lawyer elects to represent the husband and the wife, then the lawyer has an obligation
to explain the risks and advantages ofjoint representation. The estate planning lawyer would be making a serious mistake
to limit advice to issues of transfer taxes, children, etc. It is possible that some estate planning lawyers have placed
an over-emphasis on marital deduction planning-qualified terminal interest trusts, distributions from qualified plan
arrangements-and not enough emphasis on explaining each spouse's rights to the other's property. Lawyers need to assist
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clients in considering rights granted by the Commonwealth, the effect of renunciation, and ways to deal with the issues of
marital rights, assuming the clients want to do so after being advised of the issues. As stated above, however, the lawyer
must be careful not to suggest a course of action that will put the marriage at risk.
Joint representation of wives and husbands is the "norm," and rests on the premise that without evidence to
the contrary, there is no conflict between the spouses. There may be a potential for conflict, but in many situations it is
logical to assume that the effective estate planning lawyer may serve as an advisor and intermediary, and bring the spouses
together to form an estate plan that is in fact a celebration oftheir marriage and that all (or at least most) beneficiaries will
recognize that the work product constitutes a mutual decision of both spouses.

b.

[2.441

Plan for Elective Share Rights

The lawyer should encourage the client to observe that there is a risk to the client's intended beneficiaries when
the client does not plan for the surviving spouse's exercise of the spouse's elective share rights. Stated differently, at the
time of death, not all of a married person's assets "belong" to the deceased spouse. The Commonwealth has given a
surviving spouse a legal right to one-halfofthe deceased spouse's assets. Therefore, injoint representation ofhusband and
wife, the marital partners, like business partners, should consider the issue. While it is not the lawyer's problem, the lawyer
has a responsibility to explain that a surviving spouse has rights to a deceased spouse's estate. The lawyer must plan for
the delicate communication and then be prepared to help the married clients deal with the law.
2.

[2.451

Determine the Objectives

Years ago the marital deduction was limited to only one-half of a spouse's estate, and this comported nicely with a
surviving spouse's elective share rights. Now things are more complex. Lawyers must explain such things as the Qualified
Terminal Interest Property (QTIP) trust and the unlimited marital deduction.
Under prior versions ofthe marital deduction provisions ofthe Internal Revenue Code, the marital deduction was
limited to a maximum of one-half of a testator's estate. The property passing into a marital trust virtually guaranteed the
surviving spouse some type of control over at least one-halfofthe property ofthe first spouse to die. The Internal Revenue
Code was changed-now we can postpone the impact of death taxes for a longer period. The passage of the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) and the unlimited marital deduction may have created a double whammy for the estate
planner.
Regardless, ERTA, with the unlimited marital deduction and its QTIP, carried with it a fresh batch of potential
conflict of interest problems, and brought the issue of conflicts to the attention of the estate planner as never before. For
example, the availability of the unlimited marital deduction permits estate equalization between two spouses, frequently
a goal for the planner, without the cost of any gift tax. Thus, ERTA makes it attractive for the planner to recommend
interspousal gifts. A lawyer's recommendation of marital property transfers might be contrary to the interests of the
wealthier spouse, especially if that spouse ever seeks a divorce. Similarly, the interest of a happily married spouse in
creating a QTIP to ensure that the spouse's property passes to that spouse's children could well be contrary to the interests
ofthat spouse's equally happily married spouse, who wishes to obtain greater control ofthe property for that spouse's own
children.

3.

[2.461

How Much Disclosure Is Required?

In order for the estate planning attorney to represent the married couple, the attorney must provide full disclosure
of the effect of multiple representation on the exercise of the lawyer's independent professional judgment on behalf of
each client. The lawyer must explain, "in plain English," the meaning and personal impact of each ofthe plans ultimately
crafted, and the lawyer should take care not to permit the wealthier spouse to regulate or distort his judgment. The lawyer
must explain that while the potential for conflict exists, the married couple may elect to have one lawyer as a "problem
solver." In this case the lawyer will not serve as an advocate, but as a source of influence with the expectation that the wife
and husband will accept a compromise position for the overall advantage ofthe family.

c.

[2.48]

Marital Rights to Deceased Spouse's Assets

1.

[2.491

Surviving Spouse's Rights to Deceased Spouse's Property

Kentucky law provides that a surviving spouse has ownership rights to a deceased spouse's assets. In the event
a spouse dies without a will, then KRS 391.030 and 391.010 define the surviving spouse's rights to the deceased spouse's
estate. Further, KRS 392.020 provides that a surviving spouse has a legal right to one-half of the predeceased spouse's
"surplus real estate" which the deceased spouse owned at time of death, plus a life estate in one-third of any real estate of
which the deceased spouse owned and gave away during life, unless the surviving spouse relinquished such interest. Most
importantly, the surviving spouse has an absolute legal right to one-half of the surplus personalty left by the deceased
spouse.
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2.

r2.501

Surviving Spouses May Renounce Their Spouses' Wills

KRS 392.080 provides that a surviving spouse may release any property given to them by their deceased spouse's
will, and elect instead to take their share of the deceased spouse's estate as provided by KRS 392.020 as if no will had
been made, except that in this case the share in any real estate that was owned by the deceased spouse will be limited to a
one-third interest.

D.

r2.511

Lawyer Malpractice and Renunciation Issues

An appellate court decision from Missouri presents an example of one of the estate planning lawyer's problems.
The case ofJohnson v. Sandler, Balkin, Hellman & Weinstein. P.C., 958 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997), is worthy of close
examination.

1.

r2.521

Facts

In 1981, Harry Adreme's lawyer, Larry Bold, prepared a new will and trust for Harry. After the trust was signed it
was amended five times but the substance never changed: Harry's three daughters from his first marriage were to inherit
one-half of Harry's estate and Harry's new wife, Donna, would get the other one-half outright. In 1982, Bold prepared a
revised trust for Harry, changing the provisions for Donna from an outright distribution to a QTIP trust, the income being
payable to Donna for life, and the remainder passing to Harry's daughters upon Donna's death. Under the "new" plan
designed by Larry Bold, Harry's daughters and granddaughter would ultimately inherit Harry's entire estate.
Harry did not make any more changes to his trust until 1986, when he hired Lloyd Hellman to be his new lawyer.
Between 1986 and 1992, Harry's new lawyer, Lloyd Hellman, prepared additional amendments to Harry's trust, but none
of the revisions made by Hellman changed the substance of the provisions for Donna and Harry's daughters. When
Hellman met with Harry, Donna was also present and Hellman prepared estate planning documents for Donna. Hellman
billed Harry for all his services.
Hellman continued to represent Harry until he died in 1994. When Harry died, the estate plan was, in substance,
the same as designed by Harry's prior lawyer. When Donna learned about the QTIP trust she was very upset. Hellman
represented Donna in filing her petition to elect against Harry's estate. Donna wanted her spousal (one-halt) share free of
trust and she got it.
Harry's daughters then filed suit against Hellman. The daughters argued that Hellman was guilty of malpractice
because he failed to inform Harry that an election against the QTIP trust by Donna was possible if Harry did not take steps
to prevent it. According to Harry's daughters, due to Hellman's failure to properly inform Harry regarding the possibility
of Donna's marital rights, Harry's estate plan was frustrated, and they suffered the loss of their interest as the residuary
beneficiaries ofthe QTIPtrust, which was worth approximately $1.8 million.
Hellman filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that Harry's children lacked standing to bring a malpractice action
against him. As part of his motion Hellman included his own affidavit and Donna's affidavit.
Hellman's affidavit included the following comments: (1) that in 1986, he was consulted by both Harry and
Donna about trust matters, and that in compliance with Harry's instructions, Hellman made only certain specific changes
to the trust but none of the changes would affect the distribution of Donna's or the daughters' share; (2) that Harry never
specifically told him that the purpose of his services was to benefit his daughters. Hellman argued that if the estate plan
was defective, the mistake originated when Harry's former lawyer prepared the QTIP trust. Hellman argued that because
the modifications made by him did not change Donna's interests or the interests ofHarry's daughters, that his services were
not intended to benefit them.
Donna stated in her affidavit that Hellman represented both her and Harry, and that Harry never asked Hellman
to perform any services that would change the way the property was to be transferred to her upon his death. Donna said
that she did not know prior to Harry's death that her portion of Harry's estate was left to her in trust. Donna also stated
that no one asked her to waive her statutory rights and that had she been asked to waive her statutory rights she would have
refused to do so.
Harry's daughters argued that there were several disputed factual issues regarding whether Hellman performed
services which Harry intended would benefit his daughters. The daughters attached a copy of the second amendment
to the trust, which contained notations highlighting the extensive changes made to the first amendment, and they also
filed handwritten notes from Harry's file at the law firm which outlined the beneficiaries of Harry's estate, specifically
his wife, his children and grandchildren, and his wife's children. Also, there were copies of two letters that Hellman
wrote in 1987, and 1989, to Harry's first wife, Esther, which revealed Hellman's knowledge that Harry's daughters were
to receive one-half of Harry's estate upon Harry's death, and the other half to be held in a continuing trust until Donna's
death. In addition, Harry's daughters attached to their brief an affidavit from their expert, a law school professor of trust
and estate law, who opined that by choosing to use a QTIP trust, Harry was selecting a method to ensure that after Harry
and Donna died the remainder of the QTIP trust would pass to Harry's daughters, rather than to beneficiaries selected by
Donna. The expert also opined that Hellman undertook a total restatement of the QTIP trust, and in doing so, he assumed
full professional responsibility for giving legal effect to Harry's intent to benefit the daughters, regardless of whether their
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amendments restated an earlier amendment or were drafted anew. The expert then stated that Hellman's ''failure to discuss
with [Harry] the possibility ofan effective election against his trust and advise him ofthe alternatives open to him at the
time oftheir representation falls below the standard ofcare for attorneys practicing in the area ofestates and trusts in this
community."

2.

[2.531

Court ofAppeals Decision

The Missouri Court ofAppeals found that it is not necessary that a client advise their attorney that he "intends
to benefit" the designated beneficiaries because the main purpose of retaining an attorney to prepare estate planning
documents is to ensure the future transfer of his estate to his designated beneficiaries. Therefore, an intent to benefit is
inherent in designating persons as beneficiaries of a trust or will.
In the court's opinion, the services rendered by Hellman were sufficient to evidence that he knew of Harry's
intent, and he had a duty to effectuate that intent, regardless of the fact that the amendment did not substantively change
the dispositive provisions of the trust. The court made the following two important points:
If a lawyer is going to limit his services to that as merely being a scrivener, then the lawyer has an
obligation to advise the client of that fact.
Once a lawyer undertakes to rewrite a trust, the lawyer has a duty to (i) discuss with the client
the possibility ofthe surviving spouse exercising elective share rights, and (ii) advise the client of
methods to protect the remainder beneficiaries interest in the QTIP trust.
The fact that Hellman may have represented Harry and Donna did not relieve Hellman of his duty to effectively
represent his clients' individual interests. Under Rule 1.7 there was an inherent conflict between the interests of Harry
and Donna, as Donna's interest in receiving her half of Harry's estate outright was directly adverse to Harry's interest in
having his trust plan effectuated. If, in fact, Hellman was representing both Harry and Donna, Hellman was then obligated
to disclose the potential conflict of interest and determine if his clients desired to waive it. As Donna did not even know
about the QTIP trust, it was obvious that Hellman did not obtain their consent to the conflict.
The court found that when Hellman undertook to amend Harry's trust, that Hellman had a duty to ensure that
Harry's daughters received Harry's property in accordance with Harry's intent. Harry, as a lay person, would not know
what steps were needed to protect his daughters' remainder interest from Donna's action in exercising her right to her
spousal share. A layperson most likely would not even be aware ofthe right to an elective share or what effect the exercise
of that right would have on testamentary intent.
The court held that had Hellman properly advised Harry concerning Donna's possible exercise of her spousal
share, Hellman could have protected the daughters' residuary interest in the QTIP trust. It was certainly foreseeable that
the daughters would be harmed ifthey were deprived ofthe remainder interest in the QTIPtrust by Donna's exercise ofher
spousal election. Likewise, it was foreseeable that the daughters would suffer harm ifHellman failed to advise Harry that
Donna could easily defeat his intent by electing to take her spousal share.
The court concluded that, but for Hellman's failure to advise Harry of Donna's right to renounce, the daughters
would have received their remainder interest in the QTIP trust. Hellman had argued against the court's conclusion claiming
that even ifhe had advised Harry about the possibility of the spousal election, there is no evidence that Harry would have
asked Donna to waive the spousal election, and there was evidence from Donna that she would not have waived it. The
daughters presented evidence, however, that the waiver was not the only option available to Harry ifhe had been advised
of the potential problem in effectuating his testamentary intent. The daughters allege that their father could have created
an irrevocable QTIP trust or a joint tenancy with right of survivorship to his daughters to defeat Donna's right of election.
Hellman did not challenge the availability or the effectiveness ofthese options, instead, he criticized the authority because
it was not available during the relevant time period and contended that neither of these alternatives would have been
palatable to Harry.
The court stated that a finder of fact could reasonably conclude that Harry hired Hellman to revise his estate plan
and intended to benefit the individuals named in the revised trust. Further, that a finder of fact could conclude that Hellman
was negligent in failing to advise Harry about the possibility ofthe spousal election and that this negligence directly caused
the daughters harm.
The matter was sent back to the trial court for a jury trial, and now we can we tell you "the rest of the story." In
discussions with the daughters' trial lawyer, Martin Meyers of Kansas City, Missouri, the author was advised:
The jury was offended that Hellman not only prepared Harry's estate planning documents, but he
acted improperly in serving as Donna's lawyer; specifically, Hellman prepared Harry's estate plan
and then he represented Donna in her efforts to renounce Harry's will, claim her marital share, and
basically destroy the plan that he had helped to create.
The jury awarded the daughters a judgment of $1.6 million, and the case ultimately settled for
something just under $1 million-the limits of Hellman's malpractice insurance.
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E.

[2.541

Elimination of Surviving Spouse's Rights to Deceased Spouse's Estate

1.

r2.551

Antenuptial Agreement

Lawyers are familiar with the advantages of an antenuptial agreement; the properly prepared agreement will
place a limit on one spouse's rights to the assets of the other spouse. But such agreements come with a cost: usually, an
expectancy of safety, but with the possibility of acrimony at the time of marriage. In many instances these agreements
work, but unfortunately, there have been too many instances where the antenuptial agreement is not effective because one
ofthe parties becomes disenchanted with it. At the time of divorce a less wealthy spouse will allege that they were subject
to undue influence, the more wealthy spouse did not disclose all ofthe assets, the more wealthy spouse undervalued assets,
the more wealthy spouse's assets have appreciated in value more than expected, or has obtained additional sources of
income. Further, there has been a significant change in circumstances.

2.

[2.561

Joint Wills - Trusts

Joint trusts may be used as a vehicle to ensure the expectancy ofeach spouse's future inheritance. It is the author's
view that one lawyer for the parties may prepare a joint and mutual will and a joint and mutual trust, especially as the
instrument becomes enforceable at the time of death. It would be appropriate, ofcourse, that mutual documents contain an
appropriate explanation of each spouse's marital rights. For an excellent discussion on the uses ofjoint trusts see Melinda
S. Merk, Joint Revocable Trusts for Married Couples Domiciled in Common-Law Property States, 32 Real Prop. Probe &
T. J. 345 (Summer 1997).

3.

[2.571

Postnuptial Agreements

Kentucky law, like the law of most states, has recognized the right of the parties to enter into a postnuptial
agreement that would control the disposition oftheir assets in the event ofthe death ofthe spouses. In Smith V. Smith, 295
Ky. 50,173 S.W.2d 813 (1943), the court opined that a husband and wife could validly enter into a postnuptial contract
wherein each relinquished his or her respective interest in the property of the other if the contract was fair and equitable
and supported by adequate consideration.

a.

r2.581

May One Lawyer Serve as Counsel for Both Parties?

As a part of a husband and wife's estate planning is it appropriate for the lawyer to prepare a postnuptial
agreement? The question has not yet been answered by the Kentucky Bar Association's Ethics Committee or the Supreme
Court of Kentucky. However, it is the author's opinion that a joint representation may be logical and appropriate.
Instruments that reflect the clients' mutual intent and are "fair and equitable" are inherently consistent when they
implement the clients' mutual expectancies. Further, the. preparation and execution of such instruments, when there is
agreement by both clients, does not create an attorney client conflict. Rule 1.7 contemplates that the lawyer will explain the
risks, advantages and disadvantages of such plan of action, and then allow the clients to waive any conflict ifthey choose.
Upon receiving mutual assent from both clients, the lawyer may proceed to prepare and help the clients understand and
execute a postnuptial agreement. Obviously, if the clients are not willing to evidence their consent in writing, the lawyer
knows that the clients have a conflict, and that it is necessary for the lawyer to withdraw from the joint representation.
In the absence of advance agreement to the contrary, Rule 1.9 may make it necessary for the lawyer to withdraw from a
representation of both spouses.
Agreements such as joint wills, mutual-joint trusts and/or post-marital agreements should reflect the fact that
each spouse understands their marital rights, and they have agreed to waive their rights to elect their marital share upon
the death of the first spouse to die. Such agreements will help document the client's intent and will demonstrate to the
clients' intended beneficiaries that both clients understood their rights, and that the entire estate plan reflects their mutual
intentions. The existence of such an agreement may help to provide the intended beneficiaries with a better understanding
and appreciation of the clients' intent.
Further, Rule 2.2, as explained above, sets the framework for the lawyer as an intermediary; it is in this context
that the estate planning lawyer is best assisting the married couple achieve their mutual objectives.

b.

[2.591

Suggested Provision of Explanation

For purposes of illustration, assume that a lawyer represents Abe and Mary, an explanation ofthe marital rights in
a sample Postnuptial Agreement might look like the following:
Abe and Mary acknowledge that they understand the provisions ofKentucky law regarding the
legal rights that a surviving spouse has to a portion of their deceased spouse's property. Specifically,
Abe and Mary acknowledge that they know that Kentucky law allows a surviving spouse to renounce
the terms of their deceased spouse's Will and to take, as a matter of legal right, the following property
from their deceased spouse's estate: (i) the right to clear and free title to one-third of their predeceased
spouse's surplus real property, of which the deceased spouse owned at the time of death; (ii) the right
to use, during their remaining years of life (referred to as a life estate) one-third of the real property
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that the deceased spouse owned during the time both spouses were married but was not owned by the
predeceased spouse at the time of their death; and (iii) the right to own, free and clear of any intrusion
and in their own name, one-half of their predeceased spouse's surplus personal property (such as cash,
stocks, bonds and the like) which was owned by their predeceased spouse at the time of such spouse's
death.
Abe and Mary acknowledge and understand that such rights and entitlements under Kentucky
law may change and be different at the time that one of them dies or at the time both of them dies.
Abe and Mary acknowledge and understand that either or both of them may not be Kentucky
residents at the time oftheir death, and that either or both ofthem may own property which does not pass
pursuant to Kentucky law.
Abe and Mary acknowledge and understand that either or both ofthem may die without having
a will which directs the disposition of their estate. Specifically, they are aware that Kentucky gives the
survivor of them the following described marital rights if their spouse dies without a will: (i) the right
to own, clear and free title, to one-half of the deceased spouse's surplus real property that the deceased
spouse owned at the time ofdeath; (ii) the right to use for their remaining life (referred to as a life estate)
one-third of their deceased spouse's real property that their deceased spouse owned but is not owned by
such spouse at the time of death; (iii) the right to own, free and clear of any intrusion and in their own
name, one-half oftheir predeceased spouse's surplus personal property (such as cash, stocks, bonds and
the like) which was owned by their predeceased spouse at the time of such spouse's death.
Abe and Mary understand that any transfers of property by either one of them without the
express written consent of the other might possibly be considered as a fraudulent transfer by the other
and that such transfer might possibly be set aside as a fraud upon the other spouse's marital rights.
Abe and Mary acknowledge and understand that each of them has no obligation either under
law or as a prerequisite to the continuation of their marriage to enter into this Agreement or to waive
any of the marital rights waived hereunder. It is possible that this Agreement might be set aside by a
court if either one of them is able to convince a court that the other spouse committed fraud or that one
of the spouses was under duress at the time they signed this agreement. Hence, they both agree that
they have entered into this Agreement freely and voluntarily and they fully consent to the terms of this
Agreement.

c.

[2.601

Additional Suggested Disclosures

The provisions in the suggested instrument should also contain the following types of lawyer disclosures.
Abe and Mary acknowledge that they have had the opportunity to seek and obtain their own
lawyer, and that they mutually state that they have requested that John Marshall serve as their joint
lawyer.
Abe and Mary state that Marshall has advised them that conflicts exist in a joint representation
and that they each have valuable rights to their own property which may be adversely affected by
employing Marshall as their joint counsel and entering into this Agreement. Further, Marshall has
explained to them the legal effect ofthis Agreement and that they understand all ofthe terms, provisions,
and legal effects of this Agreement.
Abe and Mary acknowledge that they each have a full understanding of the provisions of
this Agreement, and that this Agreement substantially alters the marital and property rights, claims, or
interests that each would have had but for the execution ofthis Agreement. Abe and Mary acknowledge
that this Agreement has been freely and voluntarily entered into by each of them without coercion,
constraint, or intimidation on the part ofthe other.

F.

[2.611

Confidentiality Between Spouses

1.

[2.621

Assessing Various Forms of Confidences in the Joint Representation

During the course of representation, the lawyer may meet or confer with either spouse separately, and this, by
itself, will not breach any ethical rule. Regardless ofwhether the lawyer has discussed issues ofconfidentiality between the
spouses, at some point one ofthe spouses may tell their lawyer that he or she desires that the lawyer not disclose something
to the other spouse. In a joint representation, a lawyer's duty with respect to a confidence imparted by only one spouse
requires an inquiry into the nature ofthe confidence to permit the lawyer to determine whether the couple's differences that
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caused infonnation to be secret constitutes either a material potential for conflict or true adversity. There are three broad
types of confidences that will cause a lawyer to conclude that differences between spouses constitute true adversity.

a.

[2.63]

Communication Requesting a Reduction or Defeat of Other Spouse's Interest

A communication that asks the lawyer to draft a document or give advice that, without the other spouse's
knowledge, would reduce or defeat the other spouse's interest in the confiding spouse's property, or pass the confiding
spouse's property to another, creates a true adversity. The lawyer's action to assist a confiding spouse is not appropriate if
done without the knowledge of the other spouse.

b.

[2.64]

Communication of Intent of Material Harm to Other Spouse

A communication of intent that seeks no action by the lawyer but nonetheless indicates substantial potential
of material hann to the interests of the other spouse is another example of a true adversity. For example, if the lawyer
recommends spousal gifts to equalize estates and the donee spouse confides that he or she plans a divorce immediately after
receiving the gift, then the lawyer knows a true adversity exists.

c.

[2.65]

Comnlunication of Untrue Expectations or Understandings

A communication by which the lawyer learns that the expectations of one spouse with respect to the plan, or the
spouse's understanding of the facts on which the plan is based, are not true constitutes another fonn of harm to a joint
representation. Here the lawyer has not been asked to take action, nor has the lawyer defeated either spouse's rights.
Nonetheless, in such cases the lawyer learns, by the disclosure of the other spouse, that one spouse's expectations will be
wholly or partially defeated with respect to operation ofthe estate plan. Such a confidence occurs if a fact or circumstance
thwarts the purpose or a key element of the plan. For example, when the lawyer learns that a contingent heir clause in
one spouse's will would include the illegitimate child of the other spouse. The infonnation may not come from one of
the spouses, but nonetheless is a fact the other spouse intends to remain confidential. All adverse confidences require the
lawyer's specific consideration of appropriate protective measures.

2.

[2.66]

The Nonadverse Confidences

Some disclosures of a confidence do not create true adversity. Such confidences range, for example, from the
disclosure by one spouse of a significant relationship outside the marriage, or of significant hidden assets, to isolated
comments about the strength of the marriage or of the other spouse's ability to handle money. The seriousness of such
statements may range from earnest disclosures to joking exclamations. A disclosure about the strength ofthe marriage, such
as a statement of intent to divorce, if no marital rights are defined or exchanged, is not one that defeats the other spouse's
rights, nor any expectation about the operation ofthe plan. Unless coupled with an adverse confidence by one spouse, the
lawyer should be free to assess each individual instance and the duties required in a continuing representation.

3.

[2.67]

Consequences of an "Adverse" Confidence

Assuming no agreement with the husband and wife governing the lawyer's conduct, adverse confidences require
the lawyer to assess both the need for disclosure to the other spouse and the need to withdraw from the representation.
Again, the communication of confidences themselves do not per se require this assessment; it is the substance of such
secrets that does so.

a.

[2.68]

Fiduciary Obligation

The lawyer may act as a fiduciary, that is, balance the potential for material harm to the confiding spouse caused
by disclosure against the potential for material harm to the other spouse caused by a failure to disclose.

b.

[2.69]

Duty of Loyalty

The lawyer should consider his duty of loyalty to the parties in a joint representation, which may require a
consideration of the effect of disclosure of an adverse confidence imparted by one spouse to the other spouse. Most
confidences would not be imparted if the client were mindful ofthe lawyer 50 competing duty to the other spouse.

c.

[2.70]

Withdrawal Absent Knowing Consent

The lawyer must withdraw when a confidence is imparted unless (I) each spouse makes a knowing consent ofthe
representation pursuant to Rule 1.7(a), or (2) withdrawal would result in disclosure. In no case may the lawyer act upon
the confidence to the detriment of the other spouse. If withdrawal is the proper course, the lawyer must withdraw at the
first reasonable opportunity.

d.

[2.71]

Example from Florida Ethics Committee

In Florida Ethics Opinion 95-4 (May 30, 1997), the Florida Bar's Ethics Committee opined that during a joint
representation of husband and wife, an attorney is not required to discuss issues regarding confidentiality at the outset of
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representation. However, when the lawyer has no prior agreement with the her clients, then she may not reveal confidential
information to the wife when the husband tells the lawyer that he wishes to provide for a beneficiary that is unknown to the
wife. In this situation the lawyer must withdraw from the representation of both the husband and the wife because of the
conflict presented when the lawyer must maintain the husband's separate confidences and not disclose such confidences
to the client wife. A careful examination of the entire opinion is recommended because the Kentucky Bar Association's
Ethics Committee has not yet opined on this important area of the law.
4.

r2.721

Recommended Approach-Advise Your Clients In Writing

a.

r2.731

How to Approach the Topic

Most recognized estate planning authorities agree; the estate planning lawyer should advise a husband and wife
at the outset ofthe representation as to what action the lawyer will take regarding the issues of confidentiality. The lawyer
should determine the choice of action. The lawyer's choices include the following: (i) tell all; (ii) keep it a secret, or (iii)
terminate the lawyer-client representation. While the authorities have different names for it, the bottom line is the same;
the effective estate planning lawyer should think it through and adopt the position that is best suited to the individual
lawyer's style.
b.

r2.741

Examples of Engagement Letters ofAmerican College of Trust & Estate Counsel

The American College of Trust & Estate Counsel (ACTEC) has published its engagement letters on its website.
As these letters are not subject to a copyright, they are reproduced as follows-pick your choice.
Joint Spousal Representation Engagement Letter
Dear (clients):
You have asked me to [describe scope ofrepresentation]. I have agreed to do this work and will
bill for it on the following basis: [Describe arrangements pertaining to fees, billing, etc.]. If I am asked
to perform tasks not described in this letter, an additional engagement letter may be required for that
work.
It is common for a husband and wife to employ the same lawyer to assist them in planning
their estates. You have taken this approach by asking me to represent both of you in your planning. It
is important that you understand that because I will be representing both of you, you are considered
my client, collectively. Accordingly, matters that one of you might discuss with me may be disclosed
to the other of you. Ethical considerations prohibit me from agreeing with either of you to withhold
information from the other. In this representation, I will not give legal advice to either of you or make
any changes in any ofyour estate planning documents without your mutual knowledge and consent. Of
course, anything either ofyou discusses with me is privileged from disclosure to third parties.
[CHOOSE ONE OF THE FOLLOWING]

# 1 If a conflict of interest arises between you during the course of your planning or if the two
of you have a difference of opinion, I can point out the pros and cons of your respective positions or
differing opinions. However, ethical considerations prohibit me, as the lawyer for both of you, from
advocating one of your positions over the other. Furthermore, I would not be able to advocate one of
your positions versus the other if there is a dispute at any time as to your respective property rights or
interests or as to other legal issues between you. If actual conflicts of interest do arise between you of
such a nature that in my judgment it is impossible for me to perform my ethical obligations to both of
you, it would become necessary for me to withdraw as your joint lawyer.
#2 If a conflict of interest arises between you during the course of your planning or if the two
of you have a difference of opinion concerning the proposed plan for disposition of your property or on
any other subject, I can point out the pros and cons of your respective positions or differing opinions.
However, ethical considerations prohibit me, as the lawyer for both ofyou, from advocating one ofyour
positions over the other. Furthermore, I would not be able to advocate one of your positions versus the
other ifthere is a dispute at any time as to your respective property rights or interests or as to other legal
issues between you.
If actual conflicts of interest do arise between you of such a nature that in my judgment it is
impossible for me to perform my ethical obligations to both ofyou, it would become necessary for me to
cease acting as your joint attorney. Since [Bob] is a client of long standing, I may elect to/would continue
to represent him and in that event [Mary] would have to retain another lawyer to represent her. However,
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I would not be able to continue to represent [Bob] if prior to my undertaking separate representation I
learn that [Bob] has breached any understanding with [Mary] or has advised me that he intends to do so
(such as changing his estate plan to her detriment) unless [Mary] is fully informed of the breach or the
intended breach and fully understands your current circumstances. By signing her consent to this letter,
[Mary] agrees to my continued representation of [Bob] should a conflict arise between you, subject to
the conditions set forth in this letter.
[OPTIONAL]
Once documentation is executed to put into place the planning that you have hired me to
implement, my engagement will be concluded and our attorney-client relationship will terminate. Ifyou
need my services in the future, please feel free to contact me and renew our relationship. In the meantime,
I will not take any further action with reference to your affairs unless and until I hear otherwise from
you.
After considering the foregoing, ifyou consent to my representing both ofyou jointly, I request
that you sign and return the enclosed copy of this letter. If you have any questions about anything
discussed in this letter, please let me know. In addition, you should feel free to consult with another
lawyer about the effect of signing this letter.
Conflicts ofinterest and confidentiality are ofparamount concern ifa lawyer undertakes concurrent separate representation
ofspouses. Such representation should only be undertaken after careful consideration ofall possible conflicts ofinterest.

Concurrent Separate Spousal Representation Engagement Letter
Dear (clients):
It is common for a husband and wife to employ the same lawyer to assist them in planning
their estates. You have taken this approach by asking me to represent both of you [describe scope of
representation]. However, each of you wants to maintain your right to confidentiality and the ability to
meet separately with me. I have agreed to do this work on this basis and will bill for it on the following
basis: [Describe arrangements pertaining to fees, billing, and which of the parties, if not both, will
be responsible for payment]. If I am asked to perform tasks not described in this letter, an additional
engagement letter may be required.
I will represent each of you separately and will not discuss with either one of you what your
spouse has disclosed to me. Each ofyou releases me from the obligation to reveal to you any information
I may have received from the other that is material and adverse to your interests. Furthermore, I will not
use any information I obtain from one of you in preparing the other's plan, even if the result is that the
two plans are incompatible or one plan is detrimental to the interests of the other spouse. In short, the
representation will be structured so that each of you will have the same relationship with me as if each
ofyou had gone to a separate lawyer for assistance in your planning.
While I have agreed to undertake this representation on a separate and confidential basis, you
should be aware that there might be disputes between you now or in the future as to your respective
property rights and interests, or as to other issues which may arise between you. Should this occur, I
would not be able to represent either of you in resolving any such dispute, and each of you would have
to obtain your own representation.
After considering the foregoing, ifyou consent to my representation ofeach ofyou separately, I
request that you sign and return the enclosed copy ofthis letter. Ifyou have any questions about anything
discussed in this letter, please let me know. In addition, you should feel free to consult with another
lawyer about the effect of signing this letter.
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5.

[2.75]

Recommended Client Memorandum
LYNCH, Cox, GILMAN & MAHAN P.S.C.
400 WEST MARKET STREET - SUITE 2200
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY 40202
(502) 589-4215
(502) 589-4994

DIRECT LINE
ThLEFAX

CLIENT MEMORANDUM
ESTATE PLANNING FOR HUSBANDS AND WIVES

When husbands and wives plan their estates they usually have common goals and one lawyer
represents both spouses. When a lawyer represents both spouses the lawyer has duties of loyalty and
fidelity to each spouse and this is what each spouse expects. However, lawyers are required to explain, in
writing, the lawyer rules of confidentiality and the possible actions that might create a conflict of interest
for the lawyer. In order to be in compliance with the ethics rules we have prepared this Memorandum.
As to confidentiality issues, any information that one spouse shares with their spouse will no
longer be confidential. Information that is provided to the lawyer in the presence of both spouses or as a
part ofthe estate planning process will no longer be confidential. Information that one spouse provides to
the lawyer that is specifically designated as not to be provided to the other spouse may create a problem.
For example, if a wife discloses confidential information to a lawyer with instructions that the lawyer
is not to disclose that information to the husband, then the lawyer may not disclose that information
without the wife's consent. However, ifthe lawyer concludes that such information is detrimental to the
interests of the husband, then the lawyer may be required to resign from the mutual representation, and
the lawyer's resignation must be made known to both spouses. Also, there might be a problem for the
lawyer to represent either spouse in the future.
As to conflicts of interest situations, conflicts might arise because one spouse may want their
separate, non-marital, property to pass to persons to whom the other spouse does not agree, or because
the husband and wife may have children from a prior marriage and the couple have strong differences
of opinion as to how to dispose of their assets to their children. Another example, the couple may have
a difference of opinion regarding the distribution of property that was given to one of them by their
parents. In all of these situations the husband's and wife's differences of opinion may create a legal
conflict of interest. If a husband and wife have a difference of opinion that cannot be resolved, then it
is possible that the lawyer might not be able to represent both spouses. The lawyer may help a married
couple discuss their differences of opinion and come to a common solution, but sometimes this does
not work out and then each spouse will need their own lawyer. In this situation the lawyer might be
prohibited from representing either spouse.
Married persons have legal rights to a portion of their spouse's estate. When a married person
dies the surviving spouse has the right to take a portion oftheir deceased spouse's estate, notwithstanding
the terms ofthe deceased spouse's will or trust. For example, ifyou create a trust that pays all the income
to your spouse, and upon your spouse's death the property is to pass to your children from a previous
marriage, you should know that your surviving spouse has the legal right to set aside the terms of your
will and elect to take their marital share, free of any trust. There are ways to set up an estate so that a
surviving spouse may not elect to claim their marital share; for example, a husband and wife may agree,
in writing, not to elect their marital share. Ifyou want to be sure that your spouse does not reject your will
then you must say something to your lawyer. Ifyou do not make a written arrangement then your spouse
may elect to destroy your estate plan and elect to take their marital share. Oral agreements to limit
a spouse's rights are not enforceable. As oral agreements are worthless, you must communicate your
wishes to your lawyer. If you decide to protect your estate from your spouse's right to elect a marital
share then it is possible that the lawyer might not be able to represent both spouses.

I~

[2.76]

Business Transactions With Client

A.

[2.771

Review of the Ethics Rule

1.

[2.78]

Rule 1.8. Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions

(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership,
possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) The transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to
the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can
be reasonably understood by the client;
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(2) The client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the
transaction; and
(3) The client consents in writing thereto.

2.

[2.79]

Comment

The more pertinent Comments for the estate planning lawyer are as follows:
Transactions between Client and Lawyer
[1] As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should be fair and reasonable
to the client. In such transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is often
advisable. Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploit information relating to the representation to the
client's disadvantage. For example, a lawyer who has learned that the client is investing in specific
real estate may not, without the client's consent, seek to acquire nearby property where doing so
would adversely affect the client's plan for investment. Paragraph (a) does not, however, apply to
standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the
client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services,
products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities services. In such transactions,
the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are
unnecessary and impracticable.

3.

[2.80]

Practical Review of Rule

Although business transactions between a lawyer and client are not prohibited, Rule 1.8 provides mandatory (nonoptional) safeguards directed at protecting the client's interests. The Rule requires that transactions between a lawyer and
client be objectively fair to the client, and that the client be given a written explanation ofthe terms of the transaction, the
risks and a detailed explanation of the areas of conflict. Then the client must be advised to consult independent counsel.
The client's consent to the arrangement must be in writing.
Unlike the Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 1.8 does not prohibit a lawyer from initiating discussions
about potential business transactions with clients.
For a violation to occur under Rule 1.8, a lawyer-client relationship must exist. Although this requirement is
relevant to many Rules, the existence ofthe relationship is more difficult to ascertain in the context ofbusiness transactions
between a lawyer and client.
The time to determine whether there has been sufficient disclosure, and whether the transaction was fair to the
client is determined on an after the fact basis: when the transaction is considered closed or the client invites review for
determining the propriety ofthe lawyer's action. In light ofthe careful review imposed by disciplinary administrators and
the courts, it would appear to be very difficult for a lawyer to pass the test at the time of the subsequent close review.

B.

[2.811

Selling Life Insurance to Clients

In March 1995, the Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Committee issued KBA E-376, which contains a review of
the complicated issues involved in whether a lawyer may sell life insurance to the lawyer's client.

1.

[2.82]

Review of Specific Questions

The questions presented for consideration by the Ethics Committee were the following:
Question:

A member of a law firm asks the following questions:

1.

May I sell insurance to a client, and receive a commission for it, when the sale of insurance is related
to my representation of the client, and the legal representation involves estate and employee benefit
planning?

2.

Is disclosure to my client of my receipt of a commission necessary?

3.

May I make the sale if there is no relationship between the insurance and the legal representation?

4.

Is disclosure to my client of my receipt of a commission necessary?

5.

May I prospect for insurance clients who are not now legal clients? What if they desire to become
legal clients in the future?
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2.

6.

Can I adjust my legal fees (discount) or would that be considered a rebate of commissions in
violation of insurance statutes?

7.

Can insurance commissions be considered partnership income, even if the commission is paid
directly to me as an individual?

8.

May I receive a referral fee from another insurance agent if I refer a client to him/her in connection
with a legal matter? What disclosures are necessary to the client and to the insurance agent?

9.

Are the answers to the above questions altered by using a low-load insurance product?

[2.831

The Committee's Comments

In response to the questions raised for the review, the Committee's Opinion included the following comments:

Without comment on law-related services generally, the Committee believes that the Kentucky
Rules of Professional Conduct permit the lawyer to sell life insurance products to the lawyer's clients
when the sale of such insurance is related to the legal matter being handled by the lawyer, provided the
applicable Rules of Professional Conduct are followed. The idea of selling insurance is already allowed
with respect to the title insurance, and it is apparent that the client might benefit from such transactions.
On the other hand we find that the sale of life insurance products to clients constitutes a business
transaction with a client, and that there is the potentialfor conflicts ofinterest; for example, the client:Sneeds to maintain confidentiality regarding the client:S- health, and an insurer:S- need to have complete
disclosure ofall health questions. Accordingly, the lawyer must be satisfied of compliance with Rules
1.7, 1.8(a). See Michigan Op., RI-135 (1992). Further, all fees and commissions must be disclosed to the
client, and the client should consent to such arrangement in writing.
Further, to make our position as clear as possible, we emphasize that a lawyer has a duty of
loyalty to the client, and that advising a client about the disposition of the client's estate after death, and
the sale of life insurance raises inherent problems of conflicts of interest as the insurer pays the agent
(lawyer) to maximize insurance sales, and the lawyer's responsibility to maintain independence may be
compromised; accordingly, it is necessary for the lawyer to disclose all of these matters in writing to the
client, and to obtain the client's consent. The disclosure should advise the client that it is appropriate to
obtain independent advice, counsel, in these unique circumstances.
We emphasize that the lawyer may not solicit legal business personally or by telephone
from current or former insurance customers unless they are also current or former clients. Michigan
Op. RI-135. "Prospecting" for insurance clients from the lawyer's law office is inconsistent with our
earlier opinions regarding the separation of other businesses from the lawyer's law practice, and invites
misunderstandings and possible violations ofthe advertising rules. For this reason, Question 5 is answered
with a "Qualified No." The answer is qualified because if the insurance business is sufficiently separate
from the lawyer's law practice then that business may advertise for insurance customers purchasers like
any other insurance agency. However, the separate business may not be used to circumvent the rules
governing lawyer advertising.
In the opinion of the Committee the lawyer should not accept referral fees for referring clients
to other insurance agents. There is no apparent justification for accepting such fees as the lawyer is
providing no substantial additional service to the client, and the suggested practice is difficult to reconcile
with Rules 1.7 and 1.8(a). We also fear that such arrangements might lead to improper "feeding" of
business.

3.

[2.841

Reconsideration of Opinion

In light of subsequent developments it is the author's opinion that it is doubtful that the KBA's Ethics Committee
would, today, endorse, the result ofthis ethics opinion. In 1996, the Rhode Island Ethics Committee, in R.I. Opinion 96-26,
opined that a lawyer may not sell insurance to estate planning clients and may not provide estate planning legal services
to insurance customers; as a practical matter, consultation and disclosure, properly and fully carried out, will not result in
client consent. The comments of the Rhode Island Committee are very compelling and the interested reader is advised to
consider the Rhode Island Opinion before proceeding to sell life insurance to an estate planning client.

C.

[2.851

Lawyers Receiving Commissions for Investment Referrals

In KBA E-390, July 1996, the KBA's Ethics Committee explained why a lawyer could not be compensated for
referring clients to investment advisory services, even with client consent.
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1.

[2.86]

Defining the Question

The following question was presented for consideration by the Ethics Committee:
Maya lawyer, after disclosure to and consent by the client, receive compensation, structures as
a percentage share of a recurring account management fee, for the lawyer's referral of the client to an
investment advisor?

2.

[2.87]

The Committee's Comments

The Committee's Opinion included the following comments:
A question has been raised whether a lawyer may ethically affiliate with an investment
advisor in an arrangement whereby the lawyer refers the client to the investment advisor in exchange
for a percentage share of the investment advisor's recurring management fees (based on the amount of
client's assets under management), even assuming arguendo, the lawyer has fully disclosed the referral
fee arrangement and has obtained the client's written consent. In the opinion of the Committee, this
arrangement presents a serious conflict of interest and is likely to involve circumstances where it is
impossible for the lawyer to make sufficient disclosure to properly inform the client's consent.
The referral fee arrangement raises concerns under a number of KBA Rules, including, among
others, Rules 1.1 (requirement of competent counsel), 1.7(b) (prohibition of representation that may
be materially limited by the lawyer's own interests), 1.8 (prohibition of business transactions with
the client), 2.1 (requirement of professional independence) and 5.4 (prohibition of fee-sharing with
non-lawyers). The prospect of the lawyer's referral compensation, supplementary to the legal fee
already being paid by the client, is likely to interfere materially, on a continual basis, with the lawyer's
independent professional judgment in objectively considering the client's best interests. Moreover, in
many instances the lawyer's affiliation with the investment advisor and the resultant client referrals
could involve the lawyer in matters beyond his professional competence, and, indeed, raises difficult
questions regarding state and federal investment advisor registration and examination requirements.
Consequently, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the lawyer to disclose fully and fairly to the
client the consequences ofpursuing the recommended course instead ofother alternatives that the lawyer
is unlikely to have evaluated or considered. These issues obviously become even more troublesome in
the common situation where the client requests advice in the investment of funds obtained during the
representation, funds which in many instances constitute the bulk of the client's personal assets. Should
the client suffer the loss of these assets, the lawyer will be challenged to explain satisfactorily that his
advice was based on his independent professional judgment and was not in any sense clouded by his own
pecuniary interest in the management ofthe client's assets by the particular investment advisor to whom
he referred the client.
In conclusion, reference should be made to KBA E-264, which states that a lawyer could not
ethically participate in an arrangement in which the lawyer would refer clients to a bank in exchange
for a percentage fee based on the amount of deposited by those clients in bank-sponsored Individual
Retirement Accounts. The opinion provides, ''whether they are called referral fees or commissions or
even kickbacks, they have one common characteristic, they are payments to an attorney for allowing that
person or organization to make a profit from his client" and "attorneys are cautioned that a presumption
exists that such referral fees are, even with full disclosure to the client and with his consent, unethical
because they lend themselves to the appearance of impropriety."

D.

[2.881

Association with Financial Planner

In some situations a financial planning organization may refer its members to a specific lawyer and one may
ask if a close referral relationship is permissible. In Texas Ethics Opinion 446, May 1987, the following question was
considered.

1.

[2.89]

Defining the Question

The question was defined as follows:
May an attorney allow a financial planning organization to refer its members to him for
preparation of wills and trusts and accept payment of part or all of his fee from the organization?
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2.

[2.901

The Committee's Comments

The Committee's opinion included the following comments:
An organization that provides financial planning services conducts seminars which, among
others things, stress the importance of setting financial goals, making a will, choosing the right type of
insurance, etc. Individual services consist ofa review ofa member's income tax returns, insurance review
and advice, and investment counseling. No legal advice or legal services are rendered by the organization
but in explaining to prospective members the services that are offered, a member is advised that $150 of
his membership fee goes towards the preparation of a will and living trust for the member and his spouse.
Prospective members are told that ifthey are represented by local counsel, the organization will forward
$150 of the membership fee to their local counsel after the member consults with the attorney of his
choice concerning terms and provisions which the financial planning group deems to be advantageous
for the member. If the attorney's fee exceeds the $150 paid by the organization, that fee is billed to the
member by the attorney.

If a prospective member is not represented by counsel, the organization provides the member
with a list of attorneys with whom it has comnlunicated and informs the member that the attorneys on
the list have agreed to prepare two fairly simple wills and one living trust for $150. The organization
then forwards to an attorney in the area pertinent financial information pertaining to the member and the
member is told that the attorney will contact the member to verify the financial information and ask any
additional questions the attorney deems advisable.
The organization contacts attorneys to inquire as to whether they are willing to make their
services available to members ofthe financial planning group at the rate specified but promises no work
and no referrals to attorneys. The organization does submit to the prospective attorneys a pro forma copy
ofthe simple wills and living trust recommended by the organization to its members, but the drafting of
the wills and trust agreements for a member are left entirely to the attorney.
The financial planning organization described above derives no profit· from the legal services
rendered by lawyers to whom its members are referred. There is no indication that any lawyer to whom
referrals are made initiated or promoted the formation of the organization or that it is operated for the
purpose of procuring legal work or financial benefit for any lawyer as a private practitioner. The inquiry
upon which this opinion is based clearly indicates that the member of the organization, and not· the
organization, is recognized as the client of the lawyer. If the statement of the services to be rendered
for the flat fee of $150 is not misleading or deceptive and the member is free to select an attorney of
his choice, or reject an attorney whose name has been recommended by the organization, the guidelines
under which the organization is operated appear to comport with the requirements of DR 21 03(E)(5).
To eliminate the possibility of a violation of DR 2101(A)(I), the organization must clearly inform its
members that the $150 does not necessarily cover the entire fee ofan attorney for preparing the wills and
trust agreement.
No violation of the disciplinary rules results from an attorney allowing a financial planning
organization to recommend him to a member of the organization who has no attorney or accepting
payment for part or all of his fee for services rendered to a member under the facts set out above.

E.

[2.911

Financial Services Firm & the Unauthorized Practice of Law

The Kentucky Bar Association's Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee issued an opinion making it clear that
a financial and tax consulting firm, with lawyer employees, may not solicit estate planning business and prepare estate
planning documents.

1.

[2.921

The Opinion

In KBA U-50, June 17, 1997, the Committee provided the following advice:
The preparation and execution of wills and powers of attorney, and the drafting and funding
of living trusts involve legal knowledge and advice, and therefore constitute the practice of law. Such
services affect the legal rights of, and involve the risk of financial harm to, the individual who received
such services and to that individual's heirs and beneficiaries. The public interest demands that estate
planning services be rendered only by lawyers, who are held to high standards ofcompetence, ethics, and
confidentiality, and who tailor documentation to their client's needs. The performance of and solicitation
for such services by non-lawyers constitutes the unauthorized practice of law in violation of KRS
524.130.
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Estate planning marketing schemes are typically misrepresented as the cure for all family
and tax bills, are aimed at the elderly, and result in canned documents prepared by lawyer or nonlawyer employees of the financial services marketer who have little knowledge or and no loyalty to the
customer.
The employment of staff attorneys by marketers to prepare wills, trusts, and powers of attorney
does not avoid the unauthorized practice of law. Neither corporations nor their salaried employee
attorneys may offer legal services to the public.
Practicing attorneys who review documents prepared by non-lawyer employees of such
marketers, or who share fees with such marketers, aid the unauthorized practice of law in violation of
SCR 3. 130(5.5)(b) and 3.470.

2.

[2.931

Unauthorized Practice Highlighted

The Committee's comments in the last paragraph are deserving of emphasis. Lawyers may not participate, in any
way, in the unauthorized practice of law. The lawyer is required to maintain the integrity of the profession.

~

[2.941

Representation of Fiduciary Issues

A.

[2.951

The Client Is Dead, Who Does the Lawyer Represent?

1.

[2.961

The Lawyer's Choice - Plan Ahead

a.

[2.971

General Considerations

The estate planning lawyer who intends to help settle decedents' estates must recognize and deal with the
professional responsibility issues. That is, will the lawyer represent the estate, the trust, the fiduciary, the beneficiaries,
the decedent's business entity and/or the creditors? Who the lawyer represents is the issue, and in most cases it is best to
resolve this issue as soon as possible.

b.

[2.981

Kentucky Rules

The Rules ofProfessional Conduct impose high standards upon lawyers dealing with clients. However, the Rules
do not define "client" in the estate and trust administration practice. Many lawyers have struggled with the question ofclient
identification in the administration ofan estate or trust. In the process ofadministering an estate, lawyer-client relationships
can develop almost accidentally. For example, the beneficiaries often perceive the estate lawyer to be the lawyer for
the entire family. Care should be given at the outset of estate administration to avoid such an implied relationship with
beneficiaries to avoid many ofthese problems. The Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Committee explained its position on
these issues in order to give insight into the applicable Rules of Professional Conduct.

2.

[2.991

Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Opinion E-401

The KBA's Ethics Committee, in KBA E-401, answered many of the questions regarding estate administration
issues and provided necessary guidance to Kentucky's lawyers.

a.

[2.1001 Introduction
In this Opinion the Ethics Committee stated:
The Committee has been asked to address the applicability of the Kentucky Rules of Professional
Conduct with respect to a lawyer's representation of the fiduciary of a decedent's estate or trust, and
the lawyer's responsibilities to the beneficiaries of estates and trusts. In order to provide the requested
advice, explain the Committee's position on these issues, and to give insight into the applicable Rules of
Professional Conduct, the following questions are presented for response and discussion.

b.

(2.1011 Short Issues and Answers
The questions presented for examination and the short answers were as follows:
Question 1: Does a lawyer's representation of a fiduciary of a decedent's estate or trust expand or limit
the lawyer's obligation to the fiduciary under the Rules of Professional Conduct?
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Answer: No.
Question 2: Does a lawyer's representation of a fiduciary of a decedent's trust or estate impose on the
lawyer obligations to the beneficiaries of the decedent's trust or estate that the lawyer would not have
toward third parties?
Answer: No.
Question 3: Is the lawyer's obligation to preserve client confidences under Rule 1.6 altered by the fact
that the client is a fiduciary?
Answer: No.
Question 4: May the lawyer for the fiduciary also represent the beneficiaries of the decedent's trust or
estate?
Answer: Qualified Yes.

c.

[2.1021 Discussion

A Kentucky lawyer who is serious about performing estate planning and estate and trust administration services
needs to study the Committee's Opinion in depth. However, for a brief overview the following comments are presented
for a quick study.
The examination ofthese issues must focus on Rule 1.7, Conflict of Interest: General Rule, and
the problems generated by a lawyer's multiple representation of clients.
Lawyer for Fiduciary. Under the majority view, a lawyer who represents a fiduciary ... stands
in a lawyer-client relationship with the fiduciary and not with respect to the fiduciary estate or the
beneficiaries....
Duties to Beneficiaries. The lawyer who represents a fiduciary generally is not usually
considered also to represent the beneficiaries. However, most courts have concluded that the lawyer
owes some duties to them. Some courts subject the lawyer to the duties because the beneficiaries are
characterized as the lawyer's "joint," "derivative" or "secondary" clients. Other courts do so because the
lawyer stands in a fiduciary relationship with respect to the fiduciary, who, in turn, owes fiduciary duties
to the beneficiaries. The duties, commonly called "fiduciary duties," arise largely because of the nature
ofthe representation and the relative positions ofthe lawyer, fiduciary, and beneficiaries. However, note
that the existence and nature of the duties may be affected by the nature and extent of the representation
that a lawyer provides to a fiduciary. Thus, a lawyer who represents a fiduciary individually regarding a
fiduciary estate may owe few, ifany, duties to the beneficiaries apart from the duties that the lawyer owes
to other nonclients.
Disclosures to Multiple Clients. Before, or within a reasonable time after, commencing the
representation, a lawyer who is consulted by multiple parties with related interests should discuss with
them the implications of a joint representation (or a separate representation if the lawyer believes that
mode of representation to be more appropriate and separate representation is permissible under the
applicable local rules). In particular, the prospective clients and the lawyer should discuss the extent to
which material information imparted by either client would be shared with the other and the possibility
that the lawyer would be required to withdraw if a conflict in their interests developed to the degree
that the lawyer could not effectively represent both of them. The information may be best understood
by the clients if it is discussed with them in person and also provided to them in written form, as in an
engagement letter or brochure.
Further, this Committee agrees with ABA Formal Opinion 94-380, and adopts the majority
view; that is, that a lawyer who represents a fiduciary does not also represent the beneficiaries. We reject
the view that a lawyer who represents a fiduciary also owes fiduciary obligations to the beneficiaries
that in some circumstances will override obligations otherwise owed by the lawyer to the fiduciary, such
as the obligation of confidentiality. We also reject the view that when a lawyer represents a fiduciary
in a trust or estate matter, the client is not the fiduciary, but is the trust estate. We adopt the following
comments made in the ABA's Formal Opinion: "When the fiduciary is the lawyer's client all of the
Model Rules prescribing a lawyer's duties to a client apply. The scope of the lawyer's representation is
defined by and limited by Model Rule 1.2. The lawyer must diligently represent the fiduciary, see Model
Rule 1.3, preserve in confidence communications between the lawyer and the fiduciary, see Model Rule
4.I(a). The fact that the fiduciary client has obligations toward the beneficiaries does not impose parallel
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obligations on the lawyer, or otherwise expand or supersede the lawyer's responsibilities under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct."
Based upon the instructive comments of the ACTEC Commentaries and the ABA Formal
Opinion, this Committee concludes with the following advice for Kentucky lawyers.
1.

In representing a fiduciary the lawyer's client relationship is with the fiduciary and not with the
trust or estate, nor with the beneficiaries of a trust or estate.

2.

The fact that a fiduciary has obligations to the beneficiaries ofthe trust or estate does not in itself
either expand or limit the lawyer's obligations to the fiduciary under the Rules of Professional
Conduct, nor impose on the lawyer obligations toward the beneficiaries that the lawyer would
not have toward other third parties.

3.

The lawyer's obligation to preserve client's confidences under Rule 1.6 is not altered by the
circumstance that the client is a fiduciary.

4.

A lawyer has a duty to advise multiple parties who are involved with a decedent's estate or trust
regarding the identity ofthe lawyer's client, and the lawyer's obligations to that client. A lawyer
should not imply that the lawyer represents the estate or trust or the beneficiaries ofthe estate or
trust because ofthe probability ofconfusion. Further, in order to avoid such confusion, a lawyer
should not use the term "lawyer for the estate" or the term "lawyer for the trust" on documents
or correspondence or in other dealings with the fiduciary or the beneficiaries.

5.

A lawyer may represent the fiduciary of a decedent's estate or a trust and the beneficiaries
of an estate or trust if the lawyer obtains the consent of the multiple clients, and explains the
limitations on the lawyer's actions in the event a conflict arises, and the consequences to the
clients if a conflict occurs. Further, a lawyer may obtain the consent of multiple clients only
after appropriate consultation with the multiple clients at the time ofthe commencement of the
representation.

B.

[2.1031 Lawyer & Fiduciary Obligations to Surviving Spouse

1.

[2.1041 Advising on Right to Take Against Deceased Spouse's Estate

The reader has already observed that a surviving spouse has rights to a portion oftheir deceased spouse's estate.
The big question is: Does anybody have an obligation to advise the surviving spouse of their right to take against their
deceased spouse's estate? While Kentucky has not formally addressed this issue, the Florida Bar's Ethics Committee has
addressed this question. Florida Bar Opinion 76-16 explains that not only does the fiduciary have an obligation to advise
the surviving spouse of the surviving spouse's rights to elect a marital share, but that if the fiduciary does not advise the
surviving spouse, then the fiduciary's lawyer has an obligation to do so, even if the fiduciary requests that the lawyer not
do so!

2.

[2.1051 Informing of Family Allowance, Exempt Property and Elective Share

Does the lawyer for the personal representative have the right to inform the surviving spouse of his or her
entitlement to family allowance, exempt property, or right to claim an elective share? Yes.
The purpose ofthe Florida Probate Code is to provide a procedure to pay a decedent's debts and
taxes and transfer and distribute the remaining assets as efficiently and inexpensively as possible to those
entitled to them under the will or by intestacy. It is normal in most instances that the persons entitled to
those assets will look to the personal representative or the lawyer for the estate to find out what they may
expect to receive from the estate.
We believe that the lawyer for the personal representative has the right to provide those persons
with that information and to provide the surviving spouse with information about his or her rights....
This is to be distinguished from counseling or giving legal advice.
The surviving spouse frequently is the personal representative. In claiming an elective share, a
family allowance or exempt property, we believe the surviving spouse is exercising a right provided by
statute and is not acting in conflict with his or her duties as personal representative of the estate. ... We
believe that in most instances the lawyer for the personal representative prepares the papers by which the
surviving spouse elects against the will or claims statutory entitlements. We see no ethical problem with
this, provided there is no legal objection to claiming an elective share or entitlements.
If the surviving spouse claims one or more ofthe rights provided by statute, the result may be
less for other beneficiaries. But· the fact that claiming an elective share or statutory entitlements may
alter the manner in which the estate is distributed does not, in the Committee:SO opinion, create a conflict
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of interest that requires the personal representative or his lawyer to refuse to provide any information
about the existence ofthose rights and, in effect, to treat the surviving spouse as an adverse party.

Such a result could force the surviving spouse to seek independent legal advice. We do not
believe that the Probate Code intended to create a proliferation of lawyers; its purpose was just the
opposite.
The Committee recognizes that there may be situations where it is apparent from the outset
that there will be a dispute between a personal representative and a surviving spouse - a will contest,
for example. In such situations, the lawyer for the personal representative should advise the surviving
spouse that an actual or potential conflict of interest exists and suggest that he or she obtain independent
legal advice.
Even where there is an actual or potential conflict of interest between personal representative
and surviving spouse, we do not think the lawyer for the personal representative should refuse to furnish
information about the surviving spouse's legal rights under the Florida Probate Code.

3.

[2.1061 Lawyer's Specific Obligation to Advise
Is the lawyer obligated to inform the surviving spouse of such rights?
The lawyer is not necessarily required to inform the surviving spouse of such rights, but the
Committee believes that it would be advisable to do so in most instances.
When the personal representative is someone other than the surviving spouse, the surviving
spouse may be looking to the lawyer for the personal representative for information even though there is
no attorney-client relationship between them. Ifthe lawyer knows this, we believe he may have a duty to
inform the surviving spouse ofthese statutory rights. Ifthe surviving spouse has retained a lawyer, there
is probably no need to. When the surviving spouse is the personal representative, we believe the lawyer
should advise the surviving spouse of these rights.

4.

[2.1071 Obligations Where Personal Representative Objects to Advice to Surviving Spouse

Assuming that the personal representative is someone other than the surviving spouse, are the rights or obligations
of the lawyer different if the personal representative objects to the lawyer's informing the surviving spouse of her
entitlement? No.
The right to claim an elective share, or family allowance or exempt property are, as stated
above, rights provided by statute.
The personal representative has the duty to administer the estate according to law. He has no
duty to try to prevent the exercise of those rights.

5.

[2.1081 Obligations Where Lawyer Previously Represented Decedent and Spouse

Assuming that the personal representative is someone other than the surviving spouse, would the answer be
different if the lawyer had represented the decedent and spouse for a number of years? No.
The fact that the lawyer previously represented the decedent and spouse does not automatically
create a duty to inform the surviving spouse of his or her statutory rights.
But, as stated above, the lawyer for the personal representative may have a duty, as distinguished
from a right, to inform a surviving spouse of certain statutory rights if the lawyer has represented the
decedent and spouse previously and knows the surviving spouse is looking to him for information.

6.

[2.1091 Obligations Where Personal Representative's Objection to Advice to Surviving Spouse is Based on
Adverse Interest

Assuming that the personal representative is someone other than the surviving spouse, would the answer be
different if the personal representative's opposition to the spouse claiming an elective share or statutory entitlements is
based upon the personal representative's desire to increase his own distributive share? No.
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A personal representative
immaterial.

C.

IS

a fiduciary, and his private desires vis-a-vis the estate are

[2.1101 Designation ofAttorney As Fiduciary

The American Bar Association has addressed the issues involved in designating the drafting attorney as the
attorney for the fiduciary. In ABA Formal Opinion 02-426, May 31, 2002, the ABA's Ethics Committee addressed the
following specific issues: (1) responding to a client's request to serve as a fiduciary for estate planning document that the
lawyer is preparing for the client; (2) while serving as fiduciary, a lawyer wishes to appoint himself or a member ofhis firm
to represent him in his capacity as fiduciary; or (3) while serving as fiduciary, the lawyer or his firm is asked to represent
either a beneficiary or a creditor of the estate or trust.

1.

[2.1111

Client's Designation of Lawyer as Fiduciary

With respect to the client's designation of the lawyer as a fiduciary, the ABA Formal Opinion states:
One of a lawyer's important responsibilities in providing estate planning for his client is to help
her select an appropriate personal representative to administer her estate and a trustee to manage any
trust established by the will.... This discussion should cover information reasonably adequate to permit
the client to understand the tasks to be performed by the fiduciary; the fiduciary's desired skills; the kinds
ofindividuals or entities likely to serve most effectively, such as professionals, corporate fiduciaries, and
family members; and the benefits and detriments ofusing each, including relative costs.
When exploring the options with his client, the lawyer may disclose his own availability to
serve as a fiduciary. The lawyer must not, however, allow his potential self-interest to interfere with
his exercise of independent professional judgment in recommending to the client the best choices
for fiduciaries. When there is a significant risk that the lawyer's independent professional judgment
in advising the client in the selection of a fiduciary will be materially limited because of the potential
amount of the fiduciary compensation or other factors, the lawyer must obtain the client's informed
consent and confirm it in writing.

2.

[2.1121

Lawyer or Lawyer's Firm Representing Lawyer as Fiduciary

With respect to the lawyer or lawyer's firm representing the lawyer as a fiduciary, the ABA Formal Opinion
states:
A lawyer acting as personal representative of an estate or as trustee of a trust frequently will
wish to appoint himself or his law firm as counsel to perform legal work that arises in administering the
estate or trust. By law in most jurisdictions, the lawyer so appointed represents only himself as fiduciary
and not the trust or estate as an entity or its beneficiaries, absent agreement otherwise. For purposes of
this opinion, we therefore assume that the lawyer has undertaken to represent only the fiduciary.
In that situation, the Model Rules do not prohibit the fiduciary from appointing himself or
his firm as counsel to perform legal work during the administration of the estate or trust because the
dual roles do not involve a conflict of interest. The obligations of the lawyer or his firm as counsel
to the fiduciary do not differ materially from the obligations of the lawyer as fiduciary. The principal
responsibility ofthe lawyer for a fiduciary is to give advice to assist the fiduciary in properly performing
his fiduciary duties. The lawyer for a personal representative or trustee may owe a limited duty of care to
the legatees and creditors of the estate or to the beneficiaries of the trust for which the fiduciary serves.
This duty, however, is no greater than the duty that the personal representative or trustee himself owes
the beneficiaries of the estate or trust.

3.

[2.1131

Conflicts of Fiduciary for Estate or Trust in Representing Interested Parties

With respect to conflicts of interests between acting as a fiduciary for an estate or trust and representing interested
parties, the ABA Formal Opinion states:
When a lawyer serves as a fiduciary and concurrently represents a beneficiary or creditor of
the estate or trust, he must, in accordance with Rule 1.7, resolve any conflicts of interest that may arise.
For example, were a lawyer serving as a fiduciary to recognize, while also attempting to represent a
beneficiary or creditor in a claim against the estate, that he would be obligated as fiduciary to oppose
the beneficiary or creditor's claim, his representation thereby would be materially limited under Rule
1.7(a). Moreover, the representation ofthe beneficiary or creditor would not be permissible even with the
consent ofthe client, because it would be unreasonable for the lawyer to conclude that he could provide
competent and diligent representation when opposing the interests of an estate or trust for which he is a
fiduciary.
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Even though it would be permissible under the Model Rules for the fiduciary to represent
one of several beneficiaries in unrelated matters with consent of the client in some circumstances, the
lawyer nevertheless should not do so. For example, if the lawyer serves as sole trustee of a trust with
discretionary power to distribute principal or income unequally among the beneficiaries, his decision to
distribute principal to only one beneficiary excluding the others might well be questioned.

VI.

[2.114]

The Disabled Client

A.

[2.115] A Review of the Rule

1.

[2.116]

Rule 1.14. Client Under a Disability

(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation
is impaired, whether because of [minority] age, mental disability or for some other reason, the
lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the
client.
(b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action with respect to a
client, only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's
own interest.

2.

[2.1171

Comment

The more pertinent Comments for the estate planning lawyer are as follows:
[1] The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly
advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is
a minor or suffers from a mental disorder or disability, however, maintaining the ordinary clientlawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. In particular, an incapacitated person may
have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client lacking legal competence
often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting
the client's own well-being. Furthermore, to an increasing extent the law recognizes intermediate
degrees of competence. For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly
those often or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings
concerning their custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons of advanced age can be quite
capable of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection concerning
major transactions.
[2] The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the client
with attention and respect. If the person has no guardian or legal representative, the lawyer often
must act as de/acto guardian. Even ifthe person does have a legal representative, the lawyer should
as far as possible accord the represented person the status of client, particularly in maintaining
communication.
[3] If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily
look to the representative for decisions on behalf ofthe client. If a legal representative has not been
appointed, the lawyer should see to such an appointment where it would serve the client's best
interests. Thus, ifa disabled client has substantial property that should be sold for the client's benefit,
effective completion of the transaction ordinarily requires appointment of a legal representative. In
many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be expensive or traumatic
for the client. Evaluation ofthese considerations is a matter ofprofessional judgment on the lawyer's
part.

B. [2.118]

Pro-active Measures to Deal With a Future - Potential Disability

It is appropriate for the estate planning lawyer to consult with her client about problems that may result from a
disability and the ways a client may protect himself. At a minimum, it is appropriate for the lawyer to recommend devices
to avoid the necessity of a guardianship or similar type of proceeding. Thus, the lawyer should advise their client, in a
general way about the advantages and disadvantages of durable powers of attorney, directives to physicians or living wills,
health care proxies, and revocable trusts. A lawyer may properly suggest that their client consider executing a letter or
other document that would authorize the lawyer to communicate to designated parties (e.g., family members, health care
providers, a court) concerns that the lawyer might have regarding the client's capacity. In addition, a lawyer may properly
suggest that a durable power of attorney include authorization for the attorney-in-fact to waive on behalf ofthe client, the
lawyer-client and physician-patient duties of confidentiality in specified types of circumstances.
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C.

r2.119] Lawyer Power to Seek Appointment of Guardian

When the lawyer's client has suffered a disability or the lawyer reasonably believes that their client has suffered
a disability or is unable to act on his or her own, the estate planning lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or
take other protective action with respect to the client's person and property. The lawyer may then "seek guidance from an
appropriate diagnostician." There is reason to believe that the lawyer for a disabled client may have implied authority to
make disclosures and take actions that the lawyer reasonably believes are in accordance with the client's wishes, clearly
stated during his or her competency. If the client's wishes were not clearly expressed, then it is possible that the lawyer
may still be impliedly authorized to make disclosures and take such actions as the lawyer reasonably believes are in the
client's best interests. It is not improper for the lawyer to take actions on behalf of an apparently disabled client that the
lawyer reasonably believes are in the best interests of the client. While there are no Kentucky opinions on the subject, the
American Bar Association, in ABA Informal Opinion 89-1530 (1989), stated the following:
The Committee concludes that the disclosure by the lawyer of information relating to the representation
to the extent necessary to serve the best interests of the client reasonably believed to be disabled is
impliedly authorized within the meaning of Model Rule 1.6. Thus, the inquirer may consult a physician
concerning the suspected disability.
(Emphasis added).

D.

r2.120] Disabled Client's Testamentary Capacity

If the ''testamentary capacity" of a client is uncertain, the lawyer should exercise caution in assisting the client
to modify his or her estate plan. The lawyer generally should not prepare a will for a client who the lawyer reasonably
believes lacks the requisite capacity. On the other hand, because of the importance of testamentary freedom, the lawyer
may properly assist clients whose testamentary capacity appears to be borderline. In any such case the lawyer should
take steps to preserve evidence regarding the client's testamentary capacity. It is most difficult for a lawyer to determine
a client's testamentary capacity, but it is appropriate for the lawyer to consider having conversations with the client's
physician, care givers, adult children and others who may be able to opine on the client's condition. The lawyer should
take into consideration the client's ability to understand the extent of their assets, their family members, etc. In difficult
cases, the lawyer may prefer to consider discussing the client's problem with a member ofthe Kentucky Bar Association's
Ethics Hotline.

1.

r2.121] Florida Bar v. Betts

In Florida Bar v. Betts, 530 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1988), an attorney was publicly reprimanded for his actions in
preparing two codicils to the will of his client at a time when the client was in a rapidly deteriorating physical and mental
state. In the first codicil the testator removed his daughter and son-in-law as beneficiaries. The lawyer spoke with his client
several times in an effort to persuade him to reinstate his daughter as a beneficiary. Subsequently, the lawyer prepared a
second codicil to reach this result. However, when the codicil was presented to the testator, he was in a comatose state. The
lawyer did not read the second codicil to the testator, the testator made no verbal response when the lawyer presented the
codicil to him, and the lawyer had the codicil executed by an X that the lawyer marked on the document with a pen he had
placed and guided in the testator's hand. The court observed:
Improperly coercing an apparently incompetent client into executing a codicil raises serious questions
both of ethical and legal impropriety, and could potentially result in damage to the client or third-parties.
It is undisputed that [Lawyer] did not benefit by his action and was merely acting out of his belief that
the client's family should not be disinherited. Nevertheless, a lawyer's responsibility is to execute his
client's wishes, not his own.

Id at 929.

2.

r2.122] Vienes v. Weiskopf

In Vignes v. Weiskopf, 42 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1949), the Florida Supreme Court held that it was proper for a lawyer to
prepare and supervise the execution of a codicil for a client who was "incurably ill and was in such pain that a great deal
of medication to relieve him of his suffering was being administered, such as phenobarbital, novatrine, demerol, cobra
venom, and so forth." In addition, the court made the following statements.
We are convinced that the lawyer should have complied as nearly as he could with the testator's request,
should have exposed the true situation to the court, which he did, and should have then left the matter to
that tribunal to decide whether in view of all facts surrounding the execution of the codicil it should be
admitted to probate.
Had the attorney arrogated to himself the power and responsibility of determining the capacity of the
testator, decided he was incapacitated, and departed, he would indeed have been subjected to severe
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criticism when, after the testator's death, it was discovered that because of his presumptuousness the
last-minute effort of a dying man to change his will had been thwarted.

Id at 86.

3.

[2.123] San Diego Ethics Opinion 1990-3 (1990)

In San Diego Ethics Opinion 1990-3 (1990), a portion ofthis opinion dealt with the capacity of a client where the
Committee opined that "a lawyer must be satisfied that the client is competent to make a will and is not acting as a result
of fraud or undue influence." The opinion suggests that once an issue of capacity is raised in the attorney's mind it must
be resolved. "The attorney should schedule an extended interview with the client without any interested parties present
and keep a detailed and complete record ofthe interview. Ifthe lawyer is not satisfied that the client has sufficient capacity
and is free of undue influence and fraud, no will should be prepared. The attorney may simply decline to act and pennit the
client to seek other counselor may recommend the immediate initiation of a conservatorship."

E.

[2.1241 Lawyer Retained by Guardian or Conservator for Disabled Person

The lawyer who is retained by a fiduciary for a disabled person, including a guardian, conservator, or attorneyin-fact, stands in a lawyer-client relationship with respect to the fiduciary. A lawyer who is retained by a fiduciary for a
disabled person, but who did not previously represent the disabled person, represents only the fiduciary. Nevertheless,
in such a case the lawyer for the fiduciary owes some duties to the disabled person. This is approach mentioned in the
Comments: "Ifthe lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward and is aware ofthe guardian acting adversely to
the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Rule 1.2(d)."

1.

[2.1251 In re Makarewicz

In In re Makarewicz, 516 N.W.2d 90 (Mich. Ct. App, 1994), the court held that the lawyer who was hired by a
minor's conservator on a contingent fee basis to pursue the minor's claim did not, after discharge by the conservator, have
standing to petition the court to replace the conservator and require acceptance ofsettlement. In this case the judge directed
the clerk ofthe court to forward a copy ofthe decision to Michigan's Attorney Grievance Committee. The court's opinion
endorses the approach taken in the Comment to Rule 1.14:
Under MRPC 1.14(b), a lawyer may take protective action with respect to a client only when the lawyer
reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interests. The Comment
accompanying MRPC 1.14 suggests that where a legal representative has already been appointed for
the client, the lawyer ordinarily should look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client.
However, if the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware that the guardian
is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the
guardian's misconduct.
Makarewicz, 516 N.W.2d at 91-92.

2.

[2.126] In re Fraser

In In re Fraser, 523 P.2d 921 (Wash. 1974), the court came to a somewhat different conclusion. In this case the
court held that the lawyer for a guardian should not "be faulted for refusing to abandon the ward at the guardian's request."
Id at 928. The court stated:
[T]he attorney owes a duty to the ward, as well as to the guardian. Since the guardian in this case
manifested a greater interest in herself than in serving the interest of the ward, it would have been
hazardous to the interests of the ward to turn the assets of her small estate over to the guardian.

Id.

F.

[2.1271 Representation of Client Who Is Now Disabled

A lawyer who represented a now disabled person as a client prior to the appointment of a fiduciary may be
considered to continue to represent the disabled person. Although incapacity may prevent a disabled person from entering
into a contract or other legal relationship, the lawyer who represented the disabled person prior to incapacity may
appropriately continue to meet with and counsel him or her. Whether the disabled person is characterized as a client or a
fonner client, the lawyer for the fiduciary owes some continuing duties to him or her. Further, if the lawyer believes that
the best interests ofthe disabled person requires representation by an independent party, the lawyer may suggest to family
members or to an appropriate tribunal that a guardian ad litem or another lawyer be appointed for the disabled person.
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1.

r2.128]

ABA Formal Opinion 96-404 (1996)

In ABA Formal Opinion 96-404 (1996), the ABA's Ethics Committee opined that "because the relationship of
client and lawyer is one ofprincipal and agent, principles ofagency law might operate to suspend or terminate the lawyer's
authority to act when a client becomes incompetent ..." The opinion goes on to observe that the lawyer may consult with
the client's family, and may· petition a court for the appointment of a guardian, but the lawyer may not represent a third
party petitioning for appointment. However, it is not impermissible for the lawyer to support the appointment of a guardian
who the lawyer expects will retain the lawyer as counsel.

2.

r2.1291 Alabama Opinion 87-137 (1987)

In Alabama Opinion 87-137 (1987), Alabama's Ethics Committee opined that a lawyer whose client has become
incompetent may file a petition for appointment of a guardian. A lawyer is "required to do so" if the lawyer believes it is
in the client's best interests.

3.

r2.1301 Alabama Opinion 90-12 (1990)

In Alabama Opinion 90-12 (1990), Alabama's Ethics Committee opined that a lawyer who believes that a client
lacks capacity to act in the client's own interests may divulge confidential information to an independent diagnostician
without the consent of the client.

4.

[2.1311 California Formal Opinion 1989-112 (1989)

In California Formal Opinion 1989-112 (1989), California's Ethics Committee opined that without the consent of
the client, a lawyer may not initiate conservatorship proceedings on the client's behalf although the lawyer has concluded
it is in the best interests of the client. Initiation of the proceeding would breach confidences of the client and constitute a
conflict of interest.

5.

r2.1321 Los Angeles Opinion 450 (1988)

In Los Angeles Opinion 450 (1988), the Ethics Committee opined that initiating a conservatorship proceeding for
a present or former client without the client's authorization involves an impermissible conflict of interest.

6.

[2.1331 Oregon Opinion 1991-41 (1991)

In Oregon Opinion 1991-41 (1991), the Ethics Committee opined that a lawyer who has represented client for
many years and has begun to observe extraordinary behavior that is contrary to the client's best interests, may take action
on the client's behalf This opinion states that,
[a]s the language ofDR 7-10 1(C) makes clear, an attorney in such a situation must reasonably be satisfied
that there is a need for protective action and must then take the least restrictive form of action sufficient
to address the situation. If, for example, client is an elderly individual and [the] attorney expects to be
able to end the inappropriate conduct simply by talking to [the] client's spouse or child, a more extreme
course of action such as seeking the appointment of a guardian would be inappropriate.

VII.

[2.1341 Continuing Representation Issues

A.

[2.1351 Retention ofYour Client's Estate Planning Documents

1.

r2.1361 New York State Bar Association Opinion 724

For a favorable view of the estate planner's retention of their client's estate planning documents, a review of the
New York State Bar Association Ethics Opinion 724, November 30, 1999, is helpful.

a.

[2.137] Question and Answer
The Committee proposed the following question and then answered it in the negative.
If a lawyer keeps custody of a client's original will, absent agreement, does the lawyer have
an obligation to learn of the client's death and, upon the client's death, to file the original will with an
appropriate court?

A-30

b.

[2.1381

Comments of Committee

The Ethics Committee Opinion included the following important comments.

c.

1.

Whether the lawyer will maintain a client's will and, if so, what additional obligations the lawyer
will assume, are primarily matters to be agreed upon by the lawyer and client after consultation.
Contractual obligations may arise if there are express or implied agreements or understandings
between the client and the lawyer in regard to the lawyer's duties and responsibilities in relation to
the will. Thus, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer will undertake the responsibility to
learn of the client's death (e.g., by reading death notices). They may also agree that, upon learning
of the client's death, the lawyer will file the will with the appropriate court. Ordinarily, a lawyer
would be obligated to carry out such contractual undertakings, as would the lawyer's firm in the
event the lawyer was unable to carry out the undertaking personally. Cj N.Y. County 709 (1995).
Whether or not a lawyer undertakes a contractual obligation of this nature in a particular situation
raises questions of fact and law about which the Committee cannot provide guidance, since our role
is limited to interpreting the Code of Professional Responsibility.

2.

When the lawyer agrees to retain the client's will, the lawyer obviously may not destroy it, but must
keep custody of it until the client requests it or the lawyer is legally obligated to produce it. The
lawyer should discuss with the client what, if any, additional obligations the lawyer will assume. At
least absent agreement to the contrary, there will ordinarily be an implied understanding that after
the client's death, if the lawyer has maintained the original will and, as far as the lawyer knows,
there is no later valid one, the lawyer must take steps to ensure that the executor and/or beneficiaries
are aware ofthe will's existence. Thus, as we have previously observed, where a client has requested
his lawyer to retain the original will for safekeeping, and the lawyer later learns ofthe client's death
... it would appear that the lawyer has an ethical obligation to carry out his client's wishes, and
quite possibly a legal obligation ... to notify the executor or the beneficiaries under the will or any
other person that may propound the will ... that the lawyer has it in his possession. N.Y. State 521
(1980).

3.

Whether the lawyer who safeguards the client's will has additional obligations-e.g., whether the
lawyer must take steps to learn of the testator's death, or whether the lawyer must file the will with
the court upon the testator's death-will be determined in the first instance not by the Code, but by
the express or implied understanding between the lawyer and client at the time the lawyer agreed
to safeguard the will or by any subsequent understanding. Therefore, the lawyer should make every
effort to clarify precisely what the lawyer will and will not do in the event the lawyer maintains the
original will. The lawyer has no ethical obligation to agree to read death notices, see Massachusetts
Op. 76-7 (a lawyer "need not watch the obituary columns"), or to agree to file the original will
with the court; the client may have good reason not to ask the lawyer to assume such obligations;
and the lawyer generally has no ethical obligation later to undertake responsibilities vis-a-vis the
original will in addition to those on which the lawyer and client agreed and those imposed by law.
By clarifying the extent and limits of the lawyer's obligations, the lawyer will enable the client to
make an informed decision whether the lawyer should safeguard the will and, if so, what additional
steps the client should take (e.g., whether to tell others, such as the executor or beneficiaries, where
the will is to be found). Doing so will also reduce the risk that the lawyer will later fail to undertake
a responsibility that, from the testator's perspective, the lawyer was obligated to undertake.

[2.1391

Author's Comments

Experienced estate planning lawyers believe that the retention of their client's estate planning documents can be
helpful to a client and excellent client relations for the lawyer. Based upon the recommendations of the New York Bar,
the estate planning lawyer should provide the client with a written acknowledgment that the lawyer holds the documents
subject to the client's instructions. Further, the lawyer should assure the safety and proper handling of the documents by
making appropriate arrangements for their handling in the event the lawyer becomes disabled or dies.

2.

[2.1401

Alternate View

Notwithstanding the favorable view and logical common practice, there is a contrary view of the practice. One
commentator wrote a law review article criticizing the practice of a lawyer's retention of the client's original documents
because, following the client's death, the lawyer who has custody of the client's original documents may have an unfair
advantage in the competition to represent the client's personal representative. See Gerald P. Johnston, An Ethical Analysis
ofCommon Estate Planning Practices - Is Good Business Bad Ethics? 45 Ohio St. L. J. 57 (1984).

B.

[2.1411 Follow-Up Responsibilities

1.

[2.1421

Dormant Representation

After the client has signed the estate planning documents and the completion of related matters, such as changes
in beneficiary designations, transfer of assets and the like, it is generally considered that the estate planner's work becomes
dormant pending reactivation by the client. At some point in time the lawyer client relationship is considered terminated.
In Heathcoat v. Santa Fe International Corp., 532 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Ark. 1982), the court held that the lawyer's
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representation of an estate planning client was terminated with the passage of 15 years during which the law firm had not
been consulted.

2.

[2.143] Client Newsletters

As a service to a lawyer's clients, the estate planning lawyer may send articles and newsletters that the lawyer
believes may be of interest to those persons for whom the lawyer has performed estate planning services. However, such·
practice does not enlarge or create a further obligation on the lawyer to notify clients about changes in the law and how
such changes may affect the client's estate plan.

3.

[2.144] Extent of Continuing Duty to Client

a.

[2.145] Brandlin v. Belcher

In Brandlin v. Belcher, 67 Cal. App. 3d 977, 134 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). The client's trust officer
conferred with the client's lawyer and discussed with the client's lawyer amending the client's estate planning documents
to add the client's other children as beneficiaries. The lawyer is reputed to have said that he would have to hear from the
client directly. The client died without having amended her trust. The beneficiaries sued the lawyer and the lawyer was
granted a summary judgment. The court stated: "[Lawyer] fully discharged whatever duty his prior representation imposed
by his request through the intermediary that the client communicate with him personally. [Lawyer's] conduct satisfied
rather than violated his duty as a lawyer." 134 Cal. Rptr. at 3.

b.

[2.146] Staneland v. Brock

In Stangland v. Brock, 747 P.2d 464 (Wash. 1987), the court opined that after a will is prepared and executed,
''the attorney has no continuing obligation to monitor the testator's management of his property to ensure that the scheme
originally established in the will is maintained."

c.

[2.147] Lama Boldine Co. v. Shearman & Sterline

In Lama Holding Co. v. Shearman & Sterling, 758 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y 1991) the court held that the lawyer
owes a duty of care, and may be liable to an otherwise former client if the lawyer had advised the client that the lawyer
would inform the client of future significant tax law changes.

C.

[2.1481 Duties To Deceased Client

1.

[2.1491 ACTEC Commentaries

The ACTEC Commentaries on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (3d ed. 1999) include the following
comments:
In general, the lawyer's duty ofconfidentiality continues after the death ofa client. Accordingly,
a lawyer ordinarily should not disclose confidential information following a client's death. However,
if consent is given by the client spersonal representative, or if the decedent had expressly or impliedly
authorized disclosure, the lawyer who represented the deceased client may provide an interestedparty,
including a potentia/litigant, with information regarding a deceased client s dispositive instruments and
intent, including prior instruments and communications relevant thereto. A lawyer may be impliedly
authorized to make appropriate disclosure of client confidential information that would promote
the client s estate plan, forestall litigation, preserve assets, and further family understanding of the
decedent s intention. Disclosures should ordinarily be limited to information that the lawyer would be
required to reveal as a witness.

Id at 124-25 (emphasis added).

2.

[2.1501 Swidler & Berlin v. U.S.

In Swidler & Berlin v. U.S., 524 U.S. 399,118 S. Ct. 2081,141 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1998), the U.S. Supreme Court
opined that the general rule with respect to confidential communications is that such communications are privileged during
a testator's lifetime and, also, after the testator's death, unless sought to be disclosed in litigation between the testator's
heirs. The Court also stated that the testamentary disclosure was permissible because the privilege, which normally
protects the client's interest, could be impliedly waived in order to fulfill the client's testamentary intent.

3.

[2.1511 In re Estate of Hamilton v. Morris

The Tennessee Court ofAppeals confirmed the application ofthe Swidier decision in a case pertaining to matters
when a disclosure would further the client's intent. In re Estate of Hamilton v. Morris, 67 S.W.3d 786 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2001).

A-32

4.

[2.1521 Ethics Opinions
The concept of continuing confidentiality has been confirmed in various ethics opinions, as explained below.

a.

[2.1531 Iowa Ethics Opinion 91-24 (1991)

In Iowa Ethics Opinion 91-24 (1991), the Committee opined that an original unsigned and unexecuted will ofa
deceased client constituted a privileged lawyer-client communication which the lawyer could not disclose in the absence of
a court order issued pursuant to evidence satisfactory to the court and directing such disclosure. The Committee stated its
view that this opinion was not inconsistent with Iowa Formal Opinion 88-11 (December 1988) wherein the attorney/client
communications privilege was held not to apply in certain litigation after a client's death between parties all ofwhom claim
under the client.

b.

[2.1541 Nassau County (New York) Opinion 89-26 (1989)

Nassau County (New York) Opinion 89-26 (1989), stated that a lawyer who drafted a prior will for a client, now
deceased, may not disclose the contents of the will except as required by law in an action involving the probate, validity,
or construction of a will.

c.

[2.1551 Philadelphia Bar Opinion 91-4 (1991)

Philadelphia Bar Opinion 91-4 (1991), advises that a lawyer may not disclose to a client's children the contents
of a deceased client's prior will: "The earlier will constitutes confidential information relating to your representation ofthe
testator, and your duty not to reveal its contents continues even after your client's death."

d.

[2.1561 Additional Reference

For further information, the estate planning lawyer may want to consider a law review article - Simon J. Frankel,
The Attorney-Client Privilege After the Death ofthe Client, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 45 (1992).

VIII.

[2.1571 Important Miscellaneous Points

A.

[2.1581 Introduction

In any outline of materials it is impossible to address in detail every possible point of concern for the estate
planning lawyer. Therefore, the following presentation of quick one pointers for the estate planning lawyer is presented
for alert status.

B.

[2.159] Unique Forms of Confidentiality Agreements

From time to time the estate planning lawyer will be confronted with materials from a financial planner, a wealth
manager or an accounting firm suggesting that they have a secret elixir for the lawyer's client and that they are prepared to
release the ingredients and the secret methodology only if the lawyer agrees to maintain the potion as "secret" and signs a
confidentiality agreement.
In Illinois State Bar Opinion No. 00-01, issued in October 2000, the Illinois Ethics Committee opined that, "A
conflict ofinterest would be created between Lawyer's representation ofone client and other similar clients ifLawyer were
to sign a confidentiality agreement required by an accounting firm that would prohibit Lawyer from divulging a package
of ideas developed by the accounting firm that would reduce the client's tax obligations. For purposes of the Illinois Rules
of Professional Conduct, a lawyer cannot agree to keep confidential interpretations ofthe law."

C.

[2.1601 Duty to Obtain Information Regarding Client's Assets & Heirs

The estate planning lawyer should be able to rely upon the information provided by the client unless there are
clear circumstances indicating that the information is not complete or needs to be verified. The lawyer should ask the client
to check and provide clarification or, in unique circumstances, conduct their own investigation to ensure an understanding
of the facts.
In Leak-Gilbert v. Fahle, 2002 WL 1753198 (Okla.), the Oklahoma Supreme Court, posed the following question:
"[W]hether, in the absence of a specific request by the client, an attorney owes a duty to the client or to the beneficiaries
named in the client's will to conduct an investigation into the client's heirs independent of, or in addition to, the information
provided by the client?" The court held: "[W]hen an attorney is retained to prepare a will, the attorney's duty to prepare
the will according to the testator's wishes does not ordinarily include an investigation of a client's heirs independent of, or
in addition to, the information provided by the client, unless the client requests such an investigation."
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D.

[2.161] Identity of Lawyer's Client - Parent or Child

From time to time the estate planning lawyer is asked to provide advice or to assist a relative of their client.
A recent opinion of the American Bar Association's Ethics Committee, ABA Formal Opinion 02-428, August 9, 2002,
addressed many ofthe issues. This new Opinion addressed the issues that arise when a lawyer is asked to prepare a will for
the client's family relative when the client will be a beneficiary of the will. The client advises her lawyer that she will pay
any fees not paid by the relative. The opinion described the measures a lawyer should employ to assure compliance with
the Rules. The opinion made the following points:
A lawyer must "exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice."
A lawyer must not allow the client, who will pay the lawyer's fees, to interfere with the lawyer's
independent professional judgment that is owed to the client's relative. In addition, the lawyer needs
to obtain the family member's informed consent to the arrangement.
If the client does not pay the lawyer's fees, the lawyer still needs to ensure that the client does not
interfere with the lawyer's professional responsibilities to the client's relative. However, it is not
necessary for the lawyer to obtain the relative's informed consent.
When a lawyer is asked to represent the client's relative, the lawyer must explain the lawyer's
responsibility to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client's relative, and
to protect the relative's confidences.
The lawyer may not reveal information without either client's informed consent. The lawyer must
obtain clear guidance whether any information relating to the representation ofthe other client may
be revealed to either uncle or used in connection with representing such clients.

IX.

[2.1621 Conclusion

In conclusion, the reader is advised that these materials are a first edition model and were prepared during
2002. Obviously, the materials have been limited to those issues that the author considered most important at the time
of preparation. These materials did not include a discussion of the American Bar Association's Ethics 2000 Report for
recommended changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Further, at the time of preparation of these materials
the Kentucky Bar Association had not yet formed a committee to consider revisions to Kentucky's edition of the Model
Rules. It is probable that within a few years Kentucky's Rules will be revised. Finally, over the next five to ten years
it is probable that there will be emerging issues that will lead to a better understanding of the lawyer's professional
responsibilities when dealing with the complex issues of family life. Some of the future issues for examination should
include a discussion of estate planning for same sex relationships, spouse abuse, child abuse, drug and alcohol abuse, and
violence in the home. Hopefully, in the next edition the future author will be able to provide a further clarification of the
lawyer's professional responsibilities in addressing these issues of family life. Notwithstanding the obvious limitations, it
is hoped that the reader has found these materials of some value and a good beginning exercise. Please return for the next
edition and observe the vast improvements.
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I.

[3.1]

Introduction

It is not unusual for a phone call to be the first contact a lawyer has with a potential estate planning client. The
client may inquire about the fee to prepare a simple will, not knowing what may be appropriate for his or her situation.
Unfortunately, many people unrealistically believe that their estate can be planned adequately with nothing more than a
simple will. They are unaware of the extent and value of their assets and the procedures required to settle an estate. To
determine what is appropriate for the client, the lawyer should meet with the client. This chapter discusses the initial
conference with the client and the use of a questionnaire to help collect information needed to develop an estate plan.

A.

[3.2]

Purpose

The purpose of an estate plan is unique to each client. Most often an estate planning client has two goals- to
transfer assets to the client's beneficiaries in an appropriate manner and to pay the least amount of taxes possible. Many
clients also strive to have their estate settled with the least amount of administrative effort and cost. Other clients may be
more concerned with providing for a family member with special needs or setting up an incentive based trust. Every client
is different, and the goals of each client's estate plan must be identified.

B.

[3.31

Role of the Lawyer

The role of the lawyer in estate planning is to help the client accomplish the client's estate planning objectives.
The lawyer must have a thorough knowledge of the applicable laws of real and personal property, probate, succession,
and gift and estate taxes. The lawyer must also be able to communicate with the client, educate the client as to the estate
planning tenninology, and explain the many options which may be available to the client.
The ability to communicate with the client is very important. The lawyer should avoid talking over the client's
head; instead, the lawyer should try to observe the client and determine if the client understands what is being discussed.
Ask the client if he or she understands, and encourage the client to ask questions. If the lawyer establishes good, open
communication with the client, then the ultimate estate plan is more likely to achieve the client's objectives.

c.

[3.41

Gathering Information

Before the lawyer can determine what the client wants or needs, the lawyer must first gather from the client
information about the objectives the client hopes to achieve, the· family and intended beneficiaries of the client, and the
assets owned by the client. The lawyer should analyze all these factors, as well as the client's assets, objectives and tax
situation. After the lawyer has made recommendations for consideration by the client, the lawyer should review each
option with the client and assist the client in making an informed decision about his or her estate plan.
Some clients are reluctant to disclose the specific details of their finances and the complexities of their family
relationships. It is the job of the lawyer to build a rapport with the client and establish a good attorney-client relationship.
At the outset, the lawyer should let the client know that all infonnation discussed will be kept strictly confidential. The
lawyer should also infonn the client that his or her estate plan will be based on the infonnation he or she provides, and
therefore, the plan will only be as good as the information provided.

D.

[3.5]

Use a Questionnaire

To assist in the compilation of the information required to prepare an estate plan, the lawyer should use a
questionnaire. Appendix A provides a fonn of questionnaire for use in gathering infonnation from the client. The
questionnaire is arranged in sections: Personal and Family Data, Financial Data, Estate Planning Information, and Location
ofDocuments and Other Information. The questionnaire assists the lawyer in gathering all the pertinent information needed
for the preparation ofa client's estate plan. By using a questionnaire, there is less likelihood that important infonnation will
be omitted from the initial conference.
Whether the questionnaire is mailed to the client to be completed before the initial conference, or completed
during the initial conference is a matter of choice. Some lawyers feel that sending a comprehensive questionnaire to the
client prior to a meeting may intimidate the client. Some lawyers believe that when the client reviews the questions and the
details which the client must provide, the client may lose interest in the process. Additionally, because no rapport has been
established, the infonnation provided by the client may be less than complete. As a result, some lawyers prefer to complete
the questionnaire while they are meeting with the client. On the other hand, sending the questionnaire in advance provides
the lawyer with an opportunity to review the client's financial and familial situations prior to the meeting which may lead
to a more productive meeting. It is a mistake in most cases, however, to presume that all clients know enough about their
assets and the significance of the questions raised on a properly constructed questionnaire to answer them all correctly,
without assistance. The lawyer should take into consideration the age of the client, size of the client's estate (if generally
known), the level of the client's sophistication, and other similar factors in determining how to use the questionnaire.
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II.

[3.6]

Initial Conference

The first conference with a client gives the lawyer the opportunity to review terminology and explain basic
concepts to the client. Many clients have concerns about probate and tax matters which may have been initiated by friends
or relatives or which may be unfounded or exaggerated. As the planner, the lawyer should discuss these issues with the
client, explain misunderstandings and correct inaccurate information. Explain the difference between probate and nonprobate assets, the right of a surviving spouse to elect to take against the will of the deceased spouse, and what is taxable
and nontaxable for estate and inheritance tax purposes. Also, explain the purpose of a will and trust and explain how a trust
is administered. Discuss how assets over which the client has the right to designate a beneficiary, such as life insurance
and retirement plans, will not pass under the client's will. Reviewing such topics will allow the lawyer to explain the
importance of getting complete and accurate information about the client's family and financial circumstances and will
give the client a better understanding of the process involved.
The initial client conference should be divided into four separate sections: explaining the law and terminology
and discussing the client's estate planning objectives; gathering personal and family data; gathering financial data about the
client's assets and liabilities; and discussing the appointment of fiduciaries and the disposition of the client's assets.

A.

[3.7]

Gathering the Facts

1.

[3.81

Personal and Family Data

Obtain the full, complete names, birth dates and social security numbers of both husband and wife, as well as any
aliases used by either of them. Also indicate whether or not the clients are United States citizens. If either spouse is not a
United States citizen, the lawyer must take this into consideration for tax planning purpose because the laws pertaining to
gifts to spouses during life and bequests to spouses at death are not the same for non-United States citizens as they are for
United States citizens.

2.

(3.91

Residence and Business Addresses and Domicile

Obtain the residence and business addresses for the client and the address(es) of any vacation property.
A person's domicile is not necessarily the same as a person's residence. Domicile is the place where a person
has a permanent home and principal residence, and to which whenever a person is absent, the person has the intention
of returning. Domicile determines the place of probate of a will. Therefore, if the client has a residence in another state,
a question may arise as to where the client is actually domiciled. Determine the client's domicile. If there is a possible
problem that the client may be considered to have more than one domicile, the lawyer should work with the client to clearly
establish the domicile the client considers to be the correct domicile.

3.

(3.101

Community Property

If the client is married and has lived in a community property state, assets accumulated during marriage while
living in the community property state must be treated differently than property accumulated in a common law state. Inform
the client of the community property states and determine if the client has ever lived in a community property state; the
community property states include: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and
Wisconsin. If applicable, explain the difference between community property states and common law states, and discuss
how property which is acquired in a community property state is administered at the time of death. The lawyer must keep
this information in mind when drafting the estate plan for the client.

4.

(3.11]

Prior Marriages

Determine if either spouse has been previously married. If so, determine if the marriage ended as a result of the
death of the other spouse or divorce. If either spouse is a widow or widower, determine if he or she is the beneficiary of a
trust or retirement plan established by the deceased spouse. If the widow or widower has a power of appointment over a
trust, obtain copies ofthe trust agreement to determine ifthe power is taxable and ifthe client wants to exercise the power.
Ifthe prior marriage ended in divorce, determine ifthe current spouse has continuing obligations to the prior spouse and/or
any children of the marriage. Obtain copies of property settlement agreements or trusts of which either spouse is a party
or a beneficiary.

5.

(3.12]

Antenuptial and Postnuptial Agreements

If either husband or wife is a party to an antenuptial or postnuptial agreement, obtain copies of the agreements.
Such agreements may obligate the client to make dispositions of income or principal not only during life, but also at
the time of death. Special provisions may need to be included in the estate plan to satisfy an obligation under such an
agreement.
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6.

f3.131

Family Tree

Obtain a complete family tree, including full names, birth dates, marital status and special circumstances
pertaining to children, grandchildren, parents, siblings, or any other relative who may be a beneficiary under the client's
estate plan. Determine ifany ofthe descendants are adopted or are not the children ofboth this husband and wife. Also find
out if any descendants are deceased but have living issue. If any beneficiary has special needs, emotionally, physically or
financially, then emphasize the importance of a trust to provide for such needs to the client; likewise, if any beneficiary is
suffering from any type of addiction, a trust may be used to protect the assets and the beneficiary from himself or herself.
The lawyer should also inquire about the financial history of the proposed beneficiaries. Determine if any
beneficiary is indebted to the client or has received advances from the client. Also, determine if any beneficiary has
received significantly more gifts from the client than other beneficiaries; e.g., annual exclusion gifts from the client to the
family of one beneficiary, which is larger than the family of another beneficiary. The client may wish to take these gifts
into consideration in his or her estate plan to equalize the client's gifts to all of his or her beneficiaries.

B.

f3.14]

Financial Data

The lawyer must obtain complete and accurate information regarding the assets the client owns. Not only must
the fair market value of all the assets the client owns or has an interest in be determined, but also how title to such property
is held, Le., is the property in the name ofthe husband alone, joint with survivorship, joint as tenants in common or held in
trust. It is preferable for the client to provide copies ofthe most recent statements from banks, brokerage houses and other
financial institutions where the client has accounts. By examining the statements, the lawyer should be able to segregate
assets based on ownership. Some clients erroneously believe that if an account is owned as joint tenants with right of
survivorship, then it is not included in their estate.

1.

[3.151

Cash and Cash Equivalents

Identify all institutions where the client has checking and savings accounts, money market accounts, certificates
ofdeposit, treasury bills and other such liquid accounts and the type ofaccounts. Make sure the ownership ofsuch accounts
is accurately indicated. Check to see if anyone other than the client and client's spouse has the authority to sign checks or
has a power of attorney over the account.

2.

f3.161

Real Estate

Request copies of the recorded deeds and all leases for real estate the client owns or has an interest in, including
life estates and leasehold interests. Since many taxing authorities do not accept the tax assessed value of real estate as the
fair market value, determine an estimate of the true fair market value of the client's real estate. Also determine the cost
basis and date of acquisition of the real estate. Examine the deed to confirm the ownership interests in the property and
check for deed restrictions. Indicate the outstanding mortgages on the property.

3.

[3.171

Securities

In the case of securities, not only should the full name of the company, number of shares of stock, type of stock
(common or preferred), current value, form of ownership and date of acquisition be indicated, but also the cost basis. If it
is appropriate for the client to consider making gifts, the selection of assets to be gifted may be influenced by the donor's
cost basis. If possible, list the CUSIP numbers for all securities.

4.

[3.18]

Trust Agreement for the Benefit of the Client

If the client is the beneficiary of a trust, obtain a copy of the trust. If the trust is currently funded, obtain a list
of the assets and a current fair market value of the assets. Check to see if the client has a general or limited power of
appointment. Determine if the client wants to exercise the power and what happens to the property in the trust ifthe client
does not exercise the power. Consider the effect ofthe inclusion of property subject to a general power of appointment on
the client's taxable estate, and consider this when drafting the tax clause for the client's will.

5.

[3.191

Life Insurance

All life insurance should be examined, not only to review the amount to be included in the client's taxable estate,
but also to review the purpose for which the insurance is being carried and the cost of the insurance. Face value, cash
value and any outstanding loan balances should all be reviewed to accurately determine the final death benefit. Current
beneficiary designations should also be reviewed. If a new estate plan will not be implemented for several weeks, it may
be appropriate to change the beneficiary designation until a new plan is in place. If a former spouse is named beneficiary,
the beneficiary designation should be changed immediately. If a deceased spouse or deceased family member is named
beneficiary, check to see if the secondary beneficiary is the appropriate beneficiary. It may be advisable for the client to
transfer ownership of certain policies·to an irrevocable life insurance trust to avoid estate taxes. By reviewing the cash
value of the insurance, the gift tax implications of the transfer can be considered.
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6.

[3.201

Closely Held Business Interests

Closely held business interests, such as sole proprietorships, partnerships, corporations and limited liability
companies, may present unique planning opportunities for the client. Because there is usually a very limited market for
such assets, care should be taken to determine the type of business organization, the nature of the business, the client's
interest, whether there is a buy-sell agreement controlling the right to dispose of the interest, who the other shareholders
are, if any other members of the client's family work for or are shareholders in the company, and what the client wants to
do with the interest upon the client's death. Obtain copies of organizational documents and buy-sell agreements. If there
is no buy-sell agreement, find out how the value will be determined on the client's death. Suggest that the client consider
having a buy-sell agreement prepared.
The lawyer should also determine if the company is an S corporation. In order for a company that is an S
corporation to remain an S corporation if the stock is transferred to a trust, the trust must meet the requirements to be a
qualified S shareholder trust (QSST). Ifthe trust is not a QSST and the client's estate plan directs that S corporation stock is
to be held in a trust, the S corporation will lose its status as an S-corporation. The loss ofS corporation status could result
in significant adverse income tax consequences to the shareholders. See chapter 11 infra, detailed treatment ofQSSTs.
If the business interest is a sole proprietorship, explain to the client what happens when the sole or co-owner dies
and the possible problems associated with continuing the business.

7.

r3.211

Employee Benefits

All employee benefits, deferred compensation arrangements, stock options, retirement plans, etc., should be
reviewed with the client. The client should provide a summary of the plan benefits, the current value, the beneficiary
designations, information describing the benefits provided and the current method elected for payment, if any. The lawyer
should review the tax implications, both income and estate, of what will occur upon the client's retirement or death. The
form of tax clause used in the estate plan may be affected by the beneficiary designation of the retirement or deferred
compensation arrangements. If retirement plans are over-funded, the lawyer can review options with the client to avoid
excess taxes on distribution. Also, as with S corporations, any trust to which retirement plan assets are to be paid must
meet certain requirements outlined in the IRS regulations in order for the assets to be distributed over time and for the
beneficiary to continue to defer income taxation on the assets.

8.

[3.221

Miscellaneous

The questionnaire may not describe all the assets in which the client has an interest. For this reason it is important
for the lawyer to review other types of assets such as patents, trademarks, copyrights, oil and gas rights, mineral interests,
contract rights, etc. to make sure everything is accounted for. More unusual assets ofthis type may require special drafting
considerations in the estate plan to carry out the client's objectives.
Significant collections, antiques, silver,jewelry, sculptures, paintings, and other similar items oftangible personal
property may be specifically bequeathed under the will. The client's family members may feel an emotional attachment
to such items, and therefore, the identification and disposition of such items in a will may prevent conflict and heartache
among family members after the death of a client. The lawyer will only be able to suggest such planning if the lawyer is
aware ofthe existence ofthese items and their value. Determine if there are insurance riders to cover such property. Some
clients have significant items oftangible personal property appraised for replacement purposes and obtain insurance riders
which list the appraised value of the insured items.
Obtain copies of all prior year gift tax returns filed by the client to determine if the client has made any taxable
gifts to which some or all of the client's exemption was allocated.
Determine if the client expects to inherit anything from his parents or anyone else. If so, determine the type of
property and its value.

9.

[3.23]

Liabilities

The liabilities to all creditors, banks and other financial institutions must be accounted for. The balance due,
payment method and amount, interest rate and maturity date should all be listed. Also, review the client's other obligations,
such as obligations for child support, amounts due under a property settlement agreement and charitable pledges. The
timing of payment and source of funds may require special provisions in the estate planning documents.

10.

[3.241

Income

The lawyer should also review income data with the client. Sources of income may disclose assets or property
interests the client has which the client may not know need to be considered for estate planning purposes. Income from
trusts, retirement or pension plans, annuities, royalties and patents are the types of income which, if received by the client
during life, may result in these assets being included in the client's estate for estate tax purposes.
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In order to carry out the estate planning objectives of the client, it is necessary to review the effect of death
or disability on the income which was being generated by the client. Determine how the loss or reduction of income at
the time of death or disability will affect the family. Recompute the income after the payment of debts, estate taxes and
administration expenses, and determine if the income will be sufficient to provide for the lifestyle of the beneficiaries as
the client desires.

c.

[3.251

Estate Planning Information

1.

[3.261

Selecting an Executor or Trustee

The selection of an executor and trustee is very important. The lawyer should review the role and duties of the
executor and trustee and explain how they interact. The executor and trustee do not have to be the same individual or entity,
and the client may choose more than one individual or entity to serve as co-executors or co-trustees. If an individual is
named, alternates or successors should also be designated. Ifthe appointment is made under the client's will, make sure the
individual or corporation named qualifies under KRS 395.005 to be appointed as a fiduciary.
If a trust is established on the death of the first spouse to die, or will be established on the death of surviving
spouse, determine who the beneficiaries will be. If the beneficiaries are minor children or individuals with special needs,
it is appropriate for the property to continue to be managed by the trustee. Ask the client when it will be appropriate to
distribute all or a part ofthe trust property to each beneficiary. The client may want to base distributions ofprincipal on the
attainment of certain ages, anniversary dates, incentives or goals. Explain how the trustee may be given the discretion to
use the income and/or principal of the trust to provide for the beneficiary until the trust is finally terminated.

2.

[3.27]

Guardian

The person named as guardian may be different from the individual named executor of the will or trustee of
the trust. The role of the guardian of the person of minor children is different from that of the executor or trustee. Both
the executor and trustee have duties pertaining to asset administration and management. The duties of the executor
are completed when the estate is closed; however, the trustee continues to administer assets in the trust until the trust
terminates. Assuming a trust will be used to manage the assets for minors, the guardian's duty is to raise the children until
they reach the age of majority.
The client should be advised that the guardian named in the will is not obligated to serve. For this reason, it is
important for the client to ask the individual(s) he or she intends to name ifhe or she is willing to serve. The client may
appoint alternate guardians in the event the named guardian(s) does not qualify or does not complete the appointment as
guardian.

3.

[3.281

Disposition ofAssets

Once the family history and financial data have been compiled and the lawyer has explained and defined estate
planning terminology, the lawyer can focus on the.objectives of the client for disposing of his or her assets.
•

If the client is considering specific bequests, obtain the names of the beneficiaries and amount of
property to be bequeathed. Also determine if the client wants the bequest conditioned upon the
beneficiary surviving the client.
Ask the client how the remainder of the estate is to pass at death.
Determine how real estate owned by the client is to pass at death.
Review the beneficiary designations for all property which passes by beneficiary designation, e.g.,
life insurance and retirement plans, to verify that the designations are correct and current.
Determine how the assets should pass if all of the primary beneficiaries are deceased.
If the client is considering charitable bequests, obtain the complete name and location of each
charity and verify that the organization is a bona fide charity as defined by the Internal Revenue
Code.
Review the possible use oftrusts for children and grandchildren.
Determine if the client would like to make inter vivos gifts and review the various techniques for
making such gifts.
Explain what a power ofattomey will enable the client to do and determine if the client would like
to have one drafted as a part of the estate plan.
Explain Kentucky's living will statute and determine if the client desires to have one drafted as a
part of the estate plan.
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4.

[3.291

Estate Tax Projections

Most clients are interested in avoiding estate taxes. For this reason, ifthe client's estate is large enough to generate
federal estate taxes, it is advisable to review several estate tax scenarios with the client. Some of the options which may
be appropriate to discuss with the client include the following: each spouse leaves all of his or her estate to the surviving
spouse with no tax planning; use ofmarital deduction and credit shelter trusts for one spouse; use ofmarital deduction and
credit shelter trusts for both spouses; use ofan irrevocable life insurance trust; and the use ofmore sophisticated techniques
based on the client's assets, family circumstances and objectives.
Sophisticated computer programs for estate planning are available which generate projections of estate taxes
based on different plans. Inflation and growth factors may be assumed to project the size ofthe estate and amount of estate
taxes at some future date. For large estates, such tools are helpful and should be used. For smaller estates, the additional
data may prove to be more confusing than helpful and may not be necessary. Explaining the need for a marital deduction
trust and use ofthe federal estate tax exemption should not require the use of a computer generated illustration.

5.

[3.301

Use of Visual Aids

Most clients have a general idea ofhow they want to dispose oftheir asset at death. It is up to the lawyer to guide
them through the planning process. Visual aids, diagrams, charts and illustrations can assist the client in understanding
the plan and reviewing options. For example, simple box diagrams to represent the assets, the will and the trust allow
the lawyer to illustrate how the assets will flow on the first spouse's death. Show that the assets which are held as joint
tenants with rights of survivorship pass automatically to the surviving joint tenant(s) and will not be controlled by the will.
Describe how, on the death of the surviving spouse, the assets which were jointly held with the surviving spouse are now
solely owned by the surviving spouse in his or her individual name. These assets will now pass through the estate of the
surviving spouse and will be subject to probate.
Ifa trust is used at the time of the death of the first spouse to avoid taxes on the surviving spouse's death, show
how the assets in trust are excluded from the estate of the survivor. Using the diagram, show the assets which will be
included in the survivor's estate for tax purposes and those which are not included.
After reviewing appropriate options, some ofwhich may involve tax planning, the lawyer may begin to explain in
more detail how the will, trust and other estate planning documents are constructed. As the lawyer explains optional plans,
it is helpful to diagram the flow of assets and illustrate how the will and trust(s) interrelate.

III.

[3.311

Ethical Considerations

From the moment the lawyer first meets with a new client, the lawyer must be prepared to identify and address
issues pertaining to the duties to the client, the propriety of representing both the husband and wife in the same or related
matter, and if the representation of the client continues after the estate plan is complete.
The lawyer who represents both husband and wife with regard to the same matter, or related matters, should
discuss the potential conflicts which may arise during the course of that representation. Obtain a clear understanding with
the client that information provided by either spouse will be disclosed to the other spouse. Explain to the clients that if a
conflict does arise, the lawyer may have to withdraw from representation of both clients. Disclose such potential conflicts
in writing and set forth potential problems in a letter to the client. An engagement letter may be the best method to provide
notice to and agreement with the client regarding conflict issues and fees. The engagement letter confirms the understanding
with respect to the fee arrangement with the client, as well as the role of the lawyer in representing both parties.
Once the estate planning documents are signed, the question often arises as to whether the lawyer continues to
represent the client. If so, the lawyer has a continuing obligation to notify the client of changes in tax laws or statutes
that may affect their plan. Most lawyers do not formally terminate the lawyer-client relationship with an "exit" letter.
Whether the issue is ever discussed with the client or not, most clients would probably be offended by such a letter. The
Commentaries of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct state,
"Although the lawyer remains bound to the client by some obligations, including the duty of confidentiality, the lawyer's
responsibilities are diminished by the completion of the active phase of the representation." ACTEC Commentaries, 49.
While this commentary does not specifically relieve the lawyer of all responsibility, it does indicate that after the estate
plan is implemented, the lawyer does not ordinarily owe the client a duty to inform the client of changes in the law or
facts that may affect the client. The lawyer should be careful, however, not to tell the client the lawyer will keep the client
informed of changes that may affect the client unless the lawyer is prepared to follow through on the commitment. The
preferred way to address this issue is to write to the client, tell the client what you will or will not do once the estate plan
is implemented, what the fee arrangement will be for the continued "supervision" of their file, and then follow-up with the
client accordingly.
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IV.

[3.321

Conclusion

The estate planning process can be overwhelming for a client. Aside from the psychological barriers which tend
to serve as road blocks to initiating or completing the estate planning process, many clients do not understand tax and
property laws well enough to know they need to have a good estate plan. The initial contact a lawyer has with the client
often detennines whether the estate planning process will be easy for the client and provide him or her with a sense of
accomplishment and relief, or whether it will be an unpleasant experience that will foster the client's disdain for discussing
wills, trusts and estate planning issues. The lawyer should view the process from the client's perspective; remember that the
client is dealing with emotional issues and most likely does not have a clear understanding of the estate planning process.
Help the client become familiar with the process so the client can make an infonned decision about an appropriate estate
plan. If these steps are taken, both the lawyer and the client will have the satisfaction of completing a very important and
perhaps difficult task with relative ease. The use of a questionnaire such as the one found in Appendix A will assist the
lawyer and client in accomplishing these goals.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

SECTION A
THE INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE CLIENT

Douglas A. Bozell
Frost Brown Todd LLC
Louisville, Kentucky

FROST BROWN TODD LLC
ATIORNEYS AT LAw
400 West Market Street
32nd Floor
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3363
(502) 589-5400
Facsimile (502) 581-1087
www.frostbrowntodd.com

DOUGLAS A. BOZELL
dbozell@fbtlaw.com
(502) 568-0208

June 21, 2004

[Insert Names]
[Insert Street Address]
[Insert City, State & Zip Code]
Re:

Personal and Estate Planning

Dear [Insert Names]:
I am pleased that you have asked me and Frost Brown Todd to assist you in developing
your estate plan. This letter shall confirm my discussion with you regarding your engagement of
our firm and shall describe the basis upon which we shall provide legal services to you.
Accordingly, I submit for your approval the following provisions governing our engagement. If
you are in agreement, please sign the enclosed copy of this letter in the space provided below and
return it to me in the enclosed envelope. If you have any questions about these provisions, please
do not hesitate to call.
Scope of Representation. You have asked me to represent the two of you with regard to
the planning, preparation, execution and implementation of appropriate documents (such as
Wills and Revocable Trust Agreements) for each of you concerning the management of your
assets during your joint lives and the life of the survivor and the disposition of those assets after
the death of the survivor, and advice with regard to asset ownership and designation of
beneficiaries in connection with various contractual rights, such as life insurance policies and
retirement plan accounts. You may limit or expand the scope of our representation from time to
time, proyided that any substantial expansion must be agreed to by us. While we would be
interested in assisting you in other matters, unless we are specifically engaged for some other
future matter this will confirm that our representation of you is limited to the foregoing matters
and will end when they are concluded.
Joint Representation. Under the ethical rules that govern attorneys, we may represent
both of you jointly so long as you are in agreement about your estate plan. It is normally quite
beneficial for one attorney to represent both a husband and wife in the estate planning process,
and my goal in doing so will be to help you implement a mutually agreeable plan for both the
present and the future. However, in the course of the estate planning process a husband and wife
sometimes develop differences in their choices of beneficiaries, appointments of trustees,
executors and representatives and in their overall interests and desires. Occasionally, couples
initially agree on a plan and then later change their minds and go in different directions.
Consequently, please understand that if I undertake to represent both of you jointly, I cannot take
sides or favor one of you over the other, either now or in the future.
KENTUCKY • OHIO • INDIANA • TENNESSEE
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During the planning process, I will necessarily obtain confidential information from each
of you, whether in conference with both of you together or with one of you alone. If I undertake
to represent you jointly, please understand that I cannot withhold any such information from
either of you even if one of you asks me to do so. The alternative is for me to represent only one
of you separately without open sharing of information. The other one of you would then have to
either engage separate counselor choose not to be represented at all. Such separate
representation is usually not practical and having one party unrepresented is usually not
·desirable. If during the course of my joint representation of you a conflict should develop that in
my opinion would keep me from adequately representing both of you or if either of you asks me
to take sides against the other, I will have no choice but to withdraw from further joint
representation of the two of you and advise each of you to obtain separate counsel. If either of
you have any questions about this joint representation, please let me know immediately so that I
may address them. Otherwise, I will assume you have none and are comfortable with my
representing both of you jointly.
Fees. Our fees are based primarily upon the time expended by our attorneys and
paralegals on the engagement. Attorneys and paralegals have been assigned hourly rates based
upon their experience and level of expertise. The present rates of those attorneys and paralegals
likely to work on these matters range from $105.00 in the case of Dolores Sparks, a senior
paralegal, to $200.00 in my case. Our hourly rates are reviewed periodically and may be
increased from time to time.
Potential Conflicts. Our firm represents many companies and other individuals. This can
create situations where work for one client on a matter may preclude us from assisting other
clients on unrelated matters. It is at least possible that during the time that we are representing
you some of our present or future clients may have disputes or transactions with you. In order to
avoid the potential problems that this kind of restriction could have for our practice, we ask you
to agree that we may continue to represent (or may undertake in the future to represent) existing
or new clients in any matter that is not substantially related to matters in which we have
represented you, even if the interests of such clients in those other matters might be adverse to
yours. We do not intend, however, for you to waive your right to have our firm maintain
confidences or secrets that you transmit to our firm, and we agree not to disclose them to any
third party without your consent. We will, of course, take appropriate steps to insure that such
information is kept confidential by us.
Privacy Policy. Enclosed is a copy of the Firm's privacy policy. Please let us know if
you have any questions about it.
Additional Standard Terms. Our engagement is also subject to the policies included in
the enclosed memorandum.
If these terms of our engagement are acceptable to you, please return a signed copy of
this letter to me in the enclosed envelope.
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If you have any questions regarding any of the matters discussed in this letter, please feel
free to give me a call.
Sincerely,
FROST BROWN TODD LLC

By

The foregoing is understood and accepted:

[Insert Name]
Date:

_

[Insert Name]
Date:

_

[Insert Client/Matter Number]
LOULibrary/314512.1
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ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF CLIENT ENGAGEMENTS
1.
Expenses. Expenses we incur on the engagement are charged to the Client's
account. Expenses include such items as court costs, charges for computerized research services
and the use of our facsimile and photocopying machines, long distance telephone calls, travel
expenses, messenger service charges, overnight mail or delivery charges, extraordinary
administrative support, filing fees, fees of court reporters and charges for depositions, fees for
expert witnesses and other expenses we incur on your behalf. Our charges for these services
reflect our actual out-of-pocket costs based on usage, and in sonle areas may also include our
related administrative expenses.
2.
Monthly Statements. Unless a different billing period is agreed upon with the
Client, the Firm will render monthly statements indicating the current status of the account as to
both fees and expenses. The statements shall be payable upon receipt. If statements are not paid
in full within 30 days, we reserve the right to add a late charge of 1% per month of the amount
due. If it becomes necessary for the Firm to file suit or to engage a collection agency for the
collection of fees or expenses, the Client shall pay all related costs and expenses, including
reasonable attorneys' fees.
3.
Termination. The Client has the right to terminate our representation at any time
by notifying us of your intention to do so in writing. We will have the same right, subject to an
obligation to give the Client reasonable notice to arrange alternative representation. If either
party should elect to terminate our relationship, our fees and expenses incurred up to that point
still will be due to us. Upon payment to us of any balance due for fees and expenses, we will
return to the Client, or to whomever the Client directs, any property or papers of the Client in our
possession. We will retain our files pertaining to any matters on which we have been engaged to
represent the Client.
4.
Withdrawal. Under the rules of professional conduct by which we are governed,
we may withdraw from our representation of the Client in the event of (for example):
nonpayment of our fees and expenses; misrepresentation or failure to disclose material facts
concerning the engagement; action taken by the Client contrary to our advice; and in situations
involving a conflict of interest with another client. If such a situation occurs, which we do not
anticipate, we will promptly give the Client written notice of our intention to withdraw.
5.
Post-Engagement Services. The Client is engaging our Firm to provide legal
services in connection with a specific matter or matters. After completion of that matter or
matters, changes may occur in the applicable laws or regulations that could have an impact on
the Client's future rights and liabilities. Unless the Client engages us after completion of a
matter to provide additional advice on issues arising from the matter, the Firm has no continuing
obligation to advise the Client with respect to future legal developments.
6.
Authorization. By the Client's agreement to these terms of our representation, the
Client authorizes us to take any and all action we deem advisable on the Client's behalf on this
matter. Whenever possible, we will discuss with the Client in advance any significant actions we
intend to take.
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PRIVACY NOTICE
Frost Brown Todd LLC ("FBT") understands your privacy is important. We are
sure that you are aware that your personal information has always been held in the
strictest confidence within FBT. You are receiving this notice in accordance with newly
applicable federal law because you receive income, estate and gift tax advice, planning,
or preparation services, or real estate settlement services, from FBT. This privacy notice
outlines what information we collect and how we use it. In serving you we are
committed to the Frost Brown Todd LLC Privacy Policy, which is summarized as
follows:
We collect "nonpublic personal information" about you from the following
sources:
•

Information we receive from you on questionnaires, forms or other documents
supplied by you to us;

•

Information about your transactions with us or with others;

•

Information we receive from others involved in your financial or tax planning
activity, such as your accountant or banker, or in your real estate transaction, such as
your broker or banker.

"Nonpublic personal information" is nonpublic information about you that we
obtain in connection with providing you, as an individual consumer, with tax
preparation and planning advice and services, or real estate settlement services.
The rules governing lawyers' professional conduct, as adopted in the various
states where we have offices, prohibit a lawyer from disclosing information obtained in
connection with representing a client, except in limited circumstances. These rules are
even more stringent than those required by this. new federal law. The lawyers at FBT
take great care to adhere to these rules, and have always protected your right to privacy.
We do not disclose any nonpublic personal information about you or about former
clients outside of FBT, except as agreed by you or as required by law or by the applicable
rules governing lawyers' conduct.
We restrict access to nonpublic personal information about you to lawyers and
employees of FBT. Physical, electronic and procedural safeguards that comply with the
rules governing lawyers' professional conduct are maintained to guard your nonpublic
personal information.
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400 West Market Street
32nd Floor
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3363
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DOUGLAS A. BOZELL
dbozell@fbtlaw.com
(502) 568-0208

June 21,2004

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL
[Insert Name]
[Insert Street Address]
[Insert City, State & Zip Code]
Re:

Estate of[Insert Name ofDecedent]

Dear [Insert Name]:
Please accept my condolences on the loss of your [insert relationship]. This letter shall
confirm my discussion with you regarding your engagement of Frost Brown Todd and shall
describe the basis upon which we will provide legal services to you. Accordingly, I submit for
your approval the following provisions governing our engagement. If you are in agreement,
please sign the enclosed copy of this letter in the space provided below and return it to me in the
enclosed envelope. If you have any questions about these provisions, please do not hesitate to
call me.
Scope of Representation. You have asked us to represent you as the Personal
Representative of the Estate of [Insert Name of Decedent]. You may limit or expand the scope of
our representation from time to time, provided that any substantial expansion must be agreed to
by us. While we would be interested in assisting you in other matters, unless we are specifically
engaged for some other future matter this will confirm that our representation of you is limited to
the foregoing matters and will end when they are concluded.
Fees. Our fees are based primarily upon the time expended by our attorneys and
paralegals on the engagement. Attorneys and paralegals have been assigned hourly rates based
upon their experience and level of expertise. The rates of those professionals likely to work on
this matter range from $200.00 for my time and $105.00 for our estate administration paralegal,
Julie Raley. Our hourly rates are reviewed periodically and may be increased from time to time.
Additional Standard Terms. Our engagement is also subject to the policies included in the
enclosed memorandum.
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If these terms of our engagement are acceptable to you, please return a signed copy of
this letter to me in the enclosed envelope.
We appreciate the opportunity to represent you. Weare looking forward very much to
working with you on this matter.

Sincerely,
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
By

_

Douglas A. Bozell
The foregoing is understood and accepted:

[Insert Name]
Date:

_

LOULibrary/313834.1
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ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF CLIENT ENGAGEMENTS

1.
Expenses. Expenses we incur on the engagement are charged to the Client's account. Expenses
include such items as court costs, charges for computerized research services and the use of our facsimile and
photocopying machines, long distance telephone calls, travel expenses, messenger service charges, overnight mail or
delivery charges, extraordinary administrative support, filing fees, fees of court reporters and charges for
depositions, fees for expert witnesses and other expenses we incur on your behalf. Our charges for these services
reflect our actual out-of-pocket costs based on usage, and in some areas may also include our related administrative
expenses.
2.
Monthly Statements. Unless a different billing period is agreed upon with the Client, the Firm
will render monthly statements indicating the current status of the account as to both fees and expenses. The
statements shall be payable upon receipt. If statements are not paid in full within 30 days, we reserve the right to
add a late charge of 1% per month of the amount due. If it becomes necessary for the Firm to file suit or to engage a
collection agency for the collection of fees or expenses, the Client shall pay all related costs and expenses, including
reasonable attorneys' fees.
3.
Termination. The Client has the right to terminate our representation at any time by notifying us
of your intention to do so in writing. We will have the same right, subject to an obligation to give the Client
reasonable notice to arrange alternative representation. If either party should elect to terminate our relationship, our
fees and expenses incurred up to that point still will be due to us. Upon payment to us of any balance due for fees
and expenses, we will return to the Client, or to whomever the Client directs, any property or papers of the Client in
our possession. We will retain our files pertaining to any matters on which we have been engaged to represent the
Client.
4.
Withdrawal. Under the rules of professional conduct by which we are governed, we may
withdraw from our representation of the Client in the event of (for example): nonpayment of our fees and expenses;
misrepresentation or failure to disclose material facts concerning the engagement; action taken by the Client
contrary to our advice; and in situations involving a conflict of interest with another client. If such a situation
occurs, which we do not anticipate, we will promptly give the Client written notice of our intention to withdraw.
5.
Post-Engagement Services. The Client is engaging our Firm to provide legal services in
connection with a specific matter or matters. After completion of that matter or matters, changes may occur in the
applicable laws or regulations that could have an impact on the Client's future rights and liabilities. Unless the
Client engages us after completion of a matter to provide additional advice on issues arising from the matter, the
Firm has no continuing obligation to advise the Client with respect to future legal developments.
6.
Authorization. By the Client's agreement to these terms of our representation, the Client
authorizes us to take any and all action we deem advisable on the Client's behalf on this matter. Whenever possible,
we will discuss with the Client in advance any significant actions we intend to take.

FROST BROWN TODD LLC
ATfORNEYS AT LAw
400 West Market Street
32nd Floor
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3363
(502) 589-5400
Facsimile (502) 581-1087
www.frostbrowntodd.com

DOUGLAS A. BOZELL
dbozell@fbtlaw.com
(502) 568-0208

June 21,2004

[Insert Name]
[Insert Street Address]
[Insert City, State & Zip Code]
Re:

Personal and Estate Planning

Dear [Insert Name]:
I am pleased that you have asked me and Frost Brown Todd to assist you in developing
your estate plan. This letter shall confirm my discussion with you regarding your engagement of
our firm and shall describe the basis upon which we shall provide legal services to you.
Accordingly, I submit for your approval the following provisions governing our engagement. If
you are in agreement, please sign the enclosed copy of this letter in the space provided below and
return it to me in the enclosed envelope. If you have any questions about these provisions, please
do not hesitate to call.
Scope of Representation. You have asked me to represent you individually with regard
to the planning, preparation, execution and implementation of appropriate documents (such as
Will, Living Will, Durable Power of Attorney and Revocable Trust). You may limit or expand
the scope of our representation from time to time, provided that any substantial expansion must
be agreed to by us. While we would be interested in assisting you in other matters, unless we are
specifically engaged for some other future matter this shall confirm that our representation of
you is limited to the foregoing matters and shall end when they are concluded.
Fees. Our fees are based primarily upon the time expended by our attorneys and
paralegals on the engagement. Attorneys and paralegals have been assigned hourly rates based
upon their experience and level of expertise. The present rates of those attorneys and paralegals
likely to work on these matters range from $105.00 in the case of Dolores Sparks, a senior
paralegal, to $200.00 in my case. Our hourly rates are reviewed periodically and may be
increased from time to time. However, I estimate that my fee for preparing and implementing
your estate planning documents shall be approximately $[insert amount], which will be due when
we meet to execute them.
Potential Conflicts. Our firm represents many companies and other individuals. This can
create situations where work for one client on a matter may preclude us from assisting other
clients on unrelated matters. It is at least possible that during the time that we are representing
you some of our present or future clients may have disputes or transactions with you. In order to
avoid the potential problems that this kind of restriction could have for our practice, we ask you
to agree that we may continue to represent (or may undertake in the future to represent) existing
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or new clients in any matter that is not substantially related to matters in which we have
represented you, even if the interests of such clients in those other matters might be adverse to
yours. We do not intend, however, for you to waive your right to have our firm maintain
confidences or secrets that you transmit to our firm, and we agree not to disclose them to any
third party without your consent. We will, of course, take appropriate steps to insure that such
information is kept confidential by us.
Privacy Policy. Enclosed is a copy of the Firm's privacy policy. Please let us know if
you have any questions about it.
Additional Standard Terms. Our engagement is also subject to the policies included in
the enclosed memorandum.
If these terms of our engagement are acceptable to you, please return a signed copy of
this letter to me in the enclosed envelope.
If you have any questions regarding any of the matters discussed in this letter, please feel
free to give me a call.
Sincerely,
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
By
The foregoing is understood and accepted:

[Insert Name]
Date:
[Insert Client/Matter Number]
LOULibrary/314505.1

KENTUCKY • OHIO • INDIANA • TENNESSEE

_

[Insert Name]
June 21, 2004
Page 3

FROST BROWNTODDILC

ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF CLIENT ENGAGEMENTS
1.
Expenses. Expenses we incur on the engagement are charged to the Client's
account. Expenses include such items as court costs, charges for computerized research services
and the use of our facsimile and photocopying machines, long distance telephone calls, travel
expenses, messenger service charges, overnight mail or delivery charges, extraordinary
administrative support, filing fees, fees of court reporters and charges for depositions, fees for
expert witnesses and other expenses we incur on your behalf. Our charges for these services
reflect our actual out-of-pocket costs based on usage, and in some areas may also include our
related administrative expenses.
2.
Monthly Statements. Unless a different billing period is agreed upon with the
Client, the Firm will render monthly statements indicating the current status of the account as to
both fees and expenses. The statements shall be payable upon receipt. If statements are not paid
in full within 30 days, we reserve the right to add a late charge of 1% per month of the amount
due. If it becomes necessary for the Firm to file suit or to engage a collection agency for the
collection of fees or expenses, the Client shall pay all related costs and expenses, including
reasonable attorneys' fees.
3.
Termination. The Client has the right to terminate our representation at any time
by notifying us of your intention to do so in writing. We will have the same right, subject to an
obligation to give the Client reasonable notice to arrange alternative representation. If either
party should elect to terminate our relationship, our fees and expenses incurred up to that point
still will be due to us. Upon payment to us of any balance due for fees and expenses, we will
return to the Client, or to whomever the Client directs, any property or papers of the Client in our
possession. We will retain our files pertaining to any matters on which we have been engaged to
represent the Client.
4.
Withdrawal. Under the rules of professional conduct by which we are governed,
we may withdraw from our representation of the Client in the event of (for example):
nonpayment of our fees and expenses; misrepresentation or failure to disclose material facts
concerning the engagement; action taken by the Client contrary to our advice; and in situations
involving a conflict of interest with another client. If such a situation occurs, which we do not
anticipate, we will promptly give the Client written notice of our intention to withdraw.
5.
Post-Engagement Services. The Client is engaging our Firm to provide legal
services in connection with a specific matter or matters. After completion of that matter or
matters, changes may occur in the applicable laws or regulations that could have an impact on
the Client's future rights and liabilities. Unless the Client engages us after completion of a
matter to provide additional advice on issues arising from the matter, the Firm has no continuing
obligation to advise the Client with respect to future legal developments.
6.
Authorization. By the Client's agreement to these terms of our representation, the
Client authorizes us to take any and all action we deem advisable on the Client's behalf on this
matter. Whenever possible, we will discuss with the Client in advance any significant actions we
intend to take.
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PRIVACY NOTICE
Frost Brown Todd LLC ("FBT") understands your privacy is important. We are
sure that you are aware that your personal information has always been held in the
strictest confidence within FBT. You are receiving this notice in accordance with newly
applicable federal law because you receive income, estate and gift tax advice, planning,
or preparation services, or real estate settlement services, from FBT. This privacy notice
outlines what information we collect and how we use it. In serving you we are
committed to the Frost Brown Todd LLC Privacy Policy, which is summarized as
follows:
We collect "nonpublic personal information" about you from the following
sources:
•

Information we receive from you on questionnaires, forms or other documents
supplied by you to us;

•

Information about your transactions with us or with others;

•

Information we receive from others involved in your financial or tax planning
activity, such as your accountant or banker, or in your real estate transaction, such as
your broker or banker.

"Nonpublic personal information" is nonpublic information about you that we
obtain in connection with providing you, as an individual consumer, with tax
preparation and planning advice and services, or real estate settlement services.
The rules governing lawyers' professional conduct, as adopted in the various
states where we have offices, prohibit a lawyer from disclosing information obtained in
connection with representing a client, except in limited circumstances. These rules are
even more stringent than those required by this new federal law. The lawyers at FBT
take great care to adhere to these rules, and have always protected your right to privacy.
We do not disclose any nonpublic personal information about you or about former
clients outside of FBT, except as agreed by you or as required by law or by the applicable
rules governing lawyers' conduct.
We restrict access to nonpublic personal information about you to lawyers and
employees of FBT. Physical, electronic and procedural safeguards that comply with the
rules governing lawyers' professional conduct are maintained to guard your nonpublic
personal information.
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OPINION

REVERSING

AND

REMANDING

** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:

KNOPF, TACKETT AND VANMETER, JUDGES.

VANMETER, JUDGE.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment

entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing appellant

Dwight V. Cave's claim of legal malpractice against appellee
George R. Q'Bryan.

For the reasons stated hereafter, we reverse

and remand for further proceedings.
In July 1997, Claude W. Cave ("Claude") sought legal

assistance from Q'Bryan to implement an estate plan. 1

Claude's

The record reveals that the value of the real estate was $80,000. Although
the record does not clearly disclose the value of Claude's personal estate,
appellant.'s allegation that Doris' renunciation reduced his share from one-

1

plan, as evidenced by his will and a deed,2 both of which were
executed on August 12, 1997, was to leave his residential real
property to his wife, Doris, and the remainder of his estate,
essentially his personal property, to three sisters and two
nephews, including appellant. 3

The deed prepared by O'Bryan

conveyed the real property from Claude, individually, to Claude
and Doris as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
Claude died August 2, 1999, and his will was admitted
to probate on August 3D, 1999.

On January 28, 2000, Doris

executed and recorded a release under KRS 392.080 4 renouncing her
interest in Claude's will.

Because title to the real estate

passed to Doris at Claude's death under the deed's survivorship
clause, the real estate was not an issue in the renunciation.
Thus, by renouncing her interest in the will, Doris became

fourth to one-eighth and damaged him by $14,000 indicates that the personal
estate's value was approximately $112,000 ($14,000 x 8).

See also Appellant's Deposition, April 16, 2002, pp. 14-17 (appellant
testified that Claude told him that appellant would get some money under the
will, while Claude's widow, Doris, would get the house and lot) .
2

The record discloses that Doris, Claude's second wife, was married to him
approximately fifteen years, and that Claude did not have children.
Apparently one sister predeceased Claude, since appellant's complaint alleges
that he would have received one-fourth (~) of the remainder but for Doris'
renunciation of the will.
3

4

states in pertinent part:
When a husband or wife dies testate, the surv1v1ng spouse
may . . . release what is given to him or her by will, if
any, and receive his or her share under KRS 392.020 as if
no will had been made, except that in such case the share
in any real estate of which the decedent . . . was seized
of an estate in fee simple at the time of death shall be
only one-third (1/3) of such real estate.

KRS 392.080(1)

-2-

entitled to receive, pursuant to KRS 392.020, one-half

(~)

of

Claude's personal property, thereby effectively reducing the
shares intended for his sisters and nephews, including
appellant. s

Therefore, instead of Doris receiving a house and

lot worth $80,000, and Claude's surviving sisters and nephews
receiving approximately $112,000 or $28,000 each, Doris received
property worth $136,000,6 while Claude's sisters and nephews
received $56,000 or $14,000 each.?

If the real property had been

left to pass under the will, Doris' renunciation would have
resulted in her receipt of property worth $82,666. 8

As this

amount is approximately the value of the house and lot, she
would have had little incentive to renounce the will.
In November 2000, appellant filed a complaint with the

Jefferson Circuit Court alleging that O'Bryan had negligently
failed to advise Claude that the shares intended for the

5

KRS 392.020 states:
After the death of the husband or wife intestate, the
survivor shall have an estate in fee of one-half (1/2) of
the surplus real estate of which the other spouse . . . was
seized of an estate in fee simple at the time of
death . . . . The survivor shall also have an absolute
estate in one-half (1/2) of the surplus personalty left by
the decedent . .

6 The house and lot, valued at $80,000, plus one-half
property, valued at $56,000, equals $136,000.

7

(~)

the personal

In percentage terms, under Claude's original plan, Doris would have received

42% of Claude's estate and his sisters and nephews 58%. Because of the deed
and renunciation, Doris received 71% of Claude's estate, and his sisters and

nephews received 29%.
8 One-third of the house and lot, $26,666, plus one-half (~) the personal
property, $56,000, equals $82,666. KRS 392.020 and 392.080(1).
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beneficiaries would be reduced if Doris renounced her interest
in his will, and that if he had been advised of that risk,
Claude would not have executed the deed giving Doris a right of
survivorship.

The circuit court granted Q/Bryan's motion for

summary judgment because no "apparent evidence" existed to
refute Q/Bryan's contention that he met the standard of care
owed to Claude.

The court also held, based on Coffey v.

Jefferson County Board of Education, Ky. ApP., 756 S.W.2d 155,
156 (1988), that appellant lacked standing to bring the legal

malpractice claim since he was not O'Bryan's client. 9

This

appeal followed.
Appellant raises two main arguments on appeal:

(1)

even though he was not Q'Bryan's client, he has standing to
bring the malpractice action because an attorney who provides
estate planning services, such as 0' Bryan, owes a duty of care
to the testator's intended beneficiaries; and (2) the circuit
court erroneously held that no evidence exists to prove
O'Bryan's negligence.

We agree with both contentions.

In Coffey, a defendant in a negligence action entered into an agreed
judgment for damages and then attempted to assign his subsequent legal
malpractice claim against his attorney. This court held the assignment void
as against public policy and upheld the trial court's judgment in favor of
the former attorney, stating that a legal malpractice claim cannot be
maintained without proof that the alleged negligent conduct resulted in
specific damage to the client. 756 S.W.2d at 156. Based on this language,
the circuit court below imposed a privity requirement on appellant's attorney
malpractice action. Our view is that Coffey cannot be read so narrowly.
9
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Historically, the rule in many jurisdictions was that
absent fraud, collusion, or privity of contract, an attorney was
not liable to a third party for professional malpractice.

E.g.,

National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 200, 25 L.Ed. 621,
623

(1880).

In Kentucky, the rule was stated slightly

differently, as being that an attorney is not ordinarily liable
to third persons for acts committed in the representation of a
client, unless such acts are fraudulent or tortuous and result
in injury to third persons.
S.W.2d 284, 284-85

(1941)

Rose v. Davis, 288 Ky. 674, 157

.10

Contrary to the circuit court's ruling in the present
case,ll appellate courts in recent decisions have not required
privity as a prerequisite for attorney liability.

In Hill v.

Willmott, Ky. App., 561 S.W.2d 331 (1978), a physician filed a

malpractice action against the attorney who represented the
Overruled on other grounds, Penrod v. Penrod, Ky., 489 S.W.2d 524, 528
(1972). The facts of Rose involved a claim by a husband against his former
wife's attorney.
10

11

The holdings in Coffey v. Jefferson County Board of Education, Ky. App.,

756 S.W.2d 155 (1988), and Mitchell v. Transamerica Insurance Co., Ky. App.,
551 S.W.2d 586 (1977), do not mandate a different result.
The facts of

Mitchell involved a claim against a Kentucky attorney who let a Kentucky
statute of limitations expire. Ultimately, the plaintiffs settled with the
original tortfeasor in an Indiana court, for more than the Kentucky attorney
had attempted to settle the case in Kentucky. The court in Mitchell noted
that while malpractice was assumed, not every malpractice case carries a
right to a monetary judgment, absent a showing that the attorney's wrongful
conduct deprived the client of something to which he or she otherwise would
have been entitled. 551 S.W.2d at 587-88 (citing Thompson v. D'Angelo, 320
A.2d 729 (Del. Super. 1974». The facts of Coffey involved a collusive
assignment of a legal malpractice claim, which this court held was void as
against public policy. In addition, the facts of the case disclosed no proof
of damages to anyone as a result of the alleged malpractice. Coffey relied
on Mitchell for the holding that proof of damages is required.
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plaintiff in a malpractice suit against him.

In discussing

whether the adverse party's attorney owed a duty to the
non-client plaintiff, the court stated that "' [a]n attorney may
be liable for damage caused by his negligence to a person

intended to be benefited by his performance irrespective of any

lack of privity . . .

(Emphasis added).

We believe this to

be a proper statement of the law in this Commonwealth."

561

S.W.2d at 334 (quoting Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal.App.3d 769, 771,
97 Cal.Rptr. 191, 192

(1971».

The court in Hill ultimately

concluded that an adverse party in a prior lawsuit was not an
intended beneficiary of the attorney's services.

Id. at 335. 12

Subsequently, in a malpractice action in Seigle v.

Jasper, Ky. App., 867 S.W.2d 476 (1993), a panel of this court
rejected the attorney's defense of lack of privity of contract.
The case was filed by real estate purchasers whose lender
required a title examination.

The attorney who performed the

examination had an ongoing relationship with the lender and
directed his title opinion to that lender, even though the
purchasers paid for the title examination through loan closing
costs paid to the lender.

Relying on Hill, 561 S.W.2d at 334,

this court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the attorney,

holding that an attorney may be held liable to a third party who
12 The court noted that the attorney possibly could have been subject to a
malicious prosecution action by the adverse party, but that cause of action
had not been pled in the case.
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was intended to be benefited by his performance, despite a lack
of privity.

867 S.W.2d at 483.

In Sparks v. Craft,

75 F.3d 257, 261 (6 th eire

1996) (applying Kentucky law), the mother of a motorist who died
in an automobile accident brought a legal malpractice action
against the attorney who represented her son's estate but had
allowed the statute of limitations to expire.

In affirming the

district court's holding that the mother had standing to sue in
her personal capacity, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated: "[I]t is icing on the cake to point out that there is no
privity requirement for legal malpractice actions in Kentucky.
Even certain persons who are not a lawyer's clients can recover
for damages caused by the lawyer's negligence."

Id. at 261

(citing Hill, 561 S.W.2d at 334; Seigle, 867 S.W.2d at 483).
As Kentucky law clearly permits intended beneficiaries
to hold attorneys liable for damages caused by negligent
performance, irrespective of privity, the question is thus
reduced to the application of this rule to claims by will
beneficiaries against estate planning attorneys.

The clear

trend among courts is to hold that estate beneficiaries are
intended to benefit from the services rendered by attorneys to
their clients.

See, e.g., Stowe v. Smith, 184 Conn. 194, 198,

441 A.2d 81, 83-84 (1981)

(failure of attorney to prepare estate

plan according to decedent's wishes would inflict injury on
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intended beneficiary); McLane v. Russell, 131 Ill.2d 509, 51920, 546 N.E.2d 499, 504 (1989)

(beneficiaries under a will were

"intended beneficiaries" of the attorney-client relationship);
Walker v. Lawson, 526 N.E.2d 968 (Ind. 1988)

(beneficiary under

a will has standing to bring a malpractice action against
attorney who drafted the will); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410
N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987)

(an attorney "owes a duty of care to

the direct, intended, and specifically identifiable
beneficiaries of the testator as expressed in the testator's
testamentary documents")i Donahue v. Shughart, Thompson &
Kilroy, p.e., 900 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Mo. 1995)

(attorney's duty to

advance client's interest is served by recognizing liability to
intended beneficiary of a testamentary transfer) .
Therefore, in light of current Kentucky law, we
conclude an attorney owes a duty of care to the direct,
intended, and specifically identifiable beneficiaries of the
estate planning client, notwithstanding a lack of privity.13
Applying this "intent to directly benefit" standard to the facts
alleged in the present case, a'Bryan owed a duty of care to
appellant-as a third-party beneficiary who was directly and
specifically identified in Claude's will.

Giv~n

that O'Bryan

13 We do not address the issue as to whether persons not named in estate
planning documents could bring a claim against the estate planning attorney.
That issue is not before us because appellant clearly was named in Claude's
will and clearly was intended to benefit from O'Bryan's performance.
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owed a duty of care to Claude's identifiable will beneficiaries
who were not his clients, it follows as a matter of law that the
circuit court misapplied Coffey to this case. 14
Next, appellant argues the circuit court erroneously
held that no evidence exists to prove Q'Bryan's negligence.
agree.

We

First, the record discloses that appellant's expert

witness would testify at a trial as to the standard of care owed
by attorneys in estate planning, the consequences of joint
ownership of real property with the right of survivorship, and
the risk that a spouse may renounce a will and take personal
property bequeathed to third parties, especially when
beneficiaries are related to the spouse only by affinity.
Q'Bryan seems to argue that he only prepared the documents as
directed by Claude, who the record indicates had only a third
grade education.

Based on the standard for summary judgment as

expressed in Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.,
Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 483

(1991),15 we do not believe it would be

impossible for appellant to produce evidence at trial warranting
judgment in his favor.

On the one hand, the will and deed

The existence of a duty presents a question of law to be determined by the
court. Mullins v. Commonwealth Life Insurance Co., Ky., 839 S.W.2d 245, 248

14

(1992) .

The Kentucky Supreme Court in Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center,
Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991), stated: "The trial judge must examine
the evidence, not to decide any issue of fact, but to discover if a real
issue exists. It clearly is not the purpose of the summary judgment rule, as
we have often declared, to cut litigants off from their right of trial if
they have issues to try."
15

-9-

clearly expressed an estate plan which was ultimately frustrated
by Doris' renunciation of the will.

On the other hand, Q'Bryan

provided self-serving testimony that he was merely the scrivener
of documents who acted at the direction of a client, albeit one
with only a third-grade education. 16

Additionally, for reasons

not made clear in the record, appellant was never given the
opportunity to depose Doris.

Clearly, issues of material fact

exist which are suitable for determination by the finder of
fact, and summary judgment was inappropriate.
The Jefferson Circuit Court's summary judgment is
reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
A~C~C~.

O'Bryan argues that Claude's estate plan was frustrated by Doris'
renunciation, rather than by any negligence on his part. While that may be
true postmortem, any negligence occurred at the time the estate plan was
implemented. Doris had an absolute right to renounce the will, but in doing
so she was entitled to only one-half of the personalty and one-third of the
realty. As noted previously, if the real property had passed under the te~s
of the will instead of by the deed, Doris would have had little incentive to
exercise her right to elect against the will. Claude's plan then would have
been carried out. The effect of the deed, however, was actually to encourage
Doris to renounce the will. O'Bryan stated in his deposition testimony that
he advised Claude that a survivorship deed would pass the property to Doris
without having to go through probate, and Claude directed the preparation of
the deed "because he wanted there to be no problems or hassles when he died."
This testimony, however, ignores the fact that a specific devise, properly
drafted, also passes property without having to go through probate. See
Stewart v. Morris, 313 Ky. 424, 231 S.W.2d 70, 71 (1950) (court held "the
interest of a devisee vests the instant of testator's death"); 2 James R.
Merritt, Kentucky Practice, Probate Practice and Procedure § 1341 (1984) ("A
classic example of a nonprobate asset is land which passes directly to the
heir or devisee"). In addition, if Claude wanted "no problems or hassles", a
properly drafted anti-terrorem clause would have gone a long way to insuring
that none of the will beneficiaries caused any "problems or hassles."
16
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ADDENDUM

SECTION A

SAMPLE ESTATE PLANNING QUESTIONNAIRE

Initial Contact With the Client

v.

[3.33]

Appendix

A.

[3.34]

Estate Planning Questionnaire

FROST BROWN TODD LLC
CONFIDENTIAL ESTATE PLANNING
QUESTIONNAIRE

ESTATE PLANNING QUESTIONNAIRE
DATE:
Please print or type all of the information requested in this fonn which apply to your
particular situation. If additional space is required, please attach a separate page.

A.

PERSONAL AND FAMILY DATA
1.

Full name of husband:

_

List any other name ever used by husband:

2.

Full name of wife:

_

List any other name ever used by wife (including maiden
name):
_
If the name listed above for either husband or wife is not the usual name used
(e.g., named used on checking account), indicate usual name here:
3.

Birthdates/Ages

Husband:

_

Wife:- - - - - -

4.

Birthplace:

Husband:

_

Wife:- - - - - -

5.

Residence Address:

6.

Telephone Numbers:
Home: <--) _ -__
Office:

Husband: <--) _-__

3-19

Wife: <--) _ -__

Kentucky Estate Planning
'~'---

Ifeither husband or wife has moved to Kentucky in the past ten (10) years, please
list all of the other states in which you have resided.

7.

Citizenship:

Husband:

_

Wife:- - - - - - -

8.

Social Security #: Husband:

_

Wife:

9.

Occupations and Employers:

_

Husband:
Wife:

_

---------------------

10. Business Addresses:
Wife:

Husband:

11. Prior Marriages:
Husband:

Wife:

_

If either husband or wife has been previously married, please indicate if previous
marriage resulted in wife's death, husband's death, or dissolution of marriage. If
result was dissolution ofmarriage, please describe the resulting obligations under
the Decree of Dissolution of Marriage. Please provide copies of any separation,
property settlement, antenuptial agreements, or postnuptial agreements.

12. Children: Please list all children (living and deceased)

Full Name and Address

~

Married? If yes, Please

Names and Ages

Indicate Name of Spouse

of Grandchildren

(a)

3-20

Initial Contact With the Client
(b)

(c)

(d)

If any children listed above are not children of both parties, or if any children are
adopted, please so indicate. Ifany ofthe children are deceased, please so indicate:

13. Data for other persons who will be named in the Will or other
documents we prepare:

Full Name

If Related to Wife or Husband,
State to Whom Related and
Nature of Relationship

Full Address

(a)

(b)

(c)

14. Please indicate if any of the individuals listed in paragraphs 12 and
13 above have special needs ~r problems that will require special
attention after your death and of which we should be aware when
preparing your estate-planning documents.
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B.

FINANCIAL DATA

1.

Cash and Cash Equivalents

(Including savings accounts, checking accounts, CD's, money market funds,
treasury bills, etc.)
H,W,
Institution

J or C*

Type ofAccount

Balance

$

Total

$

*Ownership
H=Husband
W=Wife
J=Jointly Owned
C=Community Property

Real Estate

2.

Description & Location*

Date and
Method of
Acquisitionll*

Estimated
Market
Value
$

Total

*
**

$

_

Cost
Basis

Balance
Of
Mortgage

$- -

$- - - - -

$--

$---

H,W,
J orC

Attach estimates of annual income/loss
Purchase, gift, inheritance, etc.

3.

Securities
Name of Security

Common

Date
Acquiroo

Cost
Basis

Number 0 f Shares
(Including Splits)

Current
Value

_

Total

3-22

Total

OWNER
H,W,J,
CorT*

Initial Contact With the Client
Preferred

_

Total

Total

*Ownership
H=Husband
W=Wife
J=JointlyOwned
C=Community Property
T=Trust

Name of Security

Date
Acquired

Cost
Basis

Number of Shares
or Bonds

Current
Value

Mutual
Funds

Total

Total

Total

Total

BONDS
Corporate

_

Municipal

_

Other

*Ownership
H=Husband
W=Wife
J=JointlyOwned
C=Community Property
T=Trust
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OWNER
H,W,J,
CorT*

Kentucky Estate Planning
4.

Life Insurance
1

2

3

4

5

6

Insured:
HusbandlWife
Owner
Insurance
Company
Policy Number
Type of Policy
(Whole Life or
Term)
Present
Beneficiary and
Contingent
Beneficiary
Issue Date
Face Value
Cash Value
Outstanding
Loan Amount
Agent Name

5. Business Partnerships or Limited Liability Companies: (Attach recent
balance sheet)

(1) Basic information:

_
(c) Type of business organization:
(e.g., corporation, general partnership, proprietorship, limited
liability company)
(2) Distribution of partnership interests (by % or # of units)
General

Value

Limited

Husband:
Wife:
Others:
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Value
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6.

Deferred Compensation Arrangements
Description ofthe
Deferred Compensation
Arrangement

7.

Date
Payments
Begin

Amount ofPayments
Per MonthlYear

Stock Options
Number
of
Shares

Date
of
Issue

Date of
Expiration

Current
Price

Option
Price

FMVAt
Date of
Manner Specified
Exercise** fir PaWlgOrtm Price

(If more space is needed, please attach a separate page)
*Indicate Qualified (Q) or Nonqualified (NQ) options or describe nature thereof.
**Jnclude options exercised to acquire stock currently held.

8.

Retirement Plans

Name of Plan
And Emplowr

Your Annual
Contribution
To Plan

Present
Value
Immediately
Obtainable

Yearly
Retirement
Benefits now
Receivable

Expected
Future
Retirement
Benefits

Death
Benefits

Pension:

#1
#2
Profit Sharing:
#3
#4
Other:
#5
#6
#7
Name of Plan
and Emplo)er
(Continutrl from above)

Date of Active
Participation
in the Plan

Payment Option
Available Upon
Retirement#

Beneficiaries

#1
#2
#3
#4
#5
#6
#7
*For example: lump-sum; annuity for a fixed period; annuity for husband's life; annuity for husband's
and wife's joint li\es.
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9.

Miscellaneous
Description

Value

Ownership
H,WorJ

Collections:

Personal Effects:
Patents,
trademarks, etc:

Other
miscellaneous: *

*Include intangibles such as patents or copyrights, oil and gas rights, mineral rights, contract
rights, etc. For any item generating income, list separately and show your gross or net income
and current value.

10. Liabilities

Interest
Rate

Balance Due
$----

$---

-_%

$----

$---

-_%

Date Loan
Will Be
Paid Off

Bank Loans and Installment Debt:

Other Liabilities (including amounts due under divorce or separation agreements, support
obligations, pltrlges to charities, etc.:
$
$ - - - -_%
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Maker
H,W,orJ

Initial Contact With the Client
11. Income Data

Husband
(a)

Salary or wages

(b)

Interest income

(c)

Dividends

(d)

Rental income

(e)

Pension

(f)

Social Security

(g)

Partnership share

(h)

Capital gains

(i)

Other (identify):

$---

$--

$--

$---

$--

$--

(i)
(ii)
(iii)
TOTALS

C.

ESTATE PLANNING INFORMATION
1.

Do you presently have (please circle appropriate response):
Power of

Attorney

Living Will

Memorandum
ToWill

Husband:

yes/no

yes/no

yes/no

yes/no

yes/no

Wife:

yes/no

yes/no

yes/no

yes/no

yes/no

Please provide us with copies of present Wills, Codicils, Trust Agreements and Trust
Amendments.
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2.

Please list below who you would like to serve as Executor of your estate:
Relationship,
Full Name

--.iUnY

Full Address

(a)
Husband:
IstChoire:

2ndChoire:

(b)
Wife:
1st Choire:

2ndChoire:

3.

Please list below who you would like to serve as Trustee of any trust you
create:
Relationship,
Full Name

--.iUnY

Full Address

(a)
Husband:
IstChoire:

2ndChoire:

(b)
Wife:
IstChoire:

2ndChoire:

4.

Have you considered naming a bank or trust company as Executor or
Successor Executor of your estate or Trustee or Successor Trustee of any
trust you create in the event none of the individuals named is able to
serve as such? If so, which bank or trust company have you considered?
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5.

If neither of you were living, who should take care of your minor children?
Relationship,
Full Name

~

Full Address

1st Choice:

2nd Choice:

6.

If any of your property is to pass to a minor, who should serve as Trustee
to supervise the custody and use of that property until the minor reaches
adulthood?
Relationship,
Full Name

~

Full Address

1st Choice:

2nd Choice:

7.

Please indicate below if either of you is the beneficiary of a trust. If so,
please indicate the names of the Trustor, Trustee and date of the Trust
Agreement and any Amendments, if any. Also, please provide us with a
copy of the trust.

8.

Please indicate below if either ofyou has been granted a general or limited
power of appointment, as well as the name of the Grantor of such power
and whether such power has been or should be exercised. Please provide
us with a copy of the document granting such power.

9.

Please list below and provide us with copies of any and all prior year gift
tax returns and any correspondence from the Internal Revenue Service
regarding such returns.
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10. Do either of you expect to inherit anything from parents or others?

Husband: yes/no

Wife: yes/no

If yes, what type and value of property?

11. If you are a small business owner, please use the space below to describe
the nature of the business, the form of the business (e.g., sole
proprietorship, corporation, general partnership, limited partnership,
limited liability company), your role in the business, the role of any family
members, and how you would like to handle the continuation or winding
up of the business upon your death.

12. Please indicate below how you would like to pass, upon your death, any
real estate or interests in real estate that you own at the time of your
death.

13. Please set forth in the space below how you would like to have the
remainder of your property pass upon your death. In doing so, please
state what should happen in the event that anyone you list were to die
before you.
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14. If a trust for children is desired, age of distribution:

e

Do you prefer distribution all at once, or in staggered amounts?

15. Who should receive your assets if all members of your immediate family
are deceased?
(a) Individuals:
Name:
Address:
Age:

_
_

Relation:- - - - - - - - (b) Charity (ies):

_

~ll~~oc~N~:

Address:

---------------------------

16. If you are considering making specific bequests of money or other'
property to specific individuals, please indicate below:

Full Name

Relationship,
if any

(a)

(b)

(c)
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Dollar Amount or
Full Address

Other Property

Kentucky Estate Planning
17. If you are considering making charitable contributions as part of your
estate plan, please indicate below:

Name of Charity
(a)

Address

Amount of
Contribution

_

(b)

_

(c)

_

Do you contemplate making future gifts? Yes_No_

18. Would you like to have a Power of Attorney drafted as a part of your
estate plan? If yes, please answer the following questions:
(a) Please indicate below your preferences for your attorney-in-fact (i.e., an individual
who will be given the authority to act on your behalf):

Full Name

Relationship,
~

Full Address

(1)
Husband:
1st Choice:

2nd Choice:

(2)
Wife:
1st Choice:

2nd Choice:

(b) Please indicate below whether you would like the Power of Attorney to become
effective immediately upon signing or only upon your incapacity?

Husband:

Wife:

_

---------------------------
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19. Would you like to have a Living Will drafted as part of your estate plan?
If so, please indicate your preferences for an agent below (an agent will
act on your behalf in making medical treatment decisions if you are unable
to do so):
Relationship,
ifany

Full Name

Full Address

(a)
Husband:
1st Choice:

2nd Choice:

(b)
Wife:
1st Choice:

2nd Choice:

20. Would you like a memorandum to your Will disposing of your tangible
personal property drafted as part of your es(ate plan? If so, please so
indicate. YeslNo
21. Please indicate how you would like those items of tangible personal
property which are not covered by a memorandum to your Will to pass
upon your death.

D.

LOCATION OF DOCUMENTS AND OTHER INFORMATION

Safe Deposit Box

.

Birth Certificate

.

Marriage Certificate

.

Antenuptial agrrements or postnuptial

agr~ments

.

Husband's latest Will and codicils

.

Wife's latest Will and rodicils

.

Wills offamily members, ifpertinent

u

Divorce decrees or separation agreements

.
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List ofheirs

.

Military service record

.

Social security card

.

Medical records

-

.

Life insurance policies

..

General insurance policies

.

Stocks

.

Bonds

.

Notes or mortgages receivable

'"

.

Deeds

.

I..eases

.

Estate inventory

.

Appraisals

.

Bankbooks

.

Financial records

.

Income tax returns, federal, state & city for last
6 years & copies of revenue agent's rePOrts
Gift tax returns, federal and state

.
'"

..

Balance sheets and profit/loss statanents
for last five years

.

Busin~s

.

agreements

Employment contracts

.

Employee benefit plan statanents

.

Pension, profit sharing andother
retirement plans

.

Closely-held corporation buy-sell agreements

.

Partnership agreements

.

instru~nts

.

Trust

Cemetery deeds

.

Directions regarding burial

.
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Miscellaneous doannents and property

.
~

Other

E.

ADVISORS
Accountant:
Trust Officer:

_

----------------------

Commercial Bank:

_

Stock broker or financial advisor:

--------------

Life insurance agent:

_

Clergy:

_

Physicians:

_

Other attorney:

F.

.

_

GENERAL COMMENTS
If there is any additional information which we should be aware of in preparing
your estate plan, please so indicate below:
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I.

[6.11

Introduction

A.

[6.2]

Scope of Materials

The scope of these materials is limited to common planning situations. Not discussed are the issues surrounding
the effective date rules, the rules for grandfathered trusts or the rules dealing with liability for the tax. Nor is there
discussion ofthe rules relating to nonresident aliens. Resources for consultation about all issues include Practical Drafting
(US Trust; Richard B. Covey, editor), especially the January 1990 issue and the updates following, and Harrington and
Acker, 444-2nd T.M., Generation-Skipping Tax. Examples in the text are taken from the final generation skipping tax
regulations issued December 26, 1995, and have been modified as necessary to reflect changes in the law since that time.
All references to "sections" refer to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

B.

[6.3]

History of the Generation Skipping Transfer Tax

In 1916 the federal estate tax was enacted, followed by the federal gift tax. The latter was thought necessary
to prevent taxpayers from avoiding the estate tax through lifetime gifts. A perceived loophole remained, in the form of
generation skipping transfers.
Suppose a parent created a trust in which a child of the parent, and that child's issue, could receive income
and principal in the trustee's discretion for their health, education, maintenance, and support. Such a trust would not be
included in the child's estate at the child's death because the child would have none of the powers or rights over the trust
that cause estate tax inclusion. Nor would such a trust create any gift from child to child's issue. Child could even be given
a special power of appointment among the parent's issue (or even among any person or entity, excluding the child, the
child's estate, the child's creditors and the creditors of the child's estate) without causing inclusion in the child's estate.
The effect of the trust described would be to pass undistributed principal through multiple generations while
paying transfer tax only at the parent's death. The only limit to such a trust would be a state law against alienation, such
as the rule against perpetuities.
The benefit of a generation skipping trust would be maximized if the trust were very large such that the
beneficiaries would require income distributions only, allowing the principal to remain intact to grow and be available
to succeeding generations. Wealthy families were thought to be more advantaged, therefore, because their trusts were
especially likely to be very large. Thus, the ability to create trusts which would escape gift or estate taxation for multiple
generations was thought to be primarily a loophole for the wealthiest.
In 1976 Congress attempted to close the loophole by enacting a generation skipping transfer tax. The tax was
terribly complicated, and closed only some ofthe perceived loopholes. In 1986 the old tax was repealed, retroactively, and
a new generation skipping transfer tax (referred to here as the "GST") was enacted as Chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue
Code covering sections 2601 to 2663.
In 2001, in an effort to honor campaign promises to repeal the Federal estate tax, the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) was enacted. The most notable effect of EGTRRA is that it will repeal
the estate and GST taxes in 2010 before it expires on December 31,2010, and both are reinstated in 2011. In addition,
EGTRRA made several significant changes to the GST tax rules that were intended to reduce the risk of harm to taxpayers
for inadvertent failures to make certain elections and by other traps found in the complex rules of Chapter 13. As with the
other provisions ofEGTRRA, these changes are currently scheduled to expire on December 31, 2010.

II.

[6.4]

Operation of the GST

The GST rate is the highest federal estate tax rate, which was historically 55% and is currently 49% in 2003. The
GST is imposed on taxable distributions, taxable terminations, and direct skips which have not been exempted from the tax
either because the transfer is nontaxable, or because a portion of the GST exemption is used.

A.

[6.51

Terms

The transferor is the person who made the gift, ifthe transfer is subject to gift tax, or the decedent ifthe transfer is
subject to estate tax. A skip person is a person who is two or more generations below the transferor. Treas. Reg. § 26.26121(d). A trust may be a skip person ifno non-skip persons have an interest in the trust, or ifno one has an interest in the trust
but no distributions may be made to non-skip persons.
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Examples:

Identity ofTransferor. T transfers $100,000 to a trust for the sole benefit ofT's grandchild. The
transfer is a completed gift. Thus, T is the transferor of the $100,000. It is immaterial that a
portion ofthe transfer is excluded from the total amount ofT's taxable gift by reason of section
2503(b).
Gift Splitting and Identity of Transferor. The facts are the same as in the previous example,
except T's spouse, S, consents under section 2513 to split the gift with T. For purposes of
chapter 13, Sand T are each treated as a transferor of $50,000 to the trust.
Change of Transferor on Subsequent Transfer Tax Event. T transfers $100,000 to a trust
providing that all the net trust income is to be paid to T's spouse, S, for S's lifetime. T elects
under section 2523(f) to treat the transfer as a transfer of qualified terminable interest property,
and T does not make the reverse QTIP election under section 2652(a)(3). On S's death, the trust
property is included in S's gross estate under section 2044. Thus, S becomes the transferor at
the time ofS's death.
Effect of Lapse of Withdrawal Right on Identity of Transferor. T transfers $10,000 to a new
trust providing that the trust income is to be paid to T's child, C, for C's life and, on the death of
C, the trust principal is to be paid to T's grandchild, GC. The trustee has discretion to distribute
principal for GC's benefit during C's lifetime. C has a right to withdraw $10,000 from the trust
for a 60-day period following the transfer. Thereafter, the power lapses. C does not exercise
the withdrawal right. The transfer by T is a completed transfer within the meaning of section
27.2511-2 of this chapter and, thus, T is treated as having transferred the entire $10,000 to the
trust. On the lapse of the withdrawal right, C becomes a transferor to the extent C is treated as
having made a completed transfer for purposes of chapter 12. Therefore, except to the extent
that the amount with respect to which the power of withdrawal lapses exceeds the greater of
$5,000 or 5% of the value ofthe trust property, T remains the transferor ofthe trust property for
purposes of chapter 13.
A taxable distribution is a distribution from a trust ofincome or principal to a skip person and a taxable termination
is a termination ofan interest in the trust by the last non-skip person such that only skip persons have an interest in the trust.
A direct skip is a transfer to a skip person.
Examples:

Direct Skip. T gratuitously conveys Blackacre to T's grandchild. Because the transfer is a
transfer to a skip person of property subject to Federal gift tax, it is a direct skip.
Direct Skip of More Than One Generation. T gratuitously conveys Blackacre to T's greatgrandchild. The transfer is a direct skip. Only one GST tax is imposed on the direct skip
although two generations are skipped by the transfer.
Withdrawal Power in Trust. T transfers $50,000 to a new trust providing that trust income
is to be paid to T's child, C, for life and, on C's death, the trust principal is to be paid to T's
descendants. Under the terms of the trust, T grants four grandchildren the right to withdraw
$10,000 from the trust for a 60 day period following the transfer. Since C, who is not a skip
person, has an interest in the trust, the trust is not a skip person. T's transfer to the trust is not
a direct skip.
Taxable Termination. T establishes an irrevocable trust under which the income is to be paid to
T's child, C, for life. On the death of C, the trust principal is to be paid to T's grandchild, GC.
Since C has an interest in the trust, the trust is not a skip person and the transfer to the trust is
not a direct skip. If C dies survived by GC, a taxable termination occurs at C's death because
C's interest in the trust terminates and thereafter the trust property is held by a skip person who
occupies a lower generation than C.
Direct Skip ofProperty Held in Trust. T establishes a testamentary trust under which the income
is to be paid to T's surviving spouse, S, for life and the remainder is to be paid to a grandchild
ofT and S. T's executor elects to treat the trust as qualified terminable interest property under
section 2056(b)(7). The transfer to the trust is not a direct skip because S, a person who is not
a skip person, holds a present right to receive income from the trust. Upon S's death, the trust
property is included in S's gross estate under section 2044 and passes directly to a skip person.
The GST occurring at that time is a direct skip because it is a transfer subject to chapter 11. The
fact that the interest created by T is terminated at S's death is immaterial because S becomes the
transferor at the time of the transfer subject to chapter 11.
Taxable Termination. T establishes an irrevocable trust for the benefit of T's child, C, T's
grandchild, GC, and T's great-grandchild, GGC. Under the terms of the trust, income and
principal may be distributed to any or all of the living beneficiaries at the discretion of the
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trustee. Upon the death of the second beneficiary to die, the trust principal is to be paid to the
survivor. C dies first. A taxable termination occurs at that time because, immediately after C's
interest terminates, all interests in the trust are held by skip persons (GC and GGC).
Partial Taxable Termination. T creates an irrevocable trust providing that trust income is to be
paid to T's children, A and B, in such proportions as the trustee determines for their joint lives.
On the death ofthe first child to die, one-half ofthe trust principal is to be paid to T's then living
grandchildren. The balance ofthe trust principal is to be paid to T's grandchildren on the death
of the survivor of A and B. If A predeceases B, the distribution occurring on the termination
ofA's interest in the trust is a taxable termination and not a taxable distribution. It is a taxable
termination because the distribution is a distribution of a portion of the trust that occurs as a
result of the death of A, a lineal descendant to T. It is immaterial that a portion of the trust
continues and that B, a person other than a skip person, thereafter holds an interest in the trust.
Taxable Distribution. T establishes an irrevocable trust under which the trust income is payable
to T's child, C, for life. When T's grandchild, GC, attains 35 years of age, GC is to receive onehalf of the principal. The remaining one-half of the principal is to be distributed to GC on C's
death. Assume that C survives until GC attains age 35. When the trustee distributes one-halfof
the principal to GC on GC's 35th birthday, the distribution is a taxable distribution because it is
a distribution to a skip person and is neither a taxable termination nor a direct skip.
Exercise ofWithdrawal Right as Taxable Distribution. The facts are the same as in the example
immediately above, except GC holds a continuing right to withdraw trust principal and after
one year GC withdraws $10,000. The withdrawal by GC is not a taxable termination because
the withdrawal does not terminate C's interest in the trust. The withdrawal by GC is a taxable
distribution to GC.
Section 2651(e) (formerly s § 2612(c)(2) creates the predeceased child exception. If, at the time of a GST
transfer, a child of transferor (or transferor's spouse) has died, the child's children will be treated as having moved up a
generation for purposes ofdetermining whether or not a direct skip occurs. The child's children's issue will also be moved
up a generation. The benefit exists for direct skips and for taxable terminations and taxable distributions occurring after
December 31, 1997, provided that the parent of the relevant transferee was deceased at the time of the original transfer.
The benefit also exists for a transferor's grandnieces and grandnephews where the transferor has no descendants and the
transferor's sibling has died. Disclaimers may not be used to create a "predeceased" child; the disclaimer will not be
effective to change the assignment of generations.
Examples:

Predeceased Ancestor Exception. T establishes an irrevocable trust providing that trust income
is to be paid to T's grandchild, GC, for 5 years. At the end of the 5-year period, the trust is to
terminate and the principal is to be distributed to GC. T's child, C, a parent of GC, is deceased
at the time T establishes the trust. Therefore, GC is treated as a child of T rather than as a
grandchild. As a result, GC is not a skip person, and the initial transfer to the trust is not a direct
skip. Similarly, distributions to GC during the term of the trust and at the termination of the
trust will not be GSTs.
Predeceased Ancestor Exception Applicable for Taxable Termination. The facts are the same
as in the example immediately above, except the trust income is to be paid to T's .spouse, S,
during the first two years of the trust. Since S has an interest in the trust, the trust is not a skip
person and the transfer by T is not a direct skip. However, since C was deceased at the time of
the original transfer, the predeceased ancestor rule does apply and GC is treated at the child of
T. No taxable termination occurs at the expiration ofS's interest.
Predeceased Ancestor Exception not Applicable. The facts are the same as in the example
immediately above, except T's child, C, a parent of GC, is alive at the time T establishes the
trust. Since C was alive at the time of the original transfer, the predeceased ancestor rule does
not apply and GC is not treated as the child ofT. A taxable termination occurs at the expiration
of S's interest.
Treas. Reg. § 26.2612-1(a)(2) provides that if a child dies within 90 days after the transfer, and by the terms ofthe
trust instrument or applicable state law is treated as having predeceased the transferor, then the predeceased child exception
applies. The Taxpayer ReliefAct of 1997 replaced former section 2612(c)(2) with section 2651(e). However, no policy
reason exists why the 90 day survivorship rule would not be applied under the new statute. Kentucky has no such statute,
thus this desirable feature will need to be added to the trust instrument. Treas. Reg. § 26.2612-1(a)(2).

B.

[6.61

Comparison of Types ofGST Transfers

Taxable distributions and taxable terminations have the GST calculated on a tax-inclusive basis. Direct skips
have the GST calculated on a tax-exclusive basis. Thus, the "effective rate" on a direct skip is less than that assessed
against a taxable distribution or taxable termination.
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c.

f6.71

Multiple Skips

If a trust is established to pay income and principal to a child for life, then to grandchildren for their lives, with
the remainder to be distributed to the great-grandchildren, there will be a taxable termination at the child's death-because
only non-skip persons will have an interest in the trust thereafter-and again at the death ofthe last grandchild. Postponing
and minimizing multiple skips is an important part ofthe planning process because there is no equivalent to the previously
taxed property credit for multiple skips regardless of how close in time they occur.
Examples:

Simultaneous Termination of Interests of More Than One Beneficiaty. T establishes an
irrevocable trust for the benefit of T's child, C, T's grandchild, GC, and T's great-grandchild,
GGC. Under the terms ofthe trust, income and principal may be distributed to any or all ofthe
living beneficiaries at the discretion of the trustee. Upon the death ofC, the trust property is to
be distributed to GGC ifthen living. IfC is survived by both GC and GGC, both C's and GC's
interests in the trust will terminate on C's death. However, because both interests will terminate
at the same time and as a result of one event, only one taxable termination occurs.
Multiple Generations. T transfers property to an irrevocable trust for the benefit of T's
grandchild, GC, and great-grandchild, GGC. During GC's life, the trust income may be
distributed to GC and GGC in the trustee's absolute discretion. At GC's death, the trust property
passes to GGC. Both GC and GGC have an interest in the trust for purposes of chapter 13. The
transfer by T to the trust is a direct skip, and the property is held in trust immediately after the
transfer. After the direct skip, the transferor is treated as being one generation above GC, the
highest generation individual having an interest in the trust. Therefore, GC is no longer a skip
person and distributions to GC are not taxable distributions. However, because GGC occupies
a generation that is two generations below the deemed generation to T, GGC is a skip person
and distributions of trust income to GGC are taxable distributions.
Generation Assignment. T transfers property to an irrevocable trust providing that the income
is to be paid to T's child, C, for life. At C's death, the trust income is to be accumulated for 10
years and added to principal. At the end of the 10-year accumulation period, the trust income
is to be paid to T's grandchild, GC, for life. Upon GC's death, the trust property is to be paid
to T's great-grandchild, GGC, or to GGC's estate. A GST occurs at C's death. Immediately
after C's death and during the 10-year accumulation period, no person has an interest in the
trust within the meaning of section 2652(c) and section 26.2612-1(e) because no one can
receive current distributions of income or principal. Immediately after C's death, T is treated
as occupying the generation above the generation of GC (the trust beneficiary in existence at
the time of the GST who then occupies the highest generation level of any person who may
subsequently hold an interest in the trust). Thus, subsequent income distributions to GC are not
taxable distributions.

D.

[6.81

GST Exemption and Inclusion Ratios

1.

[6.9]

Generally

Each transferor has a $1,000,000 GST exemption which may be used for the transferor's own transfers only. For
gifts split by spouses each spouse is treated as the transferor of one-half of the gifts. Since 1999, the GST exemption has
been adjusted for inflation each year and is currently, $1,120,000. The GST exemption will continue to be indexed for
inflation until December 31, 2003, at which time it will equal the applicable exclusion amount for estate taxes, increasing
from $1.5 million in 2004 to $3.5 million in 2009. Section 2631 (c).
The GST is calculated by multiplying the rate by the inclusion ratio, which is 1 minus the "applicable fraction."
The numerator of the applicable fraction is the amount of GST exemption allocated to the trust (or to the assets in the
case of a direct skip not in trust) and the denominator is the value of the property transferred in trust (or transferred in a
direct skip not in trust) (reduced by the sum of federal estate and state death tax incurred by and recovered from the trust
or assets, the amount of charitable deduction, if any, and, if a direct skip, the amount which is a non-taxable gift, if any).
Treas. Reg. § 26.2642-1.
Example:

Computation of the Inclusion Ratio. T transfers $100,000 to a newly-created irrevocable
trust providing that income is to be accumulated for 10 years. At the end of 10 years, the
accumulated income is to be distributed to T's child, C, and the trust principal is to be paid to
T's grandchild. T allocated $40,000 of T's GST exemption to the trust on a timely-filed gift
tax return. The applicable fraction with respect to the trust is .40 ($40,000 (the amount ofGST
exemption allocated to the trust) over $100,000 (the value of the property transferred to the
trust)). The inclusion ratio is .60 (1 - .40). Ifthe maximum Federal estate tax rate is 49 percent
at the time of a GST, the rate of tax applicable to the transfer (applicable rate) will be .29 (49
percent (the maximum estate tax rate) x .60 (the inclusion ratio)).
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2.

[6.101

Desirable Inclusion Ratios

If the amount of property which will pass into a generation skipping trust exceeds the amount of the transferor's
GST exemption, then an inclusion ratio of between one and zero will result. Such is undesirable because a subsequent
distribution of income or principal from the trust to a child has the effect of wasting OST exemption, and a subsequent
distribution of income or principal to a grandchild is partially subject to the GST. Thus, it is preferable to create two trusts,
one which is completely subject to the GST and one which is completely exempt.

3.

[6.111

Use ofGST Exemption

Because the amount of GST exemption remains constant, it is more desirable to allocate exemption during the
transferor's lifetime than at the transferor's death, assuming that the value of the trust to which the exemption is allocated
increases in value from the date of allocation to the date of death. The effect of the allocation can be significant when
projected over a long period of time if assets substantially increase in value.
Special issues occur when considering whether to allocate GST exemption to life insurance. Generally, GST
exemption should not be allocated to the premiums given to an irrevocable trust which is the owner of term insurance
because most term insurance polices lapse prior to the insured's death. Premiums used for permanent insurance which
is likely to remain in force until the insured's death will be a better candidate for GST exemption allocation. For new
policies, the value of the policy while it is relatively new but older than one year will generally be less than the amount
of the premiums paid; thus, it is possible to make a late allocation of GST exemption to the actual value of the policy,
thereby using less GST exemption than would have been used otherwise. If the insured dies, however, then the strategy
will produce a terrible result. In addition, there are administrative difficulties with the strategy, including the need to obtain
from the insurance company the value of the policy (typically a Form 712) for a specific future date-the date on which
the allocation is to be made.

4.

[6.121

QTIP Trusts

The identity of the transferor shifts when the assets are included in a second person's estate. Such occurs with a
qualified terminable interest property (QTIP) trust. Section 2523(f) allows the initial spouse-transferor to opt out of this
shift by making a reverse QTIP election; the effect ofthe election is to preserve the first spouse as the transferor even after
the QTIP assets are included in the surviving spouse's estate for estate tax purposes. The benefit of the election is that the
first spouse may allocate OST exemption to the QTIP trust.

Example:
Effect of Reverse QTIP Election on Identity of the Transferor. T establishes a testamentary
trust having a principal of $500,000. Under the terms of the trust, all trust income is payable
to T's surviving spouse, S, during S's lifetime. T's executor makes an election to treat the trust
property as qualified terminable interest property and also makes the reverse QTIP election.
For purposes of chapter 13, T is the transferor with respect to the trust. On S's death, the then
full fair market value ofthe trust is includible in S's gross estate under section 2044. However,
because ofthe reverse QTIP election, S does not become the transferor with respect to the trust;
T continues to be the transferor.
The reverse QTIP election is not available for the general power of appointment marital deduction trust described
under § 2056(b)(5). Thus, if a reverse QTIP election is to be made for such a trust, the general power of appointment must
be eliminated, by, for example, a disclaimer of the power by the surviving spouse.
A reverse QTIP election must be made for all or none of a QTIP trust. To the extent that the value of the QTIP
trust exceeds the amount ofthe first spouse's available GST exemption, as it generally will, then the QTIP trust will need to
be divided so that the reverse QTIP election may be made for one part of the divided QTIP trust but not for the other part.
Another important benefit of the reverse QTIP election is that the estate taxes in the surviving spouse's estate
that will be paid from the QTIP trust may be paid, in total, from the portion of the QTIP trust as to which no reverse
QTIP election was made. The effect is to preserve the amount to which GST exemption was allocated at the first death.
Absent this special rule, the payment of estate taxes by one trust which were owed by another trust would be treated as a
constructive addition to the benefited trust.

Examples:
Effect of Reverse QTIP Election on Constructive Additions. The facts are the same as in the
previous example, except the inclusion ofthe QTIP trust in S's gross estate increased the Federal
estate tax liability of S's estate by $200,000. The estate does not exercise the right of recovery
from the trust granted under section 2207A. Under local law, the beneficiaries of S's residuary
estate (which bears all estate taxes under the will) could compel the executor to exercise the
right of recovery but do not do so. Solely for purposes of chapter 13, the beneficiaries of the
residuary estate are not treated as having made an addition to the trust by reason oftheir failure
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to exercise their right ofrecovery. Because ofthe reverse QTIP election, for GST purposes, the
trust property is not treated as includible in S's gross estate and, under those circumstances, no
right of recovery exists.
Effect of Reverse QTIP Election on Constructive Additions. S, the surviving spouse ofT, dies
testate. At the time of S's death, S was the beneficiary of a trust with respect to which T's
executor made a QTIP election under section 2056(b)(7). Thus, the trust is includible in S's
gross estate under section 2044. T's executor also made the reverse QTIP election with respect
to the trust. S's will provides that all death taxes payable with respect to the trust are payable
from S's residuary estate. Since the transferor of the property is determined without regard to
section 2044 and section 2207A, S is not treated as making a constructive addition to the trust
by reason of the tax apportionment clause in S's will.
A reverse QTIP election must be made on a timely filed Federal estate tax return to be effective. Treas. Reg. §
26.2652-2(b). However, if the executor fails to make the election on the return, the executor may request an extension
of time to make the election under Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3. The Commissioner has the discretion to grant an extension
of time to make the election if the taxpayer can demonstrate that the taxpayer acted reasonably and in good faith and the
grant of relief will not prejudice the interests of the government. The request for an extension of time must be submitted
as a request for a private letter ruling and must include affidavits from the taxpayer and all of the taxpayer's advisors who
have knowledge of the relevant facts.

E.

r6.131

Allocation ofGST Exemption

In general, all allocations of GST exemption, other than to cash gifts, should be made by a formula, which need
not be complicated. Treas. Reg. §26.2632-1(b)(2)(i). (Formula allocations are limited with respect to charitable lead
annuity trusts.) A typical formula would be as follows:

1.

Taxpayer allocates to the transfer so much GST exemption as is necessary to produce an
inclusion ratio o/zero. Taxpayer believes that $
is the necessary amount.
[6.141 Allocations During the Transferor's Lifetime, Generally

An allocation ofGST exemption to property transferred during the transferor's lifetime, other than in a direct skip,
is made on a Form 709. For direct skips, GST exemption is automatically allocated unless the transferor opts out.

Example:
Automatic Allocation to Split-Gift Direct Skip. On May 15, 2003, T transfers $50,000 to a trust
in a direct skip. T does not file a timely gift tax return electing out of the automatic allocation.
On April 30, 2005, T and T's spouse, S, file an initial gift tax return for 2003 on which they
consent, pursuant to section 2513, to have the gift treated as if one-halfhad been made by each.
As a result of the election under section 2513, which is retroactive to the date ofT's transfer,
T and S are each treated as the transferor of one-half of the property transferred in the direct
skip. Thus, $25,000 ofT's unused GST exemption and $25,000 ofS's unused GST exemption
is automatically allocated to the trust. Both allocations are effective on and after the date that
T made the transfer.
The allocation must clearly identify the trust to which the allocation is being made and the amount of GST
exemption allocated to it. If the allocation is late or, if an inclusion ratio greater than zero is claimed, the value ofthe trust
assets at the effective date of allocation must be stated. The allocation should also state the inclusion ratio ofthe trust after
the allocation.
If more GST exemption is allocated to a trust than is needed to produce an inclusion ratio of zero, the excess
allocation is void. An allocation is also void ifthe allocation is made with respect to a trust that has no GST potential with
respect to the transferor making the allocation, at the time of allocation.
An allocation to a lifetime transfer that is made late (i.e. other than on a timely filed Form 709) is effective on
the date it is postmarked to the appropriate IRS Service Center. If an allocation is made on the same date as a transfer
subject to the generation skipping tax, the allocation is deemed to have preceded the taxable event. Treas. Reg. §26.26321(b)(2)(ii).

For administrative ease, a transferor may treat an allocation as having been made on the first day ofa month during
which the late allocation is made. For example, if a Form 709 is filed on March 15, the assets to which the exemption is
being allocated may be valued on March 1. This prevents the necessity of valuing, for example, marketable securities, on
the same day that a return needs to be filed. Life insurance is not eligible for this exception if the insured dies between the
first day of the month and the date of allocation. Treas. Reg. §26.2632-I(c)(2).
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Examples:
Modification of Allocation of GST Exemption. T transfers $100,000 to an irrevocable
generation-skipping trust on December 1, 2003. The transfer to the trust is not a direct skip.
The date prescribed for filing the gift tax return reporting the taxable gift tax is April 15,
2004. On February 10,2004, T files Form 709 allocating $50,000 ofGST exemption to the
trust. On April 10 of the same year, T files an amended Form 709 allocating $100,000 ofGST
exemption to the trust in a manner that clearly indicates the intention to modify and supersede
the prior allocation with respect' to the 2003 transfer. The allocation made on the April 10
return supersedes the prior allocation because it is made on a timely-filed Form 709 that clearly
identifies the trust and the nature and extent of the modification of GST exemption allocation.
The allocation of $100,000 ofGST exemption to the trust is effective as of December 1,2003.
The result would be the same if the amended Form 709 decreased the amount of the GST
exemption allocated to the trust.
Modification of Allocation of GST Exemption. The facts are the same as in the previous
example, except on July 10, 2004, T files Form 709 attempting to reduce the earlier allocation.
The return is not a timely-filed return. The $100,000 GST exemption allocated to the trust, as
amended on April 10, 2004, remains in effect because an allocation, once made, is irrevocable
and may not be modified after the last date on which a timely-filed Form 709 can be filed.
Effective Date of Late Allocation of GST Exemption. T transfers $100,000 to an irrevocable
generation-skipping trust on December 1, 2003. The transfer to the trust is not a direct skip.
The date prescribed for filing the gift tax return reporting the taxable gift is April 15, 2004.
On December 1, 2004, T files a Form 709 and allocates $50,000 to the trust. The allocation is
effective as of December 1, 2004.
Effective Date of Late Allocation of GST Exemption. T transfers $100,000 to a generationskipping trust on December 1, 2003, in a transfer that is not a direct skip. T does not make an
allocation of GST exemption on a timely-filed Form 709. On July 1, 2004, the trustee makes
a taxable distribution from the trust to T's grandchild in the amount of $30,000. Immediately
prior to the distribution, the value ofthe trust assets was $150,000. On the same date, T allocates
GST exemption to the trust in the amount of $50,000. The allocation ofGST exemption on the
date of the transfer is treated as preceding in point of time the taxable distribution. At the time
ofthe GST, the trust has an inclusion rate of .6667 (1- (50,000/150,000)).

2.

[6.151

Allocation ofGST Exemption, ETIPRules

Treas. Reg. §26.2632-1 (c)(2). There are special rules with respect to GST exemption allocation to some lifetime
transfers. If an estate tax inclusion period (ETIP) exists, then an allocation is not effective until the end of the ETIP. An
ETIP exists during the period in which the value of property transferred would be includable, other than by reason of
section 2035, in the gross estate of the transferor or the spouse of the transferor if the death of either one were to occur
immediately after the transfer. For example, if the grantor of a grantor retained annuity trust (GRAT), or a qualified
personal residence trust (QPRT) were to die immediately after the date the trust were created, the assets ofthe trust would
be included in the transferor's estate. Thus, GST exemption cannot be allocated to a GRAT or a QPRT until the ETIP
terminates (in this instance, when the property would no longer be included in the transferor's estate-at the end of the
GRAT or QPRT term).
The ETIP rules also encompass trusts in which a spouse has a right to withdraw assets. For example, in a standard
Crummey trust if a spouse is given the right to withdraw $10,000 for 30 days after the transferor makes a gift to the trust,
there will be an ETIP until that right of withdrawal lapses. If the power "hangs" so as to prevent the spouse from making
a taxable gift to the trust the ETIP will continue beyond the 30 day period. So long as the ETIP continues with respect to
the trust, no GST exemption may be allocated to the trust.
An exception to the ETIP rules allows the ETIP issue to be eliminated for a Crummey trust by limiting the
transferor's spouse's withdrawal right to the greater of$5,000 or 5% of the trust property, so long as the spouse's right of
withdrawal terminates no later than 60 days after the transfer to the trust. Of course, if the value ofthe trust is $200,000 or
more, then the 5% amount will protect a $10,000 withdrawal right, and thus the results are the same.
Examples:
Allocation of GST Exemption During ETIP. The trust instrument provides that trust income
is to be paid to T for 9 years or until T's prior death. The trust principal is to be paid to T's
grandchild on the termination of T's income interest. If T dies within the 9-year period, the
value ofthe trust principal is includible in T's gross estate under section 2036(a). Thus, the trust
is subject to an ETIP. T files a timely Form 709 reporting the transfer and allocating $100,000
of GST exemption to the trust. The allocation of GST exemption to the trust is not effective
until the termination of the ETIP.
Effect of Prior Allocation on Termination of ETIP. The facts are the same as in the previous
example, except the trustee has the power to invade trust principal on behalf ofT's grandchild,
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GC, during the term ofT's income interest. In year 4, when the value of the trust is $200,000,
the trustee distributes $15,000 to GC. The distribution is a taxable distribution. The ETIP with
respect to the property distributed to GC terminates at the time ofthe taxable distribution. Solely
for purposes of determining the trust's inclusion ratio with respect to the taxable distribution,
the prior $100,000 allocation ofGST exemption (as well as any additional allocation made on
a timely ETIP return) is effective immediately prior to the taxable distribution. See section
26.2642-1(b)(2). The trust's inclusion ratio with respect to the taxable distribution is therefore
.50 (1-(100,000/200,000)).
Split-Gift Transfers Subject to ETIP. The trust instrument provides that trust income is to be
paid to T for 9 years or until T's prior death. The trust principal is to be paid to T's grandchild
on the termination ofT's income interest. T files a timely Form 709 reporting the transfer. T's
spouse, S, consents to have the gift treated as made one-halfby S under section 2513. Because
S is treated as transferring one-half of the property to T's grandchild, S becomes the transferor
of one-half of the trust for purposes of chapter 13. Because the value of the trust would be
includible in T's gross estate if T died immediately after the transfer, S's transfer is subject to
an ETIP. IfS should die prior to the termination ofthe trust, S's executor may allocate S's GST
exemption to the trust, but only to the portion ofthe trust for which S is treated as the transferor.
However, the allocation does not become effective until the earlier of the expiration of T's
income interest or T's death.
Transfer of Retained Interest as ETIP Termination. The trust instrument provides that trust
income is to be paid to T for 9 years or until T's prior death. The trust principal is to be paid to
T's grandchild on the termination of T's income interest. Four years after the initial transfer,
T transfers the income interest to T's sibling. The ETIP with respect to the trust terminates on
T's transfer of the income interest because, after the transfer, the trust property would not be
includible in T's gross estate (other than by reason of section 2035) ifT died at that time.

3.

[6.161

Relief from Late Allocations and Retroactive Allocations

EGTRRA makes two significant modifications to Chapter 13 which allow the transferor to make an allocation
ofGST exemption based on the value of the transfer at the time of the transfer although the allocation is being made at a
later date. First is the addition of § 2642(g)(I), which grants relief from late elections. Section 2642(g)(I) authorizes the
Secretary of the Treasury to grant an extension of time to make a timely election to allocate GST exemption (or to elect
out of the automatic allocation rules) to a transfer to a trust without regard to whether any limitations period has expired.
If such relief is granted, the allocation is made using the gift tax or estate tax value of the transfer to the trust at the time
ofthe transfer. In determining whether to grant such relief, the Service will consider all relevant circumstances, including
evidence of the taxpayer's intent as contained in the trust instrument or instrument of transfer. The request for such relief
must follow the provisions of Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3 and must take the form as a request for a private letter ruling.
Notice 2001-50.
Second is the ability under § 2631(d) to make a retroactive allocation ofGST exemption when there is an unnatural
order of deaths and the predeceased ancestor rule does not apply. If a lineal descendant of the transferor who is a nonskip person predeceases the transferor, the transferor may make an allocation of any unused GST exemption to previous
transfers to the trust on a chronological basis. The allocation, applicable fraction and inclusion ratio will be determined
based on the value of the property on the date it was transferred to the trust. This provision is only effective for non-skip
persons who die after December 31, 2000.

4.

[6.171

Allocations at the Decedent's Death

Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-1(d). The decedent's unused GST exemption is automatically allocated at the due date for
filing the Form 706, to the extent not otherwise allocated by the decedent's executor on or before that date. The automatic
allocation occurs whether or not a Form 706 is actually required to be filed.
Unused generation skipping tax exemption is allocated first to direct skips treated as occurring at the transferor's
death then to trusts with respect to which a taxable termination may occur or from which a taxable distribution may be
made. The automatic allocation is irrevocable. No automatic allocation is made to a trust that will have a new transferor
with respect to the entire trust prior to the occurrence of any generation skipping transfer (for example, a QTIP trust).
Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-1(d)(2).
An executor allocates generation skipping tax exemption either on a Form 709, for property that was given during
the transferor's lifetime, or on the Form 706. The allocation should identify the trust and the amount of the deceased's
GST exemption allocated to the trust, and the executor may allocate the decedent's generation skipping tax exemption by
use of a formula. An executor's allocation to a trust that has no GST potential with respect to the transferor for whom the
allocation is being made is void.

The authority given to the executor could be in a provision similar to:
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Generation Skipping Tax Elections. To allocate any part of my generation skipping exemption
to any property of which I was the transferor and including property transferred by me during
life as to which I did not make an allocation prior to my death. I desire Personal Representative
to allocate said exemption in a manner which, in Personal Representative's opinion, will most
likely produce the least overall generation skipping tax; and/or delay the payment of any such
tax for as long a period as possible, for I realize that tax laws are ever changing and this tax
may be eliminated in the future. Personal Representative will incur no liability for exercising
discretion regarding allocation of this exemption and no compensating adjustments will be
made.

F.

[6.181

Division of Trusts

Treas. Reg. §26.2654-1. GST exemption, once allocated to a trust, cannot be segregated if the trust is later
divided. For example, if$l,OOO,OOO ofGST exemption is allocated to a trust with a value of$2,000,000, then the trust will
have an inclusion ratio of one-half; a subsequent division of the trust into two trusts of $1 ,000,000 each will produce two
trusts each with an inclusion ratio of one-half.
On the other hand, if the trust discussed in the previous paragraph were divided prior to the time that GST
exemption were allocated then two trusts of $1,000,000 could be produced, one with an inclusion ratio of zero and the
other with an inclusion ratio of one. Each of the new trusts must have the same succession of interests and beneficiaries
as the original trust.

1.

[6.191

Authority to Divide

The authority to divide the trust must be given by the instrument itself or by applicable state law. Many states
have a statute specifically authorizing the division; Kentucky, however, has no such statute. In Kentucky, therefore, ifthere
is no authority given by the instrument, reliance must be placed on the general authority given to the district court under
KRS 386.675 with respect to trusts. Ajudicial proceeding to divide a trust must begin prior to the time the Form 706 is
due (including extensions granted).

2.

[6.201

Division ofAssets

Care must be taken when dividing the assets of the original trust to create the new trust. Typically, the division
occurs on a fractional basis. The assets need not be divided pro rata, so long as the funding is based on either the fair
market value of the assets at the date of funding or in a manner that fairly reflects the net appreciation and depreciation
in the value of the assets between the date of the transfer (e.g. death) and the date of funding. However, the trust may be
divided using a pecuniary amount if the instrument directs, but interest must be paid on the pecuniary share or the assets
must fairly reflect appreciation and depreciation (which often will result in a capital gain to the trust as a result of funding
a pecuniary obligation with appreciated assets).
A form provision usable for all trusts could read as follows:

ITEM
Generation Skipping Provisions
.1 Regardless of other provisions herein to the contrary, whenever a trust would have an inclusion
ratio of other than zero, after any intended allocation to the trust of generation skipping tax ("GST")
exemption, on account ofan allocation or addition of assets to the trust, then, prior to such allocation
or addition (and any intended application of GST exemption), the Trustee will divide the trust
(and!or the assets to be allocated or added to it) into two separate parts, each to be administered
as a separate trust upon terms identical with those of the original trust. One separate trust (after
any intended allocation of GST exemption) will have an inclusion ratio of zero (the "GST Exempt
Trust") and the other separate trust will have an inclusion ratio of more than zero (the "GST NonExempt Trust"). The GST Exempt Trust and GST Non-Exempt Trust created from an original trust
will be referred to as "related trusts."
.2 In addition, and regardless of other provisions herein to the contrary, the Trustee will have authority
to:
A. Make distributions of income and principal from related trusts, including upon the termination
of related trusts, from a GST Exempt Trust to skip persons and from a GST Non-Exempt
Trust to non-skip persons, so as to maximize the total assets from the related trusts which the
beneficiaries ofthe related trusts eventually will receive after payment of all applicable transfer
taxes; and
B. Pay federal and state transfer taxes payable from or on account of one or both of the related
trusts from a GST Non-Exempt Trust to the extent possible.
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_.3 The definitions of "inclusion ratio," "GST exemption," "skip persons," and "non-skip persons" will
be those set forth for such terms by Chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

3.

[6.211

Qualified Severance

Possibly
the
most
helpful
modification
to
Chapter
13
made
by
EGTRRA was the addition of § 2642(a)(3). Under this section, a trustee may sever a trust into separate trusts in order to
establish inclusion ratios of zero and one if the severance is made through a qualified severance. A "qualified severance"
is the division of a single trust and the creation of two or more trusts (under the terms of the governing instrument or local
law) if(l) the single trust is divided on a fractional basis, and (2) the terms of the new trusts, in the aggregate, provide for
the same succession of interests of beneficiaries as are provided in the original trust. In addition, if the single trust has an
inclusion ratio of greater than zero and less than one, the single trust must be divided into two trusts, one of which receives
a fractional share of the total value of all trust assets equal to the applicable fraction of the single trust immediately before
the severance. The trust receiving the fractional share will have an inclusion ratio of zero and the other trust will have an
inclusion ratio of one.
Example:

Qualified Severance. On December 1, 2003, T transfers $1,600,000 to a trust for T's child,
C, for life. At C's death, 70% is distributed to T's grandchild, GC, and 30% is distributed to
charity. T allocates his $1,120,000 GST exemption to the trust, thereby creating an inclusion
ratio of .30 (1- ($1,120,000 / $1,600,000)). If the trust instrument or state law authorizes the
division, the Trustee may sever the trust into two trusts so that the 70% trust will have an
inclusion ratio of zero and the 30% trust will have an inclusion ratio of one. Also, if state law
or the trust instrument so allows, the severance can provide that at C's death the 70% trust is
payable to GC and the 30% trust is payable to charity.

G.

[6.221

Non-Taxable Gifts

Several kinds of gifts are excluded from the application of the GST. Direct payments of tuition or to medical
providers which are not gifts pursuant to § 2503(e) are also not transfers subject to the GST. Annual exclusion gifts which
are direct skips, Le. made directly to a grandchild, are also not subject to the GST. Thus, such gifts may be made in addition
to the gifts which are protected by a transferor's GST exemption.
If use of the annual exclusion is to be made in trust, then the trust must be vested in the skip person. During the
life of the skip person no portion of the trust's income or principal may be distributed to or for the benefit of anyone other
than the skip person, and if the trust remains in existence at the skip person's death the trust assets must be included in the
skip person's estate for estate tax purposes.
Examples:

Gift Entirely Nontaxable. On December 1, 2003, T transfers $11,000 to an irrevocable trust
for the benefit of T's grandchild, GC. GC possesses a right to withdraw any contributions to
the trust such that the entire transfer qualifies for the annual exclusion under section 2503(b).
Under the terms of the trust, the income is to be paid to GC for 10 years or until GC's prior
death. Upon the expiration ofGC's income interest, the trust principal is payable to GC or GC's
estate. The transfer to the trust is a direct skip. T made no prior gifts to or for the benefit of GC
during 2003. The entire $11,000 transfer is a nontaxable transfer. For purposes of computing
the tax on the direct skip, the denominator of the applicable fraction is zero, and thus, the
inclusion ratio is zero.
Gift Nontaxable in Part. T transfers $13,000 to an irrevocable trust for the benefit of T's
grandchild, GC. Under the terms ofthe trust, the income is to be paid to GC for 10 years or until
GC's prior death. Upon the expiration of GC's income interest, the trust principal is payable
to GC or GC's estate. Further, GC has the right to withdraw $11,000 of any contribution to the
trust such that $11,000 of the transfer qualifies for the annual exclusion under section 2503(b).
The amount of the nontaxable transfer is $11,000. Solely for purposes of computing the tax
on the direct skip, T's transfer is divided into two portions. One portion is equal to the amount
of the nontaxable transfer ($11,000) and has a zero inclusion ratio; the other portion is $2,000
($13,000 - $11,000). With respect to the $2,000 portion, the denominator of the applicable
fraction is $2,000. Assuming that T has sufficient GST exemption available, the numerator of
the applicable fraction is $2,000 (unless T elects to have the automatic allocation provisions
not apply). Thus, assuming T does" not elect to have the automatic allocation not apply, the
applicable fraction is one ($2,000/$2,000 = 1) and the inclusion ratio is zero (1 - 1 = 0).
Gift Nontaxable in Part. Assume the same facts as in the previous example, except T files
a timely Form 709 electing that the automatic allocation of GST exemption not apply to the
$13,000 transferred in the direct skip. T's transfer is divided into two portions, a $11,000
portion with a zero inclusion ratio and a $2,000 portion with an applicable fraction of zero
(0/$2,000 = 0) and an inclusion ratio of one (1 - 0 = 1).
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H.

[6.23]

Estate Tax or GST

An important issue is whether trusts which have an inclusion ratio of other than zero should be included in the
estate of the non-skip person or should be subjected to GST: For instance, where a trust is created having a child and the
child's issue as beneficiaries which is not completely exempt from the GST, is it better to have the trust included in the
child's estate or to pay GST?

In general, it is better to have the assets included in the child's estate, from a tax standpoint. If the assets were to
be subject not only.to federal estate tax but also to state inheritance or estate tax, in excess of the federal state death tax
credit, the desired result may be different. Kentucky has phased out its inheritance tax for transfers to most issue, thus it is
unlikely that in Kentucky there is an advantage to paying the GST.

III.

[6.241

Planning

A.

[6.251

Generally

A basic decision which must be made is whether to plan at all. If a client (and the client's spouse) is expected to
have less than $2,000,000 in assets, after estate and inheritance taxes are paid, then little planning may be needed. Even if
the client has in excess of that amount, if the client wishes to leave most assets directly to the client's children then there
will be no GST planning needed.
If GST planning is important then the GST exemption should be used as soon as possible. Typically an easy use
to make of the exemption is to apply it to irrevocable life insurance trusts or other Crummey trusts. If gifts are being split
by the spouses no extra return is needed-the GST exemption is allocated on the return itself.
Most Crummey trusts, and irrevocable insurance trusts, are not skip persons because either the spouse or children,
or both, of the grantor (transferor) are beneficiaries of the trust. The Form 709 has no place for a direct allocation of GST
exemption to such a trust. Thus, the allocation of the GST exemption will typically be by a Notice of Allocation, which
requires an attachment to the Form 709.

A sample Notice ofAllocation would be as follows:

TAXPAYER
SS# 123-45-6798
FORM 709
AMOUNT OF GST EXEMPTION
ALLOCATED
The allocation of GST Exemption on Schedule C, Part 3 is based on values set forth in the
Form 709. The taxpayer believes that the amount of GST Exemption necessary to create an
inclusion ratio of zero is $
. The taxpayer hereby allocates to the trust listed above
the smallest amount of the taxpayer's GST Exemption necessary to produce an inclusion ratio
which is closest to, or if possible, equal to zero for the portion of the trust of which taxpayer is
considered transferor. This is a formula allocation which will change if values are changed on
audrt.
.
Trust EIN 98-7654321
Schedule A, Part I, Item 1
Annual Exclusion claimed

$_ _

Net value of gift
Amount ofGST exemption allocated
to gift (subject to formula above)

0
$

_

Given the complexity of Chapter 13, especially the technical requirements for making a proper allocation of GST
exemption, transferors often inadvertently omit to make an allocation of GST exemption or submit a defective allocation
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that does not comply with the procedural instructions for making the election. In an effort to lessen the severity of the
consequences for failing to make a proper allocation, EGTRRA made two changes to the GST rules that are intended to
address such failures.
First, under § 2642(f)(2), substantial compliance with the essential requirements of § 2632 may be sufficient for
the Service to deem that an allocation ofGST exemption has been made if the transferor can demonstrate to the Service's
satisfaction an intent to make such an allocation. In determining whether there has been substantial compliance, the Service
will consider all relevant circumstances, including evidence of intent contained in the trust instrument or instrument of
transfer. Although not specifically required by statute, private letter rulings issued prior to EGTRRA suggest that some
affirmative attempt by the transferor to allocate GST exemption on a timely filed return is necessary.
Second, § 2632(c) expands the automatic allocation rules which previously applied only to direct skips to apply
to all gifts made after December 31, 2000, that are indirect skips. An "indirect skip" is any gift (other than a direct skip) to
a GST trust that is subject to gift tax and is made after December 31, 2000 or is subject to an ETIP ending after that date.
A "GST trust" is a trust that could have a generation-skipping transfer with respect to the transferor unless one of the six
exceptions set forth in § 2632(c)(3)(B) apply. Unless the transferor makes an election under § 2632(c)(5) on a timely filed
gift tax return not to have the automatic allocation rules apply, the transferor's unused GST exemption will be deemed to
be allocated automatically to all indirect skips to the extent necessary to produce the lowest possible inclusion ratio.
Although Congress intended that the deemed allocation rules would ease the procedural burden placed on
transferors intending to make an allocation ofGST exemption, the effect ofthe new rules is to shift the burden to transferors
who do not intend to make an allocation ofGST exemption. The six exceptions to a GST trust are not as straight forward as
they initially appear and the Service has not issued any guidance to date to clarify the new rules. In light ofthis uncertainty,
the transferor's best course of action is to make an affirmative election either to allocate or not allocate the transferor's GST
exemption on a timely filed Form 709.

B.

[6.261

Benefits of Trusts for Children

Increasing numbers ofparents are discovering the benefits oftrusts for children, including trusts which last for the
lifetime of the child. There are four potential benefits. The first potential benefit is for the parent to continue to exercise
"control" over the assets, either to protect (or punish) the child, or to ensure that the ultimate distribution of the assets is
as the parent desires.
The second potential benefit comes from the ability ofthe parents to pass $2,240,000 ofassets to the grandchildren,
or beyond, without paying estate tax at the child level. Assume that the assets produce an after income tax return of 6%
of which 3% is income which is consumed by the children. At the conservative rate of3% annual growth the trust assets
will more than have doubled in a generation. Thus, if the child is economically successful there is a strong tax benefit to
GST planning.
The third potential benefit comes in the form of protection from spousal claims. Assets left directly to a child
can be reached by a spouse at the child's death, absent a marriage agreement to the contrary. In the event of divorce
the assets may be treated as separate property but may lose that treatment depending on the care taken by the child and
other surrounding circumstances. On the other hand, assets held in trust for the child will be exempt in Kentucky from
spousal claims at death, and will be more likely to be classified as separate property not subject to division in the event of
divorce.
The fourth potential benefit comes in the form of creditor protection. Assets left directly to a child will be
available to creditors; on the other hand, assets in a trust for the child may not be, or may be only to a limited extent,
depending on the interests the child has in the trust.
If a lifetime trust for a child is desirable primarily for tax purposes, then the child may serve as trustee (so long
as encroachment standards are ascertainable) and may be given a broad testamentary special power of appointment. The
other assets could be distributed outright to the child. A provision to that effect could be:
A trust having a generation skipping tax inclusion ratio of other than zero will be distributed
to my child in fee. A trust having a generation skipping tax inclusion ratio of zero will remain
in trust.

c.

[6.271

Marital Deduction, Applicable Exclusion Amount Planning

The current applicable exclusion amount is $1,000,000. Thus the exemption equivalent trust (sometimes called
the credit shelter trust, the family trust, or Fund B) will typically approximate $1,000,000. Where GST planning is desired,
GST exemption should be allocated to that trust because under normal circumstances it will be invested, encroached on,
and managed in such a way as to produce the greatest amount possible at the time of the surviving spouse's death. The
QTIP trust is more likely to be encroached on, or invested for income, and generally managed in such a way that the
surviving spouse receives benefits that reduce the value of the trust at the surviving spouse's death.
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The GST exemption is currently $1,120,000. Unless the first spouse to die has used $120,000 ofGST exemption
prior to, or at, death, there will be excess exemption even after the allocation to the credit shelter trust. Often, however, the
value of the marital trust will be greater than the unused GST exemption. In that event the marital trust should be divided
if it is a QTIP trust (or should be made into a QTIP trust ifpossible if it is not) so that a reverse QTIP election may be made
on the deceased spouse's Form 706 for a trust having a value of$120,000. If there is no authority in the trust instrument
then a court proceeding should be commenced. The division should be on a fractional share basis.
Beginning in 2004, the GST exemption will equal the applicable exclusion amount for estate taxes. For most
taxpayers, this will eliminate the need to make a reverse QTIP election. However, unless Congress permanently enacts the
changes made by EGTRRA, the GST exemption will once again exceed the exemption equivalent in 2011.

D.

[6.281

Trust(s) for Children

If the amount remaining after estate and inheritance taxes for issue is more than $2,240,000 then not all of the
trusts for issue may be exempt from the GST. Assume that $3,000,000 remains, that there are two children, that no GST
exemption was used during the parents' lifetimes and that the assets did not grow in value in between the spouses deaths.
Each child will have $1,500,000 as the child's share, of which $1,120,000 will be exempt from the GST.
If the trust instrument creates one trust for each child, then prior to the time the trust for each child is established,
a division should occur: one for assets coming from trusts which are exempt from the GST and one for assets coming from
trusts which are subject to the GST. The power of division must be given by the trust instrument or by applicable state law.
Once divided the trusts will be subject to the same terms.
More advanced planning allows for the trusts for each child to be different. The trust instrument could specifically
provide for the child to receive the income of the non-exempt trust, while the exempt trust income is accumulated or paid
to the grandchildren. The child could be given a right to withdraw over one of the trusts but not the other.
An example of such a dual trust strategy is set forth below:

ITEM
Generation Skipping Trusts for the
Primary Benefit of My Children
.1 Each share set aside for one of my children will be held by the Trustee as provided below.
.2 [GST Non-Exempt Trust] A trust having a generation skipping tax inclusion ratio of other than zero
will be administered as follows:
A. Until such child becomes _ years old, the Trustee will distribute from the net income of the
trust such amounts as the Trustee deems advisable for the health, education (including education
beyond the undergraduate level), maintenance and support ofsuch child. Undistributed income
will be added to principal. After such child becomes _ years old, the net income of the trust
will be distributed to such child in quarterly or more convenient installments. The Trustee will
distribute from the principal ofthe trust such amounts as the Trustee deems advisable to provide
for the health, education (including education beyond the undergraduate level), maintenance
and support of such child;
B. After attaining age _ , my child may, each year my child is living on December 31, by written
notice to the Trustee, withdraw specific assets from the principal ofthe trust, the value ofwhich
does not exceed the greater of$5,000 or 5% of the market value of the principal of the trust on
December 31 ofthe year of withdrawal. This right to withdraw is noncumulative. The Trustee
may make reasonable advancements to my child in anticipation that my child will be living on
December 31, provided such advancements are repayable to the Trustee ifmy child dies before
December 31. Regardless of other provisions to the contrary my child, or an agent acting on
behalf of my child, may relinquish this right at any time by written notice to the Trustee;

[DRAFTER: This provision addsflexibility.]
C. My child may appoint, by specific reference to this power in my child's Will, the assets held
in my child's trust that would incur, but for this power, a generation skipping tax at my child's
death to my child's estate, to the creditors of my child's estate, or to any person or entity.
Unless my child directs otherwise by specific reference to this paragraph, the Trustee will pay
directly, or to the Personal Representative of my child's estate, the amount of incremental
estate, inheritance, and other death taxes (including interest and penalties thereon, if any, and
any generation skipping tax) imposed on such estate by reason of any assets of this trust being
included therein. Assets not disposed of by a power of appointment will be known as the
remaining trust assets;
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D. In addition, my child may appoint, by specific reference to this power in my child's Will, part
or all of the assets of this trust that are exempt from the generation skipping tax among my
issue, or, ifnone, to any person or entity (but in all instances, excluding such child, such child's
estate, such child's creditors and the creditors of such child's estate) in such proportions and
in such manner, outright or in trust or otherwise, as my child determines. Regardless of other
provisions to the contrary, my child may relinquish this power in whole or in part, at any time
by written notice to the Trustee. Assets not disposed of by a. power of appointment will be
known as the remaining trust assets;
[DRAFTER: This provision will be beneficial should the GST be repealed]

E.

At my child's death, the remaining trust assets will continue to be held in trust as provided in the
next Item for such child's then living issue; but if there are none, the assets will be divided in
equal shares, one for each of my then living children and one for each ofmy deceased children
with issue then living, and held or distributed as provided herein.
.3 [GST Exempt Trust] A trust having a generation skipping tax inclusion ratio of zero will be
administered as follows:
A. The Trustee will distribute from the net income and principal of the trust such amounts as
the Trustee deems advisable to provide for the health, education (including education beyond
the undergraduate level), maintenance and support of such child and such child's issue.
Undistributed income will be added to principal. Distributions will be based on an individual's
needs and unequal distributions will not be taken into account in the final distribution of
assets;
B. My child may appoint, by specific reference to this power in my child's Will, part or all of the
assets of this trust among my issue or, if none, to any person or entity (but in all instances,
excluding such child, such child's estate, such child's creditors and the creditors of such child's
estate) in such proportions and in such manner, outright or in trust or otherwise, as my child
determines. Regardless of other provisions to the contrary, my child may relinquish this power
in whole or in part at any time and by written notice to the Trustee. Assets not disposed ofby a
power of appointment will be known as the remaining trust assets;
C. At my child's death, the remaining trust assets will continue to be held in trust as provided in the
next Item for such child's then living issue; but if there are none, the assets will be divided in
equal shares, one for each of my then living children and one for each of my deceased children
with issue then living, and held or distributed as provided herein.
A question to be faced is what power the child should be given in the non-exempt trust in order to ensure its
inclusion in the child's estate for estate tax purposes. A general power of appointment may be given. Or, a trustee may be
authorized to create a general power of appointment in a child. The former creates the risk that the child will appoint the
assets in a way in which the transferor would have thought undesirable, and locks in estate tax inclusion regardless of its
affect; the latter presents a difficulty for the trustee in making a prudent decision.
Limiting the general power to exclude certain persons (e.g. the child's spouse, or any charity) may effectively
limit the transferor's concern about transfers "outside" the family. In addition, the power may be limited to merely
appointment to the creditors ofthe child's estate and still be a general power. Of course, creditors ofthe child's estate may
be "manufactured" which presents some threat.

E.

[6.291

Trusts for Grandchildren

If the transferor's children are not likely to need the assets which the transferor is willing to give away through
annual exclusion gifts, then separate trusts for each grandchild should be considered. The advantage is that no GST
exemption is needed to shelter these gifts, unlike gifts to a standard Crummey trust which has both children and
grandchildren (and lower issue) as beneficiaries.
The relevant provisions of such a trust, with Beneficiary being a defined term, the grandchild, could be as
follows:

ITEM
Administration of Gifts to the Trust
.1 I have added assets to this trust and I and others may add additional assets to the trust. All of these
assets, when accepted by the Trustee, will be administered in accordance with the terms of this
instrument. The Trustee will promptly notify Beneficiary of Beneficiary's right to withdraw assets
added to this trust.
.2 The following provisions will apply with respect to all assets added to the trust each year by inter
vivos gifts:
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A. Beneficiary may, within 30 days after receiving notice that assets have been added to the trust,
withdraw such addition. Withdrawal rights not exercised during such period will lapse;
B. If Beneficiary dies during a time Beneficiary has withdrawal rights that have not lapsed,
Beneficiary's Personal Representative may exercise such rights as provided herein. While
Beneficiary is a minor or if Beneficiary is incapacitated, Beneficiary's duly appointed guardian
may exercise the withdrawal right on behalf of Beneficiary. If there is no such guardian, then
(1) while Beneficiary is a minor, Beneficiary's parent who is my descendant may exercise the
withdrawal right or if such parent is deceased or incapacitated then Beneficiary's other parent
may exercise such right; and (2) if Beneficiary is incapacitated, Beneficiary's attorney-in-fact
may exercise the withdrawal right;
C. The right to withdraw assets will extend to and may be satisfied out of any assets in the trust and
will be exercised by giving written notice to the Trustee and, further, will be noncumulative,
except as otherwise provided in this Item;
D. "Assets added to the trust" will include cash, life insurance policies (or any interest therein) or
other property or interests therein which are added to the trust during any calendar year and
will also include any premiums for policies owned by the trust which are paid directly to the
insurance company issuing said policies rather than first being paid to Trustee. In the case of
premiums paid directly to an insurance company the date of addition to the trust will be the
day on which the premium is transmitted to the insurance company. The amount of a premium
paid directly to an insurance company is an addition to the trust which may be withdrawn in
accordance with this Item; and
E. If the Trustee does not have cash funds available to satisfy requests for withdrawals made in
accordance with this Item, then Trustee will take whatever appropriate action Trustee deems
necessary under the circumstances including, without limitation, surrendering life insurance
policies. Such action will include, but not be limited to, surrendering policies for their cash
values and assigning ownership of policies or certificates of insurance to the beneficiary who is
requesting a withdrawal.
.3 The donor of any property added to the trust may, by giving written notice to the Trustee prior to
making the gift, exclude or limit the amount of Beneficiary's power of withdrawal.
ITEM
Distribution of Income and
Principal
_.1 Until Beneficiary becomes _ years old, the Trustee will distribute from the net income of the
trust such amounts as the Trustee deems advisable for Beneficiary's health, education (including
education beyond the undergraduate level), maintenance and support. Undistributed income will
be added to principal. After Beneficiary becomes _ years old, the net income of the trust will be
distributed to Beneficiary in quarterly or more convenient installments. The Trustee will distribute
from the principal of the trust such amounts as the Trustee deems advisable to provide for the
health, education (including education beyond the undergraduate level), maintenance and support of
Beneficiary. When Beneficiary becomes age _ _, the Trustee will distribute one-third of the then
current value ofthe trust to Beneficiary in fee; when Beneficiary becomes age _ _, the Trustee will
distribute one-half of the then current value of the trust to Beneficiary in fee; and when Beneficiary
becomes age _ _, the Trustee will distribute the remaining assets of the trust to Beneficiary in
fee.
.2 Beneficiary may appoint, by specific reference to this power in Beneficiary's Will, part or all of
the assets of this trust among my issue (excluding Beneficiary, Beneficiary's estate, Beneficiary's
creditors and the creditors of Beneficiary's estate) in such proportions and in such manner, outright
or in trust or otherwise, as Beneficiary determines. Regardless of other provisions to the contrary,
Beneficiary, may relinquish this power in whole or in part, at any time by written notice to the
Trustee. Assets not disposed of by a power of appointment will be known as the remaining trust
assets. Unless Beneficiary directs otherwise by specific reference to this paragraph, the Trustee will
pay directly or to the Personal Representative of Beneficiary's estate, the amount of incremental
death taxes imposed on such estate by reason of any assets of this trust being included therein.
.3 At Beneficiary's death, the remaining trust assets will be distributed in fee and per stirpes to
Beneficiary's then living issue; but if there are none, in equal shares - one such share to each of my
then living grandchildren and one such share to be divided, per stirpes, among the then living issue
of each of my deceased grandchildren. Provided, however, if the Trustee is then holding another
trust dated the same date as this instrument, or one created before or after this instrument for the
primary benefit of a grandchild of mine and with terms similar to those of this instrument, the
grandchild's interest in this trust will be consolidated with such other trust and will be administered
in accordance with that instrument.
.4 Notwithstanding the above, if a beneficiary is not 21 years old when the Trustee is directed to
distribute to such beneficiary any portion ofthe principal ofthis trust, such portion will vest in such
beneficiary. However, the Trustee may withhold possession of it and hold it under the provisions
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ofthis instrument for such beneficiary until the beneficiary becomes 21 years old, at which time the
remaining assets will be distributed to the beneficiary or to the beneficiary's estate if the beneficiary
dies before age 21. In the meantime, the Trustee will distribute to or for the benefit ofthe beneficiary
as much net income and principal as the Trustee deems advisable for the beneficiary's health,
education, maintenance and support. Undistributed income will be added to principal.
Where one asset-a farm for instance-is to be given to multiple grandchildren and separate trusts for each makes
management difficult, a partnership may be used. A partnership may also be helpful if marketable securities are to be
transferred and joint investment is desirable, or where a life insurance policy is to be purchased.

F.

[6.301

Direct Skip

If the transferor has great wealth, consideration should be given to a direct skip at death. There is no tax benefit
to deferring the GST until the death of a child-a transfer to a trust for the benefit of grandchildren, and their issue only,
will be a direct skip which will be taxed on a tax-exclusive basis.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS

SECTIONB

Kelly s. Henry
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP
Louisville, Kentucky

i.
!

The IRS has issued proposed regulations for making the election under section
2632(c)(5)(A)(i) to not have the deemed allocation of unused generation-skipping transfer
tax exemption apply to certain transfers to a GST trust.
Citations: REG-153841-02
Date: Jul. 12, 2004

ELECTION OUT OF GST DEEMED ALLOCATIONS

[4830-01-u]
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Internal Revenue Service
26 CFR Part 26
[REG-153841-02]
RIN 1545-8854
AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
SUMMARY: These proposed regulations provide guidance for making the election under section
2632(c)(5)(A)(i) of the Internal Revenue Code to not have the deemed allocation of unused
generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax exemption under section 2632(c)(1) apply with regard to
certain transfers to a GST trust, as defined in section 2632(c)(3)(B). The proposed regulations
also provide guidance for making the election under section 2632(c)(5)(A)(ii) to treat a trust as a
GST trust. The regulations primarily affect individuals.
DATES: Written and electronic comments and requests for a public hearing mustbe received by
October 12, 2004.
ADDRESSES: Send submissions to: CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-153841-02), room 5203, Internal
Revenue Service, PO 80x 7604, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044. Submissions may
be hand-delivered Monday through Friday between the hours of 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. to:
CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-153841-02), Courier's Desk, Internal Revenue Service, 1111 Constitution
Avenue, NW., Washington, DC, or sent electronically, via the IRS Internet site at
www.irs.gov/regs or via the Federal eRulemaking Portal at www.regulations.gov (IRS-REG153841-02).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mayer R. Samuels, (202) 622-3090 (not a toll-free
number).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Paperwork Reduction Act

The collection of information contained in this notice of proposed rulemaking has been submitted
to the Office of Management and Budget for review in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)). Comments on the collection of information should be sent to the
Office of Management and Budget, Attn: Desk Officer for the Department of the Treasury,
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC 20503, with copies to the Internal
Revenue Service, Attn: IRS Reports Clearance Officer, SE:W:CAR:MP:T:T:SP; Washington, DC
20224. Comments on the collection of information should be received by September 13, 2004.
Comments are specifically requested concerning:
Whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the
functions of the Internal Revenue Service, including whether the information will have practical
utility;
The accuracy of the estimated burden associated with the proposed collection of information (see
below);
How the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected may be enhanced;
How the burden of complying with the proposed collection of information may be minimized,
including through the application of automated collection techniques or other forms of information
technology; and
Estimates of capital or start-up costs and costs of operation, maintenance, and purchase of
service to provide information.
The collection of information in this proposed regulation is in § 26.2632-1 (b)(2)(ii), (b)(2)(iii), and
(b)(3). This information is required by the IRS for taxpayers who elect to have the automatic
allocation rules not apply to the current transfer and/or to future transfers to the trust or to
terminate such election. This information is also required by the IRS for taxpayers who elect to
treat trusts described in section 2632(c)(3)(B)(i) through (vi) as GST trusts or to terminate such
election. This information will be used to identify the trusts to which the election or termination of
election will apply. The collection of information is required in order to have a valid election or
termination of election. The likely respondents are individuals contributing to trusts that have skip
persons as beneficiaries.
Estimated total annual reporting burden: 12,500 hours.
Estimated average annual burden hours per respondent: 30 minutes.
Estimated number of respondents: 25,000.
An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of
information unless it displays a valid control number assigned by the Office of Management and
Budget.
Books or records relating to a collection of information must be retained as long as their contents
may become material in the administration of any internal revenue law. Generally, tax returns and
tax return information are confidential, as required by 26 U.S.C. 6103.

Background
Section 2601 imposes a tax on every generation-skipping transfer (GST). Under section 2631 (a),
for purposes of determining the amount of GST tax imposed on a transfer, every individual is

allowed a GST exemption ($1,500,000 in 2004) that may be allocated by the individual (or his or
her executor) to any property with regard to which the individual is the transferor. Generally,
under section 2632(a), an allocation of an individual's GST exemption may be made at any time
on or before the date prescribed for filing the estate tax return for the individual's estate
(determined with regard to extensions).
Section 2632 also provides deemed allocation rules pursuant to which an individual's available
GST exemption is automatically allocated to certain kinds of transfers, without any action on the
part of the transferor. Under section 2632(b), an individual's unused GST exemption is
automatically allocated to transfers made during that individual's lifetime that are direct skips as
defined in section 2612(c), to the extent necessary to make the inclusion ratio zero for the
property transferred. Under section 2632(c), in the case of a lifetime transfer made after
December 31, 2000 that is an indirect skip, the transferor's available GST exemption is
automatically allocated to the transfer to the extent necessary to make the inclusion ratio zero for
the property transferred. Section 2632(c)(3)(A) defines an indirect skip as a transfer of property
(other than a direct skip) subject to gift tax that is made to a GST trust. A GST trust is defined in
section 2632(c)(3)(B), in general, as any trust that could have a generation-skipping transfer.
However, no trust described in section 2632(c)(3)(B)(i) through (vi) is treated as a GST trust,
because a sufficient possibility exists (based on the statutory criteria) that the trust corpus will not
be distributed to lower generations. A transfer to any trust described in section 2632(c)(3)(B)(i)
through (vi) will not be subject to the automatic allocation of the GST exemption. The automatic
allocation under section 2632(c) also applies to an indirect skip occurring upon the post-2000
termination of an estate tax inclusion period.
Under section 2632(c)(5)(A)(i)(I), an individual may elect out of the deemed allocation rules so
that GST exemption will not be allocated automatically to a particular transfer that is an indirect
skip. Under section 2632(c)(5)(B)(i), this election out with regard to a particular indirect skip shall
be deemed timely if made on a timely filed gift tax return for the calendar year in which the
transfer was made, or deemed to have been made under section 2632(c)(4) with regard to trusts
subject to an estate tax inclusion period, or on such later dates as may be prescribed in
regulations.
Under section 2632(c)(5)(A)(i)(II), an individual may elect out of the deemed allocation rules for
indirect skips so that GST exemption will not be allocated automatically to any or all transfers
made to the trust by that individual, regardless of when a transfer is, or may in the future be,
made. Under section 2632(c)(5)(B)(ii), this election out with regard to any or all transfers to the
trust by that individual may be made on a timely filed gift tax return for the calendar year for which
the election is to become effective.
Alternatively, under section 2632(c)(5)(A)(ii), an individual may elect to treat any trust as a GST
trust with regard to any or all transfers made by that individual to the trust. If this election is made,
the rules for the automatic allocation of the GST exemption will apply with regard to that
individual's transfers to the trust, notwithstanding that the trust is described in section
2632(c)(3)(B)(i) through (vi). Under section 2632(c)(5)(B)(ii), the election to treat a trust as a GST
trust may be made on a timely filed gift tax return for the calendar year for which the election is to
become effective.
Notice 2001-50 (2001-2 C.B. 189), states that the Treasury Department and the IRS will issue
regulations providing that the election out of the automatic allocation for indirect skips and the
election to treat any trust as a GST trust must be made on a timely filed federal gift tax return
(which is the same rule that applies for the election out of the automatic allocation for direct skips
contained in section 2632(b)(3) and § 26.2632-1 (b)(1 )(i».
Explanation of Provisions

Under the proposed regulations, the election out of the automatic allocation rules for indirect skips
and the election to treat any trust as a GST trust are to be made on a timely filed federal gift tax
return.
Under the proposed regulations, a transferor who wants to elect out of the automatic allocation
rules for indirect skips has the option of electing out for the specific transfer to the GST trust, or
making a single election with regard to the trust that applies to the current transfer and all
subsequent transfers made by that transferor to the trust. Under the second option, once the
election is made with regard to a trust, the election remains effective for all subsequent transfers
to that trust by the electing transferor, until that transferor's election is terminated. Practitioners
have commented that in many cases, particularly situations in which trust corpus consists of
primarily insurance contracts, the transferor may not be required to file a Federal gift tax return
reporting annual transfers to a GST trust because the transfers qualify for the gift tax annual
exclusion under section 2503(b). If under the terms of the trust instrument distributions to skip
persons are unlikely, the transferor may choose not to allocate GST exemption to the trust. The
rule in the proposed regulation is intended to alleviate the need to repeatedly file a gift tax return
to elect out of the automatic allocation rules for transfers that would not otherwise require a
Federal gift tax return to be filed. Thus, once the transferor "elects out" of the automatic allocation
rule for indirect skips with regard to any or all transfers made by that transferor to the trust, the
election out, until terminated, remains effective for all subsequent transfers made by that
transferor to the trust, without any further reporting requirement on the part of the transferor. A
similar rule applies with regard to the election to treat a trust as a GST trust.
Finally, the proposed regulations revise the examples illustrating the rules for allocation of GST
exemption to reflect the recent statutory changes.
Proposed Effective Date
The regulations are proposed to be applicable for elections made on or after the date that the
proposed regulations are published in the Federal Register. However, any election under section
2632(c)(5)(A) made before that date will be recognized if the election was made on a timely filed
gift tax return in a manner that provided adequate notice to the Commissioner that the transferor
made the election.
Special Analyses
It has been determined that this notice of proposed rulemaking is not a significant regulatory
action as defined in Executive Order 12866. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It
also has been determined that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.
chapter 5) does not apply to these proposed regulations, and because these proposed
regulations do not impose a collection of information on small entities, the Regulatory Flexibility
Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) does not apply. Therefore, a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is not
required. Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, the proposed regulations will
be submitted to the Small Business Administration for comment on their impact on small
business.
Comments and Requests for Public Hearing
Before these proposed regulations are adopted as final regulations, consideration will be given to
any written (a signed original and eight (8) copies) or electronic comments that are submitted
timely to the IRS. The IRS and Treasury Department request comments on the clarity of the
proposed rules and how they can be made easier to understand. All comments will be available
for public inspection and copying. A public hearing will be scheduled if requested in writing by any
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person that timely submits written comments. If a public hearing is scheduled, notice of the date,
time, and place for the public hearing will be published in the Federal Register.

Drafting Information
The principal author of these proposed regulations is Mayer R. Samuels, Office of the Associate
Chief Counsel (Passthroughs and Special Industries), IRS. If you have any questions concerning
these proposed regulations, please contact Mayer R. Samuels at (202) 622-3090. Other
personnel from the IRS and the Treasury Department participated in their development.

List of Subjects in 26 CFR Part 26
Estate taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Proposed Amendments to the Regulations
Accordingly, 26 CFR part 26 is proposed to be amended as follows:
PART 26 -- GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX REGULATIONS UNDER THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1986
Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 26 continues to read, in part, as follows:
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *
Par. 2. In § 26.2600-1, the table is amended under the entries for § 26.2632-1 by revising the
entry for paragraph (b)(2) and adding entries for paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(4) and (e) to read as
follows:
§ 26.2600-1 Table of contents.
*****

§ 26.2632-1 Allocation of GST exemption.
*****

(b) * * *

(2) Automatic allocation to indirect skips made after December 31, 2000.
(3) Election to treat trust as GST trust.
(4) Allocation to other transfers.
*****

(e) Effective date
*****

Par. 3. Section 26.2632-1 is amended as follows:
1. Paragraph (b)(2) is redesignated as paragraph (b)(4).
2. Paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) are added.
3. In newly designated paragraph (b)(4)(i), the third sentence is revised.
4. In newly designated paragraph (b)(4)(ii)(A)(1), the fourth sentence is revised.
5. In newly designated paragraph (b)(4)(ii)(B):
a. All references to paragraph "(b)(2)(ii)(A)(1 )(i)" are removed and "(b)(4)(ii)(A)(1 )(i)" is added in
its place.
b. All references to paragraph "(b)(2)(ii)(A)( 1)(ii)" are removed and "(b)(4)(ii)(A)( 1)(ii)" is added in
its place.
c. All references to paragraph "(b)(2)(ii)(A)(1 )(iii)" are removed and "(b)(4)(ii)(A)(1 )(iii)" is added in
its place.
6. Examples 1 through § in newly designated paragraph (b)(4)(iii) are revised.
7. In paragraph (c)(1), the first sentence is removed and two sentences are added in its place.
8. In paragraph (d)(1), the fourth sentence is revised.
9. Paragraph (e) is added.
The additions and revisions read as follows:
26.2632-1 Allocation of GST exemption.

*****
(b) * * *
(2) Automatic allocation to indirect skips made after December 31! 2000 -- (i) In general. An
indirect skip is a transfer of property to a GST trust as defined in section 2632(c)(3)(B) provided
that the transfer is subject to gift tax and does not qualify as a direct skip. In the case of an
indirect skip made after December 31, 2000, to which section 2642(f) (relating to transfers subject
to an estate tax inclusion period) does not apply, the transferor's unused GST exemption is
automatically allocated to the property transferred (but not in excess of the fair market value of
the property on the date of the transfer). In the case of an indirect skip to which section 2642(f)
does apply, the indirect skip is deemed to be made at the close of the estate tax inclusion period
and the GST exemption is deemed to be allocated at that time. The transferor may prevent the
automatic allocation of GST exemption with regard to an indirect skip, as provided in paragraphs
(b)(2)(ii) and (iii) of this section.
(ii) Election to have automatic allocation rules not apply to the current transfer. The transferor
may prevent the automatic allocation of GST exemption with regard to the current indirect skip
(and not to any other transfer) to a trust, or to one or more separate shares that are treated as

separate trusts under § 26.2654-1 (a)(1), by attaching a statement to a timely filed Form 709 (as
defined in paragraph (b)(1 )(ii) of this section) for the calendar year in which the transfer was
made (whether or not a Form 709 would otherwise be required for that year). The statement must
identify the trust (or separate share), describe the transfer, and specifically provide that the
transferor is electing, pursuant to section 2632(c)(5)(A), to have the automatic allocation rules
contained in section 2632(c)( 1) not apply to the described transfer to the trust (or separate share).
In the case of a transfer treated as made one-half by the transferor and one-half by the
transferor's spouse under section 2513, a statement must be attached to the return filed by each
transferor seeking to prevent the automatic allocation. The election will apply only with regard to
the described transfer, and all subsequent transfers to the trust (or separate share) will be subject
to the automatic allocation rules, unless the transferor subsequently files an election described in
paragraph (b)(2)(iii) of this section, or files an election under this paragraph with regard to each
transfer as additional transfers are made.
(iii) Election to have automatic allocation rules not apply to both the current transfer and any or all
future transfers to the trust -- (A) In general. The transferor may prevent the automatic allocation
of GST exemption to both the current transfer and any or all subsequent transfers made by the
transferor to the trust or to one or more separate shares that are treated as separate trusts under
§ 26.2654-1 (a)(1). The transferor must attach a statement to a timely filed Form 709 (as defined
paragraph (b)(1 )(ii) of this section) for the calendar year in which the current transfer was made
(whether or not a Form 709 would otherwise be required for that year). The statement must
identify the trust (or separate share), describe the current transfer, and specifically provide that
pursuant to section 2632(c)(5)(A) the transferor is electing to have the automatic allocation rules
contained in section 2632(c)(1) not apply to the described current transfer as well as all future
transfers made by the transferor to the trust (or separate share). The election, unless and until
terminated, will remain in effect for all future transfers made by the transferor to the trust (or
separate share). No future gift tax return will have to be filed by the transferor in order to prevent
the automatic allocation of the GST exemption to such future transfers.
(8) Termination of election. The election described in paragraph (b)(2)(iii)(A) of this section may
be terminated by the transferor for transfers to the trust (or separate share) in a subsequent year
by attaching a statement to a timely filed Form 709 (as defined in paragraph (b)(1 )(ii) of this
section) for the calendar year in which the first transfer to which the election is not to apply was
made (whether or not a Form 709 would otherwise be required for that year). The statement must
identify the trust (or separate share), describe the transfer, and provide that the prior election out
of the GST automatic allocation rule described in § 26.2632-1 (b)(2)(iii)(A) is terminated.
Accordingly, the automatic allocation rules contained in section 2632(c)(1) are to apply to the
described current transfer as well as to all future transfers made by the transferor to the trust (or
separate share) unless and to the extent that another election under section 2632(c)(5)(A) is
made in the future.
(iv) Subsequent allocations. Making an election under paragraph (b)(2)(ii) or (iii) of this section
does not prevent the transferor from allocating the transferor's available GST exemption to a
current transfer (or, in the case of an election made under paragraph (b)(2)(iii) of this section, to
any future transfer) to a trust (or separate share) either on a timely filed Form 709 (as defined in
paragraph (b)(1 )(ii) of this section) reporting the transfer, or at a later date in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (b)(4) of this section.
(3) Election to treat trust as GST trust -- (i) In general. A transferor may elect to treat any trust as
a GST trust, in which case the automatic allocation rules will apply to current and future transfers
made by the electing transferor to the trust. The transferor must attach a statement to a timely
filed Form 709 (as defined in paragraph (b)(1 )(ii) of this section) for the calendar year in which a
transfer was made by the transferor (whether or not a Form 709 would otherwise be required for
that year). The statement must identify the trust, describe the current transfer, and specifically
provide that, pursuant to section 2632(c)(5)(A)(ii), the transferor is electing to have the trust

treated as a GST trust as defined in section 2632(c)(3)(B). As a result of this election, the current
transfer and all future transfers made by the transferor to the trust will be indirect skips as defined
in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section to which the transferor's unused GST exemption will be
automatically allocated in accordance with paragraph (b)(2) of this section. The election will
remain in effect for all future transfers made by the transferor to the trust unless and until
terminated (as described below).
(ii) Termination of election. The election may be terminated by the transferor in a subsequent year
by attaching to a timely filed Form 709 (as defined in paragraph (b)(1 )(ii) of this section) for the
calendar year in which the first transfer to which the election is not to apply was made (whether or
not a Form 709 would otherwise be required for the year), a statement identifying the trust,
describing the current transfer, and providing that the prior election to treat the trust as a GST
trust as provided under § 26.2632-1 (b)(3)(i) is terminated. Accordingly, if the trust does not satisfy
the definition of a GST trust, the automatic allocation rules contained in section 2632(c)(1) will not
apply to the described current transfer or to any future transfers made by the transferor to the
trust, unless and until another election under section 2632(c)(5)(A) is made in the future.
(4) Allocation to other transfers --(i) In general. * * * See paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of this section. * * *
(ii) Effective date of allocation -- (A) In general. (1) * * * For purposes of this paragraph (b)(4)(ii),
the Form 709 is deemed filed on the date it is postmarked to the Internal Revenue Service
address as directed in forms or other guidance published by the Service. * * *

*****
(iii) Examples. The following examples illustrate the provisions of this paragraph (b):
Example 1. Modification of allocation of GST exemption. On December 1, 2003, T transfers $1
00,000 to an irrevocable GST trust described in section 2632(c)(3)(B). The transfer to the trust is
not a direct skip. The date prescribed for filing the gift tax return reporting the taxable gift is April
15, 2004. On February 10, 2004, T files a Form 709 on which T properly elects out of the
automatic allocation rules contained in section 2632(c)(1) with respect to the transfer in
accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section, and allocates $50,000 of GST exemption to
the trust. On April 13th of the same year, T files an additional Form 709 on which T confirms the
election out of the automatic allocation rules contained in section 2632(c)(1) and allocates
$100,000 of GST exemption to the trust in a manner that clearly indicates the intention to modify
and supersede the prior allocation with respect to the 2003 transfer. The allocation made on the
April 13 return supersedes the prior allocation because it is made on a timely-filed Form 709 that
clearly identifies the trust and the nature and extent of the modification of GST exemption
allocation. The allocation of $100,000 of GST exemption to the trust is effective as of December
1, 2003. The result would be the same if the amended Form 709 decreased the amount of the
GST exemption allocated to the trust.
Example 2. Modification of allocation of GST exemption. The facts are the same as in Example 1,
except on July 8, 2004, T files a Form 709 attempting to reduce the earlier allocation. The return
is not a timely filed return. The $100,000 GST exemption allocated to the trust, as amended on
April 13;2004, remains in effect because an allocation, once made, is irrevocable and may not be
modified after the last date on which a timely filed Form 709 can be filed.
Example 3. Effective date of late allocation of GST exemption. On December 1, 2003, T transfers
$100,000 to an irrevocable GST trust described in section 2632(c)(3)(B). The transfer to the trust
is not a direct skip. The date prescribed for filing the gift tax return reporting the taxable gift is
April 15, 2004. On February 10, 2004, T files a Form 709 on which T properly elects out of the
automatic allocation rules contained in section 2632(c)(1) in accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(ii)

of this section with respect to that transfer. On December 1, 2004, T files a Form 709 and
allocates $50,000 to the trust. The allocation is effective as of December 1, 2004.
Example 4. Effective date of late allocation of GST exemption. T transfers $100,000 to a GST
trust on December 1, 2003, in a transfer that is not a direct skip. On April 15, 2004, T files a Form
709 on which T properly elects out of the automatic allocation rules contained in section
2632(c)(1) with respect to the entire transfer in accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section
and T does not make an allocation of any GST exemption on the Form 709. On September 1,
2004, the trustee makes a taxable distribution from the trust to T's grandchild in the amount of
$30,000. Immediately prior to the distribution, the value of the trust assets was $150,000. On the
same date, T allocates GST exemption to the trust in the amount of $50,000. The allocation of
GST exemption on the date of t~ transfer is treated as preceding in point of time the taxable
distribution. At the time of the GST, the trust has an inclusion ratio of .6667 (1-(50,000/150,000».
Example 5. Automatic allocation to split-gift. On December 1, 2003, T transfers $50,000 to an
irrevocable GST Trust described in section 2632(c)(3)(B). The transfer to the trust is not a direct
skip. On April 30, 2004, T and T's spouse, S, each files an initial gift tax return for 2003, on which
they consent, pursuant to section 2513, to have the gift treated as if one-half had been made by
each. PrevioUSly, neither T nor S filed a timely gift tax return electing out of the automatic
allocation rules contained in section 2632(c)(1). As a result of the election under section 2513,
which is retroactive to the date of TiS transfer, T and S are each treated as the transferor of onehalf of the property transferred in the indirect skip. Thus, $25,000 of TiS unused GST exemption
and $25,000 of SiS unused GST exemption is automatically allocated to the trust. Both allocations
are effective on and after the date that T made the transfer. The result would be the same if TiS
transfer constituted a direct skip subject to the automatic allocation rules contained in section
2632(b).
(c) Special rules during an estate tax inclusion period -- (1) In general. An allocation of GST
exemption (including an automatic allocation to a direct skip, but not an indirect skip) to property
subject to an estate tax inclusion period (ETIP) cannot be revoked, but becomes effective no
earlier than the date of any termination of the ETIP with respect to the trust. See paragraph
(b)(2)(i) of this section regarding the automatic allocation of GST exemption to an indirect skip
subject to an ETIP. * * *
*****

(d) Allocations after the transferor's death -- (1) * * * A late allocation of GST exemption by an
executor, other than an allocation that is deemed to be made under section 2632(b)(1) or (c)(1),
with respect to a lifetime transfer of property is made on Form 706, Form 706NA, or Form 709
(filed on or before the due date of the transferor's estate tax return) and is effective as of the date
the allocation is filed. * * *
*****

(e) Effective Date. Paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3), the third sentence of paragraph (b)(4)(i), the
fourth sentence of paragraph (b)(4)(ii)(A), paragraph (b)(4)(iii), the first two sentences of
paragraph (c)(1), and the fourth sentence of paragraph (d)(1) of this section, when published as
final regulations, will apply as of July 13, 2004.
Mark E. Matthews,
Deputy Commissioner for Services
and Enforcement.
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26 CFR Part 26
[REG-153841-02]
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RIN 1545-8854
Election Out of GST Deemed Allocations
AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
SUMMARY: These proposed regulations provide guidance for making the election
under section 2632(c)(5)(A)(i) of the Internal Revenue Code to not have the deemed
allocation of unused generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax exemption under

section 2632(c)(1} apply with regard to certain transfers to a GST trust, as defined in
section 2632(c)(3)(B). The proposed regulations also provide guidance for making the
election under section 2632(c)(5)(A)(ii) to treat a trust as a GST trust. The regulations
primarily affect individuals.
DATES: Written and electronic comments and requests for a public hearing must be
received by [INSERT THE DATE 90 DAYS AFTER THIS DOCUMENT IS PUBLISHED
IN THE FEDERAL REGISTERl.
ADDRESSES: Send submissions to: CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-153841-02), room 5203,
Internal Revenue Service, PO Box 7604, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044.
Submissions may be hand-delivered Monday through Friday between the hours of
8 a.m. and 4 p.m. to: CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-153841-02), Courier's Desk, Internal
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Revenue Service, 1111 Constitution Avenue, NW. t Washington, DC, or sent
electronically, via the IRS Internet site at www.irs.gov/regs or via the Federal
eRulemaking Portal at www.regulations.gov (IRS - REG-153841-02).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mayer R. Samuels, (202) 622-3090 (not a
toll-free number).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Paperwork Reduction Act
The collection of information contained in this notice of proposed rulemaking has
been submitted to the Office of Management and BUdget for review in accordance with
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d». Comments on the collection

of information should be sent to the Office of Management and Budget, Attn: Desk
Officer for the Department of the Treasury, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Washington, DC 20503, with copies to the Internal Revenue Service, Attn: IRS
Reports Clearance Officer, SE:W:CAR:MP:T:T:SP; Washington, DC 20224.
Comments on the collection of information should be received by [INSERT DATE THAT
IS 60 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN THE FEDERAL

REGISTERl. Comments are specifically requested concerning:
Whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the Internal Revenue Service, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
The accuracy of the estimated burden associated with the proposed collection of
information (see below);
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How the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected may be
enhanced;

How the burden of complying with the proposed collection of information may be
minimized, including through the application of automated collection techniques or other
forms of information technology; and
Estimates of capital or start--up costs and costs of operation, maintenance, and
purchase of service to provide information.
The collection of information in this proposed regulation is in §26.2632-1(b)(2)(ii),
(b)(2)(iii), and (b)(3). This information is required by the IRS for taxpayers who elect to
have the automatic allocation rules not apply to the current transfer and/or to future
transfers to the trust or to terminate such election. This information is also required by
the IRS for taxpayers who elect to treat trusts described in section 2632(c)(3)(B)(i)

through (vi) as GST trusts or to terminate such election. This information will be used to
identify the trusts to which the eJection or termination of election will apply. The
collection of information is required in order to have a valid election or termination of
election. The likely respondents are individuals contributing to trusts that have skip
persons as beneficiaries.
Estimated total annual reporting burden: 12,500 hours.

Estimated average annual burden hours per respondent: 30 minutes.
Estimated number of respondents: 25,000.

An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond
to, a collection of information unless-it displays a valid control number assigned by the
Office of Management and Budget.
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Books or records relating to a collection of information must be retained as long
as their contents may become material in the administration of any internal revenue
law. Generally, tax returns and tax return information are confidential, as required by 26
u.s~c.

6103.

Background
Section 2601 imposes a tax on every generation-skipping transfer (GST). Under
section 2631 (a), for purposes of determining the amount of GST tax imposed on a
transfer, every individual is allowed a GST exemption ($1,500,000 in 2004) that may be
allocated by the individual (or his or her executor) to any property with regard to which

the individual is the transferor. Generally, under section 2632(a), an allocation of an
individual's GST exemption may be made at any time on or before the date prescribed
for filing the estate tax return for the individual1s estate (determined with regard to
extensions).

Section 2632 also provides deemed allocation rules pursuant to which an
individual's available GST exemption is automatically allocated to certain kinds of
transfers, without any action on the part of the transferor. Under section 2632(b), an
individual's unused GST exemption is automatically allocated to transfers made during
that individual's lifetime that are direct skips as defined in section 2612(c), to the extent

necessary to make the inclusion ratio zero for the property transferred. Under section
2632(c), in the case of a lifetime transfer made after December 31,2000 that is an

indirect skip, the transferor's available GST exemption is automatically allocated to the
transfer to the extent necessary to make the inclusion ratio zero for the property
transferred. Section 2632(c)(3)(A) defines an indirect skip as a transfer of property
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(other than a direct skip) sUbject to gift tax that is made to a GST trust. A GST trust is
defined in section 2632(c)(3)(B), in general, as any trust that could have a
generation-skipping transfer. However, no trust described in section 2632(c)(3)(B)(i)

through (vi) is treated as a GST trust, because a sufficient possibility exists (based on
the statutory criteria) that the trust corpus will not be distributed to lower generations_ A
transfer to any trust described in section 2632(c)(3)(B)(i) through (vi) will not be subject
to the automatic allocation of the GST exemption. The automatic allocation under
section 2632(c) also applies to an indirect skip occurring upon the post-2000
termination of an estate tax inclusion period.

Under section 2632(c)(5)(A)(i)(I), an individual may elect out of the deemed
allocation rules so that GST exemption will not be allocated automatically to a particular
transfer that is an indirect skip. Under section 2632(c)(5)(B)(i), this election out with
regard to a particular indirect skip shall be deemed timely if made on a timely filed gift
tax return for the calendar year in which the transfer was made, or deemed to have
been made under section 2632(c)(4) with regard to trusts subject to an estate tax
inclusion period, or on such later dates as may be prescribed in regulations.
Under section 2632(c)(5)(A)(i)(II), an individual may elect out of the deemed
allocation rules for indirect skips so that GST exemption will not be allocated
automatically to any or all transfers made to the trust by that individual, regardless of
when a transfer is. or may in the future be, made. Under section 2632(c)(5)(B)(ii), this
election Qut with regard to any or all transfers to the trust by that individual may be
made on a timely filed gift tax return for the calendar year for which the election is to
become effective.

6
Alternatively, under section 2632(c)(5)(A)(ii), an individual may elect to treat any
trust as a GST trust with regard to any or all transfers made by that individual to the
trust. If this election is made, the rules for the automatic allocation of the GST
exemption will apply with regard to that individual's transfers

to the .trust,

notwithstanding that the trust is described in section 2632(c)(3)(B)(i) through (vi). Under
section 2632(c)(5)(B)(ii), the election to treat a trust as a GST trust may be made on a
timely filed gift tax return for the calendar year for which the election is to become
effective.
Notice 2001-50 (2001-2 C.B. 189), states that the Treasury Department and the
IRS will issue regulations providing that the election out of the automatic allocation for
indirect skips and the election to treat·any trust as a GST trust must be made on a
timely filed federal gift tax return (which is the same rule that applies for the election out
of the automatic allocation for direct skips contained in section 2632(b)(3) and

§26.2632-1 (b)(1 )(i».
Explanation of Provisions
Under the proposed regulations, the election out of the automatic allocation rules
for indirect skips and the election to treat any trust as a GST trust are to be made on a
timely filed federal gift tax return.
Under the proposed regulations, a transferor who wants to elect out of the
automatic allocation rules for indirect skips has the option of electing out for the specific
transfer to the GST trust, or making a single election with regard to the trust that applies
to the current transfer and all subsequent transfers made by that transferor to the trust.
Under the second option, once the election is made with regard to a trust, the election
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remains effective for all subsequent transfers to that trust by the electing transferor,
until that transferor's election is terminated. Practitioners have commented that in
many cases, particularly situations in which trust corpus consists of primarily insurance
contracts, the transferor may not be required to file a Federal gift tax return reporting
annual transfers to a GST trust because the transfers qualify for the gift tax annual
exclusion under section 2503(b). If under the terms of the trust instrument distributions

to skip persons are unlikely, the transferor may choose not to allocate GST exemption
to the trust. The rule in the proposed regulation is intended to alleviate the need to
repeatedly file a gift tax return to elect out of the automatic allocation rules for transfers
that would not otherwise require a Federal gift tax return to be filed. Thus, once the
transferor "elects out" of the automatic allocation rule for indirect skips with regard to
any or all transfers made by that transferor to the trust, the election out, until
terminated, remains effective for all subsequent transfers made by that transferor to the
trust, without any further reporting requirement on the part of the transferor. A similar
rule applies with regard to the election to treat a trust as a GST trust.
Finally, the proposed regulations revise the examples illustrating the rules for
allocation of GST exemption to reflect the recent statutory changes.

Proposed Effective Date
The regulations are proposed to be applicable for elections made on or after the
date that the proposed regulations are published in the Federal Register. However,
any election under section 2632(c)(5)(A) made before that date will be recognized if the
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election was made on a timely filed gift tax return in a manner that provided adequate
notice to the Commissioner that the transferor made the election.

Special Analyses
It has been determined that this notice of proposed rulemaking is not a
significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order 12866. Therefore, a
regulatory assessment is not required. It also has been determined that section 553(b)
of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to these
proposed regulations, and because these proposed regulations do not impose a
collection of information on small entities, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C.
chapter 6) does not apply. Therefore, a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is not required.
Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, the proposed regulations will
be submitted to the Small Business Administration for comment on their impact on
small business.

Comments and Requests for Public Hearing
Before these proposed regulations are adopted as final regulations,
consideration will be given to any written (a signed original'and eight (8) copies) or
electronic comments that are submitted timely to the IRS. The IRS' and Treasury
Department request comments on the clarity of the proposed rules and how they can
be made easier to understand. All comments will be available for public inspection and
copying. A public hearing will be scheduled if requested in writing by any person that

timely submits written comments. If a public hearing is scheduled, notice of the date,
time, and place for the public hearing will be published in the Federal Register.
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Drafting Information

The principal author of these proposed regulation's is Mayer R. Samuels, Office
of the Associate Chief Counsel (Passthroughs and Special Industries), IRS. If you have
any questions concerning these proposed regulations, please contact Mayer R.
Samuels at (202) 622-3090. Other personnel from the IRS and the Treasury

Department participated in their development.
List of Subjects in 26 CFR Part 26

Estate taxes, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
Proposed Amendments to the Regulations
Accordingly, 26 CFR part 26 is proposed to be amended as follows:

PART 26 -- GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX REGULATIONS UNDER THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 26 continues to read, in part, as
follows:
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *
Par. 2. In §26.2600-1, the table is amended under the entries for §26.2632-1 by
revising the entry for paragraph (b)(2) and adding entries for paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(4)
and (e) to read as follows:
§26.2600-1 Table of contents.

*****

§26.2632-1 Allocation of GST exemption.

*****
(b) * * *
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(2) Automatic allocation to indirect skips made after December 31,2000.
(3) Election to treat trust as GST trust.
(4) Allocation to other transfers.

*****
(e) Effective date

* ** **
Par. 3. Section 26.2632-1 is amended as follows:
1. Paragraph (b)(2) is redesignated as paragraph (b)(4).

2. Paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) are added.

3. In newly designated paragraph (b)(4)(i), the third sentence is revised.
4. In newly designated paragraph (b)(4)(ii)(A)(1), the fourth sentence is revised.
5. In newly designated paragraph (b)(4)(ii)(B):

a. All references to paragraph "(b)(2)(ii)(A)(1 )(i)" are removed and
"(b)(4)(ii)(A)(1 )(i)" is added in its place.

b. All references to paragraph "(b)(2)(ii)(A)(1 )(ii)" are removed and
"(b)(4)(ii)(A)(1 )(ii)"is added in its place.
c. All references to paragraph "(b)(2)(ii)(A)(1 )(iii)" are removed and
"(b)(4)(ii)(A)(1)(iii)" is added in its place.
6. Examples 1 through §. in newly designated paragraph (b)(4)(iii) are revised.
7. In paragraph (c)(1), the first sentence is removed and two sentences are
added in its place.
8. In paragraph (d)(1), the fourth sentence is revised.
9. Paragraph (e) is added.

The additions and revisions read as follows:
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§ 26.2632-1 Allocation of GST exemption.
*****
(b) * * *
(2) Automatic allocation to indirect skips made after December 31, 2000--{i) In
general. An indirect skip is a transfer of property to a GST trust as defined in
section 2632(c)(3)(B) provided that the transfer is subject to gift tax and does not qualify
as a direct skip. In the case of an indirect skip made after December 31, 2000, to which
section 2642(f) (relating to transfers subject to an estate tax inclusion period) does not
apply, the transferor's unused GST exemption is automatically allocated to the property
transferred (but not in excess of the fair market value of the property on the date of the
transfer). In the case of an indirect skip to which section 2642(f) does apply, the
indirect skip is deemed to be made at the close of the estate tax inclusion period and
the GST exemption is deemed to be allocated at that time. The transferor may prevent
the automatic allocation of GST exemption with regard to an indirect skip, as provided
in paragraphs (b)(2){ii) and (iii) of this section.
(ii) Election to have automatic allocation rules not apply to the current transfer.
The transferor may prevent the automatic allocation of GST exemption with regard to
the current indirect skip (and not to any other transfer) to a trust, or to one or more
separate shares that are treated as separate trusts under §26.2654-1 (a)(1), by
attaching a statement to a timely filed Form 709 (as defined in paragraph (b)(1 )(ii) of
this section) for the calendar year in which the transfer was made (whether or not a
Form 709 would otherwise be required for that year). The statement must identify the
trust (or separate share), describe the transfer, and specifically provide that the
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transferor is electing, pursuant to section 2632(c)(5){A), to have the automatic allocation
rules contained in section 2632(c)(1) not apply to the described transfer to the trust (or
-separate share). In the case of a transfer treated as made one-half by the transferor
and one-half by the transferor's spouse under section 2513, a statement must be
attached to the return filed by each transferor seeking to prevent the automatic

allocation.. The election will apply only with regard to the described transfer, and all
subsequent transfers to the trust (or separate share) will be subject to the automatic
allocation rules, unless the transferor subsequently files an election described in
paragraph (b)(2)(iii) of this section, or files an eJection under this paragraph with regard

to each transfer as additional transfers are made.
(iii) Election.to have automatic allocation rules not apply to both the current

transfer and any or all future transfers to the trust--(A) In general. The transferor may
prevent the automatic allocation of GST exemption to both the current transfer and any

or all subsequent transfers made by the transferor to the trust or to one or more
separate shares that are treated as separate trusts under §26_2654-1 (a)(1). The
transferor must attach a statement to a timely filed Form 709 {as defined paragraph
(b)(1 )(ii) of this section) for the calendar year in which the current transfer was made
(whether or not a Form 709 would otherwise be required for that year). The statement
must identify the trust (or separate share), describe the current transfer, and specifically
provide that pursuant to section 2632(c)(5)(A) the transferor is electing to have the
automatic allocation rules contained in section 2632(c)(1) not apply to the described
current transfer as well as all future transfers made by the transferor to the trust (or
separate share). The election, unless and until terminated, will remain in effect for all
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future transfers made by the transferor to the trust (or separate share). No future gift
tax return will have to be filed by the transferor in order to prevent the automatic
allocation of the GST exemption to such future transfers.
(B) Termination of election. The election described in paragraph (b)(2)(iii)(A) of
this section may be terminated by the transferor for transfers to the trust (or separate
share) in a subsequent year by attaching a statement to a timely filed Form 709 (as
defined in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section) for the catendar year in which the first
transfer to which the election is not to apply was made (whether or not a Form 709
would otherwise be required for that year). The statement must identify the trust (or
separate share), describe the transfer, and provide that the prior election out of the
GST automatic allocation rule described in §26.2632-1(b)(2)(iii)(A) is terminated.
Accordingly, the automatic allocation rules contained in section 2632(c)(1) are to apply
to the described current transfer as well as to all future transfers made by the transferor
to the trust (or separate share) unless and to the extent that another election under
section 2632(c)(5)(A) is made in the future.
(iv) Subsequent allocations. Making an election under paragraph (b)(2)(ii) or (iii)
of this section does not prevent the transferor from allocating the transferor's available
GST exemption to a current transfer (or, in the case of an election made under
paragraph (b)(2)(iii) of this section, to any future transfer) to a trust (or separate share)
either on a timely filed Form 709 (as defined in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section)
reporting the transfer, or at a later date in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
(b)(4) of this section.
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(3) Election to treat trust as GST trust-(i) In general. A transferor may elect to
treat any trust as a GST trust, in which case the automatic allocation rules will apply to
current and future transfers made by the electing transferor to the trust. The transferor
must attach a statement to a timely filed Form 709 (as defined in paragraph (b)(1 )(ii) of
this section) for the calendar year in which a transfer was made by the transferor
(whether or not a Form 709 would otherwise be required for that year). The statement
must identify the trust, describe the current transfer, and specifically provide that,
pursuant to section 2632(c)(5)(A)(ii), the transferor is electing to have the trust treated
as a GST trust as defined in section 2632(c)(3)(B). As a result of this election, the
current transfer and all future transfers made by the transferor to the trust will be
indirect skips as defined in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section to which the transferor's
unused GST exemption will be automatically allocated in accordance with paragraph
(b)(2) of this section. The election will remain in effect for all future transfers made by
the transferor to the trust unless and until terminated (as described below).
(ii) Termination of election. The election may be terminated by the transferor in
a subsequent year by attaching to a timely filed Form 709 (as defined in paragraph
(b)(1 )(ii) of this section) for the calendar year in which the first transfer to which the
election is not to apply was made (whether or not a Form 709 would otherwise be
required for the year), a statement identifying the trust, describing the current transfer,
and providing that the prior election to treat the trust as a GST trust as provided under
§26.2632-1 (b)(3)(i) is terminated. Accordingly, if the trust does not satisfy the definition
of a GST trust, the automatic allocation rules contained in section 2632(c)(1) will not
apply to the described current transfer or to any future transfers made by the transferor
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to the trust, unless and until another election under section 2632(c){5)(A) is made in the
future.
(4) Allocation to other transfers--(i) In general. * * * See paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of
this section. * * *

(ii) Effective date of allocation-(A) In general. (1) * * * For purposes of this
paragraph (b)(4)(ii), the Form 709 is deemed filed on the date it is postmarked to the
Internal Revenue Service address as directed in forms or other guidance published by
the Service. * * *
*****

(iii) Examples. The following examples illustrate the provisions of this paragraph
(b):
Example 1. Modification of allocation of GST exemption. On December 1, 2003,
T transfers $100,000 to an irrevocable GST trust described in section 2632(c)(3)(B).
The transfer to the trust is not a direct skip. The date prescribed for filing the gift tax
return reporting the taxable gift is April 15, 2004. On February 10, 2004, T files a Form
709 on which T properly elects out of the automatic allocation rules contained in section
2632(c)(1) with respect to the transfer in accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this
section, and allocates $50,000 of GST exemption ~o the trust. On April 13th of the
same year, T files an additional Form 709 on which T confirms the election out of the
automatic allocation rules contained in section 2632(c)(1) and allocates $100,000 of
GST exemption to the trust in a manner that clearly indicates the intention to modify
and supersede the prior allocation with respect to the 2003 transfer. The allocation
made on the April 13 return supersedes the prior allocation because it is made on a
timely-filed Form 709 that clearly identifies the trust and the nature and extent of the
modification of GST exemption allocation. The allocation of $100,000 of GST
exemption to the trust is effective as of December 1, 2003. The result would be the
same if the amended Form 709 decreased the amount of the GST exemption allocated
to the trust.
Example 2. Modification of allocation of GST exemption. The facts are the
same as in Example 1, except on July 8, 2004, T files a Form 709 attempting to reduce
the earlier allocation. The return is not a timely filed return. The $100,000 GST
exemption allocated to the trust, as amended on April 13, 2004, remains in effect
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because an allocation, once made, is irrevocable and may not be modified after the last
date on which a timely filed Form 709 can be filed.

Example 3. Effective date of late allocation of GST exemption. On December 1,
2003, T transfers $100,000 to an irrevocable GST trust described in section
2632(c)(3)(B). The transfer to the trust is not a direct skip. The date prescribed for
filing the gift tax return reporting the taxable gift is April 15, 2004. On February 10,
2004, T files a Form 709 on which T properly elects out of the automatic allocation rules
contained in section 2632(c)(1) in accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section
with respect to that transfer. On December 1, 2004, T files a Form 709 and allocates
$50,000 to the trust. The allocation is effective as of. December 1,2004.
Example 4. Effective date of late allocation of GST exemption. T transfers
$100,000 to a GST trust on December 1,2003, in a transfer that is not a direct skip.
On April 15, 2004, T files a Form 709 on which T properly elects out of the automatic
allocation rules contained in section 2632(c)(1) with respect to the entire transfer in
accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section and T does not make an allocation
of any GST exemption on the Form 709. On September 1, 2004, the trustee makes a
grandchild in the amount of $30,000.
taxable distribution from the trust to
Immediately prior to the distribution, the value of the trust assets was $150,000. On the
same date, T allocates GST exemption to the trust in the amount of $50,000. The
allocation of GST exemption on the date of the transfer is treated as preceding in point
of time the taxable distribution. At the time of the GST, the trust has an inclusion ratio

rs

of .6667 (1 - (50,000/150,000».
Example 5. Automatic allocation to split-gift. On December 1, 2003, T transfers
$50,000 to an irrevocable GST Trust described in section 2632(c)(3)(8). The transfer
to the trust is not a direct skip. On April 30, 2004, T and T's spouse, S, each files an
initial gift tax return for 2003, on which they consent, pursuant to section 2513, to have
the gift treated as if one-half had been made by each. Previously, neither T nor S filed
a timely gift tax return electing out of the automatic allocation rules contained in section
2632(c){1). As a result of the election under section 2513, which is retroactive to the
date of Tis transfer, T and S are each treated as the transferor of one-half of the
property transferred in the indirect skip. Thus, $25,000 of T's unused GST exemption
and $25,000 of S's unused GST exemption is automatically allocated to the trust. Both
allocations are effective on and after the date that T made the transfer. The result
would be the same if T's transfer constituted a direct skip subject to the automatic
allocation rules contained in section 2632(b).
(c) Special rules during an estate tax inclusion period--(1) In general. An
allocation of GST exemption (inclUding an automatic allocation to a direct skip, but not
an indirect skip) to property subject to an estate tax inclusion period (ETIP) cannot be
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revoked, but becomes effective no earlier than the date of any termination of the ETIP
with respect to the trust. See paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section regarding the automatic
allocation of GST exemption to an indirect skip subject to an ETIP. * * *
* ** **
(d) Allocations after the transferor's death-(1) * * * A late allocation of GST

exemption by an executor, other than an allocation that is deemed to be made under
section 2632(b)(1) or (c)(1), with respect to a lifetime transfer of property is made on
Form 706, Form 706NA, or Form 709 (filed on or before the due date of the transferor's
estate tax return) and is effective as of the date the allocation is filed. * * *

* '* * * *

(e) Effective Date. Paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3), the third sentence of paragraph
(b)(4)(i), the fourth sentence of paragraph (b)(4)(ii)(A), paragraph (b)(4 )(iii), the first two
sentences of paragraph (c)(1), and the fourth sentence of paragraph (d)(1) of this
section, when published as final regulations, will apply as o(
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l.

r9.1]

Irrevocable Trusts

A.

[9.2]

Definition

An irrevocable trust is (generally) a written arrangement under which an originator (a settlor or trustor) establishes
certain non-modifiable terms and/or restrictions (as in a last will or trust agreement) as to the ownership, holding and
management of properties and assets (the "trust") for the benefit of certain persons or entities called "beneficiaries"
(including the settlor and members of her family).

The trustee/fiduciary has the legal obligation and duty to manage the trust assets for the benefit of the trust
beneficiaries in accordance with the trust instrument, under statutory and common law standards of care. Unique to such
arrangement is the separation or "splitting" of the settlor's legal and equitable title, with the trustee "receiving" legal
title, and the beneficiaries "receiving" equitable title, in and to the trust (and its assets and properties). See generally
Restatement (Second) of Trusts (American Law Institute 1959) (hereinafter, "Restatement (Second)").

B.

[9.3]
1.

Different Kinds of Irrevocable Trusts.

Inter Vivos Trusts
(a) Revocable "living" trusts becoming irrevocable (for example, at the death of settlor).
(b) Straight forward, basic Irrevocable trust, where settlor retains no rights to, or control over, the
trust.
(c) "Crummey" or withdrawal/demand right trust.
(d) Dynasty and generation-skipping trusts
(e) Special needs trusts
(f) Life insurance trusts

2.

TestamentaryTrusts

3.

Minor's ("Age 21") Present Interest Trust
(a) Minor's Trust under IRC §§ 2503(b) and 2503(c).
(b) "Crummey" Withdrawal Trusts

4.

Grantor Trusts
(a) Trust income taxed to settlor (grantor) under IRC §§ 671 through 679.
(b) Settlor/grantor either has retained certain rights and powers over the trust, or has a reversionary
interest in the trust.
(c) "Defective" irrevocable (inter vivos) Trusts
(d) Grantor Retained Annuity Trust (GRAT) and Grantor Retained Unitrust (GRUT)
(e) Inter vivos QTIP Trust
(f) Qualified Personal Residence Trust (QPRT)

5.

Charitable "Split Interest" Trusts
(a) Charitable Remainder Annuity Trust (CRAT) and Charitable Remainder Unitrust (CRUT)
(b) Charitable Lead Unitrusts and Annuity Trusts

II.

[9.4]

The "DNA" of Irrevocable Trusts

The common "genes" or elements of irrevocable trusts are as follows:
1.

a maker(s)/settlor(s)/trustor(s)

2.

a trust instrument (last will or agreement)

3.

a trustee(s)

4.

trust assets and properties

5.

trust beneficiaries

6.

irrevocability of the trust
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7.

A.

(and finally) dispositive provisions

[9.51

The Trust's Creator

The descriptive tenns and names for a trust's creator are numerous and interchangeable. However, the tenn
"settlor" will be used in this chapter (rather than "creator," "maker" or "trustor,") in order to be consistent with the use of
"settlor" in the Restatement (First and Second) of Trusts. The tenn "grantor" derives from IRC §§ 671 through 679.
"Settlor" refers primarily to the person who creates and establishes the trust. In most (but not all) instances, the
settlor also is the person who gives and/or transfers assets to the trust.

B.

[9.61

The Trust Instrument (a/k/a Settlor's Intent)

The element of a written instrument is often assumed because it is so obvious. However, it should not be taken
for granted. Clear, consistent and thorough provisions are of paramount importance when preparing a trust.
Another crucial element is the settlor's intention to create a trust. Restatement (Second) Trusts, § 23. It is also
important to state the objects and purpose(s) of the trust:
(a) for the trustee
(b) for the beneficiary(ies)
(c) for the tax authorities
Keep in mind Kentucky's rules of trust construction, including settlor's intent as the "polar star," and the "4
comers ofthe document" rule. The cardinal rule oftrust construction is to ascertain and effectuate the primary intention of
the settlor from the language of the trust instrument, the contemporary circumstances, the object to be accomplished and
all of the relevant facts within the knowledge of the parties. Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust Co. v. McNeal, 279 S.W.2d
751 (Ky. 1955); First National Bank and Trust Co. ofLexington v. Purcell, 244 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. 1951); and Department of
Revenue v. The Kentucky Trust Co., 313 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1958).
Where circumstances arise that were unforeseen by the settlor, the courts will construe the trust instrument so as
to effectuate and carry out the dominant intent ofthe settlor in creating the trust. Lindenberger v. Kentucky Title Trust Co.,
110 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1937); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Conrad, 107 S.W.2d 248 (Ky. 1937).

c.

[9.71

The Trustee

For a trust to be created, title to assets must be held by a person (the trustee) for the benefit of someone else (the
beneficiary). The trustee has to be named (identified) in the trust instrument, but the trustee is not required to execute the
trust instrument, if the trust is otherwise valid. Restatement (Second) § 35.
The transfer of assets to the trust does not have to be made with the named trustee's knowledge or consent. The
trust will not fail by reason of the trustee's renunciation or relinquishment of his position and role as trustee. Restatement
(Second) § 35.
Some important provisions to keep in mind with respect to the trustee are the following:
(a) trustee resignation and removal;
(b) unfulfilled trusteeship;
(c) powers and liabilities of successor trustees;
(d) bond and surety (Remember the distinction here between serving without bond and serving
without surety on an official bond. I think the proper language to use with respect to trusts that
will be under court supervision is "to serve without surety on his or her official bond" since in all
instances Kentucky law mandates any "fiduciary" to always execute a bond (even though the surety
is waived). In many instances a court "waives bond," but I do not believe this to be technically
correct. The court should require a bond but can waive surety on such bond. However, with respect
to a private instrument that will neither be under the jurisdiction of the court nor registered with the
court, it might be proper to require the trustee to serve "without bond and/or surety on bond.");
(e) court supervision;
(f) waiver of trust registration requirements;
(g) accountings;
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(h) multiple trustees.
Finally, give serious consideration to trustee powers and authorities with particular reference to Kentucky's
Uniform Trustee's Powers Act (KRS 386.800 et seq.) as well as the following other areas:
(a) compensation for the trustee;
(b) distributions in kind;
(c) environmental problems;
(d) what to do with nonproductive property.

D.

r9.81

Trust Properties and Funding

The transfer of assets to a trust is crucial to such trust's validity. Generally an irrevocable trust is effective with
the following:
(a) a settlor's intention to transfer assets to such trust,
(b) transfers and deliveries of such assets (by some legal instrument) to the trustee of the trust, and
(c) a trustee capable oftaking title to, and control of, the assets so transferred.
Upon the transfer of assets to (thus "funding") the trust, the trust becomes enforceable. Restatement (Second) §§
28-32. As a practical matter, consider attaching either a list of assets transferred (as a schedule) or copies of the transfer
documents (as exhibits) to the trust instrument.
Any transferable interest, vested or contingent, legal or equitable, real or personal, tangible or intangible, can be
held in trust. Restatement (Second) §§ 74-88, but one should consider those assets that are suitable to be held by a trust.
There is an increased importance given to a Trustee's approval and acceptance of assets and properties, due to
growing concerns on Trustee liability.
(a) For example, potential liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
adn Liability Act of 1980 ("Cercla")[42USC 9601-9675] may cause a Trustee to request or require
an environmental audit before agreeing to own and hold real estate that may be at risk for toxic
waste.
(b) The trust instrument could contain provisions allowing any Trustee to approve transfers of property
into the Trust.

E.

r9.91

Beneficiaries

To be valid, a trust must have an ascertainable beneficiary (or beneficiaries). Restatement (Second) § 112. The
beneficiary's interest in a trust can be measured by a life (the beneficiary's or another's), and/or measured by a term of
years, and/or be contingent or vested, and/or be subject to conditions precedent or subsequent. The attorney must be sure
to draft a clear method to define or determine the primary, contingent and ultimate beneficiaries.

F.

r9.101

Irrevocability of Trust

A trust generally is irrevocable unless the settlor expressly reserves the right to revoke it; nevertheless, a great
part of the trust's tax efficiency depends on the trust clearly being irrevocable. It is very important to clearly describe the
irrevocable nature of the trust early on in the trust instrument.

G.

r9.111

Dispositive Provisions

The substantive "meat" of any basic trust structure consists of the ongoing and very transactional dispositive
provisions clearly written into and contained in the trust instrument. In other words, simply naming a beneficiary and
a trustee and even the trust assets is not sufficient to make a trust "work." A trust is a continuing relationship whereby
the trustee holds property under some type of instructions. The dispositive provisions are the "written instructions" as
to how the trust will operate and more importantly how the trust income and principal will be used on behalf of any and
all beneficiaries. Drafting dispositive provisions requires a lot of lucid thinking, good judgment and clear and flexible
drafting. Keep in mind three principal areas in drafting the dispositive provisions. These are:
(a) the disposition of trust income;
(b) the disposition of trust principal;
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(c) provisions for the disposition of income and principal in the event of a ben~ficiary's death or some
future clearly identified event causing a termination of or a significant change in how the trust is
administered.

1.

[9.121

Trust Income and Principal

If a beneficiary is to receive the income from a trust, inquiry must be made (in drafting the trust) as to whether the
income includes all ordinary income and tax exempt income and whether "income" also includes the gain from the sale
or exchange of an asset. Generally most settlors assume that income would include such things as interest and dividend
income as well as royalty and rental income, but when it comes to gain on the disposition ofcapital assets (i.e. the principal)
most settlors assume that such gain would not constitute "income" for fiduciary accounting or fiduciary tax purposes. The
point here is not whether one concept of income is right or wrong, but rather how important it is to clearly define what
constitutes principal and what constitutes income for purposes of the trust instrument that the attorney is drafting.
In drafting dispositive provisions relating to income and principal, the attorney drafting the instrument should
immediately think of Kentucky's Uniform Principal and Income Act. The Uniform Principal and Income Acts developed
over a number of years to provide "uniform guidance" in the allocation of an item between income and principal. In most
instances of "gray" areas, the federal and state tax authorities will defer to a Uniform Principal or Income Act or whatever
definition of principal or income is contained in the trust instrument. Also, note a short statutory history lesson here.
There are generally three versions of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, namely the 1931 Uniform Principal
and Income Act (the "1931 Act"), the 1962 Revised Principal and Income Act (the "1962 Act"), and the 1997 Uniform
Principal and Income Act (the"1997 Act").
These Acts are default statutes that operate only when the trust instrument is silent. Such uniform acts will
not come into play if a determination of allocation of or allocation between income and principal is covered, by careful
drafting, in the trust instrument.
Kentucky, many years ago, adopted a modified version ofthe 1962 Act. This is codified in KRS 386.181 through
386.349. Remember that Kentucky has not yet adopted the 1997 Act.
Any estate and trust practitioner should be very familiar with Kentucky's Principal and Income Act as well as the
1997 Act, and should seriously consider at least in some instances providing that the 1997 Act should apply (to override
some of the outdated provisions of the Kentucky Act).
Generally any gain received from the use of the trust principal is trust income. (But is it "distributable trust
income" under the trust instrument?) Any replacement of the original trust principal remains trust principal. For the
most part (as you would think), interest, dividends, rents and royalties are trust income. Proceeds from the sale of trust
property and payments of the principal on debts owed to the trust are principal. The reason for these classifications is the
fact that there are normally two classes of beneficiaries-the income beneficiaries and the remainder beneficiaries-who
have by definition conflicting purposes and agendas. The trustee has a fiduciary duty to ensure that income and remainder
beneficiaries are "protected." (For a frightening case (at least for the trustee), see Wiggins v. PNC Bank, 988 S.W.2d 498
(Ky. Ct. App. 1999)).

2.

[9.131

Applying Distributions for the Benefit of a Beneficiary

The dispositive provisions of a trust instrument may allow the trustee to payor apply distributions of income
and!or principal to or for the benefit of, a beneficiary, which grants to the trustee great latitude in making distributions. In
other words, such language enables the trustee to make direct payments to the providers of properties or services for the
beneficiary. Such direct payments to providers rather than to a minor or disabled or spendthrift beneficiary ensures that the
distributions will be used for the proper purposes.

3.

[9.141

Death of a Beneficiary

If a beneficiary dies prior to the disposition of his or her interest in a trust, provision must be made for the
beneficiary's interest in the trust. In other words, the drafter should always be considering not only what happens during
the life of a beneficiary, but what happens to the trust estate created for the beneficiary when such beneficiary dies.
One basic question to ask in drafting is whether the trust instrument itself and not the beneficiary (through a power
of appointment) will determine and control where the trust assets will go at the death of such beneficiary. On the other
hand, the trust instrument may grant to such beneficiary a general or limited power of appointment with respect to the trust
assets.
A wise piece of advice here is for the trust drafter to always engage in some "worse case scenario" planning
discussions with the client settlor. With such exchange the practitioner can get a better idea as to where such client wants
the assets to go in the event that there is a death of a beneficiary in the future.
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Also keep in mind that it is always advisable to think in terms of having an "ultimate distribution" clause in the
event all beneficiaries (income or remainder beneficiaries) are deceased. In such event, questions should be asked as to
where the trust assets would then go, with the two general "destinations" being heirs at law under the law of descent and
distribution in Kentucky or the settlor's favorite charities.

III.

[9.151

Estate and Gift Tax Considerations

To be safe, any practitioner drafting a trust instrument should assume that there are estate and gift tax consequences
of irrevocable trusts. In drafting and/or reviewing an irrevocable trust (agreement), the attorney should keep in mind the
rules relating to completed gifts, the IRC Chapter 14 rules that may apply, and the estate tax inclusion/exclusion rules
relating to all or a portion of the trust assets in the settlor's estate.

A.

[9.161

Gifts to Irrevocable Trusts

A donative transfer to an irrevocable trust constitutes a gift to such trust's beneficiaries. Helvering v. Hutchings,
312 U.S. 393 (1941). Such gift is one ofa future interest, which does not qualify for the annual ($11,000) gift tax exclusion
under IRC § 2503(b), unless coupled with "Crummey" withdrawal right provisions.
1.

[9.171

Incomplete Gifts

For a donative transfer to be complete, it has to be irrevocable and complete. Burnett v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S.
280 (1933). Some elements of"incompleteness" include reservation ofpowers to revoke, or appoint other beneficiaries or
to change beneficial enjoyment of trust. Note: If the transfer is not complete, it is not subject to federal gift tax, or to IRC
§ 2702. See generally Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c).

a.

[9.181

Power to Revoke

Ifthe settlor retains or reserves the power to revoke the trust, the gift ofproperty to the trust is incomplete. Estate
of Holtz v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 37 (1962). If the settlor's creditors have the right to trust property under Kentucky law, then
there is deemed to be a power to revoke. Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293. If the gift is revocable (Le. incomplete), the
value of the trust assets will be included in the settlor's estate under IRC §§ 2036 or 2038.

b.

[9.191

Power to Alter or Amend

If the settlor reserves the power to alter or amend the beneficial interests in the trust, the gift of property to the
trust is incomplete. The settlor must relinquish totally all domain and control over the trust properties for the gift to be
complete. If the settlor, in any capacity, invades the trust principal (or income) for the benefit of herself or others, then
there is no guarantee that there will be any trust assets remaining upon the trust's termination; therefore the original transfer
is incomplete. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-2(c); 25.2511-2(f).

c.

[9.201

Power re Timing or Manner of Enjoyment

Ifthe settlor retains a power that only affects the timing or the manner of a beneficiary's enjoyment oftrust income
or principal, the gift to the trust is still complete. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(d).

d.

[9.211

Ascertainable Standards

The settlor's gift to the trust is complete even if the settlor retains prohibited powers, so long as such powers
are subject to ascertainable standards in the trust instrument. Acceptable standards include education, care, maintenance,
support, health care needs, "reasonable support and comfort" to maintain a beneficiary's "accustomed standard of living";
however, use of such words as "pleasure," "desire" or "happiness" may cause gift to be incomplete. Treas. Reg. §
25.2511-1(g)(2).

e.

[9.221

Power to Remove or Replace Trustee

The IRS now agrees that a gift is complete if a transfer is made to a trust in which the settlor has the power to
remove the trustee and appoint a successor trustee that is not related or subordinate to the settlor. Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-36
I.R.B. 16; IRC § 672(c) provides rules for determining such "related" or "subordinate" status.

f.

[9.231

Powers Exercisable in Conjunction with Others

The gift to the trust is incomplete even if the settlor "shares" an exercisable power with a person, unless that
person has a "substantial adverse interest in the disposition of the trust property." Treas. Reg. § 25 .2511-2(c).
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2.

[9.24]

Annual Exclusion For Present Value of Income Interest in a Trust

The annual exclusion (now $11,000 per annum) applies when the irrevocable trust (instrument) requires the
trustee to distribute trust income currently. The annual exclusion is available for the present value of the income interest.
IRC § 2503(b). See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-03-040 (10/98). The present value of an income interest is equal to the value of
the trust property multiplied by the term ofyears or life interest actuarial factor corresponding to the applicable IRC §7520
interest rate (and term of years or life interest period). See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(d)(2)(iii).

3.

[9.25]

"Less Than Whole" Gifts To Trust

A donor/settlor can make a gift of less than her entire interest in property. Generally only the amount actually
given is subject to gift tax. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e); Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943).

a.

[9.26]

Undivided Interests

Gifts of undivided interests (tenancies in common) in property are permissible and useful (in obtaining valuation
discounts). See Estate of Wineman v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, T.C.M. 2000-193.

b.

[9.27]

Remainder Interests

The settlor can give a remainder interest in property to the trust reserving a life estate (or term ofyears). The value
of the gift is reduced by the interest retained by the settlor/donor. Bowden v. Comm'r, 234 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 916 (1956). Where IRC § 2702 does not apply, the value of the retained income interest (calculated by
using IRS actuarial tables (IRS Pub. 1457)) is subtracted from the value of the gifted property. The gift of the remainder
interest is one ofa future interest (and not eligible for the present annual exclusion under IRC § 2503(b)). Treas. Reg. §
25.2503-3(a).

B.

[9.28]

Chapter 14 (IRC § 2704)

Chapter 14 of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted in 1990, targeting various "estate freeze" techniques
(recapitalizations, etc.). However, only IRC § 2702 (of Chapter 14) is directly applicable to irrevocable trusts. Chapter
14 (including IRC § 2702) only affects transfers to family members where the transferor retains an interest in the property
being transferred. It does not apply to a gift in trust to a non-family member, or a transfer (to a trust) of the donor's entire
interest in the property.
IRC § 2702 was primarily aimed to eliminate the use of a Grantor Retained Interest Trust (GRIT) for transfers
to family members when the donor/settlor retains an interest in the trust. IRC § 2702 does not apply when remaindermen
are not family members, when the transferor does not retain an interest in the trust, to qualified personal residence trusts
(QPRTs) (IRC § 2702(a)(3)(A)) or for trusts in which the transferor retains a qualified interest or annuity interest. IRC §
2702 (b).
IflRC § 2702 applies to a gift in trust, then the retained interest is valued at zero, resulting in the transferor being
deemed to have made an immediate gift of the entire interest in the property to the trust.

1.

[9.291

Family Members

IRC § 2702 (unlike other IRC definitions of "family members") includes the transferor and his spouse, and the
ancestors or lineal descendants (with spouses) of the transferor or his spouse and brother and sisters (with spouses) of the
transferor and/or his spouse. Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-2(a)(I).

2.

[9.30]

Transfers in Trust

A transfer in trust includes a transfer to a new or existing trust, and an assignment of an interest in an existing
trust. Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-2(a)(2).

3.

[9.31]

Valuing a Remainder Interest

If the retained interest is not a "qualified interest," the retained interest is valued at zero, and the amount of the
gift is the entire value of the property transferred. Treas. Reg. § 25-2702-1(a). Obviously this rule wipes out the estate
planning use of a GRIT involving family members.

4.

[9.32]

Qualified Interest Exception

The principal exceptions to IRC § 2702 are a qualified annuity interest (Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b)) and a
qualified unitrust interest (Treas. Reg. §25.2702-3(c)).
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C.

[9.331

Estate Tax on Retained Interests

Keep in mind that the federal estate tax and gift tax are parts comprising a unified federal transfer tax system.
Generally, the factors causing a gift to be incomplete (for gift tax purposes) are the same factors resulting in estate inclusion
(for estate tax purposes). See Sanford's Estate v. Comm'r, 308 U.S 39 (1939). Three sections of the IRC that relate to
estate inclusion for transfers in or to trusts are § 2036, § 2037 and § 2038.

1.

[9.341

IRC § 2036 (Transfers Within Retained Life Estate)

Any property that is transferred (except as to a bona fide sale for full consideration) by trust (or otherwise) during
the settlor's lifetime, is included in the settlor's gross estate if the settlor retained the benefits of the property (or income)
or the right to designate the persons who would receive the benefits of such property. IRC § 2036(a).
The settlor (not a third party) must have made a transfer of a beneficial interest to the trust. See Helvering v.
United States Trust Co., 111 F.2d 576 (2nd Cir. 1940).
Transfer must be without full consideration. So, if the settlor transfers property to a trust and receives full value
in return, then IRC § 2036 should not apply. Conversely, if the settlor has sold property to the trust at less than fair market
value, and also retained the use ofthe property, then IRC § 2036 will cause inclusion ofthe trust property in settlor's estate,
to the extent that the sales price is less than the full fair market value ofthe property. See Estate of Goetchius v. Comm'r,
17 T.C. 495 (1951).
IRC § 2036(a) applies to an interest retained by the settlor only if the interest (or power) retained was created by
the settlor. Retention of an interest can occur by reason of the trust instrument itself. Other retained interests include:
(a) Power to name himself (settlor) as trustee, if a vacancy occurs. Estate ofAlexander v. Comm'r, 81
T.C. 757 (1983).
(b) Facts and circumstances showing settlor's "dominion" and "control" over the trust and/or trustee.
(c) Settlor's continued use or possession of property transferred to the trust (for example a gift of a
residence to the trust with settlor continuing to reside there). Estate of Maxwell v. Comm'r, 3 F.3d
591 (2nd Cir. 1993), aff'g 98 T.C. 594 (1992); Estate of Baggett v. Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 333
(1991).
(d) The right to designate who will be entitled to trust assets (or income) (even if such right to designate
must be exercised with another person). Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(3). See also, Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2002-47-037 (Aug. 19, 2002).
e)

Retention of voting rights after transfer of stock to the trust ("Anti-Byrum" rule). IRC § 2036(b).

(f) Retained powers by reason ofthe reciprocal trust doctrine (based on case law, not the IRC). United
States v. Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969).

2.

[9.351

IRC § 2037 (Transfers Taking Effect at Death)

Assets that are transferred by the settlor are includable in the settlor's estate if the assets could be "enjoyed" by
other beneficiaries only if they survive the settlor and the settlor retains a reversionary interest valued at more than 50%
ofthe value of such assets. While it is unlikely that IRC § 2037 will apply to the typical irrevocable trust, the existence of
IRC § 2037 is reason enough, in trust drafting, to always provide for an "ultimate distribution" clause to "close the gap"
with respect to the possibility of reversion.

3.

[9.361

IRC § 2038 (Revocable Transfers)

Generally, a transfer covered by IRC § 2038 will also be covered by IRC § 2036(a). However, under IRC §
2036(a), the entire value of the trust assets is included in the settlor's estate. Under IRC § 2038, only the value of an
interest in property subject to a IRC § 2038 power is included in the settlor's estate.
In addition to the power to revoke, if the settlor can change the trust's beneficiaries, or accelerate a beneficiary's
interest in the trust, or terminate the trust or make trust distributions at will, then IRC § 2038 applies.

Example
George Bush creates a trust which provides income to a daughter for her life, with remainder to Dick
Cheney. George reserves the right to invade trust corpus for the benefit of daughter or Dick. IRC § 2038
applies, since George's power to invade corpus for either daughter or Dick will affect the "enjoyment"
of the trust income of daughter, and the "enjoyment" of the remainder for Dick.
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Example (non- Trust but closer to home)
Bill and Hillary establish a Uniform Transfer to Minor Act (UTMA or UGMA) account for Chelsea's
child (their grandchild). Bill is custodian of grandchild's account (now worth $50,000) when Bill dies.
Under IRC § 2038, the $50,000 account is included in Bill's estate. The UGMA/UTMA account allows
the custodian the discretion to apply income and principal for a minor's benefit (See KRS Chapter 385).
The creator's custodian's ability to "alter or amend" the account comes within IRC § 2038. Rev. Rul.
70-348, 1970-2 C.B. 193; Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 C.B. 212; Rev. Rul. 57-366, 1957-2 C.B. 618; and
also see Stuit v. Comm'r, 452 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1971) and Estate of Eichstedt v. Comm'r, 354 F. Supp.
484 (N.D. Cal. 1972) and Estate ofPrudowski v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 890 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 465
F.2d 62 (7th Cir. 1972).
Among the exceptions to (or exclusions from) IRC § 2038 are:
(a) Transfers for full and adequate consideration;
(b) If a settlor's powers can only be exercised by all parties (with vested or contingent interests in the
trust), Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a)(2);
(c) Power to alter, amend or revoke is with another person, Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a)(3);
(d) 'Normal' trustee powers, Old Colony Trust v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
(e) If power held by the settlor is subject to an ascertainable standard, Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74
(2nd Cir. 1947).
D.

[9.371

Kentucky Death Tax Considerations.

There are significant differences between Kentucky inheritance and estate law and federal estate and gift tax law
in connection with gifts to an irrevocable trust. Kentucky does not have a gift tax; however, under KRS 140.020 every
transfer ofproperty made by a decedant within three years ofsuch decedent's death will be presumed to be in contemplation
of death and therefore includable in the decedent's estate for Kentucky inheritance tax purposes. As outlined above, with
the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the federal estate tax no longer applies to gift transfers made
within three years of death (other than in certain limited circumstances such as the transfer of life insurance). Thus
Kentucky could include in a decedent's taxable estate any gifts made to a funded irrevocable trust within three years ofthe
decedent's death, with the federal estate tax generally not applying to such transfers.

I\t:

[9.381

Income Tax Considerations

Any estate and trust practitioner must have a good knowledge of, and must consider, the income tax rules
and consequences. These basic rules and their impact on irrevocable trusts, are discussed below, starting with some
fundamental definitions.
(a) Simple Trust. A simple trust is a trust which, in any year, requires that all of its trust accounting
income be distributed currently, and makes no principal donation (in that year). IRC § 651(a).
(b) Grantor Trust. A grantor trust is not a separate (income) taxpayer. Such trust's income, deductions,
gains, losses and credits are reported directly by the grantor (settlor) (or sometimes by a trust
beneficiary). IRC § 671.
(c) Complex Trust. A complex trust is any trust that is neither a simple trust nor a grantor trust.
(d) Income. An attorney must keep in mind two different concepts of "income" when drafting a trust.
Accounting income is governed by accounting rules, and state law (i.e. principal and income acts)
and/or the trust instrument. Taxable income means items of"income" subject to federal income tax.
It has some relation to accounting income, but the two concepts are not the same.
A.

[9.391

Taxation of Simple Trusts

The income tax rules for complex trusts apply generally to simple trusts as well, except the tax treatment of simple
trusts is much "simpler" (as you would expect) since a simple trust is required to distribute all of its income currently and
there are no distributions of principal.
A simple trust receives a distribution deduction for the amount of income required to be paid in the year of
distribution. IRC §§ 651(a), 652(a). Consequently, a simple trust, which has to distribute all of its fiduciary accounting
income currently, will only pay tax on items of taxable income that constitute principal for fiduciary accounting purposes
(for example, capital gains and income from depreciating or depleting assets, to the extent of depletion or depreciation
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reserves). For simple trusts only, extraordinary dividends and taxable stock dividends are excluded from distributable net
income (DNI) if such dividends are properly allocated to principal. IRC § 643(a)(4).
Income that is required to be distributed in, for example, 2002, is treated as having been distributed in 2002, even
if the distribution actually takes place in 2003. IRC §§ 651(a) and 652(a).

B.

[9.401

Grantor Trust

The income, gains, deductions, losses and credits of any trust established during a settlor's lifetime will be
required to be reported by the settlor rather than the trust if certain rules under IRC §§ 671 through 678 apply. Accordingly,
these rules should always be considered in drafting such type ofTrust. The settlor will not be treated as the owner of a trust
for federal income tax purposes if all of the seven (7) conditions set forth in 1. through 7. below.

1.

[9.411

Irrevocability of Trust

A trust will be a grantor trust if the trust is revocable. IRC § 676.

2.

[9.421

No Beneficial Interest of Settlor

A trust will be wholly or partially a grantor trust if either the settlor (grantor) or his or her spouse has a beneficial
interest in the trust. IRC §§ 673, 677(a)(I) and (2).

3.

[9.431

No Life Insurance on Grantor or Spouse

A trust will be a grantor trust to the extent that premiums on life insurance actually held by the trust on the life of
the settlor/grantor or his or her spouse can be paid from income. IRC § 677(a)(3).

4.

[9.441

Discretionary Distributions are Limited

Generally a trust will be a grantor trust unless the trustee's power to make distributions is limited in one of the
following four ways:
(a) Independent Trustees. The trustee can have full discretion regarding distributions if (i) neither
the settlor nor his spouse can make any decisions regarding distributions and (ii) a majority of the
persons who can make distribution decisions for the trust are not related or subordinate parties
(under IRC § 672(c)) who are subservient to the wishes of the grantor or his or her spouse. IRC §
674(c).
(b) Ascertainable Standard with Non-Independent Trustees. If the grantor or his spouse is not the
trustee, the distribution limitation requirement will be met ifthe trustee's power to distribute income
and principal among beneficiaries is limited by a reasonably definite standard such as support,
maintenance, health and/or education. IRC §§ 674(d) and 674(b)(5). Consequently, a trust with
a related or subordinate trustee who is subservient to the wishes of the grantor or his spouse will
meet the distribution limitation requirement if his or her power to distribute is limited by such an
ascertainable standard.
(c) Separate Trust - Special Rule. The distribution limitation requirement will be met even if the
grantor or spouse is the sole trustee if (i) the trust is a separate trust; (ii) only one beneficiary is
permitted to receive distributions during that beneficiary's lifetime (unless he or she consents to
a different distribution); and (iii) either the trust termination date is reasonably expected to occur
during that beneficiary's lifetime or the beneficiary has a broad limited power of appointment. See
IRC § 674(b)(5) and (6). Note that even though the permissible appointees of the beneficiary's
broad limited power of appointment will by definition include the trust's grantor (while he is alive)
and therefore trust income could possibly be distributed to the grantor by reason of an exercise of
such power, nevertheless the grantor will not for this reason be treated as the owner ofthe trust under
IRC § 677. See Treas. Reg. § 1.674-1(b)(6)(a).
(d) Adverse Party Consent. The distribution limitation requirement will be met regardless ofwho is the
trustee if any distribution of trust assets can be made only with the consent of an adverse party (as
defined in IRC § 672(a)).

5.

[9.451

No Additional Beneficiaries

As a general rule a trust will be a grantor trust if anyone has the power to add to the trust beneficiaries except to
provide for after-born or after-adopted children. IRC § 674(b)(5). A testamentary power of appointment does not violate
this rule. Treas. Reg. § 1.674(d)-2(b). The power to assign or appoint during an assignor's or appointer's lifetime does not
violate this rule if the assignment or appointment would be adverse to the assignor or appointer. Treas. Reg. § 1.674(d)2(b).
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6.

[9.461

Administrative Powers Are Not Granted

Generally a trust will be a grantor trust if certain administrative powers set forth below exist with respect to the
trust.
(a) Power to Deal for Less than Adequate Consideration with Trust. A trust will be a grantor trust if
anyone can, without an adverse party's consent, purchase, deal with, exchange or dispose ofthe trust
property for less than adequate consideration. IRC § 675(1).
(b) Power to Make Certain Loans. A trust will be a grantor trust if anyone can without an adverse
party's consent, lend the trust assets to the grantor without adequate interest and security unless a
trustee who is not the grantor (i) is authorized to lend to any person without regard to interest or
security, (IRC § 675(2)) and (ii) either there is no such loan to the grantor or spouse outstanding at
any time during the year or all loans to the grantor and/or spouse outstanding during the year are
made with adequate interest and security and are made by a trustee who is not the grantor, his or
her spouse or a related or subordinate trustee who is subservient to such grantor or spouse. IRC §
675(3).
(c) Other Prohibited Powers. A trust will be a grantor trust ifanyone acting in any nonfiduciary capacity
can do any of the following without the trustee's approval-vote the trust stock, control or veto the
trust's investment, or reacquire trust assets by substituting assets of equivalent value. See IRC §
675(4).

7.

[9.471

No Disqualifying Replacement Powers Held by Grantor or Spouse

A trust will be a grantor trust if the grantor or his spouse can remove and replace the trustee in such a manner as
to cause the trust to be a grantor trust under any of the tests discussed above. Treas. Reg. § 1.674(d)-2(a).

8.

[9.481

Trusts Treated as Owned by the Beneficiary

If a trust beneficiary has the right by herselfto cause trust income or principal to be distributed to her, and the trust
is not taxable to the actual grantor as a "grantor trust," then the trust will be treated for income tax purposes as owned by
such trust beneficiary. IRC § 678(a).
In addition, if the beneficiary once had such a right and released or modified it and the beneficiary has rights or
powers that would cause the trust income tax items to be attributed to her ifthe beneficiary were the grantor, then the trust
income tax items will be taxable to the beneficiary unless the trust income tax items are taxable to the actual grantor. IRC
§ 678(a)(2), and (b).

C.

[9.491

Complex Trusts

A complex trust is a separate taxable entity and is taxed on its gross income less deductions. IRC § 641. Unique
to trusts and estates is a deduction not otherwise allowed to taxpayers, namely, the deductions for distributions of DNI.
IRC § 661(a).

1.

[9.501

Distributable Net Income (DNI)

DNI is taxable income of a trust with certain adjustments.
No distribution deduction is taken.
No personal exemption is taken.
Capital gains are ordinarily excluded.
Capital losses are not taken (except to the extent of capital gains which are included in DNI). See
generally IRC § 643.
Tax exempt interest is included less certain expenses.

2.

[9.511

Distributions of Distributable Net Income.

Generally distributions that carry out DNI are deducted by the trust and taxed to the beneficiary. IRC § 662(a).
Further, if a trust has DNI, trust distributions will ordinarily "carry out" DNI whether they are in fact made from DNI or
not.
Example

A trust has $100,000 of DNI consisting of cash dividends. If such trust distributes $25,000 of real estate
to the trust beneficiary, the distribution carries out DNI, reducing the trust's DNI to $75,000 and adding
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$25,000 to the beneficiary's taxable income.
There are exceptions to this DNI "carry out" rule.
distributions.

These exceptions include specific gifts and charitable

Under the specific gift exception distribution of a gift of a specific sum of money (or of specific property) which
is paid in three or fewer installments and which is not restricted to being paid out of income, does not carry out DNI. IRC
§ 663(a)(I). A typical marital deduction pecuniary formula bequest is not a specific gift for this exception to apply.
Under the charitable distribution exception a trust distribution that qualifies for a charitable deduction does not
carry out DNI. IRC § 663(a)(2).

a.

[9.52]

Character ofDNI Distributions

Generally distributed income tax has the same character in the beneficiary's hands as it had in the trust. Further,
unless the terms ofthe governing trust instrument specifically allocate different classes of income to different beneficiaries,
a trust distribution carrying out DNI is deemed to consist of the same proportion of each class of income included in DNI
as the total of each class bears to total DNI. See IRC §§ 652(b), 661 (b), 662(b).
Example

A trust earns $50,000 in dividends and $100,000 in rent. The trust distributes $50,000 each to two
beneficiaries. Each beneficiary will include $16,667 of dividends and $33,333 ofrent in his or her gross
income.

b.

[9.53]

Timing of Deemed Distributions

Under the "65 day rule" a trustee can elect to treat all distributions made within the first 65 days of the taxable
year as having been made within the previous year. IRC § 663(b). Under the required distribution rule, income which is
required to be distributed is treated as distributed whether it is in fact distributed or not. IRC §§ 661(a) and 662(a).

3.

[9.541

Undistributed Net Income

The trust is taxed to the extent that DNI is not distributed. The after tax amount is accumulated and constitutes
undistributed net income (UNI). IRC § 665(a). When UNI is finally distributed it is an "accumulation distribution" and
used to be subject to a "throwback tax."
The throwback tax rules have been repealed with respect to amounts distributed from "qualified trusts" in any
taxable year beginning after August 5, 1997. A qualified trust includes any trust except a foreign trust (as well as a
domestic trust that was once treated as a foreign trust) and a domestic trust created before March 1, 1984, unless it is
established that such trust would not be aggregated with other trusts under IRC § 643(t) ifIRC § 643(f) applied to the trust.
IRC § 665(c).
With respect to trusts exempt from the throwback rules, distributions after the effective date are computed
without regard to any UNI. IRC § 665(c). What this also means is that the IRC § 667(c) "multiple trust rule," taxing the
accumulation distributions from certain trusts (similar to corporate dividends) is no longer effective with respect to these
"qualified trusts."

4.

[9.55]

Income Not Included in DNI

Income which is not included in DNI is taxable to the trust. If the after tax income is accumulated, it is not part
ofUNI and is not taxable to the beneficiary on distribution.

5.

[9.56]

Special Rules for In-Kind Distribution of Property

a.

[9.57]

Distribution in Satisfaction of a Dollar Amount

If the trust is required to pay a beneficiary $10,000, the trust may distribute property having a fair market value
of$10,000 if that is permitted by the trust instrument. This will be treated as a sale of the property to the beneficiary for
$10,000 followed by a distribution to her of $10,000 sale proceeds. Gain or loss will be recognized by the trust on this
deemed sale. Accordingly the trust will be taxed on any gain. However, a loss will not be deductible by the trust but will
be available to the beneficiary if she ever sells the property for more than $10,000. IRC §§ 267(a)(I), (b)(6), and (d). The
beneficiary will take a new basis, which will be the trust's basis adjusted for recognized gain or loss. IRC § 643(e)( 1).
The beneficiary also will start a new holding period for the distributed property. The trust will receive a distribution
deduction of $10,000, and the beneficiary will take the $10,000 into her income if DNI of at least that amount exists (the
gain itself ordinarily will not generate DNI since capital gains are not usually included in DNI). The capital gain will not
be considered distributed to the beneficiary in this case absent any other facts. Rev. Rul. 68-392, 1968-2 C.B. 284.
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b.

[9.58]

Other Distributions

If a trust makes a distribution of property but does not do so in satisfaction of a specific dollar obligation, one of
two tax treatments can apply:
Generally the beneficiary will take a carryover basis from the trust (or the fair market value of the
property if it is less), IRC § 643(e)(2), and no gain or loss will be realized. The beneficiary will
''tack'' the trust's holding period. To the extent ofDNI the trust will receive a distribution deduction
of its basis (or fair market value of the property if less) in the property and the beneficiary will
include that amount in income. IRC § 643(e)(2).
The trust can file an election to treat the distribution as ifit were a sale. IRC § 643(e)(3). In that case
the trust will realize gain or loss. A loss cannot be deducted, but can be used on an eventual sale of
the property by the beneficiary for more than the fair market value on the date of distribution. IRC
§§ 267(a)(I), (b)(6), and (d). The beneficiary will take a new basis equal to the trust's basis plus
the trust's recognized gain or loss and a new holding period will begin with the date of distribution.
The trust can take a distribution deduction of the fair market value of the property distributed and
the beneficiary will take that amount into income. IRC § 643(e)(3)(A)(iii).

c.

r9.59]

Non-Pro Rata Distributions

If the trust instrument does not permit non-pro rata distributions (or if the state law does not so permit) and the
trustee makes such a distribution with the agreement of the beneficiaries, the distribution will be treated as a pro rata
distribution to the beneficiaries followed by an exchange between the beneficiaries resulting in the non-pro rata holdings.
This deemed exchange will constitute a taxable transaction ifno exception applies. Rev. Rul. 69-489, 1969-2 C.B. 172.

6.

[9.60]

Sale ofAppreciated Property Within Two Years of Transfer

If a settlor contributes appreciated property to a trust and the trust sells the property at a gain within two years,
the trust tax rate on the pre-transfe'r gain will be the higher of its own tax rate or the settlor's individual tax rate (without
regard to loss carrybacks and carryovers). IRC § 644(a). Special rules apply to short sales and substitute basis property
and installment sales. See IRC § 644(d) and (f). IRC § 644, which imposes this rule, does not apply to property passing to
the trust from a decedent or to the sale of the property after the transferor's death. IRC § 644(e)(I) and (4).
Note that § 644 was enacted in 1976 when income tax rates were steeply graduated. It was enacted to prevent
a high income taxpayer who wanted to sell appreciated property from giving the property to a trust just before the sale in
order to lower the capital gains rate on the sale. Section 644 has limited application in today's climate because a trust will
reach the maximum capital gains rate at about $1,900 of income (in 2003) and the maximum ordinary income tax rate (of
38.6%) at $9,350.00 (in 2003).

7.

[9.611

Losses

A trust can take ordinary and capital losses and net operating loss carryovers. However, such trust cannot
distribute them to the beneficiaries, and therefore the beneficiaries cannot deduct such trust losses until the year that the
trust terminates. IRC § 642(h). If a trust has expenses in excess of income in a particular year, the excess is not deductible
unless it qualifies for a carryover and can be deducted in subsequent years or unless the trust is in its termination year, in
which case the deductions can be carried out to the beneficiaries, to be deducted on their individual income tax returns.

8

[9.62]

Capital Gains Treatment

It may be desirable that capital gains be part ofDNI. Capital gains normally are not included in DNI unless (a)
the trust is terminating; (b) the trust instrument requires that capital gains be distributed; (c) the trustee regularly follows
a practice of distributing capital gains; or (d) the trustee validly allocates capital gain to income on the trust's books and
records or by notice to the beneficiary. Treas. Reg. § 1.643(a)-3(a); Rev. Rul. 68-392, 1968-2 C.B. 284.

~

[9.63]

Grantor Trust Planning

In the present context a grantor trust may sometimes be referred to as a "defective trust" or an "intentionally
defective grantor trust." In "normal" circumstances (whatever that means) a grantor will not want to be taxed on the
income of property transferred to a trust and will arrange for the normal trust taxation rules to apply by following the
guidelines set forth in Part IV, Subpart B. [9.40] hereinabove.
"Defective Grantor Trust" planning involves intentionally violating one of the above rules so that a trust held for
the benefit of another is taxable to the grantor for federal income tax purposes.
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A defective grantor trust provides a good opportunity for the settlor effectively to increase the value of property
transferred to the trust with no additional gift tax. For example, a defective grantor trust for a child has income of$I,500,
the settlor reports the $1,500 as his own income, and (assuming he is in a high income tax bracket) pays an income tax of
$594. Since the settlor rather than the trust is liable for the tax, the settlor has enabled the "defective trust" to save $594
(assuming the trust was in the highest income tax bracket of39.6%), and the settlor has made no gift to the trust. Obviously
if the settlor is in a lower income tax bracket than the trust, then the other advantage is the ability of the settlor to play the
"income tax switch" to an overall income tax benefit.

A.

[9.64]

Use of Intentionally Defective Grantor Trust

A settlor may want (i) to pay the income taxes on the trust and thus permit the trust to grow on an "after tax basis"
or (ii) to use the trust losses against her personal income, or (iii) to ensure that the trust qualifies as a "grantor trust" in order
to be a qualified S corporation shareholder, or (iv) to take advantage of the lower rates applicable to individuals without
making distributions.
The settlor may also want to enter into transactions that take advantage ofthe Internal Revenue Service's position
that transactions between a grantor and a grantor trust are ignored for federal income tax purposes. In this regard, please
refer to Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184 (but you also should look at Rothstain v. United States, 735 F.2d 704 (2d Cir.
1984)). Also look at certain private letter rulings by the Internal Revenue Service to the effect that a grantor's sale of
appreciated assets to a grantor trust does not trigger gain. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-35-026 (May 1995), Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-25-032
(Mar. 1995), Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-19-029 (Feb. 1995), Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-08-008 (Nov. 1994) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-45-035
(Aug. 1993).

B.

[9.65]

Potential Disadvantages of Defective Grantor Trusts

A defective grantor trust can, of course, become a real problem if the settlor owes the tax but does not have the
cash to pay the tax, since distributions to the grantor from the trust are not generally permitted. (Possibly a bona fide loan
from the trust to the settlor may be arranged in appropriate circumstances.)
Always keep in mind the continuing effort by the IRS to try to treat the settlor's payment of income tax as a gift,
either as it is paid or in the establishment ofthe trust, in an amount to be determined by a formula. In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-44033 (Aug. 1994), the IRS stated within the context of a grantor retained annuity trust that the trust contained a provision to
reimburse the settlor/grantor for any income tax paid by the grantor attributable to income he did not receive. This ruling
stated (effectively in dicta) that if there were no reimbursement provision, an additional gift ''to the remainderman" would
occur when the grantor paid the tax on income of the trust.
Note that the IRS's informal policy appears to be not to issue GRAT rulings without a reimbursement condition,
since any "gift" might constitute an impermissible contribution to a GRAT. Ifstate law requires the grantor to be reimbursed
for his payment of the trust's income taxes and reimbursement is not made, the grantor may be deemed to have made a
gift to the trust (with the same being true if the trust instrument required reimbursement and such was not made). In this
context, please note that to my knowledge Kentucky state law does not have such a reimbursement requirement. Finally,
please note a recent ruling by the IRS that a reimbursement provision will not result in the inclusion of the trust principal
and the settlor/grantor's estate under IRC § 2036. The IRS noted that this result applies ifpayments on grantor's behalf
relate to the tax on trust income. However, the grantor would have retained an income interest in the trust for purposes of
IRC § 2036 if the trustee of the trust had been required to reimburse the grantor for any tax liability not attributable to the
trust (for example, income tax on the grantor's personal salary or capital gains on personal investments). Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9709-001 (Nov. 1996), Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-19-039 (Feb. 1999) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-22-062 (Feb. 1999). Likewise, the
IRS has ruled that the existence of a provision allowing an independent trustee the discretion to reimburse the beneficiary
would not cause inclusion of the trust in the grantor's estate. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-20-021 (Feb. 2001).

c.

[9.66]

Making a Grantor Trust Defective

The objective here is to include a provision that causes the trust assets to be deemed to be owned by the settlor for
income tax purposes but not for estate and gift tax purposes. The trust is usually made defective in one of the following
ways.
The settlor may be given the power (exercisable in a nonfiduciary capacity) to reacquire trust assets by
substituting assets of equivalent value. IRC § 675(4)(c). This is a very popular device. The Tax Court has held (with the
IRS agreeing) that the retention of this power will not cause inclusion in the grantor's estate under IRC § 238. Estate of
Jordahl v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 92 (1975), acq. 1977-2 C.B. 1. The IRS subsequently reached the same result under IRC §
236. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-47-024 (Aug. 1992) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-27-013 (Mar. 1992). However, the IRS will generally not
rule on whether an IRC § 675 power will make a trust defective, since IRC § 675 remains an area under study (according
to the IRS). See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-48-013 (Aug. 1995), Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-37-011 (June 1993), noting that the IRS considers
questions ofwhether a power to substitute assets is exercisable in a "nonfiduciary capacity" to be a fact question. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 94-13-045 (Jan. 1994). Finally, the IRS has reached the same results under §§ 2036 and 2042. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-47024 (Aug. 1992), Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-27-013 (Mar. 1992) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-43-024 (July 1998).
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The trust will be defective if a trustee who is related or subordinate to the grantor (and subservient to the wishes
of the grantor) can make discretionary distributions (not limited by a reasonably definite standard). IRC § 674(a).
If the trustee is a related or subordinate party, a rebuttable presumption exists for income tax purposes, that the
trustee is subservient to the wishes ofthe grantor. IRC § 672(c). There is no reported case requiring the inclusion of a trust
in the grantor's estate solely due to the existence of a trustee who is merely presumed to be subservient to the grantor's
wishes for income tax purposes. The grantor must actually control the trustee (by agreement or otherwise) for the trust
to be included in the grantor's estate if it would not otherwise be includable. See Estate of McCabe v. United States, 475
F.2d 1142 (1st Cir. 1973).
The trust will be defective if a nonadverse party has the power to add a beneficiary other than after-born or afteradopted children. IRC § 674(b)(5), (6) and (7) and 674(c) and (d). The person with this power should not, however, have
the power to add the grantor as the beneficiary for estate and gift tax purposes. Use of this power should not result in an
incomplete gift by the grantor, provided the grantor does not retain the power. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(f). A successor
power holder should be named to avoid unintentional cessation ofgrantor trust treatment in the event ofthe power holder's
death. If the trustee has the power to add a beneficiary, the permissible persons to be added are potential distributes from
the beginning. Therefore, the person with the power to add the beneficiaries probably needs to be a nontrustee. The holder
ofthe power should not be the grantor. IRC §§ 2036 and 2038.
The trust will be defective if the grantor's spouse is a permissible distributee or the holder of a power that would
render the trust defective if the grantor held it. IRC §§ 673, 677 and 672(e). Keep in mind that if the spouse dies the trust
will suddenly cease being a grantor trust, unless other arrangements are (or were) made to maintain its status.
If a United States (citizen) grantor creates a foreign trust for the benefit of United States (citizens) persons, the
grantor will be taxed on the trust income. IRC § 679. While I have not done this, I think the assumption is that such a
foreign trust could be used as a grantor trust.
Some other ways of making a trust defective probably involve estate tax problems. For example, retaining a
reversionary income worth more than 5% (IRC §§ 673 and 2037) or retaining a power to revoke (IRC §§ 676 and 238) or
retaining a beneficial interest (IRC §§ 677 and 2036). Retaining the power to invest in life insurance on the grantor's life
only results in grantor trust status to the extent that premiums on a policy actually held by the trust could be paid out of
trust income. See IRC § 677(a)(3) and Rand v. Helvering 40 B.T.A. 233 (1939), aff'd 116 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 313 U.S. 594 (1941).

D.

[9.671

How Do You Transform a Defective Trust Back to a Nondefective Regular Grantor Trust?

It may be advisable to include a means to enable the trust to cease being a defective trust during the grantor's
lifetime. This will involve reversing whatever means were chosen to make the trust a defective trust, like releasing powers
which originally caused defective trust status or having a related or subordinate trustee resign, or domesticating a foreign
trust.
Keep in mind however, the IRS has taken the position that, for income tax purposes, the termination of grantor
trust status during the grantor's lifetime constitutes a deemed transfer of the trust assets to the newly recognized trust,
which results in a gain from the deemed sale of an interest to the extent liabilities exceed basis. See Rev. Rul. 77-402,
1977-2 C.B. 222; Madorin v. Comm'r, 84 T.C. 667 (1985).

E.

r9.681

Filing/Reporting Requirements

The IRS has issued alternative methods for reporting income of grantor trusts. (Spouses who file jointly are
considered a single grantor for the purposes of all reporting methods. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-4(b)(8)). The alternative
methods are available for the 1996 and subsequent tax years. T.D. 8633, 1996-4 I.R.B. 20 (amending Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6714, 1.6012-3(a)(9) and 301.6109-1(a)(2)).

1.

r9.691

Traditional Method

Under the traditional reporting method, the trustee files a Form 1041 (U.S. Fiduciary Income Tax Return) on or
before the 15th day of the fourth month following the close of the trust's tax year. IRC §§ 60 12(a)(4); 6072(a). However,
the "tax items" (income, deductions, credits) are not reported on the Form 1041, but rather are shown on a separate
statement attached to such Form 1041 that identifies the grantor. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-4(a); Form 1041 Instructions. In
turn, the grantor reports such ''tax items" on his or her tax return (Form 1040). See Treas. Reg. § 1.671-4(b)(I) for other
"traditional" methods.

2.

r9.701

First Alternative Method

Under this method, the trustee furnishes the grantor's name and taxpayer identification number (TIN), and address
of the trust, to all "payors" of the trust (see Treas. Reg. § 1.671-4(b)(5)) during the taxable year, and furnishes the grantor
with a statement:
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(a) informing the grantor that the information on the statement must be included in calculating the
grantor's taxable income and credits,
(b) listing all tax items for the trust for such taxable year,
(c) identifying all information necessary for the grantor to calculate his taxable income relating to the
trust. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-4(b)(2)(i)(A), and (ii).

3.

r9.711

Second Alternative Method

Under this method, the trustee furnishes the grantor's name and TIN and address of the trust to all payors of the
trust during the taxable year. The trustee then files all of the trust's Forms 1099 (showing the payor, and the grantor as
payee) with the IRS. The trustee has the same obligations for filing Forms 1099 as a payor, except that the trustee must
report each type of income in the aggregate and each item of gross proceeds separately. The trustee must furnish the
grantor with a statement similar to the one described in the first alternative method (9.70 above)(except the statement does
not have to list the trust's payors).

4.

r9.721

Third Alternative Method (Two or More Grantors)

Under this method, the trustee furnishes the name and TIN ofthe grantor, and the address ofthe trust, to all payors
of the trust for the taxable year. The trust has to provide each grantor with the statement (required under Method Number
2) with respect to that part of the trust treated as being owned by that grantor. The trustee must file the trust's Form 1099
with the IRS, reporting the income items (paid to the trust by all payors) during the taxable year attributable to the portion
ofthe trust owned by each grantor. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-4(b)(3). The trustee has the same obligations for filing the Forms
1099 as a payor (making reportable payments), except that the trustee has to report each type of income in the aggregate
and each item of gross proceeds separately.

5.

r9.731

Alternative Methods Not Available

The alternative reporting methods cannot be used by or for a common trust fund, a qualified subchapter S trust,
a non-U.S. situs trust, a trust with a non-U.S. person as grantor, or a trust with a single grantor who files on a fiscal (not
calendar) year basis. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-4(b)(6).

6.

r9.74]

Selecting an Alternative Method

A trustee filing Forms 1041, who wishes to switch to alternative method, must file a final Form 1041, indicating
"Pursuant to Reg. 1.671-4(g)."

7.

r9.75]

Reporting Rules When Grantor Dies

There now are proposed regulations addressing this circumstance. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-4(h).
A grantor trust continues reporting (under Treas. Reg. § 1.671-4) for the taxable year that ends with the decedent!
grantor's death, but cannot do so for subsequent years.
A grantor trust continuing after the grantor's death must obtain a new TIN (whether or not it previously had been
assigned a TIN during the grantor's lifetime). Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.6109-1(a)(3)(i)(A). But, if an IRC § 645 election
will be made to treat the trust as part of the decedent/grantor's estate, a new TIN is not required.
If the trust had been filing Forms 1041 (with an attached statement as to trust income allocable to the portion of
the trust treated as owned by the decedent/grantor), the Form 1041 (due for the taxable year ending with the grantor's year
of death) will be due April 15 of the following year. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-4(h)(3)(i).
If the trust was deemed to have been wholly owned by the decedent/grantor, then the return must also show that
it is the final return to be filed under the decedent's SSN (or TIN assigned to the trust during the grantor's lifetime). Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.671-4(h)(3)(i). Please refer to Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-4(h) for guidance on more technical or esoteric
situations.

F.

r9.76]

Comparing Individual and Trust Income Tax Rates and Rules

1.

r9.77]

Income Tax Rates

In 2003, the regular income tax rates for married individuals filing jointly do not reach 38.6% until $311,950
($155,975 for married filing separately). The maximum tax on long-term capital gains is the same for trusts and individuals.
The maximum alternative minimum tax for both individuals and trusts generally is 26%. IRC § 55(b)(1)(A). However,
remember that trusts, practically speaking, are usually not in the AMT situation because trusts rarely have significant tax
preferences.
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Generally, for 2003 (notwithstanding any changes made in the most recent 2003 Tax Reform Act), gain from the
sale of long-term Assets is subject to a maximum capital gains tax rate of20$ (10% for individuals in the 10% or 15% tax
bracket). A lower rate of8% (for individuals in the 10% or 15% tax bracket) may apply when the asset was still for more
than 5 years. The capital gain tax rate is 25% on the sale oflRC Section 1250 property to the extent that the unrecaptured
gain would have been treated as ordinary income if the property had been IRC Section 1245 property (in other words, to
the extent of depreciation taken). The capital gains tax rate for collectibles (capital assets which are held for more than 12
months) is 28%.
Note that the maximum ordinary income tax rate is 38.6% in 2003 and drops to 37.6% in 2004 and 2005, and
35% in 2006 and thereafter (subject to the sunset rules ofthe Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of2001
(EGTRRA)). See generally IRC § 1.
All trust ordinary income over $9,350 (for 2003) is taxed at 38.6%. IRC § 1. For years after 2000, the same
maximum rate phase-downs applicable to individuals apply to trusts, except that trusts are not eligible for a new 10%
bracket applicable to individuals under IRC § l(i)(I)(A)(I).

2.

[9.781

Reduction of Itemized Deductions for High Income Taxpayers

For individuals whose adjusted gross income exceeds $139,500 (in 2003) ($69,750 in 2003 for married filing
separately) itemized deductions are reduced by the lesser of 3% of adjusted gross income exceeding that amount or 80%
ofthe itemized deductions. IRC § 68(a). The reduction does not apply to the deductions for medical expenses, investment
interests, casualty losses or wagering losses. IRC § 68(c). Note also that the reduction of itemized deductions for
individuals is phased out over a period from 2006 to 2009 and is completely repealed in 2010 and then is reinstated in 2011
due to the sunset provisions of the EGTRRA. IRC § 68(f) and (g). The reduction does not apply to trusts. IRC § 68(e).

3.

[9.791

Floor on Miscellaneous Itemized Deductions

An individual can take certain itemized deductions only to the extent they exceed 2% of his adjusted gross
income. IRC § 67. The deductions include all itemized deductions except deductions for interests, state and local
taxes, environmental taxes, casualty losses, wagering losses, charitable contributions, medical expenses, and a few other
miscellaneous deductions.

Trusts are also subject to this limitation, except that a trust is allowed to deduct the following without regard to
the 2% limitation:
(a) administrative expenses which were incurred as a result of the property being held in trust;
(b) distributions to beneficiaries;
(c) its personal exemption.
See IRC § 67(e). It has never been clear what expenses are included as trust administration expenses. The United States
Sixth Circuit Court ofAppeals has held the investment advisory fees incurred by a nonprofessional trustee are not subject
to the floor. O'Neal v. Comm'r, 994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1993), reversing 98 T.C. 227 (1992). However, the tax court took
the opposite view and the IRS has not acquiesced in this case. See 1994-2 C.B. 1. One final note: the tax court has held
that the grantor of grantor trusts cannot take advantage of IRC § 67(e) so as to deduct trust administration expenses in
determining the trust's adjusted gross income. Accordingly, those expenses were subject to reduction under the itemized
deduction rules. See Bay v. Comm'r T.C.M. 1998-411.

4.

[9.801

Charitable Deduction

An individual is subject to limitations on the deductibility ofcharitable contributions. IRC § 170(b). An individual
does not get a charitable income tax deduction for amounts contributed to foreign charities or to domestic charities for use
outside of the United States. IRC §§ 170(a)(I), 170(c)(2).

A trust is entitled to an unlimited charitable deduction for charitable contributions required pursuant to its
governing instrument except against unrelated business taxable income (UBTI). IRC §§ 642(c), 681(a). UBTI is subject
to the same limitations as those thaJ apply to an individual. IRC § 681(a). A trust can receive a charitable income tax
deduction for a distribution to a foreign charity. IRC § 642(c)(I).

5.

[9.811

Personal Exemption

The personal exemption for an individual is $3,050 (for 2003), but is phased out at the rate of 2% for each
$2,500 (or a fraction) by which the individual's income exceeds a threshold. IRC § 151(d)(3). For 2003, the threshold
starts at $209,250 for joint returns and surviving spouses ($139,500 for single persons and $104,625 for married filing
separately).
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A trust is entitled to a personal exemption of $300 for a simple trust or $100 for other trusts (Le. complex trusts),
none of which is subject to the phase out. IRC § 642(b).

6.

[9.82]

Standard Deduction

A non-itemizing individual is generally entitled to a standard deduction in 2003 of $7,950 (married filing
jointly), $4,750 (single individual) or $3,975 (married filing separately). IRC § 63(c). Note also that from 2005 to 2009,
the standard deduction for married filing jointly is phased up to twice that of singles, subject to the sunset provisions of
EGTRRA in 2011.
A trust is not entitled to a standard deduction. IRC § 63(c)(6)(D).

VI.

[9.83]

Crummey Withdrawal Right Trusts

Withdrawal or demand right trusts are employed to transform what would ordinarily be deemed a "gift of a future
interest" into a "gift of a present interest." Keep in mind that in general terms a completed transfer to an irrevocable trust
(other than a gift to a minor's or "age 21" trust (under IRC § 2503(c)) is a gift ofa future interest which does not qualify
for the annual gift tax exclusion (currently $11,000) under IRC § 2503(b).
An irrevocable trust is usually designed to hold property for the future benefit of beneficiaries (otherwise there
would be very few reasons why it would be used). Accordingly, transfers to an irrevocable trust involve invariably gifts
of future interests.

A gift of a present interest is one in which there is an unrestricted right to the immediate use, possession and
enjoyment ofproperty or income from the property. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b); Estate ofBabbit v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 1270
(1986). Usually a gift of a present interest is a direct gift that is unconditional as to the donee's use and enjoyment of the
gift.
One of the significant disadvantages of using an irrevocable trust as a vehicle for making gifts is that because
the transfer to an irrevocable trust is a gift of a future interest, transfers to the trust result in a taxable gift subject to the
application ofthe donor's unified credit (thereby reducing the federal exemption equivalent amount). Ifthe donor's unified
credit has been exhausted by other transfers, then all future interest gifts are subject to federal transfer taxes.
Even if a person with a taxable estate has not used up her unified credit, taxable gifts do effectively erode the
unified credit. Loss of a credit is a real cost because gifts that are not gift-tax free use up the credit eventually subjecting
assets to transfer tax.
The Crummey Withdrawal Right Trust was designed (years ago) to allow gifts in trust that otherwise would be
gifts of future interests to qualify for the annual exclusion making it a very significant and frequently used planning device.
Annual exclusion gifts can now be made to irrevocable trusts so that a great deal ofproperty can be transferred to children,
grandchildren or other donees subject to all of the "future conditions" that an irrevocable trust allows.

A.

[9.84]

Crummey Withdrawal Right Powers

In Crummey v. Comm'r, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968), the settlor created an irrevocable trust for the benefit of
his four children, two of whom were minors. Each beneficiary had the right to demand a distribution of contributions
made to the trust during the year. The right was exercisable at any time before the end ofthe year. The court held that the
transfers were gifts of present interest regardless of the fact that the minors would need a guardian to exercise the demand
or withdrawal right.
In Rev. Rul. 73-405, 1973-2 C.B. 321, the IRS found that where there is no impediment under the terms of a trust
or local law to the appointment of a guardian and the minor donee has the right to demand distribution, the transfer is a gift
of a present interest that qualifies for the gift tax annual exclusion. Also, Rev. Rul. 80-261, 1980-2 C.B. 279 provided that
a right to demand and receive at least a pro rata portion of trust principal is a gift of a present interest to the extent of each
beneficiary's pro rata share of a gift and that the annual exclusion is allowable.
There are quite a number of private letter rulings in which the IRS has held that a demand right qualifies for the
gift tax annual exclusion, so long as the beneficiary has a real and immediate benefit. See for example Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9625-031 (Mar. 1996), Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-32-001 (Apr. 1995) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-11-021 (Dec. 1992).

1.

[9.851

Notice of Withdrawal Right

A person who has a right to demand trust income or principal has to have a real opportunity to exercise the
right, meaning that the holder of the demand right has to have an adequate period of time and adequate notice to exercise
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the withdrawal right. Roderick v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 108 (1971). In Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981-1 C.B. 474, the IRS held that
a demand right does not qualify a transfer to a trust as a present interest if the donor's conduct makes the demand right
"illusory" and effectively deprives the donee of the power. (In that ruling the demand right was granted on December 29
and it lapsed on December 31, and that the person given the demand right did not receive notice of the right.) Rev. Rul.
87-7,1981-1 C.B. 474.
There are two key elements of notice. First, the trustee has to give immediate notice of the withdrawal right to
the withdrawal right beneficiaries. Without such notice the withdrawal right beneficiaries have no knowledge oftheir right
to withdraw and the right is illusory. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-30-005 (Apr. 1990). Second, the withdrawal right beneficiaries
have to have an adequate amount of time to exercise their demand right. There are no hard and fast rules here as to how
long a withdrawal right beneficiary must be given to exercise the right. Thirty days has consistently been held to be a
reasonable length of time. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-11-021 (Dec. 1992) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-32-013 (May 1992). See also
Estate of Cristofani v. Comm'r,97 T.C. 74 (1991), involving a 15-day demand right period. The trustees of a trust that
has a withdrawal right provision should always give the notice in writing to the withdrawal right beneficiaries. The notice
requirements should be in the trust instrument with the draftsman/attorney emphasizing to the trustees their obligation
to notify the withdrawal right beneficiaries. It is recommended that notification be made by certified mail return receipt
requested or in some other manner that evidences both delivery and receipt of delivery. Note here that if the IRS decides
to audit the trust (particularly upon the death of the settlor) the settlor may lose the benefit of anticipated gift tax annual
exclusions and the trustees may subsequently be liable for their failure to notify withdrawal right beneficiaries. Be careful
in following the practice ofhaving one withdrawal right notice serving as a "continuing notice." While there may be some
argument in support ofthis approach, it remains preferable to have annual "current notices" ofthe withdrawal right provided
to the withdrawal right beneficiaries. See Appendix A for a standard form notice of right of withdrawal provision.

a.

[9.861

Minor Withdrawal Right Beneficiaries

Ifthere are withdrawal right beneficiaries who are minor children, then notice should be given to such beneficiary's
legal guardians. In many instances there will be no legal guardian, so that notice should be given to the parent or parents
ofthe minor withdrawal beneficiary. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-12-014 (Dec. 1986). There is no problem with giving notice to
the settlor ofthe trust even ifthe settlor is the parent or guardian ofthe child. To be safe, ifthe settlor is married, the notice
should be given to the spouse who is not the settlor of the child.

b.

[9.871

Withdrawal Rights Beyond the Calendar Year End

Practically speaking, many clients decide to initiate gift planning they should have accomplished earlier in the
year sometimes toward the end of the year. Accordingly, a great deal of thought needs to be given to the year end plan of
using annual exclusions. The problem is how to grant an adequate period of time to exercise a withdrawal right when it is
late December and there are not thirty days left in the year. The IRS has held that the gift tax annual exclusion is available
for the calendar year in which the transfer is made to the trust irrespective of the calendar year in which the withdrawal
right terminates, provided that the notice of the withdrawal right is promptly given to the trust beneficiaries (after the
transfer), the withdrawal right does not lapse at the end of the year and the withdrawal right beneficiaries are given an
adequate time to make the withdrawal demand. See Rev. Rul. 83-108, 1983-2 C.B. 167; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-06-063 (Nov.
1987). But see also Rev. Rul. 81-7,1981-1 C.B. 474.

c.

[9.881

Need for Liquidity to Satisfy the Withdrawal Right

There is some question as to whether or not the assets available for the exercise of a withdrawal right must be
liquid. This issue is particularly true in the context of an irrevocable life insurance trust where life insurance premiums
are paid prior to the lapse of withdrawal rights. There have been quite a number of private letter rulings indicating that
liquidity is not necessary in order for a withdrawal right to be effective. The language in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-18-051 (Feb.
1981) allows the annual exclusion "only to the extent that there is cash, or assets reducible to cash, in the trust" in order
for the withdrawal right to be satisfied. The bottom line here is that as long as the trust has sufficient assets of any kind to
satisfy the withdrawal right, the annual exclusion should be available. However, it is also obvious that the IRS has taken
very inconsistent positions on this issue in private letter rulings. See Appendix B for form language on the distribution and
satisfaction of a right of withdrawal.

2.

[9.891

Lapse ofa Withdrawal Right (the "Giftover" Problem)

The lapse of a withdrawal right can result in some unexpected gift tax results. A withdrawal right is a general
power of appointment because it is a power that is exercisable in favor of the person holding the power and that person's
estate creditors (or the creditors of his or her estate). IRC § 2514(c). When a withdrawal right lapses it is a release of the
power which is deemed to be a transfer of the property subject to the withdrawal right. IRC § 2514(e). To the extent that
the value ofthe property subject to the withdrawal right exceeds the greater of$5,000 or 5% ofthe total value ofthe assets
(out of which the exercise of the lapsed power could be satisfied), a gift has been made by the owner/holder of the power.
IRC § 2514(e); Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(c)(4).
It is because of this "giftover problem" that withdrawal right powers are generally limited to the greater of the
"5 and 5" rule or restriction, namely the greater of $5,000 or 5% of the value of the assets (from which the withdrawal
right can be satisfied). See Appendix C for standard withdrawal right provisions relative to the annual limitations on
withdrawals to comply with the 5 and 5 power/restriction. This standard provision has two important points. The first is a
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reference to the IRC § 2514(e) limitation relative to the "greater of$5,000 or 5%." The second is that the owner or holder
of the withdrawal right cannot withdraw more than the annual exclusion amount per donor.
One of the most confusing aspects of Crummey withdrawal right trusts is the interplay of the annual exclusion
(about which you advise your client early on) and the 5 and 5 power limitation (about which you later advise your client
in reviewing, for example, a life insurance trust). It is the donor of the gift (Le. the settlor of the trust) who wants to fully
utilize his or her annual exclusion, Le., at $11,000 per donee (or $22,000 if the settlor is married and his spouse consents
to the gift the annual exclusion). However, the donor/settlor's desire for full gift tax annual exclusion for the gift often is
at odds with the withdrawal right beneficiary's failure to exercise the withdrawal right. The withdrawal right beneficiary
is the intended object of the gift, but the donor is hoping that the beneficiary will not exercise the withdrawal right. The
settlor/donor wants the gift to be held in trust and is merely using the withdrawal right to fund an irrevocable trust using
gifts that qualify for the annual exclusion. Doing so, however, is a calculated risk on the part of the donor/settlor because
the withdrawal right beneficiary by doing the "right thing" (i.e. giving up the valuable property right), may be, ifthe 5 and
5 power restrictions are not in effect, transferring a property right by reason of a lapse of such withdrawal right.
Ifthe withdrawal right beneficiary is the only beneficiary ofthe trust, then she is making a gift to herself, and since
you cannot make a gift to yourself, there is no adverse result under IRC § 2514(e). However, ifthere are other beneficiaries
ofthe trust and one ofthe beneficiaries is giving up his or her withdrawal right, then the property over which the withdrawal
right could have been exercised belongs to all of the beneficiaries. Accordingly, a gift, however unintentional, has been
made, to the extent that the value of the property right being given up exceeds the greater of $5,000 or 5% of the "trust"
(for simplicity purposes) it is a gift from the holder of the withdrawal right. Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(c)(4). Keep in mind
that this gift is of a future interest because the trust will likely require that amounts over which a withdrawal right has
lapsed are to be retained in trust. Thus the unified credit, not ofthe original donor/settlor, but rather ofthe withdrawal right
beneficiary (who let her right lapse) will be reduced by the amount of the lapse in excess of the 5 and 5 rule.
If the original donor/settlor of the gift in trust that is subject to the withdrawal right does not want to penalize the
holder of the withdrawal right, the donor/settlor will have to restrict or structure the amount of the gift in such a way that
it does not violate the IRC § 2514(e) 5 and 5 power.
3.

[9.901

Methods to Avoid the "Giftover" Problem

There are several methods to solve and eliminate the "giftover" problem which is a not uncommon problem with
respect to irrevocable life insurance trusts. The methods include the hanging power, multiple demand right beneficiaries,
separate shares, separate trusts and limited powers of appointment.

a.

[9.911

Hanging Power

Generally a right ofwithdrawal can be exercised only during a limited period oftime each year. The power lapses
if a beneficiary does not exercise such power within a stated time period. On the other hand, a hanging power is open all
year and may be open for subsequent years. At the end of the year the power lapses only to the extent of the greater of
$5,000 or 5% of the trust principal. Any excess over that amount does not lapse but is carried fOlWard (hence the term
"hangs over") to subsequent years until the lapse ofthe hanging power will not be treated as a taxable gift by reason ofIRC
§ 2514(e). The withdrawal power in excess ofthe greater of$5,000 or the 5% exemption remains open for the beneficiary
to draw against, but diminishes over a period of time, so that the adverse estate and gift tax consequences are minimized
or done away with. Appendix B provides suggested language with respect to the hanging power.

b.

[9.921

Multiple Demand Right Beneficiaries

Another method that has been used to eliminate the giftover problem has been to increase the number of
beneficiaries available for the annual gift tax exclusion by naming multiple withdrawal right beneficiaries. For example, a
trust settlor could name his or her children, grandchildren and even advisors and friends to be demand right beneficiaries.
Time does not permit our getting into great detail with respect to the benefits and risks of using this approach. Suffice it
to say that the IRS has taken the position that it will oppose any multiple withdrawal right beneficiaries unless it can be
demonstrated that such beneficiaries have some type of continuing interest in the trust (and have simply not been added
to take advantage of the annual gift tax exclusion or to minimize the giftover problem). The taxpayer has been successful
in two significant cases involving this issue. These are Estate of Crisofani v. Comm'r, 97 T.C. 74 (1991) and Estate of
Kohlsaat v. Comm'r, T.C.M. 1997-212. As a planning suggestion, please note that if any practitioner plans to solve the
giftover problem with the use ofmultiple withdrawal right beneficiaries, such practitioner should be very mindful to ensure
that the beneficiaries have some type of continuing interest in the trust.

c.

[9.931

Separate Shares

This approach involves the creation of a separate trust within the irrevocable trust for each lifetime withdrawal
right beneficiary. Each time a gift subject to a withdrawal right is made to the withdrawal right trust, the gift is allocated
among each of the beneficiary's separate trusts. Each beneficiary then has the withdrawal right to take his or her share of
the gift from the separate trust during the withdrawal right period. Since each trust is separate, the trust settlor receives a
full annual exclusion for each separate trust. Upon the lapse ofa withdrawal right there is no giftover to other beneficiaries
since there are no other beneficiaries of the separate trust. Under Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b), if the person who releases a
general power retains control and dominion over the property subject to the power, there is a wholly incomplete transfer
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and no gift. Since with this technique the same beneficiary who allowed the gift to lapse is the sole beneficiary of the
lifetime separate trust, the beneficiary is making a gift back to himself, and the gift is incomplete. While the settlor is
living the separate trust for the lifetime beneficiaries continue in existence. To my knowledge the use of separate trust has
not been specifically tested in any case or revenue ruling. However, please refer to Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-29-097 (Feb. 1982),
wherein the IRS suggested a similar method to avoid the giftover problem.

d.

[9.941

Separate Trusts

Another method to avoid the giftover issue is to create a separate trust for each beneficiary. The settlor then makes
transfers to each trust. If the withdrawal right lapses there is no giftover problem, because the property subject to the
withdrawal right will continue to be used for the benefit of the beneficiary. In other words, this is a more formal variation
ofthe "separate shares" approach under subparagraph (c) above. Creating separate trusts allows each trust to be treated as
a separate entity for income tax purposes. However, if all of the gifts to a separate trust are subject to a withdrawal right,
the beneficiary ofthe trust is considered to be the grantor ofthe trust. However, using this approach can be administratively
awkward because each trust requires separate accounting. In addition, if a number of separate trusts own an undivided
interest in the same asset (for example, real estate or a life insurance policy) it is sometimes very cumbersome to list such
trusts as owners of the asset held in common. One way to get around this complexity is to have a single trustee for all of
the trusts, which trustee would have common fund investment and management powers.

e.

[9.951

Limited Power ofAppointment

One final method for circumventing the giftover problem is to grant the holder of a withdrawal right a limited
power of appointment of elapsed amounts. Such limited power of appointment would be testamentary in nature. Because
the trust provisions would allow the beneficiary to retain the power to dispose ofthe property that was subject to the lapsed
withdrawal right, such beneficiary would not have made a completed gift. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b). Accordingly there
cannot be a giftover to the other beneficiaries of the trust. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-30-005 (Apr. 1990). Keep in mind some
problems in using this method. Ifthe beneficiaries (to which the holder ofthe limited power can appoint the property that is
subject to the lapsed withdrawal right) are grandchildren ofthe trust's initial maker/settlor, there may be adverse generation
skipping transfer tax implications. The holder ofthe power should be considered to be the transferor so that the generation
skipping tax (which could well come into play if the appointees are grandchildren of the holder) will not be applied if the
appointees are one generation below the holder.

4.

[9.961

The Trust Settlor's Right to Restrict the Trust Amount Subject to Withdrawal Rights

A trust settlor may not at all times want a withdrawal right beneficiary to have the right to withdraw all or part of
a gift that is made to a withdrawal right trust. For example, a withdrawal right beneficiary may have previously exercised
her withdrawal right or the settlor may want to make outright gifts to the withdrawal right beneficiary and make other gifts
in trust that are not subject to the withdrawal right. Accordingly, instead of creating a new trust, it may be much easier to
use an existing withdrawal right trust.
There does not appear to be a problem in allowing a trust settlor (or for that matter any donor to a withdrawal right
trust) to restrict a gift to a withdrawal right trust without any language in the trust allowing such a restriction. See Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 81-03-074 (Oct. 1980) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-03-069 (Oct. 1980). However, there may be an argument that the
right of the settlor to control whether or not a withdrawal right could be exercised over a particular gift is a power to alter,
amend, revoke or terminate the trust, which would in turn cause inclusion of some or all of the trust in the settlor's estate
(under IRC § 2038(a)(I)). Generally speaking, however, as long as the direction by the settlor that a gift is not subject to
the withdrawal right is made prior to or at the time the gift is made, the settlor has not retained any powers. (It may be
helpful for you to refer to Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-01-004.)

5.

[9.971

Estate Tax Consequences of a Withdrawal Right

If a power holder dies during the time that a withdrawal right is outstanding, the amount of the existing
withdrawal right is included in that holder's (the beneficiary's) estate. See Estate of Dietz v. Comm'r, T.C.M. 1996-471;
IRC § 2041(a)(2). The chances of this happening obviously are pretty slight, since usually the withdrawal right is for a
short period of time (such as a thirty-day period). However, estate inclusion is more of a concern for hanging powers or
powers that are open for a calendar year.
Ifthe amount ofthe existing withdrawal right is included in the estate ofthe deceased withdrawal right beneficiary,
the effect is often ofno consequence. Often the estate ofthe withdrawal right beneficiary is not subject to federal estate tax
because it is relatively small and simply will not be subject to federal estate taxation. If the withdrawal right beneficiary's
estate will be subject to federal estate taxation, you should weigh the potential cost of the estate tax to the deceased
beneficiary's estate against the settlor's loss of the annual exclusion for the year in which the death occurs.
Since the odds of a withdrawal right beneficiary's dying within the demand right period is pretty long and the
value of the outstanding withdrawal right is usually less than $22,000 (assuming there is a gift spent between the settlor
and spouse) it is generally better to extend the withdrawal right to the personal representative ofthe beneficiary's estate so
that the settlor can take advantage of the annual exclusion. This is on the assumption that in most instances the settlor has
a far greater estate tax problem than does the withdrawal right beneficiary.
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[9.981

Income Tax Consequences of a Withdrawal Right

The beneficial)' of a withdrawal right trust is treated as the owner of the trust to the extent that such beneficiary
holds a power to withdraw the property whether or not the power is exercised. IRC § 678(a). However, if the settlor is
treated as the owner of the trust under any of the grantor trust provisions, the grantor/settlor and not the withdrawal right
beneficiary will be treated as the trust's owner for income tax purposes. IRC § 678(b). Therefore, in the context ofcreating
an intentionally defective grantor trust (that we have discussed above) the lapse of a withdrawal right is governed by IRC
§ 678(a)(2) so that if the settlor is treated as a grantor trust then IRC § 678(b) controls.
When a withdrawal right beneficial)' is treated as the owner, the IRS has indicated how the portion of the trust
that the power holder owns as a grantor is to be computed. For this calculation please refer to Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-004
(Aug. 1990).

VII.

[9.991

Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts

An irrevocable life insurance trust (LIT) normally is a withdrawal right trust that owns life insurance on the life of
the settlor, or if there is more than one settlor, in the lives of the settlors. An LIT's primary functions include:

(a) avoiding federal estate tax on the life insurance proceeds;
(b) qualifying gifts to the trust for the gift tax annual exclusion; and
(c) allowing the settlor to control the use of the trust assets in such a way as to allow a completed gift
and to exclude the trust from the settlor's estate.
Since the LIT owns life insurance, the attorney faces some issues in addition to those relating to withdrawal right
trusts that do not hold life insurance. More particularly, incidents of ownership of life insurance policies under IRC § 2042
and transfers ofthose incidents of ownership within three years ofthe insured's (normally the settlor's) date of death under
IRC § 2035 have an important impact on planning for and drafting and administering an LIT. In addition, split dollar
premium arrangements and choice of trustee are important considerations in determining the effectiveness of an LIT.
A.

[9.1001 Trust's Ownership of Life Insurance

Ifthe settlor ofan LIT retains any "incidents of ownership" on insurance policies insuring the settlor's life that are
exercisable by the settlor alone or in conjunction with someone else, the policy proceeds will be included in the settlor's
gross estate under IRC § 2042(2). (Remember that an incident of ownership includes a reversional)' interest arising by
the express terms of the instrument or by operation of law only if the value of such reversional)' interest exceeds 5% of
the value of the policy immediately before the death of the settlor. See again IRC § 2042(2).) The term "incidents of
ownership" does not necessarily mean direct ownership of the policy. The right of the settlor or the settlor's estate to the
economic benefits of the policy is enough to trigger estate inclusion under IRC § 2042(2). Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2).
These regulations list a number of incidents of ownership including:
(a) The power to change the beneficial)' of the policy;
(b) The power to assign the policy;
(c) The power to revoke an assignment made by the owner of the policy;
(d) The right to borrow against the policy;
(e) The power to surrender or cancel the policy;
(f) The right to use the policy to collateralize a loan.

When life insurance is held in an LIT the settlor is considered to have an incident of ownership if the settlor (either alone
or in conjunction with another person) has the power as trustee (or otherwise) to change the beneficial ownership of the
policy or its proceeds or the time or manner of enjoyment ofthe proceeds, even though the settlor has no beneficial interest
in the trust. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c)(4). Note that payment ofthe premiums by the settlor in and of itself is not a reason
for estate tax inclusion under IRC § 2042(2). In most instances it is the terms of the policy or the terms of the LIT that
determine the incidents of ownership and not necessarily the intention ofthe parties. C.I.R. v. Estate ofNoel, 380 u.S. 678
(1965). Note also that Kentucky law plays a large part in determining whether an insured has an incident of ownership.
1.

f9.1011 Insured as Trustee

While there are a number of mixed cases and rulings in this area, the rule to follow here is that under no
circumstances should the settlor serve as trustee of a trust (an LIT) in which the settlor is a maker. The rulings and
authorities giving some type of approval to the settlor/insured acting as trustee are so conflicting and/or restricted that
practically speaking they should be disregarded. Further, the trust should not grant the insured the power to remove and
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replace the trustee since this would almost certainly be considered to be an incident of ownership. The line between having
incidents of ownership and not having any is at best very vague. If the insured was acting as trustee of an LIT at his or
her death or can remove or replace the trustee, it is very probable that the IRS will look into the terms of the trust and the
circumstances creating the creation and funding and administration of the LIT. If there is even a slight indication that the
insured retained incidents of ownership, you can rest assured that a dispute with the IRS will arise simply because the
"stakes" are quite high (federal estate taxation of the life insurance proceeds).

2.

[9.1021 Insured's Ability to Control the LIT

Ifthe insured's consent is required before an action relating to an incident of ownership can be exercised, then the
insured probably holds incidents of ownership. See Estate of Karagheusian v. Comm'r, 233 F.2d 197 (2nd Cir. 1956).
The primary objective in many instances of an LIT is the elimination of estate taxation of life insurance proceeds
from policies insuring the life of the trust settlor. To reach this goal, the trust instrument should not allow the insured/
settlor to have any direct or indirect incidents of ownership. If the settlor wants a certain degree of control the trust should
be drafted at the outset with provisions to include enough conditions so that the policy or its cash value and/or the proceeds
will be used in a manner that the settlor intends without allowing the settlor to hold any beneficial interest under the policies
or retain any interest in the trust that would cause federal estate tax inclusion under IRC §§ 2036, 2037 or 2038.
Where an insured wants to control the policies to such an extent that she has an incident of ownership, the use of
the LIT is an exercise in futility. If a client insists on being aggressive, then reliance on rulings and cases can be dangerous
because they are so very much fact specific and look to the differing state laws. In this regard, keep in mind the inclusion
of certain language or provision in the trust instrument to the effect that notwithstanding anything in the trust agreement,
the settlor shall not have any incident of ownership as defined in the Code or Regulations, over any life insurance policy
insuring the settlor's life.

3.

[9.1031 Transfers of Existing Policies to an LIT

Ifthe settlor of an LIT transfers a policy of life insurance on her life to the trust in which the settlor had an incident
of ownership and then dies within three years of the transfer, the life insurance proceeds are included in the settlor's estate
under IRe § 2035. This life insurance proceeds inclusion provision is one of the few and last vestiges of the old "gifts in
contemplation of death" rules that remain in the Code. See IRC § 2035(d). The proceeds are not includable in the gross
estate ofthe settlor, ifthe settlor did not possess any incidents of ownership in the policy at the time of death or at any time
during the three years preceding death. The three year rule becomes very important when an LIT is being funded with
existing policies. If the insured transfers such policy to an LIT over which the insured held any incidents of ownership
and then dies within three years ofthe transfer, the total amount ofthe insurance proceeds will be included in the insured's
estate. If the insured makes the transfer and dies more than three years after the transfer, the proceeds will not be included
in the estate. On the other hand, if the trustee of an LIT applies for the policy and is the owner of the policy from its
inception, the proceeds will not be included in the insured's estate.

a.

[9.1041 Incidents of Ownership - The IRS Version

Before the enactment of IRC § 2035(d) in 1981, the IRS was successful in having life insurance included in a
deceased person's estate under the agency theory and the "beamed transfer theory." This latter theory (beamed transfer
theory) was used by the IRS in Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971) in order to include insurance proceeds in
the estate of the decedent. In that case the decedent bought an accidental death policy within one year of his death. The
policy was issued to and owned by the decedent's children. The court held that the substance ofthe transaction was as ifthe
decedent has made a transfer within three years ofhis death for less than adequate and full consideration and it included the
amount ofthe proceeds in his estate. By paying premiums and being closely involved in the planning for his children, the
decedent designated the ownership ofthe policy and created in his children all the contract rights to the insurance benefits.
In essence, the IRS contended that the decedent had made a transfer of the policy within three years of death. The court
stated that a transfer had been made even though the policy was owned initially by the decedent's children. In Detroit Bank
and Trust Company v. United States, 467 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1972), the IRS used the agency theory successfully, arguing
that the trustee of an LIT was merely acting as an agent or a facilitator for the insured in buying a life insurance policy. The
court concluded that in substance the insured had purchased the life insurance and had transferred it to the trust. Again,
in these instances, before the enactment oflRC § 2035(d), the IRS made it very difficult to structure an LIT it the insured
was more than incidentally involved. In other words, the insured cannot be the instigator or the facilitator of the planning
that included an LIT.

b.

[9.1051 Incidents of Ownership - The Court's Version

In Estate of Lederv. C.I.R., 89 T.C. 235 (1987), aff'd 893 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1989), the decedent had his wife
apply for a million dollar life insurance policy on his life. The decedent's wife was the owner and beneficiary of the
policy. The monthly premium was paid by loans from the decedent's wholly owned corporation. Within three years ofthe
purchase ofthe policy the decedent died. Three months before the decedent's death his wife created an LIT naming herself
as trustee and as a beneficiary along with their three children. The IRS argued that the life insurance proceeds should be
included in the decedent's estate. The tax court analyzing the facts under IRC § 2035(b) held that the proceeds were not
includable in the decedent's estate. The tax court's reasoning was that the three year rule under IRC § 2035 would have
applied only if the decedent had ownership of the policy under the incidents of ownership test of IRC § 2042. Since the
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decedent's wife was the owner of the policy (initially in her own name and then as trustee) the decedent never had any
incidents of ownership in the policy. Under IRC § 2035(b), the decedent must have retained incidents of ownership for
the proceeds to be included in his estate. It was irrelevant that the premiums were paid by his wholly owned corporation.
Since the decedent had no incidents of ownership in the policy, the proceeds were not included in his estate. It is important
to note here that the tax court went on to remind us that the IRS's beamed transfer and agency theories might have been
relevant prior to the enactment ofIRC § 2035(d); however, since IRC § 2035(d) was enacted, such theories of agency had
been effectively undermined and probably done away with by IRC § 2035(a).
Subsequent to Leder, the Tax Court in Estate ofHeadrick v. Comm'r, 93 T.C. 171 (1989), aff'd918 F.2d 1263 (6th
Cir. 1990), held that under the reasoning ofLeder, even if a decedent is deemed to have directly or indirectly paid insurance
premiums of death, no estate tax inclusion will result as long as the decedent retained no interest in the policy and had no
ownership rights in the policy. This rule continues to be the current position of the U.S. Tax Court.

4.

r9.1061 Kentucky Inheritance and Estate Tax re Life Insurance

Where life insurance proceeds are payable to a designated beneficiary, which includes an inter vivos or
testamentary trust, such proceeds are not subject to Kentucky's inheritance tax. The Kentucky Inheritance Tax Return
(Form 92A120) specifically identifies on Schedule D, "insurance payable to the estate." See KRS 140.030.
No similar exemption applies to life insurance proceeds in the context of the federal tax statutes, which taxes
such proceeds essentially on the basis of the grantor's ownership or the estate's beneficial interest therein. Accordingly,
for Kentucky inheritance tax purposes, all that is necessary is that the policies be made payable to a designated beneficiary
(including the trust). Kentucky's three year contemplation of death rule is irrelevant here, even though for federal estate
tax purposes IRC § 203 5(d) the three year rule applies to transfers of life insurance policies.
All Kentucky inheritance tax liability applicable to children and grandchildren (as well as spouses) has been
completely eliminated after July 1, 1999. See KRS 140.080(1)(c).

5.

r9.1071 Some Common Problems in Creating an LIT

If the insured rather than the trustee of an LIT applies for the life insurance, the insured may be considered to
be the policy's original owner. Obviously it is always better for the trustee of the LIT to sign the application for the life
insurance; however, this may not always be practical. Having the trustee sign the application assumes that the LIT is
drafted (i.e., the Agreement is executed). In many cases where health may be a concern, the insured does not want to incur
the expense of having an LIT prepared, just to find out if he or she is insurable, or if insurable, is rated at a prohibitive
high premium because of health problems. Consequently, it may be wise to submit a supplementary application to test
insurability. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 91410007.
Also it sometimes happens that the insured is ready to purchase life insurance from a "very willing" life insurance
agent before the attorney has been able to draft the trust. A supplementary application may address the concerns of all the
parties.
An alternative to having the LIT drafted immediately is to have the insured's spouse apply for the policy. This is
what was done in the Leder case. However, the funds used for the premium should probably come from the spouse's share
ofthe marital property; otherwise, the IRS could argue that the insured was the "facilitator" ofthe transaction and again try
to argue one of the theories that the IRS has never quite given up on (the agency and beamed transfer theories).

6.

r9.1081 Some Comments on Trust Drafting

A well drafted LIT will contain a fail-safe provision in the event that the life insurance proceeds are brought back
into the insured's estate for any reason. Ifthis clause is not in the LIT, you could have quite severe federal estate tax effects
resulting. If the LIT only has a credit shelter provision and not a marital deduction or QTIP provision, then the decedent!
settlor may be "locked in" in case of a death within three years of a transfer. The main point here is to draft the LIT so that
there is a "safety valve" in case of a death within the three years of transfer. Typically this can be accomplished either by
drafting an alternative marital deduction/QTIP provision within the LIT itself, or by having the amount of proceeds in the
life insurance trust "pour back" into the decedent's probate estate, assuming that the decedent's last will or testamentary
instrument has some type of marital deduction or QTIP arrangement resulting in the "unexpected insurance proceeds"
qualifying for the marital deduction. Please remember that if this fail-safe mechanism is to work, then all of the marital
deduction components under § 2056(b)(7) (the standard QTIP provisions) need to be included in either the trust or the
ultimate testamentary instrument used for "funneling" the unexpected life insurance proceeds.

7.

r9.1091 Transfer for Value Issues.

As a general rule, death proceeds of life insurance are exempt from income taxes under IRC § 101(a)(I). On
the other hand, if during the insured's lifetime there has been a transfer of the policy for value, then the proceeds (minus
the amount of value paid for the policy and any premiums paid by the transferee) will be subject to income tax. IRC §
101(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1(b)(I). There is not a transfer for value when the basis of the policy in the transferee is
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determined in whole or in part by reference to the basis of the policy in the hands of the transferor. IRC § 101(a)(2)(A).
This is the usual LIT situation in which the insured settlor is making a gift of the policy.
If the settlor transfers a policy on his or her life that is subject to a policy loan and the transfer for value rule does
not apply, the proceeds are income tax free. Rev. Rul. 69-187, 1969-1 C.B. 45. However, it is not clear what the effect
of the transfer for value rule would have if the amount of the loan exceeded the insured's basis. Therefore this type of
transfer should be avoided if possible. Although transfer for value is not generally a problem, it can be solved by adding
trust provisions that will cause the LIT to be a grantor trust under IRC §§ 673 through 677 (and 679).
Transfer-For-Value rules generally do not apply to grantor trusts. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-47-006 (Aug. 2002).
B.

[9.1101 Life Insurance Issues In an Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust

An LIT can ownjust about any type of life insurance product, including whole life, universal life, variable life and
term. For a good resource in this area see Zaritsky and Leimberg, Tax Planning With Life Insurance, Analysis With Forms
(Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1992). Each life insurance product has its own merits and pitfalls and time does not permit
us to get into these matters. Suffice it to say that the particular life insurance product should be analyzed carefully either
by the attorney or probably by life insurance specialist or consultant, so that the product is consistent with the purpose of
the trust settlor and the trust terms.
There is increased concern by attorneys that there may be some liability associated with the creation and
implementation of an LIT. Guarding against this potential liability and ensuring that the LIT will provide life insurance
proceeds at the death of its settlor insured, requires the services of a very good life insurance specialist in LIT planning.
Very few attorneys are licensed life insurance agents, much less highly competent in this field. Attorneys should be
prepared early on to alert their clients for the need of competent life insurance professionals in creating and implementing
an LIT.

c.

[9.1111 Second-To-Die Life Insurance

All ofyou know that life insurance can be issued on the lives ofmore than one life. A typical product is a joint life
or "second-to-die policy" or sometimes known as the last survivor policy, usually for a married couple. This second-to-die
policy is a policy in which the death benefits are not paid until the death of the surviving spouse.
The principal reason for the attractiveness of such a second to die policy relates to the availability ofthe unlimited
marital deduction and the graduated increase in the unified credit/federal exemption equivalent amounts that originated
with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. Pub. L. No. 97-34 (1981). By use of proper planning a married couple can
delay federal estate taxation until both spouses have died; therefore, for many married couples the need for life insurance,
particularly for the payment of federal estate taxes, doesn't come into play until the death of the survivor of them.
A principal "up front" advantage of second-to-die life insurance is that the cost of such insurance may be
substantially less than the cost for an individual life insurance policy (whether in the term, variable, universal or whole
life categories). The simple reason for this reduced cost is that the odds of two persons dying prior to each one of their
individual life expectancy is far less than one of them dying prior to life expectancy; therefore, the risk to the insurance
company is less, meaning (hopefully) that the cost of the insurance element of such a policy is reduced.
When second to die life insurance is used, an LIT is drafted generally so that each spouse is a settlor of the trust.
However, to avoid any incidents of ownership, it is recommended that neither spouse is named as a beneficiary or as a
trustee. In all other respects, generally speaking, the LIT for this purpose is like an LIT relating to an individual settlor
(and insured).
D.

[9.1121 Owner and Beneficiary of Life Insurance

Obviously a critical portion of LIT planning is the ownership and beneficiary status of life insurance policies
on the life of the settlor. In all instances (to my knowledge at least) the trustee of the LIT should be the owner and the
beneficiary of any life insurance policy. If the trustee is not the owner of such policy, the trustee cannot exercise control
over the policy. If the owner is the trust settlor (and insured), the life insurance proceeds will be included in such settlor's
estate.
Ifthe LIT's trustee is not the beneficiary ofthe policy, the terms ofthe trust will not control the disposition of the
policy's proceeds (as it reaches the trust). If the beneficiary is the settlor (insured) the proceeds again will be included in
the settlor's (insured's) estate.
When you are employing an LIT, the owner and the beneficiary of any life insurance policy should be the trustee
ofthe LIT. The attorney and the trustee should always have a copy ofeach life insurance policy showing the ownership and
beneficiary designation. You should also review these policies periodically to ensure that the status of the life insurance
remains intact (or does not need to be changed for any reason).
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E.

[9.113] Using the Life Insurance Trust for Liquidity Needs of Settlor's Estate

All ofus have heard irrevocable life insurance trusts being "pushed" for taking care of estate tax needs (as well as
any other debts or expenses ofthe insured's estate). Describing an LIT's use for these purposes is not exactly accurate. An
LIT should not be used directly to pay any estate or inheritance taxes caused or generated by the insured's estate. Ifthe LIT
does do so (at least on a direct basis) the payment is considered a gift from the LIT to the estate of the deceased insured.
See A.F. Goodman v. Comm'r, 156 F.2d 218 (2nd Cir. 1946). Going one step further, if the LIT is required under its own
terms to pay the insured's taxes, debts or administrative expenses, the insurance proceeds will be included in the insured's
estate. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(b).
The LIT should use an alternate method for paying such death taxes. The LIT will typically contain language that
allows the trustee to either loan some or all of the life insurance proceeds to the insured's probate or trust estate, or, in the
alternative, to purchase and acquire assets from such probate or trust estate (at fair market value of course).
In a loan arrangement the transaction should be at arms-length to avoid any gift implications. Interest should be
paid and the indebtedness should be evidenced by a promissory note, as well as some insurance that the loan will be repaid
or at least extinguished in some manner.
An alternative to the loan method is the "acquisition method" under which the LIT purchases assets from the
insured's probate or trust estate. Remember that under IRC § 1014 all of the property included in a decedent's estate
receives a "stepped up" basis at death if the LIT purchases and acquires assets that have a stepped up basis for a purchase
price equal to such stepped up basis/value, there will be no taxable gain. There will be taxable gain only to the extent that
the acquisition price of the assets is greater than the stepped up basis (date-of-death reported value).

The loan and acquisition methods for paying death taxes both have disadvantages. A promissory note (in the loan
approach) is a legitimate interest bearing debt and has to be repaid. When property is purchased by the LIT that property
will no longer be controlled by the terms of the settlor's will or trust instrument and may not pass in the manner that the
settlor intended. To minimize this problem at times the terms of the LIT will "mirror" those of the insured's testamentary
or inter vivos (revocable living) trust. If the terms ofthe trusts are identical, it does not matter which trust owns the assets.
The cash and property remaining after all estate taxes, debts and administration expenses are paid (presumably with the life
insurance proceeds that reached the probate or trust estate) will pass in the manner determined by the insured settlor under
the terms of the LIT (which mirror the insured's living or testamentary trust).

VIII.

r9.1141 Appendix - Forms

A.

[9.115] Notice of the Right of Withdrawal

Notice of the Right of Withdrawal
The Trustee shall provide written notice to each Primary Beneficiary of the amount of the Contributed Property
and his or her right to withdraw that property. Notice for purposes of this Trust Agreement shall be effective when made
in writing by either:
Personally delivering notice to the Primary Beneficiary and securing a written receipt, or
Mailing notice in the United States mail to the last known address of the Primary Beneficiary by
certified mail, return receipt requested.

B.

r9.1161 Distribution in Satisfaction ofa Right of Withdrawal
Distribution in Satisfaction of a Right of Withdrawal

Upon notification by a Primary Beneficiary of his or her desire to exercise a right of withdrawal, the Trustee
shall distribute the amount so requested. The Trustee may distribute trust property in cash or in kind, including insurance
policies held in the trust or interests in those policies, in satisfaction of a withdrawal right. The Trustee is authorized to
borrow, upon such terms as are reasonable and necessary, in order to provide for payment of amounts required by any
exercise of a right of withdrawal.

c.

r9.117] Annual Limit on Withdrawals
Section

Annual Limit on Withdrawals

In no event shall the total amount withdrawable by a Primary Beneficiary by reason of a direct or indirect gift to
this trust by each donor in anyone calendar year exceed an amount equal to the maximum gift tax annual exclusion under
Section 2503(b) of the Code or any other corresponding provisions of any subsequent federal tax laws in effect in the
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calendar year of withdrawal, provided, however, that in no event maya Primary Beneficiary withdraw in anyone year an
amount greater than the maximum annual amount allowable under Section2514(e) ofthe IRC § or any other corresponding
provisions of any subsequent federal tax laws in effect in the calendar year of withdrawal as to which the lapse of a power
of appointment shall not be considered a release of such power.

a)

Contributed Property

Contributed Property shall include any property transferred to the trust by the Makers, individually or
jointly, or any other donor that is accepted by the Trustee. The contribution value of a gift shall be used
for purposes of determining the value of the withdrawal rights.

b)

Restrictions on Demand Right

Any donor transferring property to the trust may, by a writing delivered to the Trustee at the time of the
transfer, restrict a Primary Beneficiary's right of withdrawal to part or all of the transferred property.

c)

Notice of the Right of Withdrawal

The Trustee, within ten days following the transfer of Contributed Property to the trust, shall provide
written notice to each Primary Beneficiary ofthe amount ofthe Contributed Property and his or her right
to withdraw that property. Notice for purposes of this Trust Agreement shall be effective when made in
writing by either:
Personally delivering notice to each Primary Beneficiary and securing a written receipt, or
Mailing notice in the United States mail to the last known address of each Primary Beneficiary by
certified mail, return receipt requested.

d)

Lapse ofa Right of Withdrawal

A Primary Beneficiary's right to withdraw is non-cumulative and shall lapse, to the extent that the right
of withdrawal has not been exercised, at the end of forty-five days after the date of the Trustee's notice
to the Primary Beneficiary of the right to withdraw.

D.

r9.1181 Right of Withdrawal
Section _ _ Right of Withdrawal

During each calendar year prior to the Maker's death, each Primary Beneficiary shall have the right to withdraw an equal
share ofthe Contributed Property. A Primary Beneficiary's right of withdrawal shall be vested as ofthe date ofthe transfer
to the trust of the Contributed Property.

a) The Annual Lapse of Withdrawals
The right of withdrawal for each Primary Beneficiary shall be cumulative except that, on December 31
of each year, the total amount which may be withdrawn by each Primary Beneficiary shall be reduced by
the greater of$5,000 or 5 percent of the value of the trust principal on such date.
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I.

[10.1]

General Comments

The largest single asset in a client's estate is often the total oftheir qualified plan and IRA accounts. These assets
have been and still are extremely hard to deal with· in adopting practical estate plans for clients. However, on January
17, 2001, the IRS' New Proposed Regulations on minimum required distributions (RMD) were published in the Federal
Register. Thereafter on April 16, 2002 the IRS issued permanent regulations on the minimum distributions rule. The
proposed regulations replaced the proposed regulations originally issued on July 17, 1987 relative to the required minimum
distribution rules that were never followed by permanent regulations thereafter.
The proposed and permanent regulations made permanent all distributions made in the 2003 calendar year and
hereafter to IRA owners and participants in qualified plans (hereinafter referred to as "participant"). In addition, the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, hereinafter referred to as "2001 Tax
Act," brought some changes in this area of the law as well.
These changes and subsequent tax planning are addressed in this chapter. The interplay of the various income,
excise and transfer taxes creates an array of opportunities, some of which will be simpler now and in the future. However,
when dealing with qualified plans and IRA distributions careful planning is still very important under the new regulations
in order to increase a client's investment growth tax free in their plans by postponing and reducing the minimum amounts
that will eventually have to be withdrawn.

II.

[10.2]

Method of Calculating Distributions

A.

[10.3]

Required Minimum Distribution

The new proposed and permanent regulations simplify the minimum required distribution rules by providing a
simple new uniform distribution table (see Exhibit A) that all participants can use to determine the minimum distribution
required during their lifetimes with the exception of a spouse who is more than 10 years younger than the participant where
a different table may be used. The permanent 2002 regulations have new life expectancy tables replacing the 2001 tables
just adopted the preceding year, under which a participant's life expectancy is approximately one year longer than the table
adopted in the preceding year. This table was adopted as a result of The 2001 Tax Act that directed the IRS to change its
life expectancy tables in order to reflect the current life expectancies.
A participant can take his or her first required minimum distribution (for their age 70 ~ years) not in that first
distribution year, but rather by April 1 of the following year. Most participants will take their first distribution in the same
year they reach age 70~. The 2002 final regulations provide that the first year's required distribution (which was made in
January - March ofthe second year) is not subtracted out in determining the IRA's value on December 31 ofthe first year.
This is a change from the old September 1987 and 2001 proposed regulations that had allowed the subtraction.
This table known as the Minimum Distribution Incidental Benefit (hereinafter referred to as a DDT), eliminates
the following prior requirements:

B.

1.

The need to determine a beneficiary by the required beginning date.

2.

The need to decide whether or not to recalculate life expectancy each year in determining required
minimum distributions, and

3.

The need to satisfy a separate minimum incidental death benefit rule.

rl0.41

Calculation of the Required Minimum Distribution (RMD)

The new proposed and permanent regulations permit the required minimum distribution during the participant's
lifetime to be calculated without regard to the beneficiary's age (except when required distributions can be reduced by
taking into account the age of a beneficiary who is a spouse more than 10 years younger than the participant) and permits
the beneficiary to be determined as of September 30th of the year following the year of the participant's death. The
September 30th date from the final regulations was moved back from the December 31 date in the proposed regulations.
This means that after a participant dies, there is less time for post-mortem planning (cash out a charity that is a beneficiary
ofa participant's revocable trust.) See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-4(a-4)(a). The trustee must provide trust documentation
to the plan administrator by October 31 of the year following the participant's death. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401(a)(9), A-5 and
A-6.

1.

rl0.51

Spouse as Designated Beneficiary

When a designated beneficiary is the individual's spouse and is more than 10 years younger than the participant,
the participant and spouse's actual joint life expectancy can be used to figure RMDs. See Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9; IRS Pub.
590, Individual Retirement Arrangements and IRS Pub. 939, General Rule for Pensions and Annuities.
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2.

[10.61

Changing the Designated Beneficiary

The new regulations allow the participant to change designated beneficiaries after the required beginning date
without increasing the required minimum distribution and allows the beneficiary to be changed after the participant's
death, such as by one or more beneficiaries disclaiming or being cashed out.

3.

[10.71

Participant's Remaining Life Expectancy at Time of Death

The new regulations permit after the RMD date that the calculation of post-death minimum distributions to take
into account the participant's remaining life expectancy at the time of death, thus allowing distributions in all cases to be
spread over a number of years after death even if the estate is the beneficiary.

4.

[10.81

Post-mortem Planning if Estate is Beneficiary

If the estate of the participant at death is the beneficiary post-mortem planning cannot be used to balance the
situation. The final regulations clearly provide that no said changes can be made.

C.

[10.91

The Uniform Distribution Period

The required minimum distribution is determined by dividing the account balance as of December 31 st of each
year by the distribution period. For lifetime required minimum distributions, the new regulations provide a uniform
distribution period for all participants of the same age.
The UDT table is based on the joint life expectancies of the participant and an imaginary survivor 10 years
younger at each age beginning at age 70.
For years after the year ofthe participant's death, the distribution period is generally the remaining life expectancy
of the designated beneficiary. The beneficiary's remaining life expectancy is calculated using the age ofthe beneficiary in
the year following the year of the participant's death, reduced by one for each subsequent year (see table, Exhibit B).
If the participant's spouse is the participant's sole beneficiary at the end of the year following the year of the
death, the distribution period during the spouse's life is the spouse's single life expectancy. For years after the year ofthe
spouse's death, the distribution period is the spouse's life expectancy calculated in the year of death, reduced by one for
each subsequent year. This shows the importance for the spouse to rollover the benefits to her own account.
If there is no designated beneficiary as of the end of September 30 of the year after the participant's death during
the RMD period, the distribution period is the participant's life expectancy calculated in the year of death, reduced by one
for each subsequent year.

D.

[10.101 Determination of Designated Beneficiary

The permanent regulations provide that, generally, in order to be a designated beneficiary, an individual must be
a beneficiary as of the date of the participant's death. Between the time of death and September 30th of the year after the
year ofthe participant's death, beneficiaries may be eliminated, but a beneficiary who was not a beneficiary or a contingent
beneficiary at the time of the participant's death, may not be added by disclaimers or any other means. Under the 2001
proposed regulations, the participant's designated beneficiary was not determined until December 31 or the year after the
year of the participant's death. If the participant dies prior to his RMD then decisions on post death distributions must be
finally determined no later than September 30, of the year following the participant's death. If a beneficiary fails to take
the first post death RMD based on his single life expectancy by December 31 following the date of the participant's death,
the entire account must be distributed no later than the last day of the fifth year after the year of participant's death.
The new rules enable those who have already been taking RMD to effectively correct past mistakes which
might have included not naming beneficiaries or of selecting a distribution method they later regretted. Since beneficiary
designation (other than a much younger spouse) doesn't effect the RMD and since there is no longer any choice of
distribution methods other than in the spouse's exception, past decisions or lack there of are completely wiped out.
Any beneficiary eliminated by distribution of the benefit or through disclaimer during the period between the
participant's death and September 30th following the year ofdeath is disregarded in determining the participant's designated
beneficiary for purposes of calculating the required minimum distributions.
If, as of September 30th of the year immediately following the date of the participant's death, the participant has
more than one designated beneficiary and the account or benefit has not been divided into separate accounts or shares
for each beneficiary, the beneficiary with the shortest life expectancy is the designated beneficiary, consistent with the
approach in the 1987 proposed regulations.
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If the beneficiary survives the participant but dies before the September 30th date, the individual continues to be
treated as the designated beneficiary of the qualified plan or IRA for determining the required minimum distribution from
the qualified plan or IRA. (The secondary beneficiary ofthe qualified plan or IRA is not considered the primary beneficiary
ofthe account.) Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-4(A-4)(6).
After the death of the participant following the RMD date, the required minimum distribution from the qualified
plan are then made over the longer of (a) the life expectancy of the designated beneficiary or (b) the life expectancy ofthe
deceased participant. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)9-5(A-B)(a)(I). This is helpful when the designated beneficiary is older than
the deceased participant.

E.

[10.111 Default Rule for Post-Death Distributions

The new regulations change the default rule in the case of death before the participant's required beginning date
for a non-spouse designated beneficiary from the 5-year rule in IRe § 401(a)(9)(B)(ii) to the life expectancy rule in IRe
§ 40 1(a)(9)(B)(iii). Thus, absent a plan provision or election of the 5-year rule, the life expectancy rule would apply in all
cases in which the participant has a designated beneficiary.
As in the case of death on or after the participant's required beginning date, the designated beneficiary whose
life expectancy is used to determine the distribution period would be determined as of the end of the year following the
year of the participant's death rather than as ofthe participant's date of death (as would have been required under the 1987
proposed regulations).
The 5-year rule would apply automatically only if the participant did not have a designated beneficiary as of
September 30th of the year following the year of the participant's death.

F.

[10.121 Rules on Minimum Amounts Only

The RMD rules only dictate the minimum amounts that must be taken from qualified plans and lRAs. As under
the prior proposed regulations participants and beneficiaries thereafter can always take larger distributions if desired.

III.

[10.131 Required Beginning Date for Qualified Plans and Traditional IRA'S

A.

[10.141 Required Beginning Date

The required beginning date is the date on which periodic payments have to be paid to the qualified plan or
IRA participant. The required beginning date (RBD) is normally April 1 immediately following the year in which the
participant or IRA owner reaches age 70 ~.

B.

[10.151 Exception

The exception is ifthe participant of a qualified plan is still employed at age 70 ~ and owns less than a 5% equity
interest in the employer, then he or she can postpone the mandatory payout period until April 1 immediately following the
date of retirement. (Small Business Protection Act of 1996).
One problem with the new definition of RBD under the 1996 Act is the uncertainty of the term "Retires." Must
the participant work full-time or will merely be working on a part-time basis to qualify to defer the commencement of
required distributions until sometime after the participant reaches 70 ~.
A non-binding discussion of "retiree" by IRS representatives have stated that 5% owner and retirement status are
determined separately for each qualified plan in which the individual participates. If so it appears that:
(i) A participant will be required to take distributions from the qualified plans in which he or she
participated that are sponsored by employers for whom the participant no longer works, even though
the participant continues to work for another employer after reaching age 70 ~:.
(ii) A participant in a plan sponsored by an employer with respect to which the participant was a more
than five-percent owner will be able to roll his or her accrued benefit into the plan ofa new employer
with respect to which the participant is not a more than five-percent owner and thereby defer the
payment of the accrued benefit until he or she retires from the new employer.

c.

[10.161 Participant Dies Prior to Reaching Required Beginning Date

Ifa participant dies before reaching his or her RBD and he or she has a final designated beneficiary as ofSeptember
30 of the calendar year following the calendar year of his or her death, the minimum distribution rules require that the
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deceased participant's qualified plan benefits and lRAs be distributed over the designated beneficiary's life expectancy,
beginning no later than the end of the calendar year after the participant dies. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401(a)(9)3, A-3(a) and
1.401(a)(9)-5, A-5(b).
If the participant's sole designated beneficiary is his or her surviving spouse and the spouse does not roll over the
benefits, the distribution must commence by the end of the calendar year in which the participant would have reached age
70~. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-3, A-3(b). However, if the spouse rolls over the benefits, the spouse can wait until he or
she is 70 ~ before reaching his or her RBD.
If the surviving spouse is the participant's sole designated beneficiary, while a spouse is alive the applicable
distribution period is the spouse's life expectancy redetermined each year. Once the spouse dies, the remaining applicable
distribution period is the spouse's life expectancy in the calendar year ofhis or her death, reduced by one for each calendar
year that has elapsed since the year immediately following the calendar year of the spouse's death.
Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401(a)(9)-5, A-5(c)(2).
Unless the surviving spouse is the participant's sole designated beneficiary, the life expectancy of the designated
beneficiary is determined in the calendar year following the calendar year ofthe participant's death, and is reduced by one
year for each year thereafter. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5, A-5(c)(1).
If the participant does not have a designated beneficiary by September 30th of the calendar year following the
calendar year of his or her death, (the estate as an example) the participant's plan benefits or lRAs must be distributed
by the end of the fifth calendar year following the calendar year of the participant's death. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5,
A-5(c)(3).

D.

f10.171 Participant Dies After the Required Beginning Date

If a participant dies after his or her RBD, the remaining qualified plan benefits or lRAs must be paid to the
participant's designated beneficiary over the designated beneficiary's life expectancy, redetermined in the year following
the calendar year of the participant's death, reduced by one year for each year thereafter, commencing by the end of the
calendar year following the participant's death. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5, A-5(a)(1).
However, if the participant's sole designated beneficiary is the participant's spouse, the applicable distribution
period is the spouse's life expectancy redetermined each year until his or her death, when it then becomes the life
expectancy ofthe spouse determined in the calendar year ofthe surviving spouse's death, reduced by one for each calendar
year that has elapsed since the calendar year immediately following the calendar year of the spouse's death. Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5, A-5(c)(2).
If there is no designated beneficiary by September 30th of the calendar year following the calendar year of the
participant's death, the applicable distribution period is the life expectancy of the participant determined in the year of
his or her death, reduced by one year for each year thereafter, rather than all the benefits having to be paid out by the end
of the calendar year immediately following the participant's death as under the prior temporary regulation. Treas. Reg
§ 1.401(a)(9)-5, A-5(a)(2).

E.

f10.181 Spouse as Beneficiary

Regardless of whether the participant dies before or after his or her RBD, if the spouse is the beneficiary of all
or part of the participant's qualified plan benefit or IRA, he or she may roll the benefit (or the part of which he or she
is beneficiary) into his or her own IRA, or, in the case of an IRA, treat the decedent's IRA as his or her own IRA. IRe
§ 402(c)(9) and Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-8,A-5(a).
Ifthe participant dies after his or her RBD, and the required minimum distribution has not been distributed to him
or her before his or her death, the required annual minimum distribution for that year would have to be paid to the surviving
spouse before the end ofthe year. Treas. Reg. § 1.408-8, A-5(a).
If the surviving spouse has already reached his or her RBD, he or she must begin receiving required minimum
distributions in the year following the year of the participant's death.
The election to treat the decedent's IRA as the spouse's IRA may be made at any time after the participant's death.
Treas. Reg. § 1.408-8, A-5(a). Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-08-042 indicated that if a spouse of a deceased IRA owner withdrew any
benefits from such IRA penalty free before she attained age 59~, the spouse made an irrevocable election not to treat the
decedent's IRA as her own IRA. Treas. Reg § 1.408-8, A-5 changes the result ofPriv. Ltr. Rul. 96-08-042. This regulation
provides that the spousal election may be made after the spouse has taken one or more distributions as a beneficiary under
the deceased IRA and such distributions do not constitute an election by the spouse to treat the remaining benefits of the
deceased's IRA as the spouse's own. See -Priv. Ltr. Rul. 01-10-033. The election by the spouse to treat his or her deceased
spouse's IRA as his or her own, is made by the spouse redesignating the IRA as an IRA in the name of the spouse as IRA
owner rather than as beneficiary. See Treas. Reg. § 1.408-8, A-5.
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If a participant dies in the middle of a calendar year without having received the required minimum distribution
for the year, the required minimum distribution is to be passed to the spouse and if he or she rolls over the decedent's
retirement account to his or her own IRA, there is no required minimum distribution from the spouse's own rollover IRA
for that same year, even if she is over 70~. The final regulations have clarified this distribution limitation.

F.

[10.19] Beneficiary Must Be an Individual
A designated beneficiary must be an individual. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-4, A-I.

An individual beneficiary of a trust may be treated as a designated beneficiary if the trust meets certain
requirements. Treas. Reg. § 1.40I(a)(9)4, A-5. If there are two or more beneficiaries, only the oldest beneficiary will
be treated as a designated beneficiary unless each beneficiary is entitled to a separate share of the account. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.40I(a)(9)-5, A-7(a)(I).

If there are two or more beneficiaries and one of the beneficiaries is not an individual, the participant will be
treated as not having any designated beneficiary unless the non-individual beneficiary is entitled to a separate share or a
separate account. Treas. Reg. § 1.40I(a)(9)-5, A-7(a)(I).
A separate account of a participant's benefit determined by an acceptable separate accounting including allocating
investment gains and losses, and contributions and forfeitures, on a pro rata basis in a reasonable and consistent manner
between such portion and any other benefits must be made. Further, the amounts of each such portion of the benefit will
be separately determined for purposes of determining the amount of the required minimum distribution. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.40I(a)(9)-8, A-3(a).
A benefit in a defined benefit plan is separated into segregated shares if it consists of separate identifiable
components that may be separately distributed. Treas. Reg. § 1.40I(a)(9)-8, A-3(b).
An individual, to be treated as a designated beneficiary, must be designated under the terms of the qualified plan,
including an affirmative election by the participant pursuant to the terms of the plan. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-4, A-I.
An individual who becomes entitled to the benefit under applicable state law is not a designated beneficiary. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.40I(a)(9)-4, A-I.

Under the final regulations, the participant will not have a designated beneficiary if his or her estate is the named
beneficiary, even though an individual becomes entitled to receive the benefit by September 30 of the year following
the year of the participant's death. Reg. § 1.40I(a)(9)-4, A-4(a). Therefore the estate is not a permissible designated
beneficiary under the minimum distribution rules.

I~

[10.20] Rollovers

A participant in a qualified retirement plan may avoid current taxation on a distribution by rolling the distribution
over into another qualified retirement plan or into an IRA.

A.

[10.21] Types of Rollovers
There are many types of rollovers:
I.

Amounts may be transferred from one IRA to another.

2.

Amounts may be transferred from a qualified retirement plan to an IRA.

3.

A rollover from one qualified retirement plan to another.

4.

A rollover to a qualified retirement plan from an IRA even if all the funds of the IRA were not from
a prior qualified plan can now be rolled over into a single IRA under the 200 I Tax Act.

5.

A Roth IRA can only be rolled over to another Roth IRA.

6.

Section 457 Governmental Plans can now be rolled over to an IRA or other qualified plan under the
200 I Tax Act, IRC § 457(e)(16). In addition, an IRA rollover can be made to a 457 Plan. See IRC
§ 402(c)(8)(B)(iv).

7.

Under the 2001 Act, now non-taxable distributions from a qualified plan can be rolled over to an
IRA as well. However you cannot later roll a non-taxable IRA distribution back to another qualified
plan, a 457 Plan or a tax sheltered annuity. IRC § 408(d)(H)(ii).
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8.

B.

A rollover IRA may be made to an eligible retirement plan (other than an IRA) only ifthe transferee
plan will accept the rollover.

[10.221 Direct Rollover

An eligible rollover distribution is subject to automatic 20% withholding unless the distribution is transferred
by a direct rollover to an eligible retirement plan that permits the acceptance of rollover distributions. A direct rollover
is an eligible rollover distribution that is paid directly to an eligible retirement plan for the benefit of the distributee (i.e.,
the distribution is made in the form of a direct trustee-to-trustee transfer from a qualified retirement plan to the eligible
retirement plan). Section 401(a)(31); Reg. § 1.401(a)(31)-I.

C.

[10.231 Transfer Within 60 Days of Receipt

With regard to a rollover from a qualified retirement plan to an IRA, the payout must be transferred into one or
more lRAs within 60 days after receipt. It is not necessary, however, to transfer the entire amount into the IRA; but the
portion not rolled over is taxed as ordinary income in the year received. However, unless the distribution is transferred
by a direct rollover to the IRA, the distribution is subject to automatic 20 percent withholding tax. Reg. § 1.402(c)-2. In
addition, one should not buy stock or other property with any cash distribution without first putting the cash back into the
rollover IRA. Reinvesting cash distributions from a qualified plan or Keogh account into other property before depositing
the property into a rollover IRA, even within the 60 day rollover period, does not qualify as a rollover contribution and
instead, subjects the taxpayer to tax on the entire amount of distribution. Lemishow v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 110
(1998).

1.

[10.241 Rollover by Surviving Spouse

The spouse of an participant who receives an eligible rollover distribution from a qualified retirement plan or is
the beneficiary of an IRA at the death of the participant, is permitted to roll over all or part of the distribution to an IRA of
his or her own. The IRS has also ruled that, ifthe deceased spouse's qualified retirement plan benefits are paid to a trust and
the trust distributes the benefits to the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse may roll over the distribution. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
96-33-043; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-33-042; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-33-042; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-09-028; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-34-032.
If the deceased spouse's qualified retirement plan benefits are paid to the decedent's estate and the surviving
spouse is the sole beneficiary ofthe decedent's residuary estate, The IRS has ruled that the surviving spouse may roll over
the distribution to an IRA. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-02-023; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-51-041; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-29-022; Priv. Ltr. Rul.
91-38-067. However, this rule was reversed in the permanent regulations.
The surviving spouse is permitted to roll over the benefit to an IRA when the deceased spouse named a trust as
the beneficiary of the death benefit payable from a qualified retirement plan, the trust beneficiaries disclaimed the benefit,
and, as a result of the disclaimer, the benefit was paid to the surviving spouse. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-50-041; Priv. Ltr. Rul.
92-47-026.
The spouse may establish an IRA rollover account even if the spouse would not be eligible to establish a regular
IRA. Section 402(c)(9) under the Tax Act of 2001 expands the plans to which surviving spouses may roll over distribution
to regular qualified plans, 403 and 457 plans, as well.
Generally, a rollover by the surviving spouse is permitted where there is no discretion on the part of someone
other than the surviving spouse. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-21-028; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-10-034; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-03-036; Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 96-26-049; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-23-064; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-23-056; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-20-038.

D.

[10.251 Rollbacks Via "Conduit" lRAs Are No Longer Necessary

Prior to the 2001 Tax Act, § 408(d)(3)(A)(ii) established the "conduit IRA" concept. Only funds rolled over from
a qualified plan to an IRA which held only the rollover amount (and income thereon) in a separate IRA could be rolled back
to a qualified plan. However, the 2001 Tax Act amended the above section to include the entire amount in an IRA (except
after-tax contributions) can now be rolled over to any expanded definition of an "eligible retirement plan."
Employees who roll over employer plan distributions into an IRA no longer have to keep that IRA separate - a
"conduit IRA" - in order to do a future rollover to another employer's plan. However, taxpayers born before 1936 who
want to keep special capital gains and ten-year averaging benefits will still need a conduit IRA to move assets from one
employer plan to another

E.

[10.261 Inherited IRA

An IRA acquired by a beneficiary upon the death of a non-spouse is an inherited IRA and does not qualify for
rollover treatment to the beneficiary's own IRA.
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F.

[10.271 Distributions Not Eligible as Rollovers
Pursuant to Treas. Reg. 1.402(c)-2, Q-7 and A-4, the following distributions are not eligible as rollovers to an

IRA:

G.

1.

Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) Dividends. Deductible dividends paid to participants
by an ESOP. Therefore, a rollover of appreciated employer securities does not defer tax on net
unrealized appreciation.

2.

Life insurance policies.

3.

A participant's loan that is treated as a distribution is therefore not eligible for rollover. Treas. Reg.
1.402(c)-2, Q & A-4(d).

[10.281 REA Restrictions

REA restrictions do not apply to lRAs, therefore, the spouse does not need to be named beneficiary of an IRA or
a consent be signed by the spouse relative to an IRA being left to other beneficiaries.

~

[10.291 Funding A Trust With Death Benefits

A.

[10.301 Beneficiary of Trust as Designated Beneficiary

In order for an individual who is the beneficiary of a trust to be treated as the participant's designated beneficiary,
the trust must satisfy four requirements during any period during which required minimum distributions are being
determined by taking into account the designated beneficiary's life expectancy.

B.

1.

The trust must be a valid trust or would be a valid trust under state law if it had a corpus.

2.

The beneficiaries of the trust entitled to the plan benefits or IRA must be identifiable.

3.

The trust must be either irrevocable or, by its terms, will become irrevocable at the participant's
death.

4.

Certain documentation requirements must be satisfied.

[10.311 Timing for Satisfying Requirements

Unless the participant's designated beneficiary is his or her spouse and the spouse is more than ten years younger
than the participant, these requirements (including the documentation requirements) must be satisfied by October 31 ofthe
calendar year following the calendar year in which the participant dies.
If the spouse is the designated beneficiary and is more than ten years younger than the participant, these
requirements must be satisfied at the RBD.
The 1987 and 2001 proposed regulations both had a "designation by beneficiaries" subsection. It provided that
after the death ofthe participant, if any person had the discretion to change the beneficiary ofthe IRA, then the IRA owner
would be treated as not having a designated beneficiary at all. The 2002 final regulations do not expressly answer this
question.

C.

[10.321 Age of Oldest Beneficiary Required for Calculation

The requirement that the beneficiaries entitled to the qualified plan benefits or lRAs be identifiable is necessary
because the age of the oldest beneficiary is required to calculate the minimum distribution.
If there are any beneficiaries entitled to the qualified plan benefits or lRAs which do not qualify as designated
beneficiaries for purposes of calculating minimum distributions, such as charities or creditors (e.g., funeral expenses, etc.),
the participant may be treated as not having a designated beneficiary. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-20-021.
The "separate account" rule is an exception to the general rule that if an IRA has multiple beneficiaries, then the
oldest of all the beneficiaries will be used to determine the distribution period for the IRA. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5(A7)(a).
If a participant's revocable trust is the beneficiary of the IRA, and the revocable trust divides into shares upon
the death of the participant, it is unclear whether the separate account rule applies or does not apply to the beneficiaries of
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the revocable trust. Until the uncertainty above is resolved, an unmarried participant might not want to name his or her
revocable trust as beneficiary of the IRA. It would be safer to leave it outright to the beneficiaries if practical. The 2002
final regulations do expressly provide that for the separate account rule to apply. The separate accounts do not have to be
established during the participant's lifetime.

D.

f10.331 Documentation of Beneficiaries and Conditions of Entitlement

Under the documentation requirements, the participant or trustee must furnish to the plan administrator by the
participant's RBD or October 31 of the calendar year following the calendar year in which the participant died either the
trust instrument or a list of beneficiaries, including contingent and remainder beneficiaries, and the conditions on their
entitlement.
In addition, the participant or trustee would have to certify that the list is complete and agree to furnish a copy of
the trust instrument if requested.
If the spouse is the designated beneficiary and is more than ten years younger than the participant, and the trust
agreement is amended, a copy of the amendment or corrected certification, if the amendment changes the information
certified, must be furnished to the plan administrator within a reasonable time. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-4, A-6.
The documentation requirements are over-broad, since in many cases there will be numerous contingent and
remainder beneficiaries that will have to be listed, as well as a description of how they will become entitled to receive a
benefit.
Only the name and age ofthe oldest beneficiary of each separate share of the trust that is a beneficiary of the trust
with respect to the plan benefit is needed by the plan administrator to determine the required minimum distribution. A plan
administrator will not usually be qualified to interpret the terms of a trust agreement.
No documentation should be required to be provided to the financial institution sponsoring an IRA, since IRA
sponsors are not responsible for determining required minimum distributions and the account holder may take the total of
the required minimum distributions calculated separately for each of his or her IRAs from anyone or more of his or her
IRA. Treas. Reg. § 1.408-8, A-9.

E.

f10.341 Trust as Beneficiary

If a trust is the beneficiary of a qualified plan benefit or IRA, the question arises as to which beneficiaries of the
trust must be considered in determining who is the oldest beneficiary and whether any beneficiary is not an individual.
If at least one beneficiary of the trust that must be considered for this purpose is not an individual, such as a
charitable organization, then the participant will be treated as not having a designated beneficiary.
Apparently, any potential beneficiary of the trust including a non-individual beneficiary or a beneficiary who is
older than the apparent designated beneficiary, must be taken into account in determining whether there is a "designated
beneficiary" under the minimum distribution rules, unless such beneficiary would only become entitled to receive
distributions from the plan or IRA if a prior individual beneficiary or beneficiaries have died prematurely.
The IRS has apparently taken the position that the only beneficiaries of the trust who can be disregarded are
those who will only become entitled to receive a qualified plan benefit or IRA distribution ifhe, she or it survives another
beneficiary, and that beneficiary would either receive the balance of the plan benefit or IRA ifhe or she were alive at the
relevant event (such as the death of the individual who was the original designated beneficiary), or all required minimum
distributions made to the trust must be redistributed to the individual beneficiaries while they are alive.
Example:

Ifa participant names a trust as his or her beneficiary, and under the terms ofthe trust the oldest beneficiary
is the participant's spouse, then following the spouse's death the assets ofthe trust, including the right to
receive the remaining plan benefits are payable outright in equal shares to the participant's three children
who survive the spouse, further, if there are no children then living, to a charitable organization, the
charitable organization would not be considered in determining whether the participant had a designated
beneficiary, because its entitlement to receive some of the plan benefit or IRA depends on none of
the participant's children surviving the spouse. On the other hand, if the trust provided that the trust
continues in existence after the spouse's death, and at the death of the last child to die the assets were
payable to the charitable organization, the charitable organization would be considered in determining
whether the participant had a designated beneficiary unless all required minimum distributions were
required to be distributed to individual beneficiaries of the trust when received by the trust.
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In addition, at least the terms ofthe trust must not direct the use ofany plan benefit or IRA distributions of
the trust being used to pay debts or expenses ofthe participant's estate, including federal and state estate
or inheritance taxes; otherwise the participant may not be treated as having a designated beneficiary
because the participant's estate will betreated as a beneficiary of part of the plan benefit or IRA.
Some ofthe above problems can be eliminated after the participant's death by cashing out certain beneficiaries, such as the
charity referred to in the example above, or, by having certain beneficiaries disclaim their interests by September 30th of
the year following the date of death of the participant, and by segregating plan benefits or account balances into separate
accounts before December 31 ofthe year following the year ofthe participant's death. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401(a)(9)-4,
A-4(a) and 1.401(a)(9)-4, A-7(a).

F.

[10.351 Funding a Pecuniary Bequest
Do not use retirement benefits to fund a pecuniary bequest, including a pecuniary marital deduction, under a will

or trust.

G.

[10.361 Separate Accounts

Separate accounts must be established no later than December 31 ofthe year following the year ofthe participant's
death. This is the same deadline as under the 2001 proposed regulations. Treas. Reg. 1-40 1(a)(9)-8A-2.

VI.

[10.371 Lump-Sum Distributions From Retirement Plans
The 10-year averaging and 20% capital gain grandfather distributions rules were not repealed by the 2001 Tax

Act.

A.

[10.381 Lump-Sum Distribution Requirement

A lump-sum distribution is a distribution from a qualified retirement plan made within one taxable year (usually
the calendar year) to the recipient, represents the balance to the credit of the participant and meets the following
requirements:
1.

Only applicable to individuals born prior to January 1, 1936

2.

On account of separation from service in the case of an employee participant; or

3.

On account of the participant's death or,

4.

On account of disability in the case of a self-employed individual. Disability for this purpose
means unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determined
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or to be of long continued
and indefinite duration. IRe § 72(m)(7).

To satisfy the requirement that the distribution be the "balance to the credit" of the participant, all pension plans
are aggregated and all profit sharing plans are aggregated. A participant may receive a lump-sum distribution from a
pension plan in one year and a lump-sum distribution from a profit sharing plan in a later year. However, special income
averaging can only be elected one time. A money purchase pension plan is aggregated with a defined benefit pension
plan. Do not take out both profit sharing and pension plan benefits entirely in the same year. Lump-sum treatment is not
automatic, it has to be elected by filing Form 4972.
The taxable amount of a lump-sum distribution is the total distribution reduced by the participant's basis,
unrealized appreciation on employer securities (unless an election is made to include such unrealized appreciation) and
accumulated deductible participant contributions plus income attributable to such contributions.
Lump-sum averaging is now only available to a participant born prior to 1936. The recipient may elect ten-year
averaging only. The calculation is computed as follows:
1.

In calculating the ten-year averaging tax on a lump-sum distribution, based on the 1986 single,
individual Federal income tax rates.

2.

If the participant was age 50 on January 1, 1986, and commenced participation in the plan prior
to 1974, then a portion of the distribution may be taxed as long-term capital gain at the 20 percent
capital gain rate that was in existence in 1986. Tax Reform Act 1986 § 1122(h) (3).
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3.

A lump-sum distribution is excluded from the recipient's adjusted gross income (AGI).
§ 402(d)(3); IRC § 62(a)(8).

IRC

4.

Only individual estates and trusts can elect to lump-sum average. Partnerships or corporations will
not qualify. IRC § 402(d) (4) (B).

5.

The special tax treatment ofa lump-sum distribution is not available to IRA's, SEP-lRA's or 403(b)
Plans or if any part of the distribution is rolled over either to another qualified retirement plan or an
individual retirement plan.

6.

The following are examples of income taxes on lump-sum distributions:
$100,000 tax $14,471 (14.5%); $200,000 tax $36,922 (18%); $300,000 tax $66,330
(22%); $400,000 tax $102,500 (25.5%).

VII.

[10.39] Premature Distributions

A ten percent additional penalty tax is imposed on withdrawals from an IRA or from a qualified retirement plan
before the participant attains the age of 59 ~.
The most noted exception to this penalty tax are distributions to a beneficiary prior to age 59
the death or disability of the participant

~

made because of

There are a number of other popular exceptions to the imposition of this penalty tax including the following:
a)

Distributions of substantially equal periodic payments over the life expectancy of the participant or
over the joint life expectancies of the participant and his or her beneficiary. For this exception to
apply to distributions from a qualified retirement plan, the plan participant must have terminated
employment. This termination ofemployment requirement, however, does not apply to distribution
from an IRA. IRC § 72(t).

b)

A distribution rolled over to an IRA or another qualified retirement plan.

c)

A distribution to an alternate payee (spouse) pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order
(QDRO).

Ifthe payment method changes before the later offive years after payments commence or attainment of age 59 ~,
there is a ten percent recapture tax penalty. The ten percent premature penalty tax is applied retroactively to payments that
were previously exempt. An individual who has multiple lRAs can use the equal payment exception for one IRA without
having to take distributions from any other IRA. IRC § 72(t)(4); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-43-054; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-50-030; Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 89-46-045.

VIII.

rl0.401 Roth IRA

A.

[10.41] Generally

For taxable years beginning after 1997, the Taxpayer ReliefAct of 1997 created a new nondeductible IRA called
the Roth IRA. The income and appreciation inside the Roth IRA is not taxable upon a qualified distribution, if made
after five years of Roth IRA participation. However, a Roth IRA, like all other IRA's is taxable for Federal estate tax
purposes.
Qualified distributions from a Roth IRA are not included in the taxpayer's gross income and are not subject to
the additional 10% early withdrawal tax. To be a qualified distribution, the distribution must satisfy the five-year holding
period and must meet one of four requirements, which are:
~;

1.

Individual attains age 59

or

2.

Made to a beneficiary (or the individual's estate) on or after the individual's death; or

3.

Attributable to the individual being disabled; or

4.

A distribution to pay for "qualified first-time home buyer expenses."

Qualification to participate in a Roth IRA is subject to the following adjusted gross income (AGI) limitation: the
maximum yearly contribution that can be made to an IRA is phased out for single taxpayers withAGI between $95,000 and
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$110,000 and for joint filers with AGI between $150,000 and $160,000. IRC § 408A(6)(3). However, if the participant
is in a qualified plan as well, that does not effect his other contribution to a Roth IRA. In addition, one may not rollover a
regular IRA into a Roth IRA if a single taxpayer or a joint filer has an AGI in excess of $1 00,000.
A taxpayer and his or her spouse may each contribute a maximum of $3,000, or $3,500 if over 50, beginning
this year to all IRA's (deductible regular and non-deductible Roth IRA's). The annual maximum limits do not include
rollover contributions. Excess contributions to a Roth IRA are subject to a 6% excise tax under IRC § 4973(f). Roth IRA
contributions are not deductible for federal income tax purposes.
Distribution from one Roth IRA may only be rolled over tax-free to another Roth IRA.
There is no rule requiring any distribution to a Roth IRA participant before his or her death. However, unlike the
original participant the person who inherits a Roth IRA is required to take distributions. Since the minimum distribution
rules apply to all IRA's including Roth IRA's after the participants death. Therefore, the same rules apply as to Roth IRA's
based on the participant's death either before or after the participant of a Roth IRA reaches age 70 ~.

B.

[10.421 Conversions From a Traditional IRA

A traditional IRA can be converted or rolled into a Roth IRA as long as the taxpayer is either a single filer or a
married person filing jointly whose MAGI does not exceed $100,000. IRC §§ 408A(c)(3)(B) and (d)(3). An inherited
transitional IRA cannot be converted by a beneficiary to a Roth IRA. IRC § 408(d)(3)(C). The regulations call such a
rollover a "conversion." Treas. Reg. § 1.408A-8(b)(2).
The $100,000 modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) limit for a traditional IRA to a Roth IRA rollover is
determined in the year that the amount is distributed from the traditional IRA.
Effective in 2005, required minimum distributions under IIRC § 401(a)(9) from traditional IRAs and qualified
retirement plans are excluded for purposes of the $100,000 MAGI limitation for conversions.
An individual can contribute to a Roth IRA even if he/she is over 70 ~ years old. However, contributions can
only be made if the taxpayer has employment income and his or her adjusted gross income is below the limits discussed
above.

The deadline for a contribution to a Roth IRA (like a deductible IRA) is the due date for filing the individual's tax
return for the year (without regard to extensions). IRC § 408A(c)(7). Further, the 5-year holding period begins to run with
the tax year to which the contribution relates, not the year in which the contribution is actually made.
A Roth IRA must be clearly designated as such in the IRA document. Treas. Reg. 1.408A-2. A Simplified
Participant Pension (SEP) or a Simple Retirement Account may be converted to a Roth IRA. Traditional IRA to Roth IRA
conversions are not allowed for married persons filing separate returns IRC § 408A(c)(3)(B)(iii). Under the 2001 Tax Act,
Roth IRA-type accounts are to be available in 40 1(k)s and 403(b)s after 2005.

IX.

[10.43] Conclusion

The new regulations and the 2001 Tax Act have given more flexibility to and made it a little easier to understand
this very complex area of the law. Important binding decisions that previously had to be made by the participant prior to
his or her required beginning date to take mandatory distributions have been eliminated in the new regulations.
Upon retirement at age 70 ~, there is a single uniform distribution table that fits all except a spouse who is more
than ten years younger than the participant, which will result in a smaller minimum annual distribution amount than under
the now uniform distribution table. This uniform distribution table was further modified by the permanent regulations
adopted in 2002 making the tables even more appealing to the participant who wishes to make only the minimum required
distribution.
It no longer makes any difference what age the beneficiary is or even if there is a beneficiary at or after RBD in
determining the minimum required distribution to be paid to the participant. The fact that the designated beneficiary of
qualified plans and IRAs does not have to be finally determined until September 30th ofthe year following the death ofthe
participant, potential post mortem death and income tax planning is more important than before.
The use of trusts and specific beneficiary designation pertaining to beneficiaries of qualified plans and IRAs can
result in longer payout periods if both are carefully drafted.
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The 2001 Tax Act has liberalized the rollover ofgovernmental and other plans as well. Although leaving the plan
or IRA benefits to the participant's estate is not as harsh as under the 1987 temporary regulations, still in almost all cases,
the estate of the participant should not be named the beneficiary by the participant either intentionally or by default.
All qualified plan and IRA assets are included in the decedent's estate, for Federal Estate Tax purposes and in
some states for State Inheritance Tax purposes as well. In addition, the following penalty taxes may also be applicable:
The 10% penalty for taking out the benefits when the participant is too young; not the 50% penalty ifthe minimum annual
distribution is not distributed when the participant reaches his or her required beginning date has not changed. In addition,
a Generation Skipping Penalty tax of 50% can still also be assessed if too much of the participant's total assets, which
includes all qualified plan and IRA benefits, skip a generation which is usually grandchildren, but not always.
The Roth IRA contributions have been liberalized and added additional contribution availability of participants
over 50. The Roth IRA offers some sizable income tax benefits over the years but is not available to many clients because
of the adjusted gross income limitations. Very careful overall tax planning needs to be considered prior to transferring a
taxable IRA into a Roth IRA.
Therefore even now after the new regulations and the 2001 Tax Act, t~e total value of the participant's qualified
plan and/or IRA benefits can still be reduced by up to 75% in taxes through the combination of income taxes, death taxes,
and generation skipping taxes.
The new regulations and other recent tax law changes by Congress in this area do not reduce but in fact actually
increases the importance of careful estate planning advice that practitioners need to provide to client participants both
during their lifetimes and following the participant's death to their beneficiaries.

x.

[10.441 Appendix

A.

[10.451 Exhibit A
UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION TABLE

Age of
Participant

Distribution
Period

Applicable
Percentage

Age of
Participant

Distribution
Period

Applicable
Percentage

70

27.4

3.6496%

93

9.6

10.1467%

71

26.6

3.7594%

94

9.1

10.9890%

72

25.6

3.9063%

95

8.6

11.6280%

73

24.7

4.0486%

96

8.1

12.3457%

74

23.8

4.2017%

97

7.6

13.1579%

75

22.9

4.3668%

98

7.1

14.0846%

76

22.0

4.5455%

99

6.7

14.9254%

77

21.2

4.7170%

100

6.3

15.8730%

78

20.3

4.9261%

101

5.9

16.9491%

79

19.5

5.1282%

102

5.5

18.1819%

5.3476%

103

5.2

19.2308%

80

18.7

81

17.9

5.5866%

104

4.9

20.4082%

82

17.1

5.8480%

105

4.5

22.2222%

83

16.3

6.14197%

106

4.2

23.8095%

84

15.5

6.4516%

107

3.9

25.6410%

85

14.8

6.7568%

108

3.7

27.0270%

86

14.1

7.0922%

109

3.4

29.41118%

87

13.4

7.4627%

110

3.1

32.2581%

88

12.7

7.8740%

111

2.9

34.4828%

89

12.0

8.333%

112

2.6

38.4615%

90

11.4

8.7719%

113

2.4

41.6667%

91

10.8

9.2593%

114

2.1

47.6190%
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NOTE: The distribution period is based on the joint and last survivor expectancy of an individual with an age in the first column and a
beneficiary 10 years younger than the participant redetermined each year. The applicable percentage, is rounded to four decimal places,
determined by dividing the distribution period into 100. However, if the participant's designated beneficiary is a spouse who is more
than ten years younger than the participant, the applicable distribution period is their joint and last survivor expectancy as redetermined
each year under Table VI under the new regulations.

B.

[10.461 Exhibit B
SINGLE LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLE - AGES 5 - 111
Age

Divisor

Age

Divisor

Age

Divisor

5
6
7
8
9

77.7
76.7
75.8
74.8
73.8

45
46
47
48
49

45.8
37.9
37.0
36.0
35.1

85
86
87
88
89

7.6
7.1
6.7
6.3
5.9

10
11
12
13
14

72.8
71.8
70.8
69.9
68.9

50
51
52
53
54

34.2
33.3
32.3
31.4
30.5

90
91
92
93
94

5.5
5.2
4.9
4.6
4.3

15
16
17
18
19

67.9
66.9
66.0
65.0
64.0

55
56
57
58
59

29.6
28.7
27.9
27.0
26.1

95
96
97
98
99

4.1
3.8
3.6
3.4
3.1

20
21
22
23
24

63.0
62.1
61.1
60.1
59.1

60
61
62
63
64

25.2
24.4
23.5
22.7
21.8

100
101
102
103
104

2.9
2.7
2.5
2.3
2.1

25
26
27
28
29

58.2
57.2
56.2
55.3
54.3

65
66
67
68
69

21.0
20.2
19.4
18.6
17.8

105
106
107
108
109

1.9
1.7
1.5
1.4
1.2

30
31
32
33
34

53.3
52.4
51.4
50.4
49.4

70
71
72
73
74

17.0
16.3
15.5
14.8
14.1

110
111

1.1
1.0

35
36
37
38
39

48.5
47.5
46.5
45.6
44.6

75
76
77
78
79

13.4
12.7
12.1
11.4
10.8

40
41
42
43
44

43.6
42.7
41.7
40.7
39.8

80
81
82
83
84

10.2
9.7
9.1
8.6
8.1
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I.

[12.11

Introduction

It is difficult to overstate the value of life insurance in estate planning. Because it can create significant wealth
with a small capital outlay, is easily transferable, and is favorably treated under tax and creditor protection laws, life
insurance is enormously popular and effective in accomplishing many estate planning goals. Accordingly, much has been
. written about life insurance in estate and business planning, l and there is an abundance of provisions in Internal Revenue
Code2 and public and private rulings of the Internal Revenue Service3 that must be consulted when planning with life
insurance.

[12.21 Uses of Life Insurance in Estate Planning
A.
[12.31 Income and Wealth Replacement/Creation
The most common use of life insurance is to provide for the financial security of our surviving dependants. This
is especially true early in one's work life when there is insufficient time to accumulate other assets to sustain the family and
when there may be children to educate. It is also common to use life insurance to replace the wealth lost to the family at
one's demise from payment of death taxes or other liabilities, or to create even more wealth to raise the economic status of
the succeeding generation. During life, the cash values ofpermanent insurance may also offer a secure income-tax-favored
means to accumulate savings for educating children or for one's retirement.
B.
[12.41 Estate Liquidity
In many cases, the aftermath of death is an expensive legal process under strict time constraints. A life insurance
death benefit available shortly after death may permit the decedent's family to avoid the economic losses from borrowing
at unfavorable interest rates, and/or rushing to sell real estate or a closely held business interest, in order to generate the
cash needed to timely pay death taxes and other estate settlement charges.
C.
[12.51 Business Uses
The business uses of life insurance include funding a buy-sell agreement for the purchase ofa decedent's business
interest; enabling a company to survive a business downturn following the death of a key employee; providing a business
with working capital following the loss ofcredit upon the death ofa principal who provided financial backing; or providing
fringe benefits to the company's employees through group-term life insurance~ split-dollar life insurance or the funding of
non-qualified deferred compensation.
D.
[12.61 Optimum Asset For Lifetime Giving/Transfer Tax Leverage/Step Up in Basis
In many estate plans, clients are encouraged to make lifetime gifts of property in order to reduce estate taxes. 4
When this approach is used, the best assets to give away during life and to remove from the estate tax transfer base are
those that are likely to appreciate significantly between the date of the gift and the donor's death. In other words, give
away during life those assets with a low gift tax value that are most likely to have a much higher estate tax value. For this
reason, insurance on the donor's life (especially a term or relatively new permanent policy) can offer the greatest transfer
tax leverage because its gift tax value (interpolated terminal reserve value plus pre-paid premium, discussed below) is
almost always considerably less than its estate tax value (the death benefit amount).
Insurance on the donor's life is often the best candidate for lifetime gifts because it is generally not an asset that
the donor acquired for his lifetime needs, but for the needs of others following his death. Most clients would feel more
comfortable giving away during life an insurance policy with a $20,000 cash value and a $100,000 death benefit rather than
$20,000 of publicly traded securities.
One ofthe potential disadvantages ofmaking a lifetime gift of appreciating property is that the donee will receive
the donor's basis in the property as adjusted for any gift tax paid (IRC § 1015, discussed below). Had the same property
passed to the donee though the donor's estate at his death, the donee would have received a basis in the property equal to
its higher estate tax value (IRC § 1014), after payment of the estate tax toll charge (assuming the value of the decedent!
donor's estate exceeded the available estate tax exemption). When the donor makes a lifetime gift of insurance on his life,
the donee's basis in the proceeds received at the donor's death will always have the higher date of death value since cash
is being received. This step up in basis without estate tax5 will also be without any income tax cost (see discussion below
of the income taxation of insurance proceeds).
Assumin~ the estate tax is repealed as provided in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001 (EGTRRA), decedent's dying in 2010 will be subject to the new carryover basis rules under § 1022. Thus, property
received from a decedent dying in 2010 will have a tax basis equal to the lesser of the decedent's tax basis or its fair
market value as of the decedent's date of death. IRC § 1022(a)(2). However, a decedent's representative may increase
the basis of certain estate property up to $1.3 million (plus an additional amount equal to any unused capital loss and net
operating carryovers of the decedent and losses that would have been allowed under § 165 had property been sold prior
to death). IRC § 1022(b). A second basis adjustment in an amount up to $3,000,000 is allowed for property passing to a
surviving spouse outright or that qualifies as qualified terminal interest property (QTIP). The basis adjustments (which
may not increase the basis of any asset above its fair market value, IRC § 1022(d)(2)) may be combined for the benefit of
the surviving spouse, such that up to $4.3 million of basis adjustments may be made to property passing to the surviving
spouse. IRC § 1022(b) and (c). The decedent's representative may not increase the basis of property constituting income
in respect of a decedent. IRC § 1022(f).
II.

Under these new carryover basis rules, insurance owned by the decedent on his life will be an even more attractive
asset to pass on to his survivors. The cash paid to the beneficiaries from the death benefit will have a fair market value and
income tax basis equal to the amount received, allowing the personal representative to allocate the $1.3 million (or $4.3
million) basis step up amount to other assets.

E-I

E.

rI2.7] Simplification of Estate Plan
Life insurance often offers a simple solution to many common estate planning problems. Examples include
leaving the family business (which may be the estate's only or most valuable asset) to one child and creating another
asset of equal value (a life insurance death benefit) for the other children; leaving one's estate to the second wife and
family and a life insurance death benefit to the children from the first marriage (or to satisfy obligations to the prior
spouse); providing for the extraordinary support and health needs of a surviving handicapped child or parent; allowing
one to consume as much (ifnot all) of one's wealth during life while still leaving significant wealth (a life insurance death
benefit) to the children; allowing one to leave all ofhis wealth to family but still make a significant charitable contribution
(a life insurance death benefit); and avoiding some or all of the expense and complexity of an aggressive estate plan (e.g.,
family partnership, charitable lead trust) to significantly reduce death taxes in a short period of time by instead creating a
significant life insurance death benefit outside of the taxable estate (e.g., in an irrevocable trust) to replace the wealth lost
to death taxes.
III.
A.

rI2.8] Life Insurance Fundamentals
rI2.9] Terminology
The following is a review of the general concepts and terminology encountered when working with life
insurance.
Applicant. The person who executes and submits an application for a life insurance policy on his life or on the life
of another person. The applicant will be the initial owner of the policy if it is issued by the insurance company, but may
not be the current owner if the policy has been transferred to another person. If the applicant is not the insured, then state
law requires that the applicant have an insurable interest in the insured.
Beneficiaty. The person that will receive the proceeds of the policy upon the death of the insured. The primary
beneficiary is the person named in the beneficiary designation form supplied by the insurance company that is first entitled
to receive the death proceeds. If the beneficiary named is an individual, he or she must survive the insured to receive
the death benefit. There can be one or more primary beneficiaries who will receive the death benefit in the proportions
designated by the policy owner on the beneficiary designation form. The contingent beneficiary, or alternate beneficiary,
or secondary beneficiary is the person named in the beneficiary designation form who is next in line to receive the death
proceeds if the primary beneficiary does not survive the insured. If the contingent beneficiary is an individual, he or she
must generally survive the insured to receive the death proceeds. There can be one or more contingent beneficiaries who
will receive the death benefit in the proportions designated by the policy owner on the beneficiary designation form. If
all of the beneficiaries named in the beneficiary designation form are individuals and predecease the insured, the death
proceeds are generally paid to the estate of the owner or the insured.
Cash surrender value. The amount that will be returned to the policy owner in the event the policy is cancelled
before the death of the insured. The cash value of a policy often exceeds its cash surrender value, given that there are
surrender charges that are deducted from the cash value in the event the policy is cancelled within a certain number of
years after issue.
Death benefit or death proceeds. The amount paid by the insurance company to the beneficiary upon the death of
the insured. The death benefit may be greater or less than the face amount of the policy. This will depend upon the nature
and particulars of a policy (e.g., whether there are existing loans on a policy, whether dividends have been applied to the
purchase of paid up death benefits or term riders, etc.).
Dividends. A policy may provide for the payment of dividends to the policy owner. Dividends may be paid by a
mutual life insurance company or stock life insurance company. A mutual life insurance company is an insurance company
that is owned by the policyholders or policy owners and pays annual dividends based upon its profitability. Conversely,
a stock life insurance company is an insurance company that is owned by the shareholders, not the policyholders or
policy owners, but makes similar disbursements to policyholders or owners which can be used to reduce premiums or
provide additional insurance coverage. Policyholders have numerous options with respect to dividends paid by insurance
companies, including receiving the cash dividends outright; accumulating the dividends within the policy and accruing
interest thereon, which increases the cash value of the policy; applying the dividends to pay future premiums; or using
the dividends to purchase paid-up insurance (i.e., additional insurance that will not require any additional premiums to
continue the insurance in force until the insured's death or the policy is cancelled) or to purchase additional one-year term
insurance (Le., additional insurance that will pay a death benefit only if the insured dies within a year of its purchase).
Face amount. The amount stated on the face ofthe policy that will be paid upon the death ofthe insured. The face
amount may be more or less than the death benefit actually paid by the insurance company.
Insurable interest. State law prohibits a person from procuring an insurance policy on the life of another unless
the benefits under the contract are payable to a person with a specified family or business relationship with the insured,
or with a specified economic interest in the life of the insured. See KRS 304-14.040, KRS 304-14.050. These laws are
designed to prohibit wagering in life insurance contracts.
Insured. The individual upon whose death the life insurance company is required to pay a death benefit to the
beneficiary(ies).
Interpolated terminal reserve. The interpolated terminal reserve of a policy is used to determine its value for
transfer tax purposes (as discussed below). The terminal reserve of a policy is the amount the insurance company sets
aside on its books to provide for part ofthe death benefit under the policy. This amount is entered on the company's books
each anniversary of the policy and it will generally exceed the cash value of the policy in its early years. The interpolated
terminal reserve is the terminal reserve ofthe policy on the date ofthe gift, which is based on (i) the actual terminal reserve
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of the policy on its anniversary date immediately preceding the date of the gift, and (ii) the terminal reserve of the policy
that will be set aside on the policy's anniversary date immediately following the gift.
Investment in the contract. The aggregate amount of premiums or other amounts paid for the policy, minus the
aggregate amount received under the contract that was excludable from gross income. IRC § 72(c)(I).
Owner. The person designated as the owner ofthe insurance policy on forms designed for such purpose provided
by the insurance company. There may be more than one owner of a policy. The owner ofthe policy is the person or entity
(e.g., a trust, corporation, etc.) who possesses all of the ownership rights with respect to the policy. This includes the right
to change beneficiaries, borrow against the cash surrender value of the policy, pledge the policy as security for a loan, gift
or sell the policy to another person, etc. These ownership rights are sometimes collectively referred to as incidents of
ownership. Changes in ownership can be made on a change of ownership form provided by the insurance company. The
new owner will generally assume all incidents of ownership in the policy.
Paid up policy. A paid up policy is an insurance policy which, by the terms ofthe contract, no longer requires that
premium payments be made for the insurance coverage to remain in force.
Policy. A policy includes any clauses, riders, endorsements and papers which are attached thereto. See KRS
304.14-020.
Premium. The amount which must be paid by the policy owner on a monthly, quarterly or annual basis to keep
the policy in force.
Rider. Riders are contractual modifications to a policy that expand or restrict benefits or conditions to payment.
A double indemnity rider or accidental death rider is a rider that pays twice the face amount of a policy to a beneficial)'
in the event, for example, that the insured dies in an accident. A waiver of premium or disability rider is a rider that
provides that future premiums will continue to be paid in the event the insured becomes disabled and is unable to work.
The disability rider is, for the most part, a disability insurance policy attached to the life insurance policy. A guaranteed
insurability rider or guaranteed purchase option provides that on certain dates or events additional insurance coverage can
be bought regardless of insurability. A living benefits rider permits a terminally or extremely ill insured to utilize during
life a certain portion of the death benefits of the policy. An estate preservation rider will increase the death benefit if the
policy proceeds are included in the estate of the insured, because of death within three years of transfer of the policy (see
IRC § 2035, discussed below).
Settlement option. Upon the death of the insured, the beneficiary must decide upon the method or option by
which the insurance company will pay the beneficial)' the death benefit. The options are set by the insurance company in
the policy and are usually exercised by checking a box on a death benefit claim form provided by the insurance company.
Typically, the options include a lump sum payment or some type of annuity (e.g., payment of the death proceeds in
installments over a term of years or during the life of the beneficial)' or some combination thereof).· To receive the policy
proceeds upon the death ofthe insured, the beneficiary must provide the insurance company with a completed death benefit
claim form, along with any other requested documentation (i.e., a certified copy of the death certificate, etc.).7

B.
1.

[12.101 Types of Life Insurance
[12.111 Term Life Insurance

Term insurance is insurance that provides only for the payment of a death benefit if the insured dies within the
specified term of the policy, which is typically one, five, ten or twenty years. It is considered pure insurance because
the owner pays only mortality and expense charges. This means that an insurance company establishes its annual term
premium by determining the amount it must charge per $1,000 of death benefits in order to pay death benefits to those
insureds in the same age group that are expected to die during the year. To this actuarially determined amount the company
adds various operating expenses, taxes and its desired profit. The older the insured becomes, the greater the premium the
insurance company must charge. Term insurance may pay dividends (ifmortality costs have been overestimated) but has
no cash value. Premiums on a newly issued term policy are less than on other types of newly issued policies.
Term insurance may be renewable, which means that the policy can be renewed during a stated period (generally
five or ten years) regardless of the health of the insured. The premiums for term insurance will increase annually as the
insured ages, unless the insurance is fixed or level term, which means that the premium will not change during the term
of the policy (e.g., a period of five, ten or twenty years). Depending on the policy, term insurance may be converted to
permanent insurance with a credit for a portion of the premiums previously paid and with or without an increase in the
term premium at the time of the conversion. For gift and generation-skipping transfer tax planning (discussed below),
term insurance can be gifted at little to no transfer tax cost as compared to other types of insurance. Term insurance is most
often used when the need for insurance is for a limited period of time (e.g., until a loan is paid in full) and not for the life
expectancy of the insured.

2.

[12.121 Permanent Insurance

All life insurance is term insurance. Permanent insurance results when the premium charged includes an amount
(i.e., investment capital) in excess of the current mortality and expense charges of the term insurance. This investment
capital inside the policy is managed by the insurance company (or policy owner) and is used in later years to cover the
higher mortality cost of the term insurance as the insured ages. This can allow the premiums to remain level or fixed over
the life of the insured and the policy, which generally continues until the insured reaches age 95. This is why it is called
"permanent" insurance. Depending on the amount of capital invested in the policy and the return on the investment,
premiums may no longer be necessary to keep the policy in force. As discussed below, favorable income tax laws may
allow the investments inside the policy to grow, to be used to pay future premiums or to be received by the beneficiary
income tax free (not just income tax deferred). There are four basic types of permanent insurance: whole life insurance,
variable life insurance, universal life insurance, and variable universal life insurance.
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a)

[12.13] Whole Life Insurance
Whole .life insurance (also referred to as ordinaty life insurance or straight life insurance) was the first type of
permanent insurance developed by insurance companies. It is characterized by (i) a fixed premium amount for the life
of the policy (i.e., from date of issue until the insured is age 95 or some other age that is considered his statistical life
expectancy); (ii) a level death benefit; and (iii) a fixed schedule ofannually increasing minimum cash surrender values. The
annual premium of a whole life policy is derived by averaging the premiums for term insurance over the life ofthe policy,
with adjustments being made for the time value of money depending on how frequently premiums are paid. Because in
the early years ofthe policy the premium paid will exceed the mortality and expense charges for the insurance, this excess
portion is credited to an account in the name of the policy owner. This reserve account is invested in the general portfolio
of the insurance company, which is typically comprised of bonds and mortgages that earn interest at the prevailing rate at
the time they were purchased. The owner's account is credited with a portion of the earnings from the portfolio (called
dividends) after the company recovers its operating costs (including its mortality expenses). The reserve account generally
increases each year from additional premiums paid and from earnings credited to the account. In the event the insured
dies, the insurance company is at risk (Le., it must payout of its funds) only for the amount by which the death benefit
exceeds the policy's reserve account. Accordingly, as the reserve account increases, the amount ofterm insurance required
to sustain the death benefit decreases.
The cash value ofa whole life policy is related, but not equal, to the reserve account. Because the policy guarantees
a minimum cash surrender value that increases each year the policy is in force, a certain amount of the investment risk of
the reserve account is borne by the insurance company. Depending on the policy, owners can borrow against the cash value
or withdraw it; and the earnings on the reserve account (i.e., dividends paid on the policy) can be credited to the reserve
account, used to reduce current premiums, or used to buy additional insurance.
The premiums of a straight whole life policy remain fixed in amount and must be paid throughout the life of the
policy. In a limited-pay whole life policy, the premiums are higher such that they do not have to be paid for the life of the
policy in order to sustain the death benefit and guaranteed cash values. After the premiums have been paid for the specified
number of years, the policy is paid up and the face amount of the policy will remain in force regardless of how long the
insured might live.
b)
[12.14] Variable Life Insurance
The next type of permanent insurance developed by insurance companies is variable life insurance. It is best
described as a whole life policy where the owner may invest his reserve account not only in bonds and mortgages, but
also in common stock, money market and other types of investment accounts maintained by the insurance company. The
investment choices can generally be changed throughout the term of the policy. Unlike a whole life policy, the reserve
account of a variable life policy is a pro rata share of an investment account that is segregated from the general investment
portfolio of the insurance company. Also, the reserve account or cash value of the policy has no guaranteed rate of return
or dollar amount, but is dependent upon the rate ofreturn and current value ofthe investments chosen by the policy owner.
Depending on the investments' performance, the death benefit amount at any time may vary within limits established in the
policy. The premiums, however, remain fixed throughout the life of the policy or the stated term if the policy is "limited
pay" insurance.
c)
[12.15] Universal Life Insurance
Insurance companies next developed a type of permanent insurance referred to as universal life insurance or
flexible-premium adjustable life insurance. In universal life, the premium is set much the same as in a straight whole life
policy. The portion of the premium not used to cover the cost of the current term insurance and other charges is credited
to an investment account which will earn interest at least at a guaranteed minimum rate. Depending on the actual interest
earned, the premiums paid can be increased or decreased by the policy owner within certain limits and even skipped if the
account or cash value of the policy is sufficient to cover the current cost of the term insurance provided under the policy.
If the investment account is not sufficient and additional premiums are not paid to cover the current mortality expense,
the policy will lapse. Skipped premiums are not considered policy loans as in a whole life policy. The death benefit of
the policy may also be decreased or increased (assuming continued insurability) by the owner in a universal life policy.
Because universal policies provide for back-end loading, they typically have greater cash values in the earlier years of
the policy. Loading is the recovery by the insurance company of its costs in placing the policy (e.g., commissions and
underwriting expenses). In a traditional whole life policy these costs are recovered out of the initial premiums, called
front-end loading. Universal policies were very popular during the 1980's when interest rates were high and were reflected
in the cash values of the policies.
d)
[12.16] Variable Universal Life Insurance
It was only a matter of time until insurance companies developed a permanent policy that incorporated the
investment choices of the variable life policy with the premium payment and death benefit flexibility of the universal
policy. With variable universal life insurance, the policy owner can control the face amount of the policy and the amount
and timing of premium payments, as well as choose the reserve account's investments from among the company's general
account or various separate equity and non-equity investment accounts. Clearly, these policies require considerable
understanding and time on the part of the owner if they are to be maintained with a sufficient death benefit at affordable
premiums.
3.
[12.17] Endowment Contracts
An endowment contract is a permanent insurance policy that "endows" or "matures" upon the insured reaching
a certain age (e.g., age 65 at retirement) that is younger than his statistically determined life expectancy (which is the
age used for a traditional whole life policy). If the insured dies before the policy endows, the death benefit is paid to the
beneficiaries of the policy. If the insured is living when the policy matures, as expected, he has the option of withdrawing
the endowed amount or using it to purchase an annuity payable over a term ofyears or the remainder of his life.
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4.

[12.181 Second-to-Die or Survivorship Life Insurance

Second-to-die life insurance (also known as survivorship insurance or last-to-die insurance or joint life insurance)
has two (or more) insureds and pays its death benefit at the death of the second (or last) of them to die. The two insureds
are typically husband and wife. Second-to-die life insurance can be either term or permanent insurance. Premiums for
a second-to-die policy are less than the premiums for a single life policy of the same face amount on one of the insureds.
This is the case even if one of the insureds is in poor health and would not be insurable under a single life policy. Unless
the policy is paid up at the death ofthe first to die, the premium must continue to be paid during the life ofthe survivor (at
least until the policy is paid up, assuming it is structured in this way).
Second-to-die policies became very popular following the enactment of the federal estate tax unlimited marital
deduction, which allowed estate taxes (and thus their payment by insurance death benefits) to be deferred until the death of
the second to die ofthe spouses. This type ofpolicy could also be used when a company has two (or more) key employees
and can withstand the financial loss of one of them but not both.

5.

[12.191 First-to-Die Life Insurance

First-to-die life insurance has two insureds and pays its death benefit at the death ofthe first ofthem to die. These
policies are typically used to fund a buy-sell agreement where the survivor ofthe two insureds must purchase the business
interest of the first to die. The premium for such a policy may be less expensive than the combined premiums of two
separate single life policies on the insureds, with each policy having the same face amount as the first-to-die policy.

6.

[12.201 Group Term Life Insurance

Many employers provide group-term life insurance as a fringe benefit to their employees. Under these
arrangements, the employer typically pays all of the premiums for a certain amount of term life insurance on each of
their employees. Because of the number of insureds, the group term rate is generally less than what an individual would
pay for the same term coverage under an individual policy. The employee can generally designate whomever he chooses
as beneficiary of the insurance death benefit. As discussed below, there are favorable income tax consequences to the
employee for non-discriminatory group term insurance plans.

7.

[12.211 Split-Dollar Life Insurance

Split-dollar life insurance is not a type of life insurance but a method of paying the premiums of a permanent life
insurance policy. Split-dollar life insurance arrangements can be useful business and estate planning tools and can take
various forms. Recently promulgated proposed regulations define a split-dollar arrangement as
any arrangement (that is not part of a group term life insurance plan described in § 79) between an
owner of a life insurance contract and a non-owner of the contract under which either party to the
arrangement pays all or part ofthe premiums, and one ofthe parties paying the premiums is entitled to
recover (either conditionally or unconditionally) all or any portion ofthose premiums and such recovery
is to be made from, or is secured by, the proceeds ofthe contract. This definition is intended to apply
broadly and will cover an arrangement, for example, under which the non-owner ofa contract provides
funds directly to the owner of the contract with which the owner pays premiums, as long as the nOnowner is entitled to recover (either conditionally or unconditionally) all or a portion ofthe funds from
the contract proceeds (for example, death benefits) or has an interest in the contract to secure the right
ofrecovery. Split-Dollar Life Insurance Arrangements, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,416 (proposed July 9, 2002) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 and 31).

There are generally five basic types of split-dollar life insurance arrangements: traditional or classic split-dollar,
equity split-dollar, reverse split-dollar, private split-dollar and charitable split-dollar.
In traditional or classic split-dollar, the employer pays that portion of each premium equal to the annual increase
in the cash surrender value of the policy, and the employee pays the remainder of the premium. Although the employee
must pay a substantial part of the premiums in the initial years, his share of the premiums decreases and in some cases
becomes zero after a few years as the cash value ofthe policy increases. The split-dollar arrangement is terminated by the
death of the insured/employee (or may be terminated before death by agreement of the parties). Upon termination of the
arrangement, the employer is returned the cumulative amount ofpremiums it has paid, which is approximately equal to the
cash value of the policy. If the arrangement is terminated by the employee's death, the employee (Le., the beneficiaries of
the policy he has previously named) receive the death proceeds less the amount paid to the employer, which is a greater
death benefit amount than the portion of the premiums paid by the employee would have otherwise provided. If the
agreement is terminated before the employee's death, the employee receives very little from the policy's cash value, but he
has received the benefit of insurance coverage during the term ofthe arrangement in excess ofthe coverage that could have
been provided otherwise by the premiums he actually paid. Accordingly, the economic benefit provided to the employee
of insurance coverage in excess ofthe premiums he has paid must be included in his gross income each year. See Rev. Rul.
64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11; I.R.S. Notice 2002-8. Also, the employer is not allowed to deduct the premiums it has paid. Id.
In traditional split-dollar arrangements, the employer generally owns the policy with the employee's rights
endorsed thereon ("endorsement method"). In some cases, however, the employee (or his spouse, child or trust) may
own the policy with the employer's interest secured by a collateral assignment of the policy (Le., "collateral assignment
method"). More recently, the split-dollar arrangement may be "undocumented" or "unsecured," such that the interest of
the non-owner of the policy is merely contractual and not secured by or endorsed on the policy. Also, the "co-ownership"
method may be used, where the ownership ofthe policy is split between the parties in accordance with their interests under
the split-dollar agreement.
Under contemporary split-dollar arrangements, the employer will pay the entire amount of premiums due on
the policy regardless of its cash value ("employer pay-all"), or pay the entire amount of each premium less a portion
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contributed by the employee equal to the P.S. 58 offset, which was a method formerly used to measure the economic benefit
ofthe insurance coverage provided to the employee ("contributory arrangements"). See I.R.S. Notice 2002-8.
In equity split-dollar arrangements, when the arrangement is terminated due to the death of the employee or by
earlier agreement of the parties, the employer is entitled to receive only the cumulative amount of the premiums paid by
the employer and not the greater cash value amount of the policy. This so called equity in the policy (Le., the amount by
which the policy's cash value exceeds the premiums paid by the employer) belongs to the employee. The rules for taxing
the equity that passes to the employee are still being developed.
In reverse split-dollar, the roles are reversed and the employer is responsible for paying the cost of the life
insurance coverage and the employee pays the greater portion of the premium. When the arrangement is terminated, the
employee (at least in theory) should receive an amount equal to the premiums paid and the remainder of the proceeds
should be paid to the employer. However, these arrangements are subject to scrutiny because the:

Treasury and the Service understand that, under certain split-dollar life insurance arrangements (some
ofwhich are referred to as Hreverse" split-dollar), one party holding a right to current life insurance
protection uses inappropriately high current term insurance rates, prepayment ofpremiums, or other
techniques to confer policy benefits other than current life insurance protection on another party. The
use ofsuch techniques by any party to understate the value of these other policy benefits distorts the
income, employment, or gift tax consequences ofthe arrangement and does not conform to, and is not
permitted by, any published guidance. I.R.S. Notice 2002-59.
It appears that the Service, at least implicitly, has recently approved non-abusive reverse split-dollar arrangements. See
I.R.S. Notice 2002-59 and Split-Dollar Life Insurance Arrangements, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,416, n.l (proposed July 9, 2002) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 and 31).
A private split-dollar arrangement is between two persons where there is no employer/employee relationship
(e.g., between an individual and a member of his family or a trust established for their benefit; or between a corporation
and a non-employee shareholder). It should be noted that private split-dollar arrangements have only been approved in
nonbinding Private Letter Rulings. However, I.R.S. Notice 2002-59 alludes to "arrangements outside ofthe compensatory
context."
Under a charitable split-dollar arrangement, the charity has the discretion to pay its proportion of the premiums
from donations received from the insured, who takes a charitable deduction for the donations. The insured's irrevocable
trust is typically the beneficiary of the policy and collects the remaining death benefits after reimbursing the charity for its
share of the premium payments. After being subject to IRS scrutiny for years, charitable split-dollar arrangements were
effectively legislated out of existence by the Taxpayer Relief Extension Act of 1999. See IRC § 170(f)(10).
The income, gift, estate and generation-skipping transfer tax consequences of split-dollar life insurance
arrangements, while discussed to some degree below, are beyond the scope of this Chapter. Prior to the Service's
reconsideration ofthe matter in 2002, the tax consequences ofsplit-dollar arrangements were largely addressed in Revenue
Rulings. See I.R.S. Notice 2002-8 (which revokes I.R.S. Notice 2001-10 and revokes or modifies prior Revenue Rulings.);
I.R.S. Notice 2002-59. Proposed Treasury Regulations have now been introduced which, once adopted, should bring more
clarity to this area. See REG-164754-01, 67 Fed. Reg. 45414, July 9, 2002, addressing the income, employment, and
gift taxation of split-dollar life insurance arrangements. The Background and Explanation of Provisions to the Proposed
Treasury Regulations provide an excellent summary of the evolution of the taxation of split-dollar arrangements. See
Split-Dollar Life Insurance Arrangements, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,416 (proposed July 9, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1
and 31).
A split-dollar life insurance arrangement can provide funding by one person for payment of life insurance
premiums for the benefit of another person with generally favorable tax treatment. The disadvantages of the arrangement
include administrative and tax reporting complexities, tax treatment uncertainty due to recent and impending changes in
the law, and legal costs of establishing the split-dollar agreement.

C.

[12.221 Evaluating Life Insurance Companies and Their Policies

The process of selecting the appropriate life insurance policy for a client's estate or business planning needs can
be overwhelming, given the number of insurance carriers and the number and complexity ofthe insurance policies offered.
While, ideally, the estate planner should have a good understanding of the insurance industry and its products, often we
must rely on experts in the area who generally are not attorneys but purveyors of the very products in need of evaluation.
Many such experts will assist in evaluating potential policies on an hourly fee basis, and will disqualify themselves from
receiving any commissions on any policies sold. Unless you are qualified to do so, it is advisable to make it clear to your
client that you are not evaluating the appropriateness of any particular policy being used in the estate or business planning
transaction.
Any evaluation of specific insurance carriers should include researching the ratings for each company from the various
ratings services. The rating services review publicly available information, including information published in the
company's annual statements. Comprehensive ratings for life insurance carriers are published by organizations such as
A.M. Best, Duff & Phelps, Moody's, and Standard & Poor's Claims-Paying Ability Ratings (CPA). Statistical ratings are
reviewed by Standard & Poor's Qualified Solvency Ratings (QSR) and Weiss Research Personal Safety Report. Each
ratings service reviews each insurance carrier for its ability to make guaranteed payments. The ratings do not evaluate
individual insurance products, but rather the solvency ofthe entire company. Each rating service summarizes the carrier's
net worth, investments, cash flow, and earnings by reviewing statements published by the companies, interviews with
company management, and other publicly available information regarding the company. Although the ratings services
are reviewing similar data, each rating criteria is quantified differently such that direct comparison of ratings services may
be difficult. See Richard A. Schwartz and Catherine R. Turner, The Insurance Counselor: Life Insurance Due Care:
Carriers, Products, and Illustrations, 1 A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP. PROBe & T. (2d ed. 1994).
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Information regarding the various companies may also be found at the Kentucky Department of Insurance and
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. The Kentucky Department of Insurance8 maintains information
regarding consumer protection, insurance agent licensing, and company information. Potential insureds may research
insurance carrier rates, solvency issues, and legislation by contacting the Department. The National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is also a good source for national trends in the insurance industry. The NAIC is the
national organization for commissioners of insurance and has promulgated a standardized model for reviewing insurance
carriers. 9
The estate planner should also consider the various types ofinsurance policies available for addressing their client's
needs, including term, whole life, universal, variable, second-to-die policies, etc., and should consider any differences in
these types ofpolicies among the various carriers. It is also important to review other types of insurance when planning for
risk management. See Ben G. Baldwin, The Lawyer's Guide to Insurance: Personal Insurance Coverage for Professionals
and Their Clients, 1999 SEC. REAL PROP. PROBe & T. Disability, long-term care, and liability insurance are types of
insurance protection that should be considered.
I~

[12.23] Federal Income Taxation of Life Insurance
As will be seen, "a life insurance contract" receives special treatment under federal income tax laws. However,
not every life insurance policy will constitute a life insurance contract.
A.

[12.24] Definition of a "Life Insurance Contract"
Over the years, life insurance has become more investment oriented, with a greater emphasis on increasing
cash values and rates of return, and with less of an emphasis on risk-shifting and risk-distribution, which are the primary
attributes of life insurance as defined by the courts. See Helvering v. LeGierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941); Barnes v. U.S., 801
F. 2d 984 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. den., 480 U.S. 945 (1987); Moseley v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 183 (1979), acq., 1980-1
C.B. 1 (addressing the circumstances under which the cash value portion of an insurance policy is within the judicially
recognized definition of life insurance). Because of this trend, and to prevent the favorable income tax treatment afforded
life insurance from being extended to primarily investment vehicles, statutory definitions of life insurance were added to
the Code.
If the statutory definition of a "life insurance contract" is met, the policy in question is entitled to the favorable
income tax treatment under the Code. If the statutory definition is not met, the favorable income tax rules will not apply.
The definition applied to a life insurance policy to determine if it is a "life insurance contract" under the Code will
depend on the issue date of the policy and the type of policy involved. The common law definition of life insurance will
always have to be met. IRC § 101(f) applies to flexible premium policies (e.g., universal and adjustable life) issued before
1985. There is no statutory definition for single and periodic premium policies issued before 1985; although these policies
must still comply with judicial precedent. All insurance policies issued after 1984 must meet the definition under IRC
§ 7702. Further, variable life insurance policies, whenever issued, must meet certain diversification requirements under
§ 817(h) for insurance company taxable years beginning after 1983, if the policy is based on a segregated asset account.
See Charles W. Gallagher and Charles J. Ratner, The Insurance Counselor: Federal Income Taxation ofLife Insurance, 2
A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP. PROBe & T. (2d ed. 1999), pp. 1-12.
Under IRC § 7702(a), an insurance policy must meet (in addition to the common law test of sharing mortality
risk) either the cash value accumulation test or the guideline premium and cash value corridor tests. Not surprisingly, these
tests focus on the relationship between the policy's cash value and death benefit, are beyond the abilities of most lawyers,
and require actuarial computations that cannot be performed without the assistance of the insurance company issuing
the policy. Accordingly, the insurer should always provide written assurance that the policy in question meets, and will
continue to meet, the statutory definition of a life insurance contract.

B.

[12.25] Income Taxation During Life of the Insured

1.

[12.26] Cash Value Build Up Not Subject to Income Tax

Under § 7702(g), the annual increases in the cash surrender value of a life insurance contract are not currently
taxable to the policy owner. For policies issued before 1985 (that meet the common law definition of life insurance) there
is no constructive receipt ofthe cash value increase when accessing it would require a substantial restriction or termination
ofthe owner's investment in the policy. Cohen v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1055 (1963), acq. 1964-1 C.B. 4. (The cash build
up may be subject to the alternative minimum tax for certain corporations. See IRC § 55.) Policies that do not qualify
as life insurance contracts are treated as term insurance policies combined with an investment fund whose earnings are
currently taxed to the policy owner. IRC § 7702(g).

2.

[12.27] Dividends Not Subject to Income Tax Until Investment in Contract Recovered

Dividends paid on a participating life insurance contract (Le., one that shares in the favorable mortality and other
expenses of the insurer) are not included in gross income (but are considered a return of premiums) until the dividends,
when added to all previous non-taxable distributions from the policy, exceed the premiums and all other consideration paid
for the contract (Le., the owner's investment in the contract). Treas. Reg. § 1.72-11(b)(l). This rule applies whether the
dividends are received in cash, left with the insurer to earn interest, or used to purchase paid up additions or term insurance
riders. The interest earned on dividends left with the insurer will be subject to current income taxation under the doctrine
of constructive receipt, unless there are restrictions on its access. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.451-2(b), 1.61-7(d).
See exception below for dividends received from "modified endowment contracts."
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3.

[12.281 Withdrawals of Cash Value Not Subject to Income Tax Until Investment in Contract Recovered

Withdrawals from a life insurance contract are generally not subject to income tax until the amount withdrawn
plus dividends distributed exceed the policy owner's investment in the contract. IRC § 72(e)(5)(A) & (E). The excess
amount is considered ordinary income and not capital gain. Bodine v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 982 (3d Cir. 1939).
However, a loan against the cash value of the policy does not result in taxable income. IRC § 72(e)(5)(C).
There is an exception to this non-recognition rule on withdrawals where the withdrawal occurs within the first 15
years of the policy's issue and there is a reduction in its death benefit. IRC § 7702(f)(7)(B). There is also an exception to
the non-recognition rule for withdrawals and loans where the life insurance contract constitutes a ''modified endowment
contract" (MEC) by failing a seven-pay test. IRC § 7702A. A contract will fail the test and constitute a MEC if the
accumulated amount paid under the contract at any time during the first seven years exceeds the sum of the net level
premiums which would have been paid on or before such time had the contract provided for paid up future benefits after
the payment of seven level premiums. IRC § 7702A(b). A single premium policy will fail the test and constitute a MEC.
If the policy is treated as a MEC, the amount withdrawn or loan received will be taxed as ordinary income to the
extent the cash value ofthe policy exceeds the owner's investment in the contract. IRC § 72(e)(10). Also, ifthe withdrawal
or loan occurs before the insured is age 59~, an additional 10% early withdrawal penalty is imposed on the amounts taxed
as ordinary income, unless the insured is disabled or receives the distribution as part of a series of substantially equal
periodic payments (not less frequently than annually) made over the life (or life expectancy) of the insured (or the joint
lives or life expectancies of the insured and his spouse or other beneficiary). IRC § 72(v). Dividends paid on a MEC are
considered withdrawals from the contract, unless the dividends are used to pay premiums on the basic policy or to purchase
additional paid up insurance.

4.

[12.291 Sale or Exchange of Life Insurance Contract
If the policy owner sells the contract to another person, the amount received in excess of his basis or investment
in the contract is ordinary income and not capital gain. Bodine v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 982 (3d Cir. 1939). The
investment in the contract is reduced by any unpaid policy loans. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-6(a)(ii).
Under § 1035, the owner of a life insurance contract may exchange it, without the recognition of gain or loss,
for another life insurance contract insuring the same individual or for an endowment contract or annuity applying to
such individual. IRC § 1035(a)(I); Treas. Reg. § 1.1035-1(c). An endowment contract may also be exchanged tax free
for another endowment contract or annuity pertaining to the same individual, but not for a life insurance contract. IRC
§ 1035(a)(2); Treas. Reg.§ 1.1035-1(c). An annuity may be exchanged tax free only for another annuity on the same
individual. IRC § 1035(a)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.1035-1(c). These rules apply even ifthe insurance company issuing the new
policy did not issue the old policy. Treas. Reg. § 1.1035-1(c). The Service has ruled that a second-to-die policy may be
exchanged tax free following the death of one of the insureds for a single life policy on the life of the survivor of the two
insureds, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-30-040. However, a tax free exchange is not permitted of a second-to-die policy where both
insureds are living for a single life policy on one of the insureds, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-42-037.
5.
[12.301 Insurance Premiums Generally Not Deductible
Life insurance premiums paid by the insured are non-deductible personal expenses for income tax purposes.
IRC § 262; Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b) (1). Life insurance premiums paid by a person who is not the insured are also not
deductible for income tax purposes, if the payor is directly or indirectly a beneficiary under the policy. IRC §§ 264; 265;
Treas. Reg. § 1.264-1. This is so even though the premium payments ''would otherwise be deductible as trade or business
expenses, if they are paid on a life insurance policy covering the life of any officer or employee of the taxpayer, or any
person (including the taxpayer) who is financially interested in any trade or business carried on by the taxpayer, when the
taxpayer is directly or indirectly a beneficiary of the policy." Treas. Reg. § 1.264-1(a).
6.
[12.311 Interest on Policy Loans Generally Not Deductible
Interest charged by the insurance company on a loan against the cash value of the policy is generally no longer
deductible. IRC §§ 163(h), 264(a) & (e).
7.
[12.321 Income Taxation of Insured on Premiums Paid By Another
[12.331 Group Term Insurance
a)
The employer is entitled to a trade or business expense deduction for the payment of the group tenn insurance
premiums. IRC § 162(a)(I). Each employee only reports as income the cost of the group term insurance coverage on his
life provided by his employers during the year that is in excess of$50,000. IRC § 79(a). The cost of such excess coverage
is not the actual cost to the employer, but the cost detennined under a table contained in the Regulations. IRC § 79(c);
Treas. Reg. 1.79-3(d)(2), Table 1. But if the group term insurance plan discriminates in favor of key employees (i.e.,
individuals that are highly compensated and/or that own a certain percentage of the employer), the key employees must
report as income the higher ofthe actual cost or the cost detennined under the Regulations for all ofthe insurance coverage
provided by the employer (not just the amount in excess of$50,000). IRC §§ 79(d), 416(i).
b)
[12.341 Split-Dollar Life Insurance
Revenue Ruling 66-110,1966-1 C.B. 12, as amplified by Rev. Rul. 67-154,1967-1 C.B. 11, provides that the
value of the insurance protection provided by the employer under a split-dollar arrangement, and which must be included
in the employee's gross income, is the lesser of the P.S. 58 cost or the insurer's published rates for individual, initial issue,
one year tenn insurance available to all standard risks. Where the policy subject to the split-dollar arrangement is a secondto-die policy, the amount included is the P.S. 38 rate. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-09-027. Based on Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-36-033, it
appears that the same principles apply to private split-dollar (Le., split-dollar agreements between parties who do not have
any employer/employee relationship). These rules have been modified, however, by subsequent I.R.S. Notices, the most
recent of which is I.R.S. Notice 2002-8, which provides the following:
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1.

For employment related split-dollar arrangements entered into before January 28, 2002 that
expressly provide for the application of the P.S. 58 rate, the value of insurance protection provided
to the employee can continue to be determined by applying the P.S. 58 (which rate is set forth in Rev.
Rul. 55-747, 1955-2 C.B. 228). (The P.S. 58 rate is the cost ofa one year term premium for each
$1,000 of single life insurance protection.)

2.

For split-dollar arrangements entered into before the effective date of future guidance, taxpayers
may use the premium rate table set forth at the end of I.R.S. Notice 2002-8 to determine the value
of current life insurance protection on a single life. (The table is captioned as Table 2001 and was
originally published in I.R.S. Notice 2001-10.) Taxpayers should make appropriate adjustments to
these premium rates if the life insurance protection covers more than one life.

3.

For employment related split-dollar arrangements entered into before the effective date of future
guidance, to the extent provided by Rev. Rul. 66-110, 1966-1 C.B. 12, as amplified by Rev. Rul.
67-154, 1967-1 C.B. 11, taxpayers may continue to determine the value of current life insurance
protection by using the insurer's lower published premium rates that are available to all standard
risks for initial issue one-year term insurance. However, for arrangements entered into after January
28, 2002, and before the effective date of future guidance, for periods after December 31, 2003,
the Service will not consider an insurer's published premium rates to be available to all standard
risks who apply for term insurance unless (i) the insurer generally makes the availability of such
rates known to persons who apply for term insurance coverage from the insurer, and (ii) the insurer
regularly sells term insurance at such rates to individuals who apply for term insurance coverage
through the insurer's normal distribution channels.

As noted above, proposed regulations have been issued that, once finalized, may modify these rules. See 67 Fed.
Reg. 45,416, n.l (proposed July 9, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 and 31). Also, on May 8, 2003, the Service
issued proposed supplemental regulations providing valuation rules for equity split-dollar arrangements. REG-16475401.

c)

[12.35] Insurance Owned By Qualified Plans

Certain qualified retirement plans (but not individual retirement accounts) may purchase limited amounts of
insurance on the lives ofthe plan participants. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1 (b)(i), (ii); Rev. Rul. 54-51, 1954-1 C.B. 147; Rev. Rul.
61-121,1961-2 C.B. 65; Rev. Rul. 74-307,1974-2 C.B 126; Rev. Rul. 69-408,1969-2 C.B. 58; Rev. Rul. 61-164,1961-2
C.B.99. The participant in the plan must report as income the economic value ofthe life insurance provided him under the
plan. IRC § 72(m)(3)(B). This amount is the excess of the death benefit provided by the policies on the participant in the
plan less the cash values ofthe policies, which are treated the same as any other investment asset ofthe plan held on behalf
of the participant. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-16(b)(2), (3). The economic value of this death benefit is measured the same as the
value of the economic benefit under a split-dollar life insurance arrangement, discussed above.

8.

[12.36] Lifetime Receipt of Death Proceeds By Terminally III

Amounts paid for or under a life insurance policy to or on account of a terminally ill or chronically ill insured
during the insured's life will be treated as an amount paid by reason of the death of the insured and will be income tax
free, if the amounts received are paid pursuant to the viatical settlement provisions under § 101 (g). Payments made to
insureds during life not terminally or chronically ill (or specifically excluded under § 101 (g)) upon the sale of a policy or
acceleration of death benefits will be subject to income tax as provided above with respect to withdrawals from or the sale
ofthe policy.
The viatical settlement is a recent development in life insurance planning providing for the acceleration of the
payment oflife insurance proceeds prior to the death ofthe insured. The accelerated benefits are paid by a viatical settlement
provider to the insured at a discount. The intent is that these accelerated benefits can be used to defray the medical costs
of the terminally ill or chronically ill insured. Generally, if a policy is sold or assigned to a viatical settlement provider,
such payments are treated as an amount paid under the life insurance contract by reason of the death of such insured and
thus income tax free. IRC § 101(g)(I)(A). The viatical settlement providers then typically sell the policies to third party
investors who collect the full death benefit upon the insured's death. A viatical settlement provider is a person regularly
engaged in the trade or business of purchasing, or taking assignments of, life insurance contracts on the lives of insureds.
IRC § 101 (g)(2)(B)(i). Generally, the viatical settlement provider must be licensed in the state in which the insured resides
or, ifthe insured resides in a state not requiring the licensing ofviatical settlement providers, must satisfy the requirements
and standards of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). IRC § 101(g)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii).
The income tax free accelerated death benefits under § 101 (g) are allowed only for insureds who are either
"terminally ill" or "chronically ill." More rigorous rules apply to accelerated payments made to chronically ill individuals.
A terminally ill individual is defined as a person who has been certified by a physician as having an illness or physical
condition which can reasonably be expected to result in death in 24 months or less after the date of the certification. IRC
§ 101(g)(4)(A). A chronically ill individual is a person who has been certified by a licensed health care practitioner as
being unable to perform without substantial assistance at least 2 activities of daily living (such as eating, bathing, dressing,
etc.) for a period of at least 90 days due to a loss of functional capacity. IRC §§ 101(g)(4)(B), 7702B(c)(2). Accelerated
death benefits payable to the chronically ill insured are excluded from gross income only if the payments are used for the
qualified long-term care services and satisfy other codified requirements. IRC § 101(g)(3).
The provisions of IRC § 101 (g) do not apply to any amounts payable to a taxpayer other than the insured if such
taxpayer has an insurable interest with respect to the life of the insured by reason of the insured being a director, officer,
or employee of the taxpayer or by reason of the insured being financially interested in any trade or business carried on by
the taxpayer. IRC § 101(g)(5).
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C.
1.

[12.371 Taxation of Proceeds Upon Death of the Insured
[12.381 General Rule - Proceeds Received By Reason of Death of Insured Excluded From Gross Income
With certain exceptions discussed below, a beneficiary of a "life insurance contract" excludes from gross income
amounts received under the contract that are paid "by reason of the death of the insured." IRC § 101(a)(l). The definition
of "a life insurance contract" is discussed above. Amounts are received by reason of the death of the insured where "the
policy provides that proceeds will be paid to the beneficiary of record upon receipt of the [insured's] proof of death, and
the insurance company determines in good faith that such a policy is payable (whether that determination is based on
facts and circumstances indicating death or on a presumption of death under applicable state law)."IO Rev. Rul. 78-372,
1978-2 C.B. 93. "Death benefit payments having the characteristics of life insurance proceeds payable by reason of
death under contracts, such as workmen's compensation insurance contracts, endowment contracts, or accident and health
insurance contracts" are also excluded from gross income. Treas. Reg. § 1.101-l(a)(l). See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-02-030
(Gross income exclusion for death benefit paid to beneficiary ofmulti-employer welfare benefit plan that provided various
benefits.)
This exclusion from gross income for "death benefits" or "death proceeds" applies whether the beneficiary is
an individual, corporation, partnership, trust or the insured's estate. Treas. Reg. § 1.101-l(a)(l). The death benefit is
excluded from gross income whether paid in a lump sum or in installments (although any interest paid on the death benefit
is taxable). IRC § 101(a)(l); Treas. Reg. § 1.101-l(a)(l). The exclusion from gross income applies even though a portion
of the death benefit might represent (i) an amount that could have been withdrawn by the insured prior to death as cash
surrender value; (ii) interest or dividends paid or accrued on the policy or cash value prior to the insured's death; or (iii)
amounts in addition to the face amount of the policy derived from paid up additions of life insurance or term insurance
riders. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-11-054.
The exclusion from gross income of death proceeds generally does not depend on the identity of the insured, the
premium payer or the policy owner.
Example: Insurance Company issues Husband a policy on Wife:S- life. Husband names Son as beneficiary. Grandfather
pays the policy premiums. Son:S- receipt ofthe death benefit will be excludedfrom Son:S- gross income under § 101(a) (1).
However, there could be gift, estate and generation-skipping transfer tax consequences depending on who owns the policy,
who pays the premiums and who receives the death benefit.
Amounts received from a policy during the life of the insured must be included in gross income unless excluded
under some other provision of the Code (see e.g., §§ 101(g) and 72, discussed below).

2.

[12.391 Exception - Death Benefit Included in Gross Income Where Policy Transferred For Valuable
Consideration ("Transfer For Value Rule")
When a life insurance contract (or interest therein) has been transferred (by assignment or otherwise) "for a
valuable consideration," the amount of death benefit excluded from gross income under § 101(a)(l) will not exceed the
value of such consideration plus the premiums and "other amounts" subsequently paid by the transferee. IRC § 101(a)(2);
Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1(b). This exception to gross income exclusion of life insurance death benefits is referred to as the
''transfer for value rule."
A "transfer for a valuable consideration" is any absolute transfer for value of a right to receive all or a part of
the proceeds of a life insurance policy. Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1 (b)(4). It is not necessary that ownership of the policy be
transferred. The creation, for value, of an enforceable contractual right to receive all or a part of the proceeds of a policy
may constitute a transfer for a valuable consideration of the policy or an interest therein. Id. On the other hand, the
pledging or assignment of a policy as collateral security is not a transfer for a valuable consideration of the policy or an
interest therein, and § 101 is inapplicable to any amounts received by the pledgee or assignee. Id.
Example: Father owns an insurance policy on his life with aface (or death benefit) amount of$100,000. Father has paid
$5,000 in premiums on the policy. Father sells the policy to Sonfor $6,000, which is the gift tax value ofthe policy. Son
designates himselfas beneficiary ofthe policy andpays $2,000 ofadditional premiums before Father dies and Son receives
the $100,000 death benefit. Only $8,000 ofthe death benefit is excludedfrom Son:S- gross income under § 101(a)(1). The
entire death benefit would have been excluded from Son:S- gross income if Father had given the policy to Son without
consideration.
Example: X Corporation owns a life insurance policy on E, one of its key employees. X Corporation is completely
liquidated and its assets, including the life insurance policy on E, are transferred to S, a shareholder, in exchange for his
stock. E dies and the death benefit is paid to S. S acquired the policy as a result ofa transfer for value (i.e., in exchange
for his stock inX corporation) and the death benefit will not be excludedfrom S:S- gross income under § 101(a)(1).
The "valuable consideration" requirement may be met even where no cash or other property was given in
exchange for the life insurance policy. Mutual promises that would suffice to support an enforceable contract may be
sufficient valuable consideration. See e.g., Monroe v. Patterson, 197 F. Supp. 146 (ND Ala. 1961) (finding a transfer for
value based on promises made in shareholders' buy-sell agreement); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 77-34-048; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-06-034;
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-03-020. To be a gift in the income tax sense, a transfer of property must proceed from a detached and
disinterested generosity. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). However, even a gift of a life insurance
policy with an outstanding policy loan may constitute a transfer for value (as discussed below).
The "other amounts" referred to in the transfer for value rule (which reduce the amount included in gross income
upon receipt of a death benefit) include interest paid or accrued on indebtedness with respect to the purchased contract not
allowed as a deduction under IRC § 264 (discussed below). IRC § 101(a)(2).
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a)

[12.401 Exceptions to Transfer For Value Rule

There are numerous exceptions to the transfer for value rule. If an exception applies, then the death benefit may
still be excluded from the beneficiary's gross income under § 101(a)(1), even though the policy was transferred for a
valuable consideration.

(1)

[12.411 Transferee's Basis Determined By Reference to Transferor's Basis

The transfer for value rule does not apply if the transferee's basis ll in the life insurance contract for determining
gain or loss is determined in whole or in part by reference to the transferor's basis in the contract. IRC § 101(a)(2)(A);
Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1(b).

Example: Corporation X is the original owner ofa life insurance policy on Key Employee. Corporation X is merged into
Corporation Y in a tax free merger and the policy ownership is changed to Corporation K Key Employee later dies and
the death benefit is paid to Corporation K The death benefit is excluded from Corporation Y~ gross income because
its basis in the policy was determined by reference to Corporation X~ basis in the policy. IRC § 362(b) provides that a
corporation ~ basis in property acquired in a merger or Type A reorganization is the same as the transferor corporation ~
basis with certain adjustments.
Example: Husband is the original owner of an insurance policy on his life. Incident to Husband~ divorce from Wife,
Husband transfers the policy and other assets to Wife in exchange for her surrender ofmarital rights in other property
retained by Husband Under IRC § 1041(b), the transfer ofthe policy is considered a gift and Wife takes Husband~ basis
in the policy. Accordingly, upon Husband~ death, Wife ~ receipt ofthe death benefit will be excludedfrom her gross income
under IRC § 101 (a) (1). The same result holds even if Wife paid Husband cash, or exchanged other property in kind of
equal value for the policy. 12 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-20-007 (Transfer of life insurance policy to wife ~ grantor trust
was transfer to spouse for purposes of§ 1041, and trust took policy with transferor ~ basis and transfer for value rule not
violated)
In the case of multiple transfers of a policy, the transfer for value rule may still apply (i.e., the death benefit is
not entirely excluded from gross income) even though the current transferee's basis is determined by reference to his
transferor's basis in the policy. See discussion below.

Part sale/part gift - transfer ofpolicy with outstanding policy loan. Where a life insurance policy is transferred
with an outstanding policy loan, care must be taken to avoid the transfer for value rule. The gratuitous transfer of a life
insurance policy with an outstanding policy loan is considered to be a part sale and a part gift. See Rev. Rul. 69-187, 19691 C.B. 45; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-51-056; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-28-007. A transferee's basis in an asset acquired in a part sale/part
gift transaction is the (i) the greater of the amount paid by the transferee or the transferor's basis in the property, plus (ii)
any basis increase allowed under IRC § 1015(d) as a result of the transferor's payment of gift tax. Treas. Reg. § 1.10154(a). The amount realized by the transferor (and thus paid by the transferee) in a part sale/part gift includes any liabilities
from which the transferor is discharged as a result of the transfer. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(1). The transfer of Eroperty
that secures a nonrecourse liability (e.g., a policy loan) is deemed to discharge the transferor from the liability. 3 Treas.
Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(4).
Under the foregoing rules, if a life insurance policy is transferred and the amount actually paid (if an)? by the
transferee plus the amount of any outstanding policy loan does not exceed the transferor's basis in the policy, 1 then the
transferee's basis will be determined by reference to the transferor's basis and the transfer for value rule will not apply,
even though there may have been a transfer for valuable consideration. However, where the amount actually paid by the
transferor (if any) plus the amount of the policy loan exceeds the transferor's basis, then the transferee's basis will be the
amount paid by the transferee (which includes the policy loan amount) and will not be based on the transferor's basis and
the transfer for value rule will apply (unless, of course, there is another exception to the transfer for value rule, e.g., a
transfer to the insured, discussed below).

Example: Father is the original owner ofan insurance policy on his life with aface amount of$100,000. Father has paid
premiums totaling (and thus his basis in the policy is) $9,000. Father has also borrowed against the policy, which has
an outstanding policy loan of$12,000. Father gives the policy to his Son subject to the policy loan. Son pays $500 of
premiums on the policy and Father dies. Son receives $88,000 ofdeath benefit ($100,000 less the $12,000 policy loan).
The transfer of the policy to Son was a transfer for value because Son ~ basis in the policy immediately following the
transfer was $12,000 (the amount ofthe policy loan at the time ofthe gift) and is not determined by reference to Father ~
basis in the policy. Accordingly, all ofthe $88,000 ofdeath benefit received by Son will be included in his gross income,
exceptfor $500 representing the premiums paid by Sonfollowing the transfer ofthe policy to him.

(2)

[12.421 Transfer to the Insured

The transfer for value rule does not apply to the transfer of a life insurance contract to the insured. IRC §
101 (a)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1 (b). This is so, even if the policy is sold to the insured or transferred to the insured
for other valuable consideration. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-06-034. Also, where a policy is transferred to a trust which is
considered to be a "grantor trust" for federal income tax purposes with respect to the insured,15 the transfer for value rule
will not apply (at least to the extent of the portion of the trust deemed to be a grantor trust). Swanson v. Commissioner,
518 F.2d 59 (8 th Cir. 1975); Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184 (To the extent a grantor is treated as the owner ofa trust,
the trust is not recognized as separate taxpayer for purposes of entering into sale transaction with grantor); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2001-20-007 (discussed above); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-28-019 (Sale of policy from one irrevocable trust to another, both of
which were deemed owned by the same grantor; no transfer for value).

(3)

[12.431 Transfers to Partner of the Insured or to a Partnership in Which the Insured is a Partner

The transfer for value rule does not apply to the transfer of a life insurance contract to a partner of the insured or
to a partnership in which the insured is a partner. IRC § 101(a)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1(b). See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199903-020; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-05-010; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-43-024; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-11-038.
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Example: Corporation owns a life insurance policy on shareholder A. Corporation sells the policy to shareholder B for its
fair market value. A and B are partners in XYZ partnership which owns rental real estate. The Corporation ~ sale ofthe
policy to B does not violate the transfer for value rule and the death benefit received by B upon A ~ death will be excluded
from B ~ gross income under IRC § 101(a) (1). Also, ifCorporation had sold the policy on A to XYZ partnership, the death
benefit received by the partnership upon A ~ death would have been excludedfrom the partnership ~ gross income under
IRC § 101 (a) (1).
A limited liability company that is taxed as a partnership for federal income tax purposes will constitute a
"partnership" and its members will constitute "partners" for purposes ofthis exception to the transfer for value rule. Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-3; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-25-013; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-20-007.
Neither the Code nor the Regulations specify a minimum percentage ofthe partnership that the insured partner or
transferee partner must own for this exception to the transfer for value rule to apply. The Service has ruled that as little as
one percent ownership is sufficient. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9045004. Further, it is apparently not necessary that the life insurance
policy transferred have any connection to the purpose or business ofthe partnership or the partners. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-35029 (Irrevocable trust recently formed by insured and became partner with insured in family limited partnership and then
purchase policy from corporation. Transfer for value rule not violated.). Apparently a partnership will exist for purposes
of avoiding the transfer for value rule, even if the partnership's only assets are life insurance policies on the lives of the
partners and the partnership's sole purpose is to hold such policies to fund a buy-sell agreement among the partners with
respect to another business entity. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-09-021. See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-25-007 (Involving a family limited
partnership).
However, in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-39-003, the Service expressed no opinion on whether the partnership qualified as
a partnership under IRC § 761. In Rev. Proc. 96-12, 1996-1 C.B. 616, amplifying Rev. Proc. 96-3, 1996-1 C.B. 456, the
Service ruled that it will not issue advance rulings on whether a partnership, limited liability company or limited liability
partnership holding life insurance on one of its partners (or members) will constitute a partnership for federal income tax
purposes. See Swanson v. Commissioner, 518 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1975), where the court found that the actions ofthe parties
indicated that there was no actual partnership even though one was validly formed under state law.
Under this exception, a life insurance policy on the life of a partner can move into and out of the partnership,
and among the partners, without violating the transfer for value. Contrast this to the exception relating to corporations
discussed below.

(4)

f12.441 Transfers to a Corporation in Which the Insured is a Shareholder or Officer

The transfer for value rule does not apply to the transfer of a life insurance contract to a corporation in which the
insured is a shareholder or officer. IRC § 10I(a)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.101-I(b). Note that this exception to the transfer
for value rule, unlike the partnership provisions above, works only one way, i.e., transfer to the corporation. Also, for this
exception to apply it does not matter if the transferor of the policy is an officer or shareholder, but only if the insured is an
officer or shareholder.

Example: A owns a policy on his life and is a shareholder ofY Corporation. A sells the policy to Y Corporationfor its gift
tax value and later dies. Y Corporation will exclude the death benefit it receives from its gross income under § 101 (a) (1).
Example: Assume that in the immediately preceding example, Y Corporation (before the death ofA) sells the policy (for its
gift tax value) to ff; A ~ spouse, who is also a shareholder of Y Corporation. At A ~ death, W may not exclude from gross
income her receipt ofthe death benefit under § 101 (a) (1), assuming there is no other applicable exception to the transfer
for value rule.
It apparently does not matter that the insured's interest as a shareholder is very small. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-54-004.

(5)

[12.451 Transfer For Value Rule When There Are Multiple Transfers of Policy

If a policy was transferred more than once, the transfer for value rule may still apply even though the current
owner received the policy in a transaction where his basis in the policy was determined by reference to his transferor's
basis. The Regulations provide that in the case of a gratuitous transfer of a life insurance policy, the amount of the death
proceeds from the policy excludable from the transferee's gross income under § 101(a) is limited to (i) the amount which
would have been excludable by the transferor under § 101(a) ifno such transfer had taken place, plus (ii) any premiums
and other amounts subsequently paid by the transferee. Treas. Reg. § 1.10 I-I (b)(2) & (3). In other words, a prior transfer
of the policy that violated the transfer for value rule may taint the policy, even in the hands ofa subsequent donee.

Example: Insurance company issues Father a policy on his life with aface amount of$1 00,000 and Father pays premiums
of $5, 000. Father sells the policy to Son for $6,000, which is the gift tax value ofthe policy. Son then gives the policy to
Grandson. Grandson names himselfas beneficiary ofthe policy and pays $1,000 ofpremiums. Father dies. Grandson
can only exclude $9,000 ofthe death benefitfrom his gross income under § 101 (a), even though his basis in the policy was
the same as his transferor ~ (i.e., Son~) basis in the policy.
However, where the transfer in question is made by or to the insured, a partner ofthe insured, a partnership in which the
insured is a partner, or a corporation in which the insured is a shareholder or officer, the entire amount ofdeath proceeds
from the policy transferred is excluded from the transferee ~ gross income, regardless of whether prior transfers of the
policy violated the transfer for value rule. Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1(b)(2) & (3). In other words, a transfer to the insured,
a partner of the insured, a partnership in which the insured is a partner, or a corporation in which the insured is a
shareholder or officer, removes the taint ofa prior transfer that violated the transfer for value rule.
Example: Insurance company issues Father apolicy on Grandson~ life with aface amount of$100,000 and Father pays
premiums of$5,000. Father sells the policy to Sonfor $6,000, which is the gift tax value ofthe policy. Son then gives
the policy to Grandson. Grandson names his spouse as beneficiary ofthe policy and pays $1,000 ofpremiums and dies.
Grandson ~ spouse can exclude the entire death benefitfrom her gross income under § 101(a).
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3.

[12.461 Exception - Interest Element of Deferred Payment of Death Benefit Included in Gross Income

Life insurance policies generally provide that the insurance company's obligation to pay the death proceeds arises
at the time ofthe insured's death, regardless ofwhen the beneficiary might apply for payment ofthe proceeds. Accordingly,
most policies provide for the payment of interest on the death benefit until it is actually paid out. Also, the beneficiary may
elect to leave the death benefit with the insurance company for a period oftime and receive interest payments thereon on a
periodic basis until the death benefit is withdrawn. In either case, the interest on the death benefit is subject to income tax
when paid or made available to the beneficiary. IRC § 101(c); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.101-3; 1.61-7, 1.451-2.
Also, under many policies the beneficiary may elect from a number of "settlement options," e.g., to receive
payment of the death benefit in installments over a fixed number of years, over the beneficiary's lifetime, or over the
beneficiary's lifetime with a fixed number ofyears guaranteed. Under some policies, the death benefit is not available in a
lump sum; it must be paid to the beneficiary in a series of payments over time. In these cases, a portion of each payment
received will be excluded from the beneficiary's gross income as death benefit and a portion will be included in gross
income as interest. IRC § 101 (d); Treas. Reg. § 1.101-4. The method used to determine the taxable and non-taxable portion
is set out in the Regulations. Id. Any interest (or similar element) paid on a death benefit under a military government life
insurance program, however, is excluded from gross income. See Rev. Rul. 72-604, 1972-2 CB 35.

4.

[12.471 Exception - Death Benefit Paid to Creditors Not Excluded Under Section 101(a)

Amounts received by a creditor of the owner of the policy that was pledged as collateral security for a debt,
are not excluded from the creditor's gross income by § 101(a). Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1(b)(4). The proceeds are deemed
to be received as payment of the debt by the policy owner and taxed accordingly. If the creditor is the initial purchaser
of the policy, exclusion under § 101(a) will depend upon whether the creditor purchased the policy for the purpose of
extinguishing the debt or for some other purpose. Rev. Rul. 70-254, 1970-1 C.B. 31; Harrison v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.
578 (1973), aeq. 1973-2 C.B. 2.

5.

[12.481 Exception - Cash Value Portion of Death Proceeds From Policies Owned By Qualified Plans Not
Excluded Under Section 101(a)
If a policy is owned by a qualified retirement plan (discussed above) when the insured dies, the death benefit
paid (less the cash value of the policy immediately before death) will be excluded from the plan participant's and the
beneficiary's gross income under § 101(a), if the proceeds are paid directly or indirectly to the beneficiary. An amount
equal to the cash value of the policy immediately before death is treated as a distribution from the retirement plan to the
participant. IRC § 72(m)(3)(C).
6.

[12.491 Exception - Death Proceeds From Policies Not Constituting Life Insurance Contracts Not
Excluded Under Section 101(a)
If the life insurance policy does not constitute a "life insurance contract" under federal income tax law (discussed
above), then the death benefit is not excluded from the gross income of the beneficiary under § 101(a)(1). See IRC §§
101(f), 7702(a). The death benefit of such a policy would be included in the beneficiary's gross income to the extent it
exceeded the policy owner's investment (or income tax basis) in the policy, Atlantic Oil Co. v. Patterson, 331 F.2d 516
(5th Cir. 1964), with certain exceptions being made for certain policies. IRC § 7702(g)(2); IRC § 101(f); Barnes v. U.S.,
801 F.2d 984 (7th Cir. 1986), eerl. denied, 480 U.S. 945 (1987).
~

[12.501 Federal Gift Taxation of Life Insurance
The federal gift tax is imposed upon the lifetime transfer ofproperty16 by gift 17 by an individual 18 . IRC § 2501(a).
The gift tax is imposed only when the gift is complete, which occurs at the point the donor relinquishes dominion and
control over the property such that he has no power to change its disposition, whether for his own benefit or for the benefit
of another. 19 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a)-(c).
A.

[12.511 Insurance Transfers Subject to Gift Tax
The following examples illustrate the gift tax consequences of life insurance transfers20 during the donor's life:
(1) A purchases with his funds a policy on his life naming B as the owner of the policy. A has made a
gift to B. The amount of the gift is the amount paid for the policy. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(8).
(2) A, the owner ofa life insurance policy, transfers without consideration all ofhis interest in the policy
to B. A has made a gift to B. 21 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(8). The amount ofthe gift is the value of
the policy at the time of the transfer, which is discussed below.
(3) After transferring without consideration all of his interest in the policy to B, A continues to pay the
premium on the policy. A makes a gift to B each time A pays a premium. (The same would occur
regardless of how B acquired the policy.) The amount ofthe gift is the amount ofthe premium paid.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(8); Commissioner v. Boeing, 123 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1941).
(4) A owns a life insurance policy on B's life and names C as beneficiary of the policy. There is not
a completed gift when A names C as beneficiary, since A can name a different beneficiary at any
time before B's death. B dies and the death benefit is payable to C. A has made a completed
gift to C upon B's death. The amount of the gift is the amount of the death benefit. Goodman v.
Commissioner, 156 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1946); Rev. Rul. 81-166, 1981-1 C.B. 477.
(5) A, the owner ofa life insurance policy, transfers without consideration all ofhis interest in the policy
to a trust (not revocable or amendable by A) whose beneficiaries are persons other than A. A has
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made a gift ofthe policy to the beneficiaries ofthe truSt. 22 Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-1(h)(8); 25.25112; Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393 (1941). The amount ofthe gift is the value ofthe policy on
the date of transfer which is discussed below.
(6) After transferring without consideration all of his interest in the policy to the trust, A continues
to pay premiums on the policy. A makes a gift to the beneficiaries of the trust each time A pays a
premium on the policy. The amount ofthe gift is the premium paid. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(8);
Commissioner v. Boeing, 123 F. 2d 86 (9th Cir. 1941). The same would be true regardless of how
the trust acquired the policy.
(7) Trust owns a life insurance policy. B, one of several beneficiaries of the trust, makes a premium
payment on the policy. The amount of the premium paid, less the actuarially determined value of
B's interest in the policy, constitutes a gift by B to the other beneficiaries ofthe trust. Commissioner
v. Berger, 201 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1953).
(8) Employee is provided group term insurance coverage by his employer. Employee does not pay
any portion of the premium for the coverage. Employee irrevocably assigns all of his rights under
the group insurance coverage to an irrevocable trust. The assignment of the insurance benefit to
the trust, and every premium payment thereafter by employer for employee's group coverage,
constitutes a gift by employee to the beneficiaries of the trust. Rev. Rul. 76-490, 1976-2 C.B. 300;
Rev. Rul. 79-47,1979-1 C.B. 312. The amount of the gift is discussed below.
(9) Employer and an irrevocable trust established by employee enter into a split-dollar agreement with
respect to an insurance policy on employee's life. The amount of the annual economic benefit that
is income taxable to employee under the split-dollar plan will constitute a gift from employee to his
trust. Rev. Rul. 81-198, 1981-2 C.B. 188; Rev. Rul. 78-420, 1978-2 C.B. 67. Also, any portion of
the premium on the policy paid by employee (whether paid directly to the insurance company or
indirectly by contribution of cash to the trust) will be a completed gift.

B.

[12.52] Gift Tax Valuation of Life Insurance

Once a gift has been made, the amount of the gift for gift tax purposes must be determined. The amount of a
gift is the value of the gifted property on the date of the gift. IRC § 2512(a). The Regulations provide that the "value of
the property is the price at which such property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell, and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." Treas. Reg. §
25.2512-1. When the gift tax regulations concerning life insurance were adopted in 1958, it was not feasible to apply
the "willing buyer-willing seller" test to life insurance transfers,23 given that there was no established secondary market
for life insurance policies at that time. 24 Accordingly, the Regulations25 provide that the gift tax value of a life insurance
policy will be its actual or replacement cost, except in cases where replacement cost cannot be determined, in which case
an approximation of value based on the policy's interpolated reserve is permitted. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6(a). See above
regarding the meaning of interpolated terminal reserve.

1.

[12.53] Newly Issued Policy
Where a donor purchases a life insurance policy naming the donee as owner of the policy, the value of the gifted
policy is its cost or the premium paid, whether the policy is a single premium policy or one on which multiple premiums
are to be paid. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6(a) & ex. (1). The same is true where the policy is issued in the donor's name and
then simultaneously assigned to the donee. Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254 (1941).
2.

[12.54] Single Premium or Paid Up Policy

Where a donor makes a gift of "a life insurance policy on which no further premium payments are to be made
(e.g. a single premium policy or paid up policy)," the value ofthe gift "is the amount which the company would charge for
a single premium contract of the same specified amount on the life of a person of the age of the insured." Treas. Reg. §
25.2512-6(a) & ex. (3); U.S. v. Ryerson, 312 U.S. 260 (1941); Rev. Rul. 78-137, 1978-1 C.B. 280 (comparable policy must
reflect all economic benefits of the policy in question). It is not certain what the Regulations mean by a "paid up policy"
(Le., whether it must be paid up based on guaranteed values or non-guaranteed values of a whole life policy; or whether a
universal policy qualifies if no further premiums are projected to be due based on current investment performance). See
Kevin D. Millard, Lawrence Brody & Norman H. Lane, ABA Insurance Counselor Primer # 3, Federal Gift, Estate, and
Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxation of Life Insurance (2d ed. 1998), pp. 11-12.

3.

[12.55] Policy in Force for Some Time on Which Further Premiums Payments Are to be Made

It is generally not possible to determine the replacement cost of a policy that has been in force for some time and
on which further premium payments are to be made, because life insurance companies do not sell policies ofthis type (i.e.,
insurance companies sell new policies on which further premiums are due). Accordingly, the Regulations provide that the
replacement cost ofthis type of policy "may be approximated by adding to the interpolated terminal reserve at the date of
the gift the proportionate part of the gross premium last paid before the date of the gift which covers the period extending
beyond that date." Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6(a) & ex. (4). There does not appear to be any clear authority, however, for
determining whether or not a policy "has been in force for some time." See Kevin D. Millard, Lawrence Brody & Norman
H. Lane, ABA Insurance Counselor Primer # 3, Federal Gift, Estate, and Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxation of Life
Insurance (2d ed. 1998), pages 12-13. If the policy has been in force for some time, then interpolated terminal reserve
plus unearned premium value may be used. If the policy has not been in force from some time, and is therefore considered
to be a newly issued policy, then the premium paid must be used. The difference in the amounts can be significant. The
interpolated terminal reserve plus unearned premium value may not be used if, "because of the unusual nature of the
contract such approximation is not reasonably close to the full value." Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6(a).
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When calculating the gift tax value based on the interpolated terminal reserve plus unearned premium, additional
adjustments are made. IRS Form 712, Life Insurance Statement, which should be attached to a federal gift tax return
reporting the lifetime transfer of a policy, provides that the value is increased "on account of dividends to credit of policy"
and that the value is reduced by any "outstanding indebtedness against policy."

4.

[12.56] Individual and Group Term Insurance
Because term life insurance has no cash value or interpolated terminal reserve, its gift tax value will be the
unearned premium on the date ofthe gift. For group term life insurance, it is possible that the gift tax value ofthe insured's
rights under the policy will be zero, if such rights are assigned just before the employer pays the premium. Rev. Rul.
76-490, 1976-2 C.B. 300. After assignment to a third party, however, each payment of premium by the employer for the
employee's coverage will be a gift by the employee to the transferee. Id.; Rev. Rul. 79-47, 1979-1 C.B. 312; Rev. Rul. 84147, 1984-2 C.B. 201. The amount ofthe gift will be the premium paid by the employer for the employee's coverage; or if
the coverage meets the nondiscrimination requirements ofIRC § 79 (or doesn't meet the requirements but the employee is
not a key employee under § 79), the amount ofthe gift is the value determined under Table 1 ofTreas. Reg. § 1.79-3(d)(2).
Rev. Rul. 84-147; 1984-2 C.B. 201.
5.
[12.57] Split-Dollar Life Insurance
Rev. Rul. 81-198, 1981-2 C.B. 188, holds that where the employee/owner of a life insurance policy, which has
been in force for some time and that is subject to a split-dollar arrangement with his employer, transfers his rights in the
policy to a trust for the benefit ofhis child, the gift tax value of the policy is the interpolated terminal reserve of the policy
plus the proportionate part ofthe premiums paid before the date ofthe gift, reduced by the value ofthe employer's interest
in the policy (Le., the amount that must be returned to the employer upon termination ofthe split-dollar agreement). Also,
the value ofthe life insurance protection provided by the employer, which is included in the employee's income, is deemed
a gift by the employee to the trust, as well as the portion of the premium (if any) actually paid by the employee. Rev. Rul.
81-198, 1981-2 C.B. 188. Where the split-dollar arrangement is entered into directly between the irrevocable trust (or
other third party) and the employer, there are indirect gifts by the employee in an amount equal to the amount included
in the employee's income by virtue of the value of the insurance protection provided by the employer. Rev. Rul. 78-420,
1978-2 C.B. 67.
Rev. Rul. 66-110,1966-1 C.B. 12, as amplified by Rev. Rul. 67-154,1967-1 C.B. 11, provides that the value of
the insurance protection provided by the employer under a split-dollar arrangement, and which must be included in the
employee's gross income, is the lesser of the P.S. 58 cost or the insurer's published rates for individual, initial issue, one
year term insurance available to all standard risks. Where the policy subject to the split-dollar arrangement is a second-todie policy, the amount included is the P.S. 38 rate. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-09-027. Based on Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-36-033 and the
Proposed Regulations, the same principles should apply to private split-dollar arrangements (i.e., split-dollar agreements
between parties who do not have any employer/employee relationship). These rules have been modified, however, by
subsequent I.R.S. Notices, the most recent of which is I.R.S. Notice 2002-8, which provides the following:
1. For employment related split-dollar arrangements entered into before January 28, 2002 that
expressly provide for the application of the P.S. 58 rate, the value of insurance protection provided to
the employee can continue to be determined by applying the P.S. 58 (which rate is set forth in Rev. Rul.
55-747,1955-2 C.B. 228). (The P.S. 58 rate is the cost ofa one year term premium for each $1,000 of
single life insurance protection.)
2. For split-dollar arrangements entered into before the effective date of future guidance,
taxpayers may use the premium rate table set forth at the end of I.R.S. Notice 2002-8 to determine the
value of current life insurance protection on a single life. (The table is captioned as Table 2001 and was
originally published in I.R.S. Notice 2001-10.) Taxpayers should make appropriate adjustments to these
premium rates if the life insurance protection covers more than one life.
3. For employment related split-dollar arrangements entered into before the effective date
of future guidance, to the extent provided by Rev. Rul. 66-110, 1966-1 C.B. 12, as amplified by Rev.
Rul. 67-154, 1967-1 C.B. 11, taxpayers may continue to determine the value of current life insurance
protection by using the insurer's lower published premium rates that are available to all standard risks
for initial issue one-year term insurance. However, for arrangements entered into after January 28, 2002,
and before the effective date of future guidance, for periods after December 31,2003, the Service will
not consider an insurer's published premium rates to be available to all standard risks who apply for
term insurance unless (i) the insurer generally makes the availability of such rates known to persons who
apply for term insurance coverage from the insurer, and (ii) the insurer regularly sells term insurance at
such rates to individuals who apply for term insurance coverage through the insurer's normal distribution
channels.
As noted above, Proposed Regulations have been issued that, once finalized, may modify these rules. See 67 Fed.
Reg. 45,416, n.l (proposed July 9,2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 and 31). The Proposed Regulations address the
gift tax consequences of transfers of life insurance policies subject to split-dollar arrangements and subsequent premium
payments thereon. The Proposed Regulations may be relied upon by taxpayers prior to them being finalized. Also, on
May 8, 2003, the Service issued proposed supplemental regulations providing valuation rules for equity split-dollar
arrangements. REG-164754-01.
6.
[12.58] Effect of Insured's Health on Gift Tax Value of Policy
What effect does the health of the insured have on the gift tax value of a life insurance policy? The question
generally arises under two scenarios: (i) a policy is transferred and the gift tax value must be reported for gift and
generation-skipping transfer tax purposes; or (ii) the insured sells a policy during his life to another, the insured dies within
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three years of the sale, and the insured's estate claims that the policy was sold for full and adequate consideration and is
therefore not included in the insured's estate under IRC § 2035 (discussed below).
In United States v. Ryerson, 312 U.S. 260 (1941), the Court addressed the gift tax value of several single premium
life insurance policies transferred by their owner many years after their issue by the insurance company. The Court,
rejecting the cash value of the policies as their gift tax value, noted that insurance policies have both an insurance and an
"investment value." The Court found that the "cost of duplicating the policies at the dates of the gifts is, in the absence
of more cogent evidence, the one criterion which reflects both their insurance and investment value to the owner" at the
time of the transfer. The Court also noted that the "fact that the then condition of an insured's health might make him
uninsurable emphasizes the conclusion" that replacement cost is a better measure of the policies' values.
In Pritchard Estate v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 204 (1944), the decedent had assigned to his wife insurance policies
on his life with a face amount of $50,000 approximately thirty days before his death from cancer. The decedent had
undergone two unsuccessful operations for his cancer just prior to the transfer of the policies. Decedent's wife had paid
the decedent a little more than $10,000 for the policies, which amount approximated their cash surrender value. The court
rejected the estate's argument that the policies should not be included in the decedent's estate because his wife had paid
adequate and full consideration (see discussion of § 2035 below). The court found that the "replacement value at the date of
the gift" must be used in ascertaining the gift tax value of life insurance policies "in the absence ofmore cogent evidence.."
Pritchard, 4 T.C. 204 at 206, citing United States v. Ryerson. The court stated that the record of the case furnished "more
cogent evidence" of value than even the "replacement cost," noting that what wife
acquired as a result ofthe assignments to her and the payment by her ofthe cash surrender value were
the right to change the beneficiary (or, more accurately in this case, the right to have the beneficiary
remain unchanged), the right to borrow upon or assign the policy, the right to surrender it for its cash
value, and the right to hold itfor its investment qualities until the death ofthe insured Ofthese, she paid
full consideration for only one -- the cash surrender value, which, generally speaking, is the reserve
in the hands of the company attributable to the policies, less a charge for surrender; it has no direct
relation to the life expectancy ofthe insured The amount ofthe payment made by decedent s wife did not
purport to be compensatoryfor the other rights or incidents ofownership which she acquired, and which
were, in view ofthese peculiar circumstances, ofgreater real value to her than the right to surrender
the policy.
The question before us is made to seem more complicated because ofthe several rights which make up the
total valuable chose in action evidenced by the policy. The investment value oflife insurance, attaching
to the right to hold the policyfor its investment qualities, is very greatly affected by the life expectancy of
the insured, and the value rises in inverse ratio to the length ofthat life expectancy. One ofthe important
elements to be considered in determining a value ofa life insurance policy is its collectibility. The nearer
the insured approaches death, which is the event of collectibility, the nearer its value approaches the
face amount for which it was issued In the instant case, the insureds health was in a desperate and
hopeless, or at least a dangerous, condition, and death was known to be relatively imminent, i.e., his life
expectancy was much less than that shown on the mortality tables as the life expectancy ofan insurable
man ofhis age. The investment feature ofthe policies was, therefore, at that time, their most valuable
attribute. Their real value then depended not so much on how much had been paid for them, which
determined their cash surrender value, as it did upon how much would almost certainly be receivedfrom
them in a very much shorter time than that anticipated by the mortality tables upon which the premiums
calledfor under the policies were calculated. Under these specialfacts, the cash surrender value was
wholly inadequate as a measure of their worth at the time of the transfers, while replacement cost in
the instant case, where the insured at the time ofthe transfer ofthe policies was obviously uninsurable,
would be only helpful as a criterion ofthe minimum value to be placed on the policies in the absence of
"more cogent evidence. Id. at 206-208.

In Tech. Adv. Mem. 88-06-004, the Service addressed the situation of where a policy on the life of a controlling
stockholder was transferred by the corporation within two years of his death to members of the controlling stockholder's
family and a trust established for their benefit. In determining whether the policy was transferred for full and adequate
consideration (and thus outside of § 2035, discussed below), the Service stated an amount equal to the reserve value ofthe
policy would not be adequate consideration. Instead, the Service concluded that the value of the policy was the amount
that would be included in the insured's estate had he not transferred it but died owning it (Le., the death benefit amount).
The Service relied on the case of U.S. v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1961),26 which concerned the value of an income
interest in a trust, and did not discuss the Pritchard case.
The Service has privately ruled that the gift tax value of a life insurance policy determined under the Regulations
will constitute full and adequate consideration for purposes of the exception to the three year inclusion rule of § 2035(a)
(discussed below). In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-13-045, the taxpayer and his spouse each created an irrevocable life insurance
trust. The A trust was created by the taxpayer as grantor, and designated his spouse as trustee. The B trust was created
by his spouse as grantor, and designated the taxpayer as trustee. Life insurance policies insuring the life of the taxpayer
were transferred to the A trust and policies insuring the life of the spouse were transferred to the B trust. Later, however,
the spouse, as trustee of the A trust, purchased a second-to-die life insurance policy insuring the lives of herself and the
taxpayer. On the same date, the taxpayer, as trustee of the B trust, purchased a second-to-die life insurance policy on the
lives ofthe taxpayer and his spouse. Given the powers of the trustees ofthe trusts, the Private Letter Ruling states that the
taxpayer and the spouse each had incidents of ownership over the second-to-die policies in the trust of which they were
trustee. To correct this problem, taxpayer and his spouse created a new trust, with respect to which neither of them was
a trustee or beneficiary. It was proposed that the independent trustee of the new trust would buy the second-to-die policy
of the A trust and the B trust. The purchase price for each policy was to be its interpolated terminal reserve value plus the
value of any unexpired premiums. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-13-045.
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Based on the taxpayer's representation that the taxpayer and his spouse were not in danger of imminent death, and
that they did not have medical problems that would unexpectedly shorten their life expectancy at the time of the purchase
ofthe second-to-die policies by the new trust, the Service ruled that the adequate consideration requirement of § 2035 was
satisfied27 and that neither second-to-die policy purchased by the trustee of the new trust would be included in the estate
of taxpayer or his spouse under § 2035 if either or both of them died within three years ofthe sale of the policies from the
old trusts to the new trust. Id.
In Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-27-007, the Service noted that an insured's terminal illness caused the value of the life
insurance to be significantly greater than its terminal reserve value. This ruling, however, did not address the question of
the gift or estate tax value of the policy.

c.

[12.591 Gift Tax Annual Exclusion

For gifts (other than gifts of future interests in property) made to any person by the donor during the calendar year,
the first $11,000 worth ofsuch gifts to such person are excluded in calculating the donor's taxable gifts. IRC § 2503(b); Treas.
Reg. § 25.2503-2. The amount ofthis "gift tax annual exclusion" has been indexed for inflation since 1999. IRC § 2503(b).
For 2002, the exclusion was $10,000; for 2003 it is $11,000. Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-46 I.R.B. 845 § 3.24(1).
Gifts offuture interests in property (which do not qualify for the annual exclusion) include reversions, remainders,
and other interests or estates, whether vested or contingent, and whether or not supported by a particular interest or estate,
which are limited to commence in use, possession or enjoyment at a future date or time. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2503-3(a) &
(c).28 Contractual rights like those existing in bonds and notes (even though they bear no interest until maturity) and life
insurance (the obligations of which are to be discharged in the future) are not "future interests," and gifts of such contract
rights will qualify for the annual exclusion. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a).
A gift of a life insurance policy (where the donee has the immediate right to surrender the policy, withdraw cash
values and otherwise exercise rights ofownership) is a gift ofa present interest in property, even though the death benefit will
not be paid until the insured's death. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a). However, the gift of a life insurance policy to two or more
persons in joint ownership (or the payment ofpremiums on a policy jointly owned) will not qualify for the annual exclusion,
where all of the owners must agree before anyone owner can exercise any incidents of ownership of the policy (i.e., the
required consent of the other owners created a future interest). See Skouras Estate v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 523 (1950),
aff'd. 188 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1951).
A donor's payment of a premium on a life insurance policy owned by another is a gift that qualifies for the annual
exclusion. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(c), ex. 6.
A gift of a life insurance policy to a trust (or the payment of premiums on a policy owned by a trust) is considered
to be a gift to the beneficiaries of the trust. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-2(a); Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393 (1941).
However, gifts or contributions to irrevocable trusts generally do not qualify for the annual exclusion (see Treas. Reg. §
25.2503-3(c)), unless one or more of the following is true:
(i) All or a specific portion ofthe income ofthe trust must be paid on a periodic basis (at least
annually) to a beneficiary of the trust. In this case, the portion of the trust's income to be paid to the
beneficiary will limit the amount of the contribution that constitutes a present interest and qualifies for
the annual exclusion. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(c) for other conditions.
(ii) A beneficiary(ies) of the trust has a right to withdraw all or a specific portion of the trust
corpus after the contribution is made. This power to withdraw a portion of the contribution is referred
to as a "Crummey power" (named after the decision Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F. 2d 82 (9th Cir.
1968)), and will result in the beneficiary(ies) having a present interest in the property contributed to the
extent of the amount ofthe withdrawal right.
(iii) The trust is a "minor's trust" qualifying under IRC § 2503(c).29
A gift of an interest in an irrevocable trust that holds a life insurance policy generally would not qualify as a gift
of a present interest in property. However, a gift of a life interest (or some other definite term) in the income of a trust that
begins immediately is a present interest, if payments of trust income start immediately and are not postponed until some
future date or at the discretion of the trustee. It is permissible for the income to be paid at regular intervals of reasonable
length (e.g., annually). E.F. Fondren v. Com'r., 324 U.S. 18 (1945). Spendthrift provisions are permitted. Rev. Rul. 54344,1954-2 C.B. 319.
A transfer of a life insurance policy to a corporation for less than full and adequate consideration would be a gift to
the shareholders ofthe corporation, as discussed above. Courts, however, have generally denied the donor annual exclusions
with respect to each shareholder ofthe corporation on the basis that possession or enjoyment ofthe gift is contingent upon the
corporation declaring dividends or liquidating, making the gift one of a future interest. Lavonna 1. Stinson Estate v. U.S., 82
AFTR2d Par. 98-5469 (N.D. Ind. 1998); Rev. Rul. 71-443, 1971-2 CB 337. However, such a gift may qualify for the marital
deduction in proportion to the spouse's interest in the corporation. Rev. Rul. 71-443, 1971-2 C.B. 337.

D.

[12.601 Gift Splitting

A married person can increase the benefit of the annual exclusion from $11,000 per donee to $22,000 per donee
(or increase the unified credit amount available for the gift), if the donor's spouse consents to treat one-half of the gift as
coming from the spouse. IRC § 2513(a). Only gifts made to third persons may be split between the donor and his spouse.
IRC § 2513(a).3o
If the donor transfers property in part to his spouse and in part to third parties, the consent to gift split is effective
with respect to the interest transferred to third parties only insofar as such interest is ascertainable at the time ofthe gift and
hence severable from the interest transferred to the spouse. Treas. Reg. § 25.2513-1(b)(4).31 Where a gift is made to a trust
which gives the trustee discretion to distribute income or principal among the donor's spouse and other beneficiaries as the
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trustee determines, the value of the spouse's interest in the trust is not susceptible of determination and is, therefore, not
severable and the spouse may not gift split. Rev. Rul. 56-439, 1956-2 C.B. 605. Where a gift is made to a trust in which
the spouse is an income beneficiary and other persons are the remaindermen, ifthe trustee has discretion to invade principal
for the benefit of the spouse, the spouse may gift split with respect to the value of the remainder interest only if (and to
the extent) the invasion power is limited by ascertainable standards by which the possibility of invasion can be measured
or stated in definite terms of money. Wang v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1972-143; Falk v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1965-22;
Robertson v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 246 (1956), acq., 1956-2 C.B. 4; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-01-020.
If gift-splitting is properly elected, liability for entire tax imposed on each spouse is joint and several liability of
each spouse. IRC § 2513(d). This could be a significant problem if a life insurance policy is transferred and the value of
the policy is uncertain given the impaired health of the insured.
Rev. Rul. 73-207, 1973-1 C.B. 409, addressed the application ofthe split gift provisions to a gift ofa life insurance
death benefit. In the ruling, wife owned insurance policies on her husband's life and designated their children as beneficiaries
of the policies. Following husband's death and the death benefit being paid to the children, the executor of the husband's
estate elected on behalfofhusband to split wife's gift ofthe death benefit to the children. It was held that the gift ofthe death
benefit from wife could not be split with husband, because husband was not alive at the time ofthe gift.

E.

[12.611 Gift Tax Marital Deduction
When an outright gift is made ofall the incidents ofownership in a life insurance policy to a donee who at the time
of the gift is the U.S. citizen spouse of the donor, a gift tax marital deduction is allowed in an amount equal to the value
of such gift. IRC §§ 2523(a) & (i). (See discussion above regarding the gift tax value ofa life insurance policy.) Like the
federal estate tax marital deduction discussed below, there is no monetary ceiling on the amount of property given during
life that is eligible for the gift tax marital deduction.
Where the· gift of a life insurance policy is to a trust for the benefit of the spouse, the gift will qualify for the
marital deduction if the terms of the trust are such that the spouse's interest therein does not constitute a nondeductible
terminable interest. IRC § 2523(b); Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(b)-(I)(a). The trusts that create deductible terminable interests
in the spouse and that qualify for the marital deduction are the life income with general power of appointment trust (the
spouse must be able to appoint to herselfor her estate), IRC § 2523(e), Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(e)-I; the qualified terminable
interest property (QTIP) trust, IRC § 2523(f), Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(t)-1; the estate trust, Rev. Rul. 68-554, 1968-2 C.B.
412;32 and the charitable remainder trust where the spouse is the only noncharitable beneficiary (other than the donor), IRC
§ 2523(g); Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(g)-I. Because the life income with general power of appointment trust and QTIP trust
require the spouse to be entitled for life to all of the trust income payable at least annually, and because a life insurance
policy prior to the insured's death is generally not income producing, the trust should provide that the spouse has the power
to require the trustee to convert the trust property to income producing property within a reasonable period of time. Treas.
Reg. § 25.2523(e)-I(t)(4); 25.2523(f)-I(c)(I).
Prior to the estate tax marital deduction becoming unlimited in 1981, it was common practice for spouses to
own life insurance on each other's lives with the owner non-insured spouse being named as beneficiary.33 This is now
unnecessary since the decedent spouse can own the policies on his life, name his surviving spouse (or a marital deduction
trust) as beneficiary, and qualify the entire death benefit (regardless of its amount) for the marital deduction. However,
this results in only a deferral of the estate tax on the death benefit, since any remaining proceeds will be included in the
surviving spouse's estate (if not consumed or given away during the surviving spouse's life). Accordingly, greater estate
tax savings can be obtained ifthe insured spouse transfers ownership ofthe policy during his life to a trust for the benefit of
the spouse and/or his descendants, and the trust is structured so its assets are not includable in the gross estate ofthe insured
or his spouse. As discussed above, the gift tax value ofa life insurance can provide considerable leverage in reducing estate
taxes, if the policy is transferred more than three years prior to the death of the insured (see discussion of § 2035).
F.
[12.62] Gift Tax Charitable Deduction
There is an unlimited federal gift tax deduction for lifetime transfers of property to qualified charitable
organizations. IRC § 2522(a). However, for a lifetime transfer of property to a trust that has beneficiaries other than
qualified charities, no amount ofthe gift may be deductible under the partial interest rule of § 2522(c)(2). Under the partial
interest rule, a gift tax charitable deduction is not allowed for a gift of property in which the donor has also retained or
given to a non-charitable donee an interest in the same property, unless the partial interest given to charity is a remainder
interest in a charitable remainder annuity trust, a charitable remainder unitrust or a pooled income fund, or unless the
partial interest given to charity is in the form of a guaranteed annuity or a fixed percentage distributed yearly of the fair
market value of property determined on an annual basis (i.e., a unitrust interest). IRC § 2522(c)(2). If the partial interest
rule is met, a portion of the gift would be deductible.
Also, transfers to charitable organizations subject to conditions or powers may not be deductible. A gift tax
deduction will not be allowed if the charitable gift is "dependent upon the performance of some act or the happening of a
precedent event in order that it might become effective, unless the possibility that the charitable transfer will not become
effective is so remote as to be negligible." Treas. Reg. § 25.2522(c)-3(b). Further, if the property "has passed to, or is
vested in, charity on the date ofthe gift and the estate or interest would be defeated by the performance of some act or the
happening of some event, the possibility of occurrence of which appeared (on the date "of the gift) to be so remote as to be
negligible, the deduction is allowable." Id.
A gift of a life insurance policy by the owner/insured to a qualified charity should quali~ for the gift tax charitable
deduction, provided the charitable organization has an insurable interest in the donor/insured 4 or state law permits an
assignment of the policy by the insured to charitable organizations. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-10-016,35 revoked by Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 91-47-040. Kentucky law permits various life insurance arrangements where "charitable, benevolent, educational
or religious institutions, or their agencies, are designated irrevocably as the beneficiaries thereof." KRS 304. 14-050(1).
See the discussion above regarding the gift tax value of a life insurance policy to determine the amount of the charitable
deduction.
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Also, where the charitable organization owns the life insurance policy, and the insured gives cash to the charity for
the payment of premiums or the insured pays the premium directly to the insurance company, the gift of cash or payment
of premium should qualify for the gift tax charitable deduction (subject to the qualifications discussed in the preceding
paragraph). See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(8).
Because of the previously discussed partial interest rule, there is no gift tax charitable deduction under a splitdollar life insurance arrangement with a charitable organization. Rev. Rul. 76-200, 1976-1 C.B. 308 (cash value of policy
irrevocably assigned to college). Nor is there an income tax deduction for such an arrangement. Rev. Rul. 76-143,
1976-1 C.B. 63; I.R.S. Notice 99-36, 1999-26 I.R.B. 3 (6/28/99). Charitable split-dollar arrangements were legislatively
abrogated by the Taxpayer Relief Extension Act of 1999, which denies donors a charitable deduction for any contributions
made pursuant to such arrangements. See IRC § 170(f)(10).

G.

[12.63] Kentucky Gift Taxation of Life Insurance
Kentucky does not have a gift tax. However, gifts made in contemplation of death are subject to the Kentucky
inheritance tax. KRS 140.020 (discussed below). There are no reported cases or Kentucky Administrative Regulations
that address the lifetime gift of a life insurance policy as a gift in contemplation of death for purposes of the Kentucky
inheritance tax.
VI.

[12.64] Federal Estate Taxation of Life Insurance

In determining whether a life insurance policy or its proceeds must be included in a decedent's estate, the first
question to ask is whether the insurance in question is on the life of the decedent or on the life of some other person.
When the insurance is on the life of the decedent, special rules apply that may cause inclusion of the death benefit in the
decedent's gross estate when he had no apparent ownership interest in the policy at the time of death.

A.

[12.65] Inclusion in the Insured's Estate Under IRe Section 2042
Section 2042 applies only to life insurance on the life of the decedent (regardless of who owns it), and not to life
insurance policies owned by the decedent on the life of another person. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(a)(2). (See discussion
of 6 2033 below regarding the inclusion in the gross estate of life insurance owned by the decedent on the life of another
person.) The term "insurance" for purposes of § 2042 refers to "life insurance ofevery description, including death benefits
paid by fraternal beneficial societies operating under the lodge system." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (a)(1). (See the discussion
above where favorable income tax rules apply only to "life insurance contracts" and not all life insurance policies.)
However, § 2042 will not apply to "a combination annuity contract and life insurance policy on the decedent's life (Le.,
a "retirement income" policy with death benefit or an "endowment" policy) under which there was no insurance element
at the time of the decedent's death." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(a)(2). The value of such a combined policy or endowment
policy that has "matured" (Le., the amount paid at death equals the amount available during life) may be included in the
gross estate under § 2039.
Except as discussed below regarding insurance owned by an entity controlled by the insured/decedent, the amount
included in the gross estate of the insured/decedent when § 2042 applies "is the full amount receivable under the policy."
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(a)(3); Rev. Rul. 79-129, 1979-1 C.B. 306. In determining this amount where the policy proceeds
are payable to the beneficiary in the form of an annuity for life or for a term of years, the amount included in the gross
estate is the "one sum payable at death under an option which could have been exercised either by the insured or by the
beneficiary, or ifno option was granted, the sum used by the insurance company in determining the amount ofthe annuity."
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(a)(3).
1.
[12.66] Proceeds Receivable By or For the Benefit of the Insured's Estate
Section 2042 includes in a decedent's gross estate the proceeds of insurance on the decedent's life receivable by
his executor or administrator (in their capacity as such)36 or payable to his estate. IRC § 2042(1); Treas. Reg. 20.2042-1.
State law will generally determine whether a death benefit is "receivable" by the insured's estate for purposes of § 2042(1).
First Kentucky Trust Company v. United States, 737 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1984).37 Where the insurance policy is community
property (under state community property law) and the proceeds are payable to the decedent's estate, then "one-half of1:he
proceeds belong to the decedent's spouse and only one-half of the proceeds are considered to be receivable by or for the
benefit of the decedent's estate." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(b)(2); Rev. Rul. 94-69, 1994-2 C.B. 241 (different result under
Louisiana community property law).
It is not only insurance proceeds actually received or receivable by the personal representative or the estate
that are included in the insured's gross estate, but also amounts receivable by others "for the benefit" of the estate, and it
"makes no difference whether or not the estate is specifically named as the beneficiary under the terms ofthe policy." Treas.
Reg. §§ 20.2042-1(a)(I) & (b)(I). Accordingly, "if under the terms of an insurance policy the proceeds are receivable by
another beneficiary but are subject to an obligation, legally binding upon the other beneficiary, to pay taxes, debts, or other
charges enforceable against the estate, then the amount of such proceeds required for the payment in full (to the extent of
the beneficiary's obligation) of such taxes, debts, or other charges is includable in the gross estate." Treas. Reg. § 20.20421(b)( 1). Also, "if the decedent purchased an insurance policy in favor of another person or a corporation as collateral
security for a loan or other accommodation, its proceeds are considered to be receivable for the benefit ofthe estate." Id. 38
But where the beneficiary of insurance proceeds is merely authorized (and not obligated) to use such proceeds for the
benefit of the insured/decedent's estate, and in fact does not exercise such authority, the proceeds should not be included
in the estate under § 2042(1). Estate of Wade v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 21 (1942), acq. 1944 C.B. 29 (predecessor of §
2042(1)). Ifthe beneficiary exercises his discretion and uses the proceeds for the benefit ofthe estate, they will be included
in the insured's gross estate under § 2042(1) to the extent used. Id; see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-47-039 (Trustee of irrevocable
trust had discretion to pay estate taxes of insured; no inclusion under § 2042(1) where discretion not exercised).
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In light of the foregoing, when using a life insurance death benefit for payment of estate taxes and administration
expenses, but wanting to exclude the death benefit from the insured's gross estate by having an irrevocable trust (or other
entity) as the owner and beneficiary of the policy, the trust (or other entity) should neither be obligated nor authorized to
use the proceeds for the benefit of the insured's estate by paying debts or taxes. Instead, the trust or other entity should be
authorized to purchase assets from or make loans (with adequate interest and security) to the estate. The purchase of assets
from, or loans to, the estate will not cause insurance proceeds used for such purpose to be included in the decedent's estate.
Because the estate receives a stepped up (or down) basis in the decedent's assets equal to their date of death (or alternate
valuation date) fair market values under § 1014 (except for assets that constitute income in respect of decedent), the estate
should not recognize' any (or very little) gain or loss on the sale of assets shortly after death.

2.

[12.671 Proceeds From Policies in Which the Insured Possessed an Incident of Ownership

Even when the insured's estate does not directly receive any benefit from insurance proceeds on the insured's life,
§ 2042 will cause the proceeds received by others to be included in the insured's gross estate if the insured "possessed at
his death any ofthe incidents of ownership in the policy, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person."
IRC § 2042(2); Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c).

a)

[12.681 Incidents of Ownership Enumerated in the Regulations
The term "incidents of ownership" not only includes ownership ofthe policy in the legal sense, but also includes
the right of the insured to the "economic benefits of the policy." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c )(2). The term "economic
benefits ofthe policy" includes the "power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy,
to revoke an assignment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of
the policy, etc." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c)(2). A "reversionary interest" in the policy or its proceeds is also an incident of
ownership, whether the reversionary interest arises "by the express terms of the policy or other instrument or by operation
of law, but only if the value of the reversionary interest immediately before the death of the decedent exceeded 5 percent
ofthe value of the policy." 39 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(3). A reversionary interest "includes a possibility that the policy
or its proceeds may return to the decedent or his estate and a possibility that the policy or its proceeds may become subject
to a power of disposition by him." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(3); see Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-49-002. However, the ''terms
'reversionary interest' and 'incidents of ownership' do not include the possibility that the decedent might receive a policy
or its proceeds by inheritance through the estate of another person, or as a surviving spouse under a statutory right of
election or a similar right." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(3).
b)

[12.691 Policy Facts Generally Determine Incidents of Ownership

In determining whether the insured has an incident of ownership in the policy causing inclusion in his gross
estate, the terms ofthe policy ("polic~ facts") generally control despite extrinsic evidence to the contrary. Commissioner v.
Estate ofNoel, 380 u.s. 678 (1965); 0 United States v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company, 355 F.2d 7 (1 st Cir. 1966).41
However, death proceeds have been excluded from the gross estate of the insured where the "intent facts overcome the
heavy predominance of the policy facts" that would otherwise establish an incident of ownership. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9651-004. 42 Also, policy facts may not always control if it can be shown that the unfavorable policy term resulted from a
mistake by the agent that sold the policy;43 or that the insured's rights under the policy were terminated by a court order;44
or that a binding collateral agreement negated the insured's rights under the policy.45
But even where the insurance policy itselfdoes not disclose that the insured/decedent had an incident ofownership,
other contracts or agreements outside of the policy may "overcome the heavy predominance of policy fact" and establish
an incident of ownership causing inclusion in the insured's gross estate. Tomerlin Estate v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1986147; Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1981-200046 ; Infante v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1970-206.
Once it is established that the insured/decedent legally held an incident of ownership, it does not matter whether
he actually had the opportunity to exercise it. See Commissioner v. Estate ofNoel, 380 U.s. 678 (1965), discussed above;
Rockwell v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1986) (insured's incapacity irrelevant).

c)

[12.701 State Law Considerations

Although the entire death benefit is included in the insured's estate even if he possessed only one incident of
ownership in the policy and even though it may have applied to only part ofthe policy,47 community property law must still
be taken into account in determining the amount included in the insured's estate. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(5).48

d)

r12.711 Joint or Veto Powers
Section 2042(2) will cause the insurance death benefit to be included in the insured's gross estate, even where
the insured could not exercise the incident of ownership without the consent of another person, or where the insured
only holds a veto power over the exercise of an incident of ownership by another person. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c);
Goldstein's Estate v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 677 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (Applies the predecessor provision of § 2042 under
the 1939 Code to insurance policies that contained a provision that no change in the beneficiaries and no exercise of other
rights in the policies could be made without the written consent of the insured.); Commissioner v. Karagheusian's Estate,
233 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956) (Policy owned by wife insuring husband's life transferred by wife to trust she established
for husband and daughter, with wife reserving the power to alter or amend the trust with the consent of her husband and
daughter. Held: policy proceeds included in husband's estate.); Rev. Rul. 75-70, 1975-1 C.B. 301 (Decedent assigned to
his wife as owner and beneficiary all ofhis right, title and interest in a policy of insurance on his life. However, at the time
of the assignment the decedent executed a rider to the policy providing that, without his written consent, his wife could
not designate as beneficiary of the policy anyone who did not have an insurable interest in the decedent's life, nor could
she assign the policy to anyone without such an interest.); but see Estate of Rockwell v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d 931 (3d
Cir. 1985) (There was no incident of ownership where the insured's retained power to veto an assignment of the policy to
a person without an insurable interest was required by Pennsylvania law at the time of the insured's transfer of the policy
to his wife.).
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[12.721 Collateral Consequence of an Independent Act and Other Special Cases
Also, even though the Regulations specifically provide that the powers to change the beneficiary of the policy
or surrender or cancel the policy are incidents of ownership,49 such a power may not be an incident of ownership where
it is a collateral consequence of an act of independent significance costly to the insured. Rev. Rul. 72-307,1972-1 C.B.
307, modifying Rev. Rul. 69-54, 1969-1 C.B. 221;50 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-21-037. 51 See Revenue Ruling 84-130, 1984-2
C.B. 194, acq. in Estate of Smead v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 43 (1982) (providing that if a decedent transfers all incidents
of ownership in a noncontributory group-term life insurance policy on the decedent's life, but retains the right to convert
the policy to an individual policy should the decedent's employment be terminated, the proceeds will not be includible in
the decedent's gross estate under § 2042(2)). The "power to convert a group-term policy that is exercisable only by the
voluntary termination of employment is a collateral consequence of a potentially costly action."
The Regulations provide that the power "to pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a loan
against the surrender value of the policy," is an incident of ownership. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2); Rev. Rul. 79-129,
1979-1 C.B. 306. 52 When the owner of a policy borrows from the insurance company against the surrender value of the
policy it is a non-recourse loan (Le., the owner of the policy is not personally liable for the loan, but if it is not eventually
paid, the policy will lapse). In the case where the owner/insured borrows against the policy surrender value and then
transfers the policy subject to the loan, retaining no rights whatsoever in the policy, and later dies while the policy loan
is still outstanding, § 2042 should not cause any of the death proceeds to be included in the insured's estate. The result is
different, however, where the owner/insured assigns the policy as collateral for a loan from a third party, and then transfers
the policy to another person subject to the loan but otherwise retaining no rights in the policy. If the insured dies before
the loan is paid off or before the policy is released as collateral for the loan, the insured will be deemed to have retained an
incident of ownership in the policy and the entire death benefit ofthe policy will be included in his estate under § 2042(2).
Estate of Krischer v. U.S., T.C.M. 1973 -172. The cases have differed as to inclusion in the insured's estate where the
insured was never an owner ofthe policy that was pledged by another to secure a loan to the insured. See Prichard v. U.S.,
397 F.2d 60 (5 th Cir. 1968); Estate of Goodwyn v. Commissioner, 32, T.C.M. 1973-153; Estate of Glade v. Commissioner,
T.C.M. 1978-316. Note that ifthe insured/decedent did not possess an incident of ownership in the policy under § 2042(2),
any proceeds from the policy that would reduce his or his estate's liability would be included in his gross estate under §
2042(1), as discussed above.
An insured's right to elect a settlement option that affects the timing, but not the amount, ofdeath benefit payments
to the beneficiary is considered an incident of ownership, Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 474 F.2d 1092 (5 th Cir. 1973) (noncontributory employer provided group term insurance), except in the Third Circuit pursuant to Estate of Connelly v. U.S.,
551 F.2d 545 (3 ed Cir. 1977) (same group insurance plan, opposite result). See Rev. Rul. 81-128, 1981-1 C.B. 469 ("The
right to elect optional modes of settlement of proceeds of life insurance on a decedent's life is an incident of ownership
within the meaning of § 2042. ... The holding in Connelly, that the right to select such optional settlement modes is not an
incident of ownership ... ifthe option merely allows the decedent to alter the time of enjoyment ofthe insurance proceeds,
will not be followed by the Service except in the Third Circuit.")
The right to purchase a policy may be an incident of ownership depending on the particular facts. Tech. Adv.
Mem. 91-28-008 (Incident of ownership where insured had option for sixty days to buy back from his assignee a term
policy for a price equal to the premiums paid by the assignee plus ten percent interest.); Rev. Rul. 79-46, 1979-1 C.B.
303 (Incident of ownership where insured employee had right to buy policy owned by corporate employer who had right
to name beneficiary, because employment agreement gave insured right to purchase policy for its cash value if employer
wanted to cancel policy or to stop paying premiums.); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 307 (1979) (No incident
of ownership where insured had right to buy policy for cash value from employer, if employer wanted to cancel policy
or stop paying premiums.), acq. in result only 1981-2 C.B. 1; Estate of Morrow v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1068 (1953)
acq. 1954-1 C.B. 5, acq. withdrawn and nonacq. substituted, 1979-1 C.B. 2; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-33-006 (Shareholder's
right to purchase from corporation a policy on his life for its cash value upon redemption of his stock not an incident of
ownership, because right to purchase insurance ''would arise as a collateral consequence of acts or events of independent
significance."); Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-49-002 (Incident of ownership found in connection with buy sell agreement using
trust as owner of policies.)
Where the insured is the beneficiary of the residuary estate of the owner of the policy, it appears that there would
be no incidents of ownership in the insured until the policy is distributed from the estate to the insured in conclusion ofthe
owner's estate administration. Dawson Estate v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 837 (1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1973).
But where the insured is a beneficiary and executor, the result is more uncertain. See discussion below of Revenue Ruling
84-179,1984-2 C.B. 194.
f)
r12.731 Incidents of Ownership Held in Fiduciary Capacity
A decedent is deemed to hold an incident ofownership in "an insurance policy on his life held in trust it: under the
terms of the policy, the decedent (either alone or in conjunction with another person or persons) has the power (as trustee
or otherwise) to change the beneficial ownership in the policy or its proceeds, or the time or manner of enjoyment thereof:
even though the decedent has no beneficial interest in the truSt.,,53 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(4).
There have been numerous cases over the years interpreting this Regulation and § 2042(2) when confronted with
the issue of whether the decedent, as trustee of a trust holding policies on his life, possessed incidents of ownership in
the policies. The cases often came to differing conclusions depending on the particular facts and the judicial circuit. The
Service's most recent public ruling on this issue is found in Rev. Rul. 84-17, 1984-2 C.B. 1949,54 which holds that
[A] decedent will not be deemed to have incidents of ownership over an insurance policy on decedent's
life where decedent's powers are held in a fiduciary capacity, and are not exercisable for decedent's
personal benefit [Le., the decedent is not also a beneficiary of the trust], where the decedent did not
transfer the policy or any of the consideration for purchasing or maintaining the policy to the trust
from personal assets, and the devolution of the powers on decedent was not part of a prearranged plan
e)
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involving the participation of decedent.55
[A] decedent will be deemed to have incidents of ownership over an insurance policy on the decedent's
life where decedent's powers are held in a fiduciary capacity and the decedent has transferred the policy
or any of the consideration for purchasing and maintaining the policy to the trust. Also, where the
decedent's powers could have been exercised for decedent's benefit [i.e., the decedent was a beneficiary
ofthe trust], they will constitute incidents ofownership in the policy, without regard to how those,lJ0wers
were acquired and without consideration ofwhether the decedent transferred property to the trust. Thus,
ifthe decedent reacquires powers over insurance policies in an individual capacity [i.e., as a beneficiary],
the powers will constitute incidents of ownership even though the decedent is a transferee.
There have been several Private Letter Rulings in this area since Rev. Rul. 84-179. For example, in Priv. Ltr. Rul.
91-11-028, the Service ruled that the insured, who was both a trustee and beneficiary of the trust, would not possess an
incident of ownership because the trust agreement specifically prohibited any trustee who was an insured from exercising
any powers over the policy. In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-34-028, the Service ruled that there would not be an incident of ownership
if the insured resigned as trustee, the designated successor trustee purchased the life insurance with trust principal and the
insured was not reinstated as trustee. Also in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-48-020, the decedent's spouse was the beneficiary and one
ofthree co-trustees ofthe credit shelter trust. The trustees ofthe credit shelter trust were to distribute all ofthe net income
to the spouse and could invade principal for the spouse's health, support and maintenance. The spouse had no power of
appointment over the assets in the trust. Decedent's children and grandchildren were contingent beneficiaries of the trust.
The spouse was to resign as a co-trustee of the trust and the trust instrument provided that no successor trustee was to be
appointed, but that the remaining trustees would serve. The remaining trustees proposed to purchase an insurance policy
on the spouse's life. The Service ruled that because the spouse resigned as a trustee, the spouse would not possess any
incidents of ownership over the policy provided that (1) she has not transferred any assets to the credit shelter trust, (2) the
premiums on the policy are paid from the principal of the trust, (3) she does not maintain the policy with personal assets,
and (4) she is not reinstated as a trustee of the credit shelter trust.
It is less clear whether there is an incident of ownership where the insured is a beneficiary of the trust holding the
life insurance policy and the insured is not a trustee but has the power to remove the trustee and name another as trustee.
In Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-22-003, the Service ruled that ifthe trustee of a trust hold incidents of ownership in a life insurance
policy on the grantor's life, and the grantor retains the power to remove the trustee without cause and substitute as trustee
anyone other than the grantor, then the grantor's retention of the replacement power is equivalent to his reservation of the
trustee's powers to exercise the incidents of ownership. This technical advice memorandum was based on Rev. Rul. 79353, 1979-2 C.B. 325 , which held that the power to remove a corporate trustee without cause and replace it with another
corporate trustee gave the power holder the trustee's powers for purposes of §§ 2036 and 2038. While Rev. Rul. 79-353
was revoked by Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-2 C.B. 191,57 neither of these Revenue Rulings dealt with incidents of ownership
under § 2042(2). Accordingly, it is unclear whether the Service still holds the view espoused in Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-22003.
Ifthe insured is a less than a fifty percent owner ofthe stock ofthe corporate trustee, and ifthe insured is an officer
or director but is prohibited by bank policy from exercising any fiduciary powers over a trust that holds life insurance on
his life, then the incidents of ownership of the corporate trustee should not be attributed to the insured. See Priv. Ltr. Rul.
93-48-028 and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-28-011 (both rulings concerned split-dollar arrangements).
If a trust holds a life insurance policy and the insured is neither the grantor nor trustee of the trust, and does not
have the power to remove the trustee, then the insuredlbeneficiary should not be deemed to have incidents of ownership
in the policy while it remains in the trust. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-34-028 (insured resigned as trustee) and Priv. Ltr. RuI.
94-51-053 (trust established for the grantor's spouse that held second-to-die policy). However, if the insuredlbeneficiary
also holds a power of appointment over the trust assets, then the insured may have incidents of ownership in the policy.
See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-02-010 and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-34-028 (both withdrawn apparently in consideration of the power of
appointment issue).
There is no controlling authority on the issue ofwhether a decedent possessed an incident ofownership in a policy
on his life, where the decedent was an attorney-in-fact under a power of attorney of a principal that owned the policy.
At least one commentator believes that (by analogy to the trust cases discussed below) the decedent could be deemed to
possess an incident of ownership either (i) if the policy was transferred by the decedent to the principal while the power
of attorney was in effect; or (ii) if the power of attorney was transferred by the decedent to the principal in a unrelated
transaction, the decedent was a potential beneficiary ofthe principal's estate or a potential recipient of lifetime gifts by the
principal (which the attorney-in-fact was authorized to make). Budin, 826 T.M., Life Insurance atA-19. Accordingly, the
safe approach would be to have the power of attorney document contain a provision prohibiting the attorney-in-fact from
exercising any incidents of ownership of the principal in policies insuring the life of the attorney-in-fact.
If the spouse of the insured owns the policy, the spouse should not name the insured's revocable trust as the
beneficiary of the policy. See Estate of Margrave v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 13 (1978), aff'd, 618 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1980)
(Service argued, unsuccessfully, that insured/decedent held incidents of ownership in policy owned by wife); Revenue
Ruling 81-166, 1981-1 C.B. 477 (Service will not advance position taken in Margrave). Even if the insured/decedent has
no incidents of ownership, naming his revocable trust or estate as beneficiary will cause the spouse that owns the policy
to make a gift upon the death of the insured spouse to the trust's beneficiaries, and spouse will be a grantor of the trusts if
they are for her benefit causing estate inclusion under §§ 2036, 2037 and 2038.
Insurance in a qualified retirement plan will generally be included in the plan participant's estate under § 2042(2),
because the participant will be deemed to have an incident of ownership based on (i) his power to designate the beneficiary
of the plan (and thus the policy), or (ii) him having a reversionary interest in the policy greater than five percent; or (iii)
him being a trustee of the plan or a controlling owner of the plan sponsor. Some have suggested that it is possible for a
plan participant to relinquish all incidents of ownership in insurance held in the plan on the participant's life and have the
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death benefit excluded from the his estate. 58 This technique is beyond the scope of this Chapter and has not been tested in
the courts or before the Service.
The right to acquire a life insurance policy held in a trust by substituting another policy of equal value should not
be an incident of ownership under authority of Estate of Jordahl v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 92 (1975),59 aeq. 1977-2 C.B.
1. See also Revenue Ruling 82-5,1982-1 C.B. 131; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9413045.
Under Kentucky law, a custodian under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act60 may hold life insurance for the
benefit ofthe minor. 61 If the insured is the custodian, will the insured have incidents of ownership under § 2042(2)? Using
the trustee attribution rules under Rev. Rul. 84-179, discussed above, the death proceeds would be included in the estate
of the insured/custodian ifhe had transferred the policy to the minor or provided the funds for its purchase. If the insured
custodian did neither of these things, then estate inclusion under the analysis of Rev. Rul. 84-179 would turn on whether
the insured/custodian had a beneficial interest in the custodian account. This, in turn, would depend on whether the account
could be used for the basic support ofthe minor and whether the custodian had a legal duty to support the minor. 62 Ifboth
of these questions are answered in the affirmative, then there could be inclusion of the death proceeds in the estate of the
insured/custodian. See Budin, 826 T.M., Life Insurance at A-17.

g)

[12.74] Incidents of Ownership from Controlled Corporations

Where the decedent is the controlling stockholder of a corporation that has "economic benefits" in a policy on the
life of the decedent, the "incidents of ownership" of the corporation will be attributed to the insured/decedent controlling
stockholder to the extent the proceeds of the policy are not payable to or for the benefit of the corporation "and thus are
not taken into account in valuing the decedent's stock holdings in the corporation for purposes of § 2031." Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2042-1(c)(6). Insurance "proceeds payable to a third party for a valid business purpose, such as in satisfaction ofa
business debt ofthe corporation, so that the net worth ofthe corporation is increased by the amount of such proceeds, shall
be deemed to be payable to the corporation and not included in the insured/decedent's gross estate" under § 2042. 63 Treas.
Reg. § 0.2042-1(c)(6). Conversely, "if the decedent is the controlling stockholder in a corporation, and the corporation
owns a life insurance policy on his life, the proceeds of which are payable to the decedent's spouse, the incidents of
ownership held by the corporation will be attributed to the decedent through his stock ownership and the proceeds will be
included in his gross estate under § 2042." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6). If only 40 percent of the policy proceeds had
been paid to the decedent's spouse and 60 percent to the corporation, only 40 percent of the proceeds would be included
in decedent's gross estate under § 2042. Treas. Reg. § 1.2042-1(c)(6). This rule is different from the general rule that
if one has an incident of ownership in only part of the policy, then the entire death benefit is included in the estate under
§ 2042(2). See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(a)(3); Rev. Rul. 79-129, 1979-1 C.B. 306 (discussed above). Also, it is only that
portion ofthe death benefit paid to the controlled corporation ofthe insured that is not included in the insured's estate under
§ 2042(2). This exception does not apply to any portion of the death benefit paid to a related entity where the payment
does not enhance the net worth of the controlled corporation (Le., the payment was not for a valid business purpose of the
controlled corporation). Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-10-004.
The "decedent will not be deemed to be the controlling stockholder of a corporation unless, at the time of his
death, he owned stock possessing more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of the corporation." Treas.
Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6). An insured/decedent is "considered to be the owner of only the stock with respect to which legal
title was held, at the time of his death, by (i) the decedent (or his agent or nominee);b4 (ii) the decedent and another person
jointly (but only the proportionate number of shares which corresponds to the portion of the total consideration which is
considered to be furnished by the decedent for purposes of § 2040 and the regulations thereunder); and (iii) a trustee of a
voting trust (to the extent ofthe decedent's beneficial interest therein) or any other trust with respect to which the decedent
was treated as an owner under [Subchapter J ofthe Code, i.e., a grantor trust] immediately prior to his death." Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2042-1(c)(6). Stock held by a qualified subchapter S trust ofwhich the insured/decedent was the electing beneficiary
will be attributed to the insured in determining control. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-11-046.
For group-term life insurance (under § 79 and its regulations) provided by a corporation, the "power to surrender
or cancel a policy held by the corporation" is not attributed to a decedent by virtue of his stock ownership. Treas. Reg. §
20.2042-1 (c)(6).
As noted above, the death benefit paid to the insured's controlled corporation is not included in the insured's gross
estate under § 2042(2), because the death benefit paid to the controlled corporation is taken into account in valuing the
corporation under § 2031. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f). However, the value ofthe death proceeds paid the corporation does
not necessarily increase the value ofthe decedent's interest in the corporation by a like amount (e.g., loss ofkey person and
other discounts may apply). See Estate of Huntsman, 66 T.C. 861 (1976) (rejecting the Service's approach offirst valuing
the corporation without the death benefit and then adding the death benefit to that value), aeq. 1977-2 C.B. 1.
In light of the above rules, in structuring a split-dollar insurance agreement between a controlled corporation
and a family member or irrevocable trust of the insured/controlling stockholder, care must be taken to avoid having the
corporation possess any incidents of ownership in the policy. If the corporation has incidents of ownership they will be
attributed to the insured controlling stockholder and the death benefit paid to the irrevocable trust will be included in the
insured's gross estate. See Rev. Rul. 82-145, 1982-2 C.B. 213.

h)

r12.751 Incidents of Ownership from Partnerships

The Regulations under § 2042(2) do not address attribution of a partnership's incidents of ownership in an
insurance policy to the insured partner. In Rev. Rul. 83-147, 1983-2 C.B. 158, the Service ruled on the issue regarding a
general partnership as follows: ''where a partnership owns a life insurance policy on a partner's life and the proceeds are
payable other than to or for the benefit ofthe partnership, the insured partner possesses incidents of ownership in the policy
in conjunction with the other partners, so that the value of the proceeds is includible in the insured partner's gross estate
under § 2042(2)." This ruling reaffirms the Service's prior acquiescence with the result in Estate ofKnillll v. Commissioner,
25 T.C. 153 (1955), aeq. in result, 1956-2 C.B. 4, aff'd on another issue, 244 F.2d 436 (4th Cir.), eert. denied, 355 U.S. 827
(1957). In Knillll, the insurance proceeds on the life ofa 50 percent partner were paid to the partnership and the acquisition
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of the insurance had been nothing more than the purchase of a partnership asset in the ordinary course of business. The
court held that the insured/decedent, in his individual capacity, had no incidents of ownership in the policies, and held that
the insurance proceeds were not includible in the gross estate under the predecessor to § 2042(2). The Service acquiesced
given that ''the insurance proceeds were paid to the partnership and inclusion of the proceeds under the predecessor of
§ 2042 would have resulted in the unwarranted double taxation of a substantial portion of the proceeds, because the
decedent's proportionate share of the proceeds of the policy were included in the value of the decedent's partnership
interest. Rev. Rul. 83-147, 1983-2 C.B. 158. See also Watson v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1977-268.
This position of the Service with regard to general partnerships as expressed in Rev. Rul. 83-147 is similar to the
rule in Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (discussed above) with regard to a corporation and its controlling stockholder. The
difference with regard to general partnerships, however, is that the Service does not require the partner to be a "controlling"
partner or that the partner own more than 50 percent of the partnership. The partner in the Ruling was only a 30 percent
partner.
See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-25-007, where the Service ruled that life insurance policies transferred by a trust to a family
limited partnership will not be included in the estate of the insured partner, because the proceeds were payable to the
partnership and the insured was not a general partner. In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-43-024, the Service concluded that incidents
of ownership in insurance held by a partnership would not be attributed to insured who was a limited partner. Same result
in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-11-038. Also, in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-17-051, a general partner was insulated from incidents of
ownership in life insurance on his life by express restrictions in the partnership agreement. In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-14-028,
incidents of ownership of partnership in insurance on life of 33% general partner not attributed to partner where insurance
proceeds paid to partnership.
Revenue Ruling 83-148, 1983-2 C.B. 157, provides, as follows:
Section 20.2042-1 (c)(6) ofthe regulations provides rules for determining whether incidents ofownership
held by a decedent's controlled corporation are attributable to the decedent. The regulation states that
in the case of group-term life insurance, as defined in the regulations under section 79 of the Code,
the power to surrender or cancel a policy held by a corporation shall not be attributed to any decedent
through the decedent's stock ownership. Similarly, a partnership's power to surrender or cancel its group
term life insurance policy shall not be attributed to any ofthe partners. It does not matter that partners, in
that they are not employees, do not qualify for the income exclusion provided in IRC section 79.
In structuring split-dollar arrangements between the partnership and the insured partner's family member or
irrevocable trust, care should be taken to assure that the partnership has no incidents of ownership in the policy (see
discussion above regarding controlled corporations).

B.

[12.761 Inclusion in the Insured's Estate Under Section 2035
If a decedent makes a transfer (by trust or otherwise) of an interest in any property (or relinquishes a power
with respect to any property) during the 3-year period ending on the date of the decedent's death, and if the value of such
property (or an interest therein) would have been included in the decedent's gross estate under §§ 2036, 2037, 2038 or
2042 if such transferred interest or relinquished power had been retained by the decedent on the date ofhis death, then the
gross estate will include the value of any property (or interest therein) which would have been so included. IRC § 2035(a).
This rule does not apply to a transfer that was "a bona fide sale for an adequate consideration in money or money's worth."
IRC § 2035(d).
1.
[12.771 Transfers by Insured Within Three Years of Death
Assuming the life insurance policy in question is not held by a trust in which the decedent has retained powers
or interests prohibited by §§ 2036, 2037 or 2038, then § 2035 will come into play only with respect to insurance on the
life ofthe decedent. This is because § 2042 applies only to insurance on the life of the decedent (see discussion of § 2042
above).
Life insurance is often snared by the gross estate under § 2035(a). The application of § 2035(a) is best explored
through the following examples.
Example: Insured transfers life insurance policy by gift to third party and insured continues to pay (or provide funds for
payment) oflife insurance premiums and then dies, all within three years ofgift ofpolicy. Result: The entire death benefit
is included in insured's estate under § 2035(a).
Example: Insured transfers life insurance policy by gift to third party and donee pays all premiums on policy after date
of gift and insured dies within 3 years ofgift ofpolicy. Result: Only a portion of the death benefit is included in the
insured's estate. The amount included is equal to the total death benefit multiplied by afraction, the numerator ofwhich
is the premiums paid by the insured and the denominator is the total premiums paid on the policy. Estate ofSilverman v.
Commissioner. 61 T.C. 338 (1973), acq. 1978-2 C.B. 1(see also Louis R. Peters. Exr. v. U.S.. 521 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1975);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8724014; Estate ofFriedber~ v. Commissioner. T. C.M 1992-310 (IRS challenged Silverman decision but Tax
Court applied Silverman inclusionformula.)
Example: Insured transfers life insurance policy by gift to third party and insured continues to pay (or provide funds for
payment) oflife insurance premiums and then dies three years after the date ofgift ofthe policy: The entire death benefit is
excludedfrom the estate under § 2035(a). See First National Bank ofMidland Texas v. U.S.. 423 F.2d 1286 (5 th Cir. 1970)
(rejecting Rev. Rul. 67-463); Rev. Rul. 71-497,1971-2 C.B. 329.
Example: Third party (at the direction of and with the assistance of the insured) applies for and is issued the insurance
policy but the insured makes all premium payments on the policy and dies within 3 years of issuance ofpolicy. Result:
The death benefit is not included in the insured's estate under § 2035(a). Estate ofHeadrick v. Commissioner. 918 F.2d
1263 (6th Cir. 1990), aff'g 93 T.C. 171 (1989); A.O.D. 1991-012; Estate ofLeder v. Commissioner. 893 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.
1989), aff'g89 T.C. 235 (1987); Estate ofPerryv. Commissioner. 927 F.2d 209 (5 th Cir. 1991), aff'g T.C.M 1990-123. This
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result should apply even ifinsured is the initial applicant ofthe policy, but before the policy is issued (i.e., before there is a
binding contract) a new application is substitutedfor the same insurance by a third party and the policy is then issued in
the name ofthe thirdparty. Tech. Adv. Mem. 932-30-02. But see Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-41-007 and Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-27007 for cases where Service will still assert constructive transfer by insured.

Given the above rules, the date a policy is transferred is critical for purposes of § 2035(a). Generally, a policy
is transferred by completing change of ownership forms and submitting them to the insurance company. However, there
are cases where a transfer date will be accepted that is prior to the actual submission of change of ownership forms to the
insurance company. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-51-004. See also O'Daniel Estate v. Commissioner, 6 F.3d 321 (5 th Cir. 1993).
The question also may arise as to whether the policy in effect at the time of the insured's death is the same policy
that was transferred by the insured within the three-year period prior to his death. In Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-41-007, an
individual policy owned by an irrevocable trust was issued in connection with the conversion rights of the insured under
a group policy. The Service ruled that the policy owned by the trust was sufficiently tied to the group policy to cause the
trust's policy to be included in the insured's estate under the three-year rule of § 2035.
There is no inclusion under § 2035(a) when the insured transfers by gift all of his rights in annually renewable
term insurance, after the transfer of the policy the insured continues to pay the premiums, which automatically renews the
policy now owned by the donee, and the insured dies more than three years from the date he gave the policy to the donee.
Rev. Rul. 82-13, 1982-1 C.B. 132. In the ruling, the decedent was an employee ofa company which covered its employees
with a renewable group term life insurance policy. All premiums were paid by the company and the policy was renewable
upon payment of the annual premium at standard rates with no evidence of insurability being required. Within three years
of the insured/decedent's death, he gratuitously assigned all rights under the policy (including any conversion privilege)
to a third party. Each subsequent yearly premium was paid by the insured's employer. 65 The Service held that the death
benefit of the renewable group term life insurance policy was not includible in the decedent's gross estate under IRC §
2035, because the decedent assigned the policy more than three years before death, even though he was considered to have
made premium payments until death.
It is possible for an employee to assign not only his rights under the employer's current group policy but also
his rights under any group policy that replaces the old policy and stay outside of § 2042(2). In Rev. Rul. 80-289, 1980-2
C.B. 270, an employee was insured under a group term life insurance policy, the premiums for which were paid by the
employer. Employee executed a written agreement with his spouse stating that the assignment would vest in the assigneespouse not only employee's rights under the current policy issued by the insurance company, but also the employee's
rights under any arrangement for life insurance coverage of the employees of employer. The employer later terminated
its insurance arrangement and obtained a similar arrangement with a different insurer, but did so less than three years
before the insured's death, and the insured assigned the new policy to the spouse. The Service held that value ofthe policy
proceeds of the new group policy was not includible in the insured's gross estate and revoked Rev. Rul. 79-231, 1979-2
C.B. 323, which had held otherwise.
Under a second-to-die life insurance policy, the death proceeds are not paid until the death of the second to die.
Because § 2042 applies only to proceeds received on the decedent's life, there would be no inclusion under this section at
the death of the first to die. (Although § 2033, discussed below, would include the interpolated terminal reserve value of
the policy in the first to die's estate, if the policy was owned by him.) Accordingly, inclusion under § 2035 should occur
only if both insureds die within three years of the date the policy is transferred.

2.

[12.781 Transfers Involving Controlled Corporations Within Three Years of Death

Bad results can occur when § 2035(a) and the controlled corporation rules under § 2042(2) (discussed above) are
combined. For example, in Revenue Ruling 82-141, 1982-2 C.B. 209, modified by Rev. Rul. 90-21, 1990-1 C.B. 172, the
decedent owned eighty percent ofthe voting stock of a corporation. The corporation owned a life insurance policy on the
decedent's life. Within three years of the decedent's death, the corporation assigned all its incidents of ownership in the
policy to a third party. Because there was no business purpose for the assignment, the decedent filed a gift tax return and
reported a gift of eighty percent of the value of the policy (in accordance with Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h), ex. 1, which
provides that a gift from a corporation is a gift from the shareholders to the extent of their proportionate interests in the
corporation). The proceeds were paid to the third party following the decedent's death. The Service ruled that the entire
value of the policy proceeds were includible in the decedent's gross estate under IRC § 2035. There is no reduction in the
amount of death benefit included to take into account the interest of a minority owner ofthe corporation. Tech. Adv. Mem.
88-06-004. See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-52-016 (same result where controlled corporation of insured transfers its incidents
of ownership in split-dollar policy within three years of insured's death).
In Rev. Rul. 90-21, 1990-1 C.B. 172, two scenarios involving controlled corporations are discussed. In one case,
a controlled corporation transfers to the controlling stockholder's son, for less than adequate and full consideration (i.e.,
for a non-business purpose), a life insurance policy on the controlling stockholder's life. The stockholder then disposes of
control ofthe corporation by transferring all ofhis stock to another child. Both the transfer ofthe life insurance policy and
the stock occur within three years of the insured's death. The Service ruled that life insurance proceeds are includible in
a deceased stockholder's gross estate under IRC § 2035 if, within 3 years of death, the corporation, for less than adequate
and full consideration, assigns an insurance policy on the stockholder's life and the stockholder then disposes of control of
the corporation and if the life insurance proceeds are payable to a third party for other than a business purpose within the
meaning of Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6). See also Tech. Adv. Mem. 88-06-004.
In the other case, a controlling stockholder holding eighty percent of the stock transfers to his child, for less
than adequate and full consideration, a controlling interest in the corporation (decedent still retained forty percent of
the outstanding stock). The corporation (both before the transfer of stock and after) owns a life insurance policy on the
stockholder's life naming the insured's son as beneficiary. At the insured's death the life insurance proceeds are paid to
the son for other than a corporate business purpose. Not surprisingly, the Service ruled that life insurance proceeds are
includible in a deceased stockholder's gross estate under § 2035 if, within 3 years of death, the stockholder, for less than
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adequate and full consideration, disposes of the controlling interest in a corporation that owns a life insurance policy on
the stockholder's life, and ifthe life insurance policy proceeds are payable to a third party for other than a business purpose
within the meaning ofTreas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6).
If, in these two scenarios, the death proceeds had been paid to the corporation or to another person for a valid
business purpose ofthe corporation, then the proceeds would have been taken into account in valuing the corporation and §
2042(2) would not have applied (ifthe decedent had maintained a controlling interest in the corporation). See discussion of
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-I(c)(6) above. Because, § 2042(2) would not have applied, then § 2035(a) would not be applicable
and the proceeds would not have been included in the insured's estate. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-06-002.

3.

[12.791 Exception to Three-Year Rule for Bona Fide Sale of Policy
As noted above, the three year rule of § 2035(a) does not apply to a transfer that is "a bona fide sale for an
adequate consideration in money or money's worth." IRC § 2035(d). The biggest problem with using this exception with
regard to the transfer of a life insurance policy is determining the "value" of the policy so the transferee can pay adequate
consideration. See discussion above regarding the gift tax value ofa policy and the cases under § 2035.
C.
[12.801 Inclusion in the Insured's or Non-Insured's Estate Under Other Code Sections
There is always the possibility that life insurance, ifnot captured by §§ 2042 or 2035, will nonetheless be included
in the insured's or a non-insured's estate under § 2033 (ifthe decedent has a beneficial interest in the policy or its proceeds);
§§ 2036, 2037 or 2038 (if the policy was transferred during life and the decedent retained certain prohibited powers over
or interests in the policy); § 2041 (if the decedent held a general power of appointment over the policy); or the reciprocal
trust doctrine (where the decedent may have never had any interest in the policy or the trust that holds it).
1.
[12.811 Section 2033
Section 2033 includes in the decedent's gross estate the value of all property beneficially owned by the decedent
at the time of his death. Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1. If the decedent is both the insured and the owner of the policy, then §
2042 (discussed above) and § 2033 will apply to the life insurance. 66 Section 2033 will come into play by itself when the
decedent owns a policy on the life of his spouse or someone else, or owns a second-to-die policy (in whole or in part) on
himself and some other person and the other insured survives the decedent. The primary issue in this situation is the value
of the policy to be included in the decedent's estate.
Similar to the gift tax regulations, the estate tax regulations provide that the value of an insurance policy on the
life ofa person other than the decedent is the policy's replacement cost (Le., what an insurance company regularly engaged
in selling a policy ofthat character would charge). Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a)(I). Ifthe policy in question is one on which
no further premiums are to be made (Le., a single premium or paid up policy), the value of the policy is the amount an
insurance company would charge for a single premium contract ofthe same specified amount on the life of a person ofthe
age ofthe insured. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a)(3), ex. (2). The comparable contract must mirror the one being valued in all
respects (including cash value). Rev. Rul. 78-137, 1978-1 C.B. 280.
However, policies cannot generally be accurately valued by comparison with the sale price of comparable
contracts when, at the date of the decedent's death, the contract has been "in force for some time and further premium
payments are to be made." Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a)(2). Accordingly, the value of such a policy owned by the decedent
on the life of another may be approximated by adding to the policy's interpolated terminal reserve at the date of the
decedent's death, the proportionate part ofthe gross premium last paid before the date ofthe decedent's death which covers
the period extending beyond that date. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a)(2) & (3), ex. (3). If, however, because of the "unusual
nature ofthe contract," such approximation is not reasonably close to the full value ofthe contract, this method may not be
used. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a)(2).
If the policy owned by the decedent (which has been in force for some time and on which further premiums
are to be made) is on the life of another person who is terminally ill, then according to the court in Pritchard Estate
v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 204 (1944) (interpreting § 2035), discussed above, it would appear that the shortened life
expectancy of the insured would cause the policy not to be valued by its interpolated terminal reserve value, but at some
higher value that reflects what an insurance company would charge for such a policy given the insured's illness. In light of
the simultaneous death cases discussed below, however, it is not certain that the health of the insured would be taken into
consideration for estate tax valuation purposes.
In Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. U.S., 430 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1970), the court addressed the estate tax value
under § 2033 of insurance policies owned by wife on husband's life when they died simultaneously in a plane crash. Wife
had named herself as primary beneficiary of the death proceeds, but if she did not survive her husband, her children were
to receive the proceeds as alternate beneficiaries. Based on the simultaneous death of husband and wife, the insurance
company paid the death proceeds to,the children. 67 The Government asserted that the value ofthe policy on husband's life
in wife's estate was the death benefit amount paid to the children. The Government argued that Regulation 20.2031-8(a)(2)
(providing for interpolated terminal reserve value) did not apply since the insurance contract was of an "unusual nature"
and one for which no further premiums were due, given that at the instant of wife's death husband had died and the policy
had matured.
In rejecting these ar~uments and holding that the interpolated terminal reserve value ofthe policy was its value as
prescribed by the Regulation, 8 the Sixth Circuit noted that it "is the circumstance of simultaneous death which is unusual,
not the character ofthe contract (which, for all that appears, is a perfectly ordinary life insurance policy)." The court noted
that there was "no provision in the Code or in the Regulations for the life expectancy ofthe insured to be taken into account
when the owner of an ordinary life insurance policy dies. Cf United States v. Land, 5 Cir., 303 F.2d 170, 173 n.4; Reg.
Section 20.2031-8(a)(3), Examples (I) and (2)." As to the Regulation not being applicable because no further premiums
were due at the time ofwife's death, the court stated that, "within the context ofthe regulation, that language is simply used
to indicate a policy which is, at the time of death, not fully paid up. Old Kent Bank & Trust Co., 430 F.2d 392. See Reg.
Section 20.2031-8(a)(3), Example (2)."
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In Estate of Wien v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1971), husband and wife both owned policies on the
life of the other, they died simultaneously in a common disaster, and the proceeds were paid to their child as alternate
beneficiary.69 Like the Sixth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit held that the interpolated terminal reserve plus prepaid premium
amount was the estate tax value of the policies owned by one spouse on the life of another. The court stated:

that the principles of estate taxation preclude consideration of such facts as the actual state of the
insured~ health or peril in valuing the owner ~ property interest. Indeed it would bring virtual disaster
upon the integrity of estate taxation if the value of an ownership interest fluctuated with the probable
longevity ofthe insured Any valuation method depending upon such an uncertain measure as the dayby-day health ofan individual insured would be impossible to enforce accurately. ... There are simply
no actuarial computations which can be applied to an individual illness or accidental circumstance
which will accurately predict the probability ofdeath. For this reason the standard mortality tables on
which the interpolated terminal reserve is based, rather than ad hoc medical prognosis, have always
been the norm for estate tax valuations. Yet here because there is a common disaster involved both the
Commissioner and the taxpayers suggest that we departfrom the norm and value the policy on the basis
ofthe individual insured ~ probability ofdeath. We think considerations ofthis sort are as unmanageable
when a common disaster is involved as they are in the ordinary case. 70
See also Estate of Meltzer v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1971); Estate ofChown v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 140
(1968), rev'd, 428 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1970).
In light of the foregoing, the Service ruled that in a simultaneous death and cross-owned insurance situation
where the local law establishes the presumption that the insured survived the beneficiary, the value of the proceeds to be
included in the gross estate of each of the owners is the sum of the interpolated terminal reserve of the policy at the date
of the insured decedent's death and the proportionate part of the gross premium last paid before the date of the insured's
death which covers the period extending beyond that date. Rev. Rul. 77-181, 1977-1 C.B. 272. This is the rule, even where
the beneficiary of the death proceeds is the estate of the deceased owner of the policy. Id. The ruling does not discuss a
policy's value where there is not a simultaneous death but the insured has a shortened life expectancy due to a terminal
illness.
Where the decedent owns a policy (in force for some time and on which further premiums are due) on the life
of another that is subject to a split-dollar agreement between the decedent and the insured's employer, the value of the
policy in the decedent's estate is the difference between the interpolated terminal reserve value ofthe policy plus pre-paid
premium reduced by the employer's interest in the policy (e.g., cash value, premiums paid) at the time of the decedent's
death. Rev. Rul. 79-429, 1979-2 C.B. 321.

2.

[12.821 Sections 2036, 2037, 2038 and 2041

Sections 2036,71 203772 and 2038 73 apply where the decedent previously transferred property but retained an
interest in the property or control over its disposition; a reversionary interest in the property greater than five percent; or
the power to alter, amend or revoke the enjoyment of the transferred interest.
Where a person establishes an irrevocable trust and designates himselfas a beneficiary, the trust's assets (including
any life insurance policies held by the trust) will be included in the settlor/beneficiary's estate under § 2036(a)(1). There
may be an exception to this rule for a self-settled trust established under Delaware or Alaska law, where the settlor is a
beneficiary but will only receive distributions by exercise ofthe independent trustee's absolute discretion and the creditors
ofthe settlor/beneficiary cannot reach the trust's assets under state law. 74 Ifthis is so, then any insurance held by such a trust
on the life of the settlor/beneficiary or any other person would presumably escape estate inclusion under § 2036(a)(1).
As discussed above, if the settlor names himself as trustee of his irrevocable trust (whether or not he is a
beneficiary), the Service will include in the settlor's gross estate the death benefit of insurance on his life held by the trust
under § 2042(2), as announced in Rev. Rul. 84-179,1984-2 C.B. 194. But what is the result if the settlor neither names
himself as a trustee nor beneficiary of his trust, but merely retains the power to remove the trustee and name a new trustee
and the trustee has discretionary powers over distributions to beneficiaries? The Regulations under §§ 203675 and 2038 76
provide that, if the grantor retains the power to remove the trustee and name himself as trustee, then the powers of the
trustee will be imputed to him whether or not he serves as trustee, and the trust assets will be included in his estate under
§§ 2036 and 2038 if the trustee has discretionary powers of distribution. Accordingly, any insurance held by such a trust
on the life of the settlor, or any other person, will be included in the settlor's estate under these Code sections (as well as
§ 2042(2) if the insurance is on the life of the settlor).
But what if the settlor does not retain the right to name himself as trustee but only the right to name some other
person? In Revenue Ruling 95-58, 1995-2 C.B. 191 , the Service, in response to Estate of Wall v. Commissioner, 101
T.C. 300 (1993), revoked Revenue Rulings 79-353 and 81-51, which had held that a grantor's power to remove the
trustee without cause and appoint another person (even if it was not the grantor but only a corporate trustee), effectively
gave the grantor the trustee's powers, causing inclusion of the trust's assets in the grantor's estate under §§ 2036(a)(2)
and 2038(a)(1). The Service's position at this time, as expressed in Revenue Ruling 95-58, is that a decedent-grantor's
reservation of an unqualified power to remove a trustee and appoint an individual or corporate successor trustee that
is not related or subordinate to the decedent (within the meaning of IRC § 672(c)),77 is not considered a reservation of
the trustee's discretionary powers of distribution over the property transferred by the decedent-grantor to the trust. As
discussed above, while it is clear that the Service intended Rev. Rul. 95-58 to apply §§ 2036 and 2038, it is not clear that
the Service intended the ruling to apply to § 2042(2), if the trust were to hold insurance on the life of the settlor with the
power to remove and name a new trustee.
If a person is not the trustee or grantor (and thus has not retained the power to remove the trustee ~ there will still
be inclusion of the trust's assets in the person's estate if the person has a general power of appointment over the trust
property. IRC § 2041 (a). Thus, any insurance held by the trust on the life ofthe general power holder would be included
in his estate under § 2041 (as well as § 2042(2)). While for purposes of § 2041, a power to consume or invade the trust
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income or corpus for one's benefit is not a general power of appointment if the power "is limited by an ascertainable
standard relating to the health, education, support, or maintenance of the decedent," IRC § 2041(b)(I), such a power
would most likely run afoul of § 2042(2) where the life insurance policy was on the life of the power holder. Also, while
a special or non-general power of appointment does not cause estate inclusion under § 2041, it appears that the Service
is still deciding on whether a special power over a trust holding life insurance on the power holder's life is an incident of
ownership under §2042(2) (see discussion above).

3.

[12.831 Reciprocal Trust Doctrine

The reciprocal trust doctrine was created by the courts to prevent circumvention of what are now §§ 2036 and
2038 by taxpayers who create separate trusts for one another's benefit. In United States v. Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969),
husband created a trust providing for payment of income to wife, for her life, with payment to her of any part of the
principal which a majority ofthe trustees thought advisable. Wife was also given power to designate the manner in which
the trust estate remaining at her death was to be distributed among the decedent and their children. Shortly thereafter,
wife, at husband's request, executed a virtually identical trust instrument naming husband as life beneficiary, with the
trust corpus consisting of the family estate and securities which husband had transferred to wife in the preceding years.
At husband's death, the Service concluded the trusts were reciprocal and included the amount of wife's trust in husband's
gross estate. The Court agreed, noting that the doctrine of reciprocal trusts was formulated in response to attempts to draft
instruments which seemingly avoid the literal terms of the Code while still leaving the decedent the lifetime enjoyment of
his property. The Court held that:
The taxability ofa trust corpus ... does not hinge on a settlor s motives, but depends upon the nature and
operative effect ofthe trust transfer, and in the reciprocal trust situation inquiries into subjective intent,
especially in intra family transfers, create obstacles to the proper application ofthe federal tax laws.
The application ofthe reciprocal trust doctrine does not depend on afinding that each trust was created
as considerationfor the other, and does not require a tax-avoidance motive ...
The application ofthe doctrine requires that the trusts be interrelated, and that the arrangement, to the
extent ofmutual value, leaves the settlors in approximately the same economic position as if they had
created trusts naming themselves as life beneficiaries.

Avoiding the reciprocal trust doctrine should always be a concern when drafting an inter vivos irrevocable trust,
whether or not it will hold life insurance. The doctrine should be easily avoidable, however, by having different dispositive
terms in the trusts and/or by using an independent trustee for one of the trusts. See Estate of Green v. United States, 68
F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 1995) (Reciprocal fiduciary powers without retained economic benefits do not invoke the reciprocal trust
doctrine.)

D.

[12.841 Estate Tax Marital Deduction

Payment ofthe death benefit in a lump sum to the surviving spouse ofthe insured/owner ofthe policy will qualify
for the estate tax marital deduction. See IRC § 2056 and the regulations thereunder. Also, payment of the death benefit in
a lump sum to a trust for the surviving spouse that otherwise qualifies for the marital deduction (as either an estate trust,
general power of appointment trust or QTIP trust) will qualify for the marital deduction. Id. .However, where payment
of the death benefit is not in a lump sum but under a "settlement option," a marital deduction for the death benefit will be
available only if the settlement option does not create a nondeductible terminable interest79 or qualifies under one of the
statutory exceptions to the terminable interest rule. Id.
Most life insurance policies offer a variety of "settlement options" for payment of the death benefit. A settlement
option may be chosen by the owner of the policy and become irrevocable upon the death of the insured, or chosen by the
owner but subject to change by the beneficiary following the death of the insured. There appear to be five basic types of
settlement options (other than a lump sum payment): life annuity; life annuity with guaranteed payments; payment for a
term of years; fixed amount option; and interest option. See Budin, 826 T.M., Life Insurance at A-36.
Under the life annuity option, the death benefit is paid to the beneficiary in the form of an annuity that ends upon
the death of the beneficiary. Under the life annuity with guaranteed payments option, the death benefit is paid in the form
of an annuity that lasts for the longer of (i) the life of the beneficiary, or (ii) a fixed number ofyears (e.g., 20 years). If the
beneficiary dies within the guaranteed term, the remaining annuity payments through the end of the guaranteed term will
be paid to an alternate beneficiary (either designated by the owner of the policy or the primary beneficiary). If the term of
years option is chosen, periodic payments are made over a selected number of years and, ifthe beneficiary dies during this
period, the remaining payments are made to an alternate beneficiary. Under the fixed amount option, the death proceeds
are paid in monthly, quarterly or annual installments with the portion not yet paid earning interest at a guaranteed rate
(although the actual interest paid may be higher if earnings exceed the guaranteed rate). Under this option, the payments
stop once all principal and interest have been paid out. Ifthe beneficiary dies before this occurs, the remaining interest and
principal will be paid to the alternate beneficiary. Under the interest option, only interest on the death benefit is paid out
to the beneficiary on a periodic basis. The beneficiary may also be permitted to withdraw principal. At the death of the
beneficiary, any remaining interest and principal is paid to an alternate beneficiary.
Even though the life annuity option is a terminable interest (Le., payments stop upon the death ofthe beneficiary),
it is not a nondeductible terminable interest when paid to the surviving spouse because at the surviving spouse's death, the
payments are not made to any other person. Accordingly, this payment option will qualify for the marital deduction.
Under the life annuity with guaranteed payments, term ofyears, fixed amount and interest only settlement options,
where the surviving spouse is the beneficiary, the spouse's interest will be a terminable interest because the payments to the
spouse may stop at her demise. Further, when the spouse dies before all of the guaranteed payments are made, or before
the end ofthe term of years, or before death benefit plus interest is paid out in full, or before the spouse has withdrawn the
principal and received all of the interest, then the remaining death benefit will pass to and be enjoyed by another person
(i.e., the alternate beneficiary) without adequate consideration. When this other person is not the estate of the surviving
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spouse, then the terminable interest will constitute a nondeductible terminable interest. Accordingly, the interest of the
spouse under the settlement option will not qualify for the marital deduction, unless one of the statutoI)' exceptions to the
nondeductible terminable interest rule is met. 80
There are several statutoI)' exceptions to the nondeductible terminable interest rule. 81 The two most relevant to
life insurance settlement options are:
1.

Life insurance or annuity payments held by the insurer with a general power of appointment in the
spouse under the requirements set forth IRC § 2056(b)(6) and Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-6; or

2.

Qualified terminable interest property under the requirements set forth in IRC § 2056(b)(7) and
Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7.

To qualify as life insurance or annuity payments held by the insurer with a general power of appointment in the
spouse, the settlement option must meet the following requirements: (i) the proceeds, or a specific portion ofthe proceeds,
must be held by the insurer subject to an agreement to pay only to the spouse for her life either the entire proceeds or a
specific portion thereof in installments, or to pay interest thereon; (ii) the installments or interest payable to the surviving
spouse must be payable annually, or more frequently, commencing not later than 13 months after the decedent's death; (iii)
the surviving spouse must have the power to appoint all or a specific portion ofthe amounts so held by the insurer to either
herself or her estate; (iv) the power in the surviving spouse must be exercisable by her alone and (whether exercisable by
will or during life) must be exercisable in all events; and (v) the amounts or the specific portion of the amounts payable
under such contract must not be subject to a power in any other person to appoint any part thereof to any person other than
the surviving spouse. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-6(a).
Under the fixed amount or interest only options where the surviving spouse also has the power to withdraw during
life the entire unpaid death benefit at any time without any conditions, such a power of withdrawal should constitute
a general power of appointment within the meaning of the Regulation and the spouse's interest (assuming the other
requirements ofTreas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-6(a) are met) will qualify for the marital deduction. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)6(e)(4). There has been litigation, however, on whether the withdrawal right of the spouse under the settlement option
constitutes a general power of appointment within the meaning of the Regulation when the insurance company places
restrictions on the surviving spouse's right of withdrawal (e.g., notice requirements, withdrawals only during certain time
periods, limited number of withdrawals, etc.). See Werbe Estate v. U.S., 178 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Ind. 1958), aff'd273 F.2d
201 (7th Cir. 1959); Cornwell Estate v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 688 (1962); Jennings Estate v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 417
(1962) acq. 1964-1 C.B. 4 (1962). Accordingly, any restrictions on the spouse's exercise of the power to withdraw the
death benefit should be carefully reviewed.
To qualify for the marital deduction as "qualified terminable interest property" (QTIP), an election has to be
timely made for a "qualifying income interest for life" ofthe surviving spouse. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7. The surviving
spouse has a qualifying income interest for life if (i) the surviving spouse is entitled to all the income from the property,
payable annually or at more frequent intervals, or has a usufruct interest for life in the property, and (ii) no person has a
power to appoint any part of the property to any person other than the surviving spouse. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(d).
The attractiveness of the QTIP approach in qualifying for the marital deduction is that the surviving spouse does not have
to be given a general power ofappointment, and the decedent!owner ofthe policy can choose the alternate beneficiary (Le.,
who receives the remaining death benefit payments after the death of the surviving spouse) which the surviving spouse
cannot change (or may be changed but with limited options, Le., a special power of appointment).
The primary issue (other than making a timely election on the estate tax return ofthe insured/owner ofthe policy)
when attempting to qualify a settlement option as QTIP property, has been whether the surviving spouse will receive all
of the income from the property at least annually. Where the settlement option provides that all interest earned on the
death benefit will be paid at least annually, this requirement should be met. But where the settlement option provides
that the surviving spouse will be paid an annuity, there is confusion in the law as to whether the all income requirement
is met. IRC § 2056(b)(7)(ii) provides that "To the extent provided in regulations, an annuity shall be treated in a manner
similar to an income interest in property (regardless of whether the property from which the annuity is payable can be
separately identified)." Proposed regulations provided that a "surviving spouse's lifetime annuity interest shall be treated
as a qualifying income interest for file for purposes of § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(c)(2). The
proposed regulation then described how to identify the portion ofthe property (based on prescribed interest rates) that was
necessary to sustain the annuity and that would qualify for the marital deduction. Id. Following the enactment in 1992
of § 2056(b)(10) (the marital deduction is available for a "portion" of property determined on "a fractional or percentage
basis"), final regulations issued in March of 199483 provided no prospective guidance on whether the annuity interest
would constitute an "all income interest," but instead provided a safe harbor for certain annuity interests created before
the enactment of § 2056(b)(10) in 1992. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(e). For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see
Budin, 826 T.M., Life Insurance, atA-39.

E.

[12.851 Estate Tax Charitable Deduction

Under IRC § 2055(a), payment of a death benefit at the death of the insured/owner of the policy to a qualified
charitable organization is fully deductible for estate tax purposes, and there is no limitation on the amount ofthe deductible
gift. IRC § 2055(a) & (d). However, ifthe death benefit is paid to a trust and the trust has beneficiaries other than qualified
charities, it is possible that no amount of death benefit will be deductible under the partial interest rule of § 2055(e)(2).
Under the partial interest rule, an estate tax charitable deduction is not allowed for a gift of property in which the donor
has also given an interest in the same property to a non-charitable donee, unless the partial interest given to charity is a
remainder interest in a charitable remainder annuity trust, a charitable remainder unitrust or a pooled income fund, or
unless the partial interest given to charity is in the form of a guaranteed annuity or a fixed percentage distributed yearly of
the fair market value of property determined on an annual basis (i.e., a unitrust interest). IRC § 2055(e)(2). If the partial
interest rule is met, then the portion ofthe death benefit passing to charity would be deductible.
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Also, transfers to charitable organizations subject to conditions or powers may not be deductible. A charitable
estate tax deduction will not be allowed, if the charitable gift is "dependent upon the performance of some act or the
occurrence of a precedent event" in order to be effective, unless, as of the date of the decedent's death, ''the possibility
that the charitable transfer will not become effective is so remote as to be negligible." Treas. Reg. § 20.20552(b). But
if the property "has passed to, or is vested in, charity at the time of a decedent's death and the estate or interest would
be defeated by the subsequent performance of some act or the happening of some event, the possibility of occurrence of
which appeared at the time of the decedent's death to be so remote as to be negligible, the deduction is allowable." Id.
The possibility that the surviving spouse may elect to take her statutory share and thereby receive a portion of the gift
otherwise destined for charity, should not defeat the estate tax charitable deduction. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(e)(I)(i), ex.
6; Longue Vue Foundation v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 150 (1988), acq. in result only 1989-1 C.B. 1. Also, if the "donee,
or trustee is empowered to divert the property or fund, in whole or in part, to a use or purpose which would have rendered
it, to the extent that it is subject to such power, not deductible had it been directly so bequeathed, devised, or given by the
decedent, the deduction will be limited to that portion, if any, of the property or fund which is exempt from an exercise of
the power." Id.
Further, ifany estate, inheritance, succession, legacy, or other death taxes, are, either by the terms ofthe will, trust
or applicable tax apportionment law, payable in whole or in part out ofthe charitable gift, then the amount ofthe otherwise
deductible gift must be reduced by the amount ofsuch taxes. IRC § 2055(c). Failure to provide that the insured/decedent's
death taxes will be paid from sources other than the death benefit passing to charity will result in a circular calculation,
reducing the amount of the charitable gift and increasing the amount of death taxes paid. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-3.
Even though a death benefit passes to a charitable organization and the estate tax charitable deduction is permitted
to the insured/decedent's estate, inclusion of the death benefit in the estate may have a significant impact on the estate's
ability to qualify under other provisions of the Code (e.g., § 303 stock redemptions, family owned business deduction
under § 2057, installment payment of estate tax under § 6166).

F.

rI2.86] Apportionment of Death Taxes With Respect to Beneficiaries of Life Insurance
Unless a decedent provides otherwise in his will, if the federal gross estate consists of proceeds from insurance
on the life of the decedent, and the proceeds are received by a beneficiary other than the personal representative, the
personal representative is entitled to recover from such beneficiary a portion of the federal estate tax, the portion being a
fraction determined by the amount of the insurance proceeds over the total taxable estate. IRC § 2206. However, if the
insurance proceeds are receivable by the decedent's surviving spouse and an estate tax marital deduction is allowed, this
apportionment rule does not apply except with respect to so much ofthe insurance proceeds that exceed the amount ofthe
marital deduction. Id. Note that the statute does not provide a similar rule for gifts to charitable organizations that qualify
for the estate tax charitable deduction.
In light of § 2206, if the non-spouse beneficiary of a life insurance death benefit included in the insured's
gross estate is to bear none of the federal estate tax burden, then the insured/decedent must so provide in his will. 84
A state apportionment statute that would otherwise relieve the beneficiary of the burden will not override the federal
apportionment statute. McAleer v. Jernigan, 804 F.2d 1231 (11 th Cir. 1986). Generally, a clause directing payment from
the residuary estate of all death taxes on assets included in the gross estate (whether passing under the will or otherwise)
will be sufficient to relieve the beneficiary of the death proceeds from payment of estate tax. It is uncertain whether such
a tax payment clause in a trust agreement would be sufficient for purposes of defeating the executor's right to recovery
from the beneficiary under § 2206. Also, it appears to be possible for the life insurance beneficiary to disclaim the benefit
of a tax payment clause under the decedent's will directing payment of the death taxes from the residuary estate, in order
to have the insurance proceeds bear a portion of the estate tax burden under § 2206. Estate of Boyd v. Commissioner, 85
T.C. 1056 (1985), rev'd 819 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1987) (disclaimer by decedent's son to relieve residuary estate of burden of
estate tax on life insurance proceeds received by son so greater portion of residuary would pass to decedent's surviving
spouse and reduce estate taxes).
In the event life insurance beneficiary does bear the burden of the federal estate tax on the proceeds received, a
liquidity problem could result if the death benefit is not paid in a lump sum but paid over time. Recognizing this, § 6161
pennits an extension of time for up to ten years for the payment of tax in such a situation, subject to the discretion of the
Service. See Treas. Reg. § 20.6161-1(a), ex. 2.
Under §§ 6324(a) and 6901(a)(I), the Service can collect from the beneficiary of life insurance proceeds included
in the insured/decedent's gross estate both federal estate and generation-skipping transfer tax (plus interest thereon) not
paid by the personal representative. Baptiste v. Commissioner, 29 F.3d 1533 (11th Cir. 1994), aff'g in part and rev 'g in
part 100 T.C. 252 (1993); Baptisite, Jr. v. Commissioner, 29 F.3d 433 (8th Cir. 1994), aff'g in part and rev 'g in part 100
T.C. 252 (1993), cert denied 513 U.S. 1190 (1995). The beneficiary is liable not just for the tax on the insurance proceeds
received but for the entire estate tax to the extent of the insurance proceeds received. Id.
Kentucky law imposes the inheritance tax on the beneficiary with respect to property received from the decedent,
directs the personal representative (or trustee) to collect the tax before the property is delivered to the beneficiary, and
authorizes the personal representative to recover the tax from the beneficiary when the property did not come into the hands
of the personal representative. KRS 140.190 & 140.220. See Houghland v. Lampton, 33 S.W.3d 536 (Ky. App. 2000).
However, Kentucky law provides that life insurance death benefits paid to beneficiaries other than the insured or his estate
are exempt from the inheritance tax. KRS 140.030(2).

VII.

fI2.87] Generation-Skipping Transfer (GST) Taxation of Life Insurance

A.

rI2.88] GST Tax Generally

Chapter 13 of Subtitle B of the Code imposes a generation-skipping transfer (hereinafter "GST") tax on all
generation-skipping transfers. A GST is a transfer (outright or in trust) to a person more than two generations below the
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transferor's generation (such as a transfer from a grandparent to a grandchild). A GST is taxed at a flat rate equal to the
then highest estate tax rate. IRC § 2641. The current GST tax rate is 49%, subject to further reductions through year
2010 when the GST tax is repealed for one year under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
(EGTRRA). IRC § 200 1(a).
A generation-skipping transfer includes "taxable distributions," ''taxable terminations," and "direct skips." IRC
§ 2611(a). A taxable distribution is a distribution from a trust to a skip person (e.g., a grandchild of the settlor). IRC §
2612(a). A taxable termination involves the termination of an interest in property, whether by death, lapse of time, release
of a power, or otherwise, unless after such termination a non-skip person (e.g., the settlor's son or daughter) has an interest
in the property, or after such termination, no distribution can be made to a skip person. IRC § 2612(b). A direct skip
is a transfer to a skip person (e.g., grandparent to grandchild or from the settlor to a trust all of whose beneficiaries are
descendants below that ofthe settlor's children). IRC § 2612(c). A "skip person" is a person who is two or more generations
below the transferor or a trust where all beneficiaries are skip persons (e.g., all ofthe beneficiaries are grandchildren). IRC
§ 2613(a). Anon-skip person is person who is not a skip person. IRC § 2613(b). Ifa non-skip person is a beneficiary of
a trust, then the trust is treated as a non-skip person.

B.

[12.89] GST Exemption
Every individual is allowed an exemption from the GST tax. IRC §§ 2631(a) & (c). Currently in 2003, the GST
exemption is $1,120,000. Rev. Proc. 2002-70, § 3.25,2002-46 I.R.B. 845. For years after December 31,2003, the GST
exemption will equal the estate tax exemption. IRC § 2631 (c) as amended by EGTRRA. Accordingly, the GST exemption
will increase to $1.5 million for years 2004 and 2005; $2.0 million for years 2006 through 2008; and $3.5 million for 2009
before the GST tax is repealed for one year in 2010. IRC § 2631 (c). Under the sunset provisions of the EGTRRA, the
GST tax returns in 2011 and the GST exemption will again be $1,000,000 for 2011 and years thereafter as adjusted for
inflation.
An individual may elect to allocate his GST exemption to certain lifetime transfers. IRC §§ 2631(a), 2632. An
executor of a deceased taxpayer may also allocate GST exemption to lifetime or testamentary transfers. Id; Treas. Reg. §
26.2632-1(a). Ifneither the individual nor his personal representative affirmatively elects to allocate the GST exemption,
automatic allocation rules apply. IRC § 2632; Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-1.
C.
[12.90] Calculating GST Tax - Inclusion Ratio
The amount of GST tax due on a taxable distribution, taxable termination, or direct skip is determined by
multiplying the "taxable amount" by the "applicable rate." IRC § 2602. The "taxable amount" is the value ofthe property
received by the transferee or subject to the transfer with certain adjustments. IRC §§ 2621, 2622, 2623. The "applicable
rate" is the product of the maximum estate tax rate at the time of the transfer (currently 49%) times the "inclusion ratio"
with respect to the transfer. IRC § 2641(a). The inclusion ratio is one minus the applicable fraction; the applicable
fraction is a fraction, the numerator of which is the amount of the GST exemption allocated to the trust (or in the case of
a direct skip, allocated to the property transferred in such skip), and the denominator of which is the value of the property
transferred to the trust (or involved in the direct skip). IRC § 2642. Stated more simply, the inclusion ratio is one minus
the proportion of GST exemption allocated to the property over the total value of the property. For example, if a donor
transfers $100,000 to a GST trust and allocates $100,000 of GST exemption to the transfer, the inclusion ratio is calculated
as one minus $100,000 divided by $100,000 or zero. Alternatively, if no GST exemption was allocated to the trust, the
inclusion ratio would be one.
For simplicity ofrecord keeping and ease of administration, it is advantageous to have an inclusion ratio of either
one or zero. Trusts with an inclusion ratio greater than zero will be subject to the GST tax on taxable distributions and
taxable terminations. The GST automatic allocation rules, discussed below, may help reduce GST tax.
D.
[12.91] GST Exclusion
Certain transfers qualify for the GST exclusion and have an inclusion ratio of zero (i.e., they are exempt from the
GST tax). Direct skips not in trust (e.g., grandparent to grandchild) that qualify for the gift tax annual exclusion (taking
into account any gift splitting with the donor's spouse), or that qualify for the gift tax exclusion for certain educational and
medical expenses, will also qualify for the GST exclusion. IRC § 2642(c)(1). A direct skip made to a trust (i.e., a trust
that has no non-skip person as a beneficiary) that qualifies for the gift tax annual exclusion will also qualify for the GST
exclusion, but only (i) if the trust has only one beneficiary during such beneficiary's life, (ii) if the trust terminates during
the beneficiary's life, the trust assets are distributed only to the beneficiary, and (iii) if the beneficiary dies before the trust
terminates, the trust assets are included in his estate for federal estate tax purposes. IRC § 2642(c). A common transfer
that will qualify for the GST annual exclusion is § 2503(c) trust for the settlor's grandchild. When the transfer qualifies for
the GST exclusion, no GST exemption needs to be allocated to the transfer.
In light of the above, it is apparent that not all transfers that qualify for the gift tax annual exclusion will qualify
for the GST exclusion. This issue often arises with the typical irrevocable life insurance trust that has multiple beneficiaries
and that is designed to keep the trust assets from being included in any beneficiary's estate until termination of the trust
in accordance with any applicable rule against perpetuities. In this type of trust, contributions qualify for the gift tax
annual exclusion only through the use of Crummey withdrawal powers. For example, settlor contributes $30,000 cash to
the trust which is used to pay the annual premium on a life insurance policy owned by the trust. The trust has six current
beneficiaries, all ofwhom have Crummey withdrawal rights over contributions to the trust. Because the settlor may donate
up to $11,000 per beneficiary per year gift tax free, the entire $30,000 transfer is exempt from the gift tax due to the gift
tax annual exclusion. However, because the contribution does not qualify for the GST exclusion, GST tax can be avoided
with respect to the trust's taxable distributions and taxable terminations only by allocating a portion of the donor's GST
exemption to the contribution. If the donor allocates $30,000 ofGST exemption to the contribution, the inclusion ratio for
the trust will be zero (assuming no other contributions are made) and the GST tax will not apply.
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[12.921 Allocation of GST Exemption to Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts
Once property is excluded from the GST tax by application of the GST exemption or the GST exclusion, any
subsequent appreciation in value of such property is also excluded from the GST tax. Because the exemption may be
allocated during life, significant leveraging of the exemption may occur by allocating GST exemption during life to
lifetime gifts of property that are expected to appreciate in value. An irrevocable life insurance trust is an excellent device
to leverage both the GST exemption and the estate tax exemption. By allocating GST exemption to the contributions used
to pay life insurance premiums, the entire death benefit from the policy may also be excluded from the GST tax.
Generally, an individual or his executor may allocate the GST exemption at any time from the date ofthe transfer
ofthe property through the date of filing the individual's federal estate tax return. Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-1. Ifthe property
is held in trust, the allocation ofGST exemption is made to the trust and not to specific assets held in the trust. Id. A timely
allocation on the donor's timely filed federal gift tax return (Form 709) is effective as of the date of the gift of property.
Any allocation filed after the due date for the Form 709 is a late allocation and is effective as of the date the Form 709 is
actually filed. Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-1 (b)(2)(ii). Said another way, the value for late allocation purposes is not the date of
transfer value but rather the value ofthe property as ofthe date the late allocation is filed. For ease ofreporting, the Service
adopted special regulations for valuing assets for late allocations. If the taxpayer elects to allocate late, the trust assets
may be valued as of the first day of the month during which the late allocation is made rather than the date the Form 709
is actually filed. Treas. Reg. § 26.2642-2(a)(2).
If a taxpayer timely allocates GST exemption to a life insurance trust, the gift of premium payments or a gift of
the policy is valued as ofthe date oftransfer. 86 Ifthe allocation ofGST exemption is made late to a life insurance trust, the
taxpayer must value the assets as ofthe date the return is filed (or as ofthe first day ofthe month in which the gift tax return
is filed, if so elected), unless the insured dies prior to the allocation. Id Significant savings of the GST exemption may
be obtained by allocating late, rather than allocating as of the actual date cash is contributed to the trust for the payment of
premiums. For permanent policies that have not been in force for a long period of time, the interpolated terminal reserve
value ofthe policy is often less than the premiums paid (see discussion above regarding the gift tax value of life insurance).
Because the life insurance policy may have a lower value than the premiums paid, it is not unusual to make "intentionally"
late allocations of GST exemption to life insurance trusts. However, if the insured dies prior to the date of late allocation,
the total policy proceeds will be included in the value of the trust assets for purposes of making the GST allocation.
F.
[12.931 Automatic Allocation of GST Exemption
Ifa taxpayer fails to affirmatively allocate his GST exemption on his gift tax or estate tax return, certain automatic
allocation rules will apply that are intended to limit the application of the GST tax. GST exemption is first allocated
automatically to lifetime transfers that are direct skips (e.g., grandparent to grandchild). IRC § 2632(b)( 1). Such automatic
allocation to lifetime gifts shall make the inclusion ratio for such property zero, if possible, otherwise, if such direct skip
exceeds such available GST exemption, the entire remaining GST exemption shall be allocated to the direct skip. Id
Next, the automatic allocation rules apply GST exemption to certain lifetime transfers to trusts that are not direct
skips. The automatic allocation rules were dramatically revised under the EGTRRA. The tax act provides for automatic
allocation of a taxpayer's "unused portion" of his or her GST exemption to property transferred by gift that is an indirect
skip in trust (i.e., a trust with at least one non-skip person; e.g., a son or daughter) to the extent necessary to cause the
property to have a zero inclusion ratio (and thus avoid the GST tax). IRC § 2632(c)(1). If the amount of the property
subject to the indirect skip exceeds the taxpayer's remaining GST exemption, then the entire remaining portion is allocated
to the transferred property. Id. This will result in an inclusion ratio between one and zero and may ultimately subject a
portion of the transferred property to the GST tax.
The "unused portion" of a taxpayer's GST exemption is that portion of their exemption which has not previously
been:
1) Allocated by the taxpayer;
2) Deemed allocated to lifetime gifts involving direct skips pursuant to § 2632(b) occurring during or
before the calendar year in which the indirect skip in trust is made; and
3) Deemed allocated to a prior indirect skip in trust pursuant to § 632(c). IRC § 2632(c)(2).
If the taxpayer has any GST exemption remaining at death, the automatic allocation rules next allocate the exemption to
direct skips taking place at the taxpayer's death. IRC § 2632(e)(1)(A). Lastly, the GST is then allocated to such trusts of
which the deceased taxpayer is the transferor and from which a taxable distribution or a taxable termination might occur at
or after such individual's death. IRe § 2632(e)(1)(B).
Although the automatic allocation rules will automatically apply to both direct skips and certain lifetime transfers
to GST trusts, a taxpayer may always elect out of the automatic allocation by filing an election on a gift tax return, Form
709.
G.
[12.941 Estate Tax Inclusion Period
Allocations of GST exemption to property subject to an estate tax inclusion period (ETIP) are not effective until
certain events occur. An ETIP is defined as the period during which should death occur, the value of transferred property
would be includible (other than by reason of § 2035) in the gross estate of the transferor (or in some cases, the spouse of
the transferor). Treas. Reg. 26.2632-1 (c)(2). In other words, an ETIP is a period that property transferred by the transferor
may be included in the transferor's estate should the transferor's death occur during the period. An example of such period
is the term set forth under a qualified personal residence trust or QPRT. A transferor may create a QPRT, transfer his
personal residence to the trust, and retain the right to use the residence for a certain period (e.g., 10 years). Ifthe transferor
dies within the period of retained used of the residence, the residence is included in the transferor's estate. This period
of possible inclusion in the transferor's estate is an ETIP. Thus, GST allocations to property subject to an ETIP are not
effective until the period of estate tax inclusion or ETIP has terminated. An allocation of GST exemption is effective at
E.
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the termination of the ETIP during the transferor's lifetime ifmade by the due date for filing the gift tax return that would
apply to a taxable gift occurring at the time the ETIP terminates. Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-1(c)(I). An ETIP terminates at the
earlier ofthe death ofthe transferor, the time in which no portion ofthe property is included in the transferor's gross estate,
or a generation-skipping transfer. Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-1 (c)(3).
An ETIP may be problematic for an irrevocable life insurance trust if the transferor's spouse is a Crummey
beneficiary under the trust. To avoid an ETIP inclusion of life insurance trust assets, the practitioner should be aware of
the "Spousal ETIP." A special exception was provided in the Regulations such that no ETIP will occur if the transferor's
spouse possesses a right to withdraw no more than the greater of $5,000 or five percent of the trust corpus and such
withdrawal right terminates no later than 60 days after the transfer to the trust. Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-1 (c)(2)(ii)(B).
Accordingly, when drafting an irrevocable life insurance trust the transferor's spouse's Crummey withdrawal right should
not exceed $5,000 or five percent ofthe trust corpus and should expires no later than 60 days following transfer to the trust.
If this rule is not followed, an ETIP will exist because of the spouse's Crummey withdrawal right.

H.

[12.951 Relief Provision
EGTRRA added a new retroactive GST allocation rule to relieve unfavorable GST tax consequences in the event
the transferor failed to allocate GST exemption to trusts that later have a taxable termination. The retroactive allocation
rule is applicable only in the narrow circumstance where a non-skip person (Le., child) with an interest in a GST trust dies
prior to the transferor, causing a taxable termination to a skip person (Le., grandchild). For example, transferor establishes
a trust for the benefit of his children and grandchildren and fails to allocate GST exemption to the trust because it is not
anticipated that a grandchild will receive distributions from the trust. A child of the transferor dies unexpectedly, leaving
the child's two surviving children (Le., grandchildren ofthe transferor) to receive a distribution from the trust, less any GST
tax due on termination. The retroactive rule eliminates the application of the GST tax in such unfortunate situations.
The rule provides retroactive allocation of GST in the event of an unnatural order ofdeath as long as the transferor
retains unused GST exemption if:
1)

a non-skip person has an interest or a future interest in a trust to which any transfer has been made,

2)

such person is a lineal descendant of a grandparent of the transferor or of a grandparent of the
transferor's spouse,

3)

such person is assigned to a generation below the generation assignment of the transferor, and

4)

such person dies before the transferor. IRC § 2632(d)(I).

The retroactive allocation is made on a timely filed gift tax return for the tax year including the non-skip person's
death. IRC § 2632(d)(2). The allocation is effective immediately before such death and the amount of GST exemption
to be allocated is determined by the amount of the transferor's unused GST exemption available immediately before the
non-skip person's death. IRC §§ 2632(d)(2)(B) & (C). The value ofthe property to be allocated to is determined as ifsuch
allocation had been made on a timely filed gift tax return (e.g., date of transfer value rather than date of allocation value).
IRC § 2632(d)(2)(A).

VIII.

[12.961 Kentucky Inheritance Taxation of Life Insurance
The Kentucky inheritance tax is levied against all real and personal property which passes by will or through
intestacy and intended to take effect at or after the death of the grantor or donor of the property. KRS 140.010. Under
KRS 140.020, all transfers made in contemplation of death, or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at death,
are subject to inheritance tax. A transfer of a material part of the donor's estate made within three years of his death is
prima facie evidence of the donor's intent to transfer the property in contemplation of death, and such property will be
subject to the inheritance tax unless this presumption can be overcome. Luckett v. Findley, 427 S.W.2d 240 (Ky. 1968).
Even transfers made beyond the three year window may be determined to be in contemplation of death and subject to the
inheritance tax. KRS 140.020(2).
Currently, Class A beneficiaries (parent, surviving spouse, child by blood, step child, adopted child, grandchild,
or full or half-siblings) that are devised or inherit property from the decedent are exempt from the inheritance tax. KRS
140.080(1)(c)(4). Class B beneficiaries (nephew, niece, aunt, uncle, daughter-in-law, son-in-law, great grandchild)
and Class C beneficiaries (all other beneficiaries and non-exempt organizations under KRS 140.060) are subject to the
inheritance tax whose maximum rate is currently 16%. KRS 140.080(1)(d) and (e).
Unlike the federal estate tax, Kentucky's inheritance tax does not attach to life insurance proceeds ifthey are paid
directly to designated beneficiaries (other than the insured or his estate) or a testamentary or inter vivos trustee even if the
decedent owned the policy prior to death. KRS 140.030(2). A "designated beneficiary" may be an individual or a trustee
as long as the ultimate recipient of the insurance proceeds is ascertainable. See Luckett v. First Nat'l Lincoln Bank, 409
S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1966). Conversely, all life insurance proceeds payable to the decedent or his estate will be subject to the
inheritance tax if Class B or C beneficiaries ultimately receive the proceeds. KRS 140.030(2). Thus, a decedent may own
an insurance policy and avoid incurring inheritance tax upon the proceeds as long as he designates a beneficiary other than
himself or his estate. Care should be taken in designating a beneficiary because a lapse in the designation (Le. death or
disclaimer) could possibly return the proceeds to the decedent or his estate unintentionally. However, proceeds paid under
any United States government life insurance policy or national service life insurance policy will be inheritance tax free
regardless of whether the decedent named a designated beneficiary or his estate as beneficiary. KRS 140.0303(2).
The Kentucky estate tax is levied against all estates equal to the amount of state death tax credit allowable under
federal tax law in excess of the Kentucky inheritance tax. KRS 140.130(1). This type of state estate tax is commonly
referred to as a "pick-up" tax, meaning that Kentucky receives any state death tax credit amount from the federal estate
tax return (to the extent it exceeds its inheritance tax). The federal estate tax rules determine the assets included in the
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gross estate and any state death tax credit calculated thereon. In addition, estate assets outside of Kentucky's jurisdiction
are prorated for state death tax credit purposes such that the estate tax payable to Kentucky represents the portion of assets
with a situs in the Commonwealth. Even though life insurance proceeds paid to beneficiaries other than the insured or his
estate will escape Kentucky inheritance tax, Kentucky estate tax may nonetheless be paid with respect to such proceeds,
where the proceeds are included in the insured's estate for federal estate tax purposes and the federal state death tax credit
exceeds the Kentucky inheritance tax.

IX.

[12.971 Creditor Protection for Life Insurance

Absent any fraudulent conveyances or consensual liens (such as collateral assignments), life insurance policies are
generally exempt from levy and attachment by creditors ofthe insured under Kentucky law. See KRS 304.14-340(1); KRS
304.14-300(1); KRS 427.110(1). The exemption extends generally to proceeds payable at the death of the insured debtor,
and to loan values and cash surrender values of any life insurance policies during the insured's life. Id; In re Worthington,
28 B.R. 736, 737 (Bankr. W.D. Ky., 1983). Moreover, life insurance policies are exempt even though the insured debtor
retains the right to change beneficiaries. KRS 304.14-300(1); In re Worthin2ton, at 738, citing In re Renaker, 295 F. 858
(E.D. Ky. 1923). Policies are also exempt whether the debtor is the insured or whether owned by the debtor but insuring
the life of another person. KRS 304.14-300(1). Notwithstanding, death proceeds payable to the debtor insured or debtor
insured's estate will be subject to the creditors of his or her estate. KRS 304.14-300(1).
While not expounded upon by the courts, it appears that, under Kentucky law, beneficiaries are protected not
only against creditors of the decedent, but also against their own creditors. Life insurance proceeds are exempt "from all
liability for any debt of the beneficiary existing at the time the policy is made available for (that beneficiary's) use." KRS
304.14-300(1). Thus, creditors should not be able to levy or attach the death proceeds payable to a beneficiary for debts
existing prior to his or her "use" of, or access to, the death proceeds. However, death proceeds should be protected from the
beneficiaries' creditors attributable to liabilities arising both before and after their access to the death proceeds if payable
to a properly drafted spendthrift trust.
Notwithstanding the above, in the event an "intent to defraud" creditors is found, the rights of creditors to the
death proceeds are limited by law. More particularly, if premiums on any policies are made with the intent to defraud the
insured's creditors, those creditors are only entitled to recover the premiums so paid, plus interest. KRS 304.14-300(1);
KRS 304.14-340(3). The beneficiaries should be entitled to the net death benefit (Le., after paying the creditors for
such premiums paid, plus interest). See Parks v. Parks Executors, 156 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ky. Ct. App. 1941). If there is no
showing of intent to defraud creditors, creditors should not be entitled to any recovery unless the proceeds are payable to
the debtor's estate.

X.

[12.981 Conclusion

As evidenced by the discussion above, life insurance is often an integral part of estate and business planning and
the applicable tax and non-tax rules concerning life insurance are numerous and complex. If care is taken following proper
planning, tremendous benefits can be achieved for the client though the use of life insurance.

XI.
1

[12.991 Endnotes

The secondary resources primarily relied upon in preparing this Chapter include:

Richard A. Schwartz and Catherine R. Turner, The Insurance Counselor: Life Insurance Due Care:
Carriers, Products, and Illustrations, 1 A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP. PROBe & T. (2d ed 1994).
Charles W Gallagher and Charles J. Ratner, The Insurance Counselor: Federal Income Taxation ofLife
Insurance, 2 A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP. PROBe & T. (2d ed 1999).
Kevin D. Millard, Lawrence Brody & Norman H Lane, The Insurance Counselor: Federal Gift, Estate,
and Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxation ofLife Insurance, 3 A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP. PROBe & T.
(2d ed 1998).
Louis A. Mezullo, An Estate Planner ~ Guide to Life Insurance, 2000 ABA SEC. REAL PROP. PROB. &
T.
Ben G. Baldwin, The Lawyer ~ Guide to Insurance: Personal Insurance Coverage for Professionals and
Their Clients, 1999 SEC. REAL PROP. PROBe & T.
HOWARD M ZARITZKY & STEPHEN R. LEIMBERG, TAX PLANNING WITH LIFE INSURANCE
(Warren, Gorham & Lamont, ed, 2d ed 1998 & Supp. 2003).
Beverly R. Budin, Tax Management Portfolio, Life Insurance, No. 826.
Lawrence Brody, Louis R. Richey and Richard C. Baeir, Tax Management Portfolio, Compensating
Employees With Insurance, No. 386-3rd
2 All references in this Chapter to the Internal Revenue Code, Code or IRC are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended. Any reference to a "section" or "§" is to the corresponding section of the Code unless otherwise stated.

3 A Private Letter Ruling of the Internal Revenue Service ("Priv. Ltr. Rul.") is issued by the IRS National Office in
response to a taxpayer's formal written request concerning the application of federal tax law to the particular facts and
circumstances of the taxpayer's proposed transaction. Private Letter Ruling are binding authority only upon the IRS and
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the taxpayer making the request, and may not be used or cited as precedent by other taxpayers. Notwithstanding, Private
Letter Rulings issued after October 31, 1976 may be relied upon by taxpayers to avoid a substantial understatement penalty
for a position taken on a tax return. Private Letter Rulings are not published by the IRS, but rather can be found through
most law service providers, such as Westlaw, Lexis-Nexis, etc.
Similar to a Private Letter Rule, a Technical Advice Memorandum of the Service ("Tech. Adv. Mem.") is issued
by the IRS National Office in response to an auditors' request for guidance arising from tax return examinations. Technical
Advice Memoranda are binding authority upon the IRS and the taxpayer subject to the examination, but may not be used
or cited as precedent by other taxpayers as provided under IRC § 6110(k)(3). As with Private Letter Rulings, Technical
Advice Memoranda issued after October 31,1976 may be relied upon by taxpayers to avoid a substantial understatement
penalty for a position taken on a tax return. Technical Advice Memoranda can also be found through most law service
providers, such as Westlaw, Lexis-Nexis, etc.
Unlike Private Letter Rulings and Technical Advice Memoranda, a Revenue Ruling ("Rev. Rul.") is binding
authority on all taxpayers and the IRS. In Revenue Rulings, the IRS applies the tax law to general or common factual
situations that taxpayers have presented, either through Private Letter Rulings, Technical Advice Memoranda, the courts
or otherwise. Provided that the facts in Revenue Rulings are substantially similar, any taxpayer may rely on them for
authority. They may also be used to avoid a substantial understatement penalty for a position taken on a tax return. They
are published weekly in the IRS' Internal Revenue Bulletin and then later in the semiannual Cumulative Bulletin and can
also be found through most law service providers.
Lifetime gifts can reduce wealth transfer taxes by eliminating entirely from the transfer tax base (i) those gifts that qualify
for the $11,000 annual gift tax exclusion (see IRC § 2503, discussed below); (ii) the appreciation in value (from the date of
the gift through the date of death) ofthe transferred assets; and (iii) any gift tax paid provided the donee survives for three
years following the date of the taxable gift (see IRC § 2503(b».
4

5 See discussion below of § 2035, where the death benefit from a policy on the donor's life given away within three years
of death is included in the donor's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.
6 Under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of2001 (EGTRRA), the estate tax is repealed in 2010.
However, under EGTRRA's sunset provisions, the estate tax returns in 2011. EGTRRA also provides for the gradual
reduction in the estate tax rates until repeal in 2010. The maximum estate tax rates will be reduced from 55% in 2001
to 45% in 2009 to 0% in 2010. IRC §§ 2019(c) and 2001(c). Further, the applicable credit amounts will be gradually
increasing until the repeal. In 2003, the credit amount was increased to $1,000,000. The credit amount will be increased
to $1,500,000 for years 2004 and 2005, $2,000,000 for years 2006 through 2008, and a final increase to $3,500,000 in
2009 before the applicable credit amount expires in 2010. The new tax act also provides that the step-up in basis rules for
decedent's dying in 2010 will be repealed. IRC § 1014(t). Persons who die between 2002 and 2009 will receive a step up
in basis as of the fair market value at the decedent's date of death. IRC § 1014. Person's dying in 2010 will be subject to
the carryover basis rules under IRC §1022. Thus, property received from a decedent dying in 2010 will have a tax basis
equal to the lesser ofthe decedent's tax basis or its fair market value as ofthe decedent's date of death. IRC § 1022(a)(2).
The new tax act also provides for two basis adjustments for certain types of property. Under IRC § 1022(b), a decedent's
property may be increased up to $1.3 million following the enactment of carryover basis. This does not mean that $1.3
million of assets will receive a stepped up basis, but rather the adjustment allows a decedent's representative to increase
the basis of property up to $1.3 million. A second basis adjustment is allowed for property passing to a surviving spouse.
Property of a decedent transferred to either a surviving spouse outright or to a QTIP trust may receive a basis adjustment
of$3.0 million. IRC § 1022(c). The basis adjustments may be combined for the benefit ofthe surviving spouse, such that
up to $4.3 million of basis adjustments may be made to property passing to the surviving spouse. IRC §§ 1022(b) and (c).
The opposite does not hold true for property passing to persons other than the surviving spouse; the $3.0 million adjustment
is allowed for spousal property only. IRC § 1022(c). These basis adjustments cannot be made to certain property including
items of income in respect of a decedent and property acquired by the decedent by gift within three years of death that
passes to the donor. IRC §§ 1022(d) and (t).

Although the federal estate tax is repealed by EGTRRA, the gift tax remains in place with minor changes. The
modifications to the gift tax include an increase in the applicable credit amount to $1,000,000 for all years, including 2010.
IRC §§ 2001(c) and 2505(a). The maximum gift tax rate is also reduced from 55% in 2001 to 35% in 2010, opening the
door for extensive gift planning before the sunset provisions return the gift tax to the pre-EGTRRA rates. The gift tax
credit amount is not adjusted upwards with the estate tax credit amount, such that the ''unified'' credit is a thing of the
past. Gifts made under the new tax act will continue to use the carryover basis rules of IRe § 1015. Recipients of donated
property will receive the donor's tax basis immediately prior to the gift for years 2002 through 2011. There are no special
carryover tax basis rules applicable to year 2011. New reporting requirements have also been instituted under the new tax
act. Beginning in 2010, donors filing gift tax returns are required to furnish written statements to each donee showing the
tax basis information of the donated gift. IRC § 6019.
Beneficiaries most often choose a lump sum payment of the death proceeds, since the proceeds are generally exempt
from federal and state income taxation (see discussion below). The beneficiaries may wish to receive the death proceeds
in installments for personal reasons (e.g., allow the insurance company to assume the risk in managing the money). An
annuity option may be best when the proceeds will be subject to federal or state income taxes because the policy was
transferred and violated the ''transfer for value" rule (discussed below). This should allow the beneficiary to defer income
taxes until receipt of the annuity payments.
7

8 For the·latest news regarding the insurance industry in Kentucky, see the Kentucky Department of Insurance web page
at <http://doi.ppr.ky.gov/kentucky>. Links are provided to many of the above referenced independent ratings services for
online research of potential carriers.

9

For in depth research of national insurance trends, visit the NAIC website at <http://www.naic.org/>.

10

KRS 422.130 creates a presumption of death after seven years of continued absence.
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11
One's basis for determining gain or loss (or "income tax basis") is governed by Subchapters 0 (general rules for
determining basis and gain or loss from the sale or other disposition ofproperty), C (relating to corporate distributions) and
P (relating to capital gains and losses) of Chapter 1, Subtitle A (Income Taxes) of the Code.

12 Unlike IRC § 1015, § 1014(b) provides that the transfer of property between spouses (or former spouses) incident to a
divorce is deemed to be a gift and the transferee takes the transferor's basis, even where the transferee gives consideration
in excess ofthe transferor's basis in the property.
13 The owner of a life insurance policy is not personally liable for a loan against the cash value of the policy made by the
insurance company. Thus, a policy loan is a type of nonrecourse debt.
14

A person's basis in a life insurance policy is generally the premiums paid, as discussed below.

15 Under IRC §§ 671-678 (so called grantor trust rules), where a person has certain powers over or interests in a trust, the
trust may be ignored for federal income tax purposes and the tax attributes of the trust will be attributed to such person.

16 The federal gift tax applies to gifts of real, personal, tangible or intangible property, whether such gifts are direct or
indirect, made in trust or otherwise. IRC § 2511 (a); Treas. Reg. § 25 .2511-1 (a). The gift tax only applies to a transfer of a
beneficial interest in property and not to a transfer of bare legal title to a trustee. It does not apply to a transfer for full and
adequate consideration or to an ordinary business transaction (Le., a transaction which is bona fide, at arm's length and free
from donative intent). Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(I); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8.

17 A gift is a transfer of property made without full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth. IRC §
2512(b). Love and affection, promise of marriage, etc., are not consideration in money or money's worth. Neither is a
relinquishment or promised relinquishment of dower or courtesy or of a statutory estate in lieu of dower or courtesy or of
other marital rights in the spouse's property or estate. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8. The Service interprets the gift tax law such
that a transfer will constitute a gift to the extent the value ofthe property transferred exceeds the value ofthe consideration,
irrespective of whether there is donative intent on the part of the transferor. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (g)(1). The courts
generally require that the following property law elements of a gift be present before there can be a gift for tax purposes: an
intention on the part ofthe donor to make a gift; delivery by the donor ofthe property constituting the gift; and acceptance
of the gift by the donee.
18 The gift tax is not applicable to transfers by corporations or persons other than individuals. IRe § 2501(a); Treas. Reg.
§ 25.0-1(b). A transfer of property without consideration by a corporation to an individual is a gift to such individual
from the stockholders of the corporation. If the donee is himself a stockholder, the transfer is a gift to him from the other
stockholders to the extent it exceeds the donee's interest in such amount as a stockholder. A transfer without consideration
by an individual to a corporation is generally a gift by the donor to the stockholders of the corporation. This rule may not
apply, however, if the donee corporation is a charitable, public or similar organization. Transfers to these organizations
may qualify for the gift tax charitable deduction, discussed below. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(I).
19 Where property is transferred (in trust or otherwise) and the donor reserves any power over its disposition, the gift may
be wholly incomplete or partially complete and partially incomplete, depending upon the facts ofthe particular case. A gift
is incomplete in every instance where the donor reserves the power to revest the beneficial title to the property in himself.
A gift is also incomplete if and to the extent that a reserved power gives the donor the power to name new beneficiaries or
to change the interests of the beneficiaries as between themselves unless the power is a fiduciary power limited by a fixed
or ascertainable standard. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a)-(c).

20

The Regulations illustrate gifts in connection with life insurance as follows:

If the insured purchases a life insurance policy, or pays a premium on a previously issued policy, the
proceeds ofwhich are payable to a beneficiary or beneficiaries other than his estate, and with respect
to which the insured retains no reversionary interest in himselfor his estate and no power to revest the
economic benefits in himselfor his estate or to change the beneficiaries or their proportionate benefits
(or if the insured relinquishes by assignment, by designation ofa new beneficiary or otherwise, every
such power that was retained in a previously issued policy), the insured has made a gift ofthe value of
the policy, or to the extent ofthe premium paid, even though the right ofthe assignee or beneficiary to
receive the benefits is conditioned upon his surviving the insured.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(8).
There is a completed taxable gift even though the donor may die within three years, causing the policy to be included in
the donor's gross estate under IRC § 2035 (discussed below). Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-33-001.
21

There is a completed taxable gift even though, under the terms ofthe trust, the policy proceeds will be paid to the donor's
estate or revocable trust in the event the policy proceeds are included in the donor's estate under § 2036 (discussed below).
Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-33-001.

22

23 The willing-buyer willing-seller test was difficult to apply, since state law has always restricted the buying and selling
of life insurance policies except to persons that have an insurable interest. See discussion below under Gift Tax Charitable
Deduction.

For many years now, viatical and settlement companies have been buying life insurance policies from the terminally ill
and elderly. The prices paid for such policies, for which further premiums are generally due, often exceed their value for
estate and gift tax purposes as determined under the Regulations. It is not yet known what effect, if any, this secondary
market will have on the valuation of life insurance policies for transfer tax purposes. See Neil Alexander & Jon J. Gallo,
"The Effect of the Secondary Market on the Valuation of Life Insurance Contracts," 14 Probe & Prop. 53 (July/August
2001).
24

25

The valuation of life insurance is addressed in the Regulations as follows:
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The value ofa life insurance contract ... issued by a company regularly engaged in the selling ofcontracts
ofthat character is established through the sale ofthe particular contract by the company, or through
the sale by the company ofcomparable contracts. As valuation ofan insurance policy through sale of
comparable contracts is not readily ascertainable when the gift is ofa contract which has been in force
for some time and on which further premium payments are to be made, the value may be approximated
by adding to the interpolated terminal reserve at the date ofthe gift the proportionate part ofthe gross
premium last paid before the date of the gift which covers the period extending beyond that date. If,
however, because ofthe unusual nature ofthe contract such approximation is not reasonably close to the
full value, this method may not be used
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6(a). The estate tax regulations read basically the same as discussed below. See Treas. Reg. §
20.2031-8(a)(2).
The Court in Allen addressed a situation where the settlor of an irrevocable trust had reserved a three-fifths income
interest for her life. The settlor later sold the income interest within three years of her death to her son in an attempt to
avoid, upon her death, inclusion in her gross estate of her attributable share of the trust corpus. The son paid his mother
an amount equal to the actuarial value of her life estate in the trust. The Court concluded, however, that the consideration
to be adequate for purposes of removing the income interest from her estate, must be equal to the value of the interest
which would otherwise have been included in her estate. The Court concluded, interpreting § 811 of the 1939 Code (the
predecessor of § 2035(d)), that tax liability arises at the time ofthe inter vivos transfer under which there was a retention of
the right to income for life. The disposition thereafter of the retained right does not eliminate the tax liability and the fact
that full and adequate consideration was paid for the transfer of the retained life estate is immaterial. To remove the trust
property from inclusion in the decedent's estate, there must be full and adequate consideration paid for the interest which
would be taxed. That interest is not the right to income for life, but the right to the property which was placed in the trust
and from which the income is produced.
26

27 The Service said it recognized that ''the amount paid to the A and B Trusts may not be included in the gross estate of
the taxpayer or his spouse at their respective deaths. Accordingly, these amounts would not ordinarily constitute adequate
consideration for purposes of § 2035. See Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945), which holds that "consideration constitutes
'adequate consideration' for estate and gift tax purposes only if the consideration.flows to the transferor and enhances
the transferor's net estate. Under the unique facts of the present case, the consideration paid for the policies was subject
to transfer tax when the funds were transferred to the A and B Trusts. Accordingly, these amounts are reflected in the
taxpayer's and spouse's transfer tax base. Under these circumstances, the adequate consideration requirement is satisfied
in this case."

However, an unrestricted right to the immediate use, possession or enjoyment ofproperty or the income from property (such
as a life estate or a term certain that begins immediately) is a present interest in property, a gift of which will qualify for the
annual exclusion. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2503-3(b) & (c).

28

29 A gift to an individual who is under 21 years of age will not be considered a gift of a future interest in property, if the
property and the income therefrom may be expended by or for the benefit of the donee before he becomes 21 years old; will
to the extent not so expended pass to the donee on his becoming 21 years old; and in the event he dies before becoming
such age, be payable to his estate or as he may appoint under a general power of appointment. IRC § 2503(c); Treas. Reg. §
25.2503-4. It is permissible for the trustee to have discretion to determine what amounts, ifany, of income and principal are
to be expended for the minor. Id. However, there can be no substantial restrictions on the trustee's discretion and the purpose
for which distributions can be made cannot be too narrow. Id. It is also not necessary for the trust to automatically terminate
at age 21, ifthe minor can compel its termination at that age. Rev. RuI. 74-43, 1974-1 C.B. 285. Under the foregoing rules, a
transfer of property for the benefit of a minor under either the Uniform Transfers (or Gifts) to Minors Act is considered to be
a completed gift of a present interest in property that qualifies for the annual exclusion.

30 A gift made by one spouse to any person other than his spouse will be considered as made one-halfby him and one-half
by his spouse (i) if at the time of the gift each spouse is a U.S. citizen or resident, and (ii) ifboth spouses have signified their
consent to gift-split in the case of all gifts made during the calendar year by either spouse while married to the other. IRC §
2513(a). An individual is considered the spouse of another only ifhe is married to such individual at the time ofthe gift and
does not remarry during the remainder of the calendar year. IRC § 2513(a)(l). The required consent to gift-split is usually
made on the gift tax return for the year the gift was made. Treas. Reg. § 25.2513-2. The consent may be signified at any time
after the close of the calendar year in which the gift was made, but such consent may not be signified after April 15th of the
year following the year in which the gift was made, if one of the spouses filed a gift tax return prior to that time without the
consent of both spouses (otherwise must signify on first return filed after April 15th); also the spouses can't signify consent
after issuance of a notice of gift tax deficiency under IRC § 6212(a) for the year of the gift. IRC § 2513(b). Consent can be
revoked ifthe revocation is before April 15 ofthe year following the year ofthe gift. A consent made after April 15th of such
year cannot be revoked. IRC § 2513(c); Treas. Reg. § 25.2513-3.
31 Gift-splitting is not permitted with respect to a gift of an interest in property if the donor creates in his spouse a general
power of appointment (as defined in IRC § 2514(c)) over such interest. IRe § 2513(a)(l).
32 See also Rev. Rul. 72-333, 1972-2 C.B. 530 (hybrid estate trust and life income with general power of appointment trust
qualifies for marital deduction); but see Revenue Ruling 75-128, 1975-1 C.B. 308 (similar trust did not qualify).

For estates of decedents dying on or before December 31, 1981, the estate tax marital deduction was limited to the
greater of $250,000 or fifty percent ofthe value ofthe adjusted gross estate. IRC § 2056(c) before its repeal by Pub. L. 9734, § 403(a)(l )(A). Even under the unlimited marital deduction regime, there can still be considerable transfer tax benefits
when spouses own insurance on one another and they die simultaneously. See Estate of Goodwin v. U.S., 430 F.2d 392
(6th Cir. 1970), discussed below.
33

For example, under Kentucky law, a person may insure his own life and name any person as beneficiary. KRS 304.14040(2). However, no person shall procure insurance on the life of another unless the proceeds are payable to the insured

34
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or to a person having an insurable interest in the insured at the time of purchase of the contract. KRS 304.14-040(2). If
this rule is violated, the insured's personal representative may institute an action to recover the death proceeds from the
beneficiary, assignee or other payee of the proceeds. KRS 304.14-040(3).
35 In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-10-016, the taxpayer requested a ruling on, among other things, whether a gift tax charitable
deduction would be permitted if the taxpayer purchased a policy on his life and then transferred the policy to a qualified
charitable organization. Because at the time New York law did not provide that charitable organizations had an insurable
interest in a private individual donor, the Service ruled that the gift of the policy was a gift of a partial interest, and thus
nondeductible, because the donee/insured's estate could sue the charity to recover the death benefit, which event was
not so unlikely as to be negligible. New York subsequently amended its Insurance Code to provide that an insured may
immediately transfer a newly purchased life insurance policy to a person without an insurable interest. Accordingly, that
ruling was revoked by Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-47-040.
36 Where the beneficiary receives insurance proceeds in her individual capacity but is incidentally appointed as executor,
the proceeds are not included in the insured/decedent's gross estate under § 2042(1). Estate ofFriedburg v. Commissioner,
T.C.M.1992-310.

37 In First Kentucky Trust, the insured's husband purchased policies on his wife naming himself as beneficiary. The
husband was convicted of feloniously killing his wife and, under KRS 381.280, the proceeds were forfeited by him and
his estate (the contingent beneficiary under the policy). The forfeiture statute caused the proceeds to pass directly to the
residuary beneficiary under the wife's will. The court stated that inclusion under § 2042(1) was proper even though the
insurance proceeds passed directly to the residuary beneficiary, because (under the court's construction of the forfeiture
statute) the proceeds were payable to the insured's executor for distribution and would have been subject to claims against
the insured's estate. The court noted that had the residuary beneficiary been the husband, in which case the proceeds would
have passed to the wife's intestate heirs, the proceeds would nevertheless have been included under § 2042(1), because
under KRS 391.030(1) the proceeds would have been subject to claims against the insured's estate.
38 The amount of the loan outstanding at the date of the decedent's death, with interest accrued to that date, may be
deductible in determining the taxable estate under § 2053. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(b).
39 To determine whether the reversionary interest immediately before the death of the decedent has a value that exceeds
five percent of the value of the policy, one applies the principles of Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2037-1(c)(3) & (4). Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2042-1(c)(3). In so doing, one takes into account "any incidents of ownership held by others immediately before
the decedent's death which would affect the value of the reversionary interest. For example, the decedent would not be
considered to have a reversionary interest in the policy of a value in excess of 5 percent if the power to obtain the cash
surrender value existed in some other person immediately before the decedent's death and was exercisable by such other
person alone and in all events." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(3). In Rev. Rul. 79-117, 1979-1 C.B. 305, husband transferred
a policy on his life to wife. Wife named herself as primary qeneficiary and designated the contingent beneficiary to be
those persons whom husband designated in his will. The Service noted that the Regulations "require that two conditions
must be met if a reversionary interest is to be treated as an incident of ownership in an insurance policy. First, the interest
must, immediately before the decedent's death, have a value that exceeds 5 percent of the value of the policy. Second,
the interest must characteristically involve the current absence of the decedent's ownership coupled with the possibility of
the decedent's future possession of the policy or its proceeds or a power of disposition over the policy or proceeds. In the
present case, the decedent's spouse, B, continued to hold the sole power to change the policy beneficiary up to the time of
D's death. In addition, in order for D's interest to become fully vested, D would have needed to survive B." The Service
held that no amount was includible in the gross estate ofD under § 2042, because the value of D's reversionary interest did
not exceed 5 percent ofthe value ofthe policy immediately before the death ofD. See Rev. Rul. 76-113, 1976-1 C.B. 276;
Rev. Rul. 60-160, 1960-1 C.B. 374; GCM 37397 (Jan. 30, 1978)
40 In Estate of Noel, husband signed applications for insurance on his life at the airport before boarding his plane naming
wife as beneficiary, who had paid the premiums on the policies. Husband then instructed the sales clerk to "give them to
my wife. They are hers now, I no longer have anything to do with them." Estate ofNoel, 380 U.S. 679-680. The clerk gave
them to wife and three hours later husband was killed in a plane crash. The Court held that because the insurance contracts
granted husband the power to assign the policies or make a beneficiary change, powers which husband had not endorsed on
the contract over to wife, husband held an incident of ownership and the proceeds were includable in his gross estate. Id.
41 Similarly, in Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company, father purchased, paid all of the premiums, and kept continuous
possession of a policy on son's life that gave only son the power to assign the policy or change beneficiary, even though
father and son always considered the father to be the owner of the policy. The Court held that the policy was includable
in son's gross estate, noting that relying on the feelings or actions of the decedent would create a subjective standard that
would be difficult and costly to administer. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company, 355 F.2d 7.

42 In Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-51-004, corporate resolutions were adopted and an irrevocable trust and a split-dollar agreement
were executed, all in 1987, to carry out a split-dollar life insurance plan with respect to existing policies ofthe corporation
on the life of one of its directors. Unfortunately, the change of ownership of the policies from the corporation to the
irrevocable trust was overlooked and not effected on the books of the insurance company until 1991. The insured died in
1992. The Service, based on the strong documentary evidence and state law, held that the policies were not included in the
insured's estate under § 2035 (discussed below), even though the insured died within three years of the date of the actual
change of ownership of the policies on the books of the insurance company.
43 See National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 773 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (To avoid complications which might
cause him to lose the sale, the insurance agent had the insured sign the application form in blank, and later filled in the
form, providing that some of the incidents of ownership vested in the insured, contrary to the intention of the insured and
her son, the intended owner of the policy; proceeds not includable in insured's estate.); Watson v. Commissioner, T.C.M.
1977-268 (Insurance policies were purchased to fund a partnership cross purchase buy sell agreement. The insurance
agent mistakenly designated each insured as the owner of the policy insuring his life, instead of designating the insured's
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partner as the owner, who was to receive the proceeds to buyout the deceased insured/partner. Proceeds not includable in
insured's estate.)

See Estate of Beauregard v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 603 (1980), acq. 1981-2 C.B. 1. (Decedent and his ex-wife had
entered into a property settlement agreement, the terms of which were incorporated into the divorce decree. Under the
decree the decedent was required to maintain his minor children as beneficiaries in connection with any group accident
and health policies. Under California law, the court order divested insured decedent of all incidents of ownership in his
employer's travel accident policy covering the decedent, and its proceeds were not includable in the decedent's gross
estate.)

44

45

See Fuchs Estate v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 199 (1966), acq. 1967-1 C.B. 2; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-10-069.

In Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1981-2000 (1981), the insured's corporation purchased a policy on
his life. The corporation was designated the owner and beneficiary of the policy, with all rights with respect to the policy
being vested in the owner corporation. Two years later, the corporation and the insured entered into a separate agreement
whereby the insured obtained the legal right, exercisable in conjunction with the corporation, to change the beneficiary
of the policy. The insured's estate alleged that this agreement was only to facilitate the insured, his corporation and his
irrevocable trust in entering into a split-dollar arrangement. Since the split-dollar agreement had been implemented (more
than three years prior to his death), the insured no longer held the right to name a beneficiary of the policy. The court
disagreed and held that the insured/decedent possessed an incident of ownership at the time of death and the policy was
includable in his gross estate.
46

47

Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(a)(3); Rev. Rul. 79-129, 1979-1 C.B. 306.

48 The Regulations include the example of where a decedent purchased a policy of insurance on his life with community
property funds, designated his son as beneficiary, but retained the right to surrender the policy. Treas. Reg. § 20.20421(c)(5).

The Regulation notes that under local law the insurance policy and proceeds are community property and that,
only when the son receives the proceeds on the insured's death, will the wife's transfer ofher one-half interest in the policy
be considered absolute. If wife predeceases the insured/husband, one-half of the value of the policy will be included in
her gross estate. Accordingly, ''the power of surrender possessed by the decedent as agent for his wife with respect to onehalf of the policy is not, for purposes ofthis section, an 'incident of ownership', and the decedent is, therefore, deemed to
possess an incident of ownership in only one-half of the policy." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(5).
49

Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2).

50 In Rev. Rul. 72-307, 1972-1 C.B. 307, modifying Rev. Rul. 69-54, 1969-1 C.B. 221, the insured irrevocably assigned all
of his rights under his group term insurance coverage provided by his employer. The insured could cancel his insurance
coverage by terminating his employment. The Service noted that the power to cancel the insurance was a collateral
consequence of the power that every employee has to terminate his employment. The Service found that the examples in
the Regulations of an incident of ownership concerned powers that directly affect the insurance policy or the payment of
its proceeds without potentially costly related consequences. Accordingly, the Service held that where the power to cancel
an insurance policy is exercisable only by terminating employment, it will not be deemed to be an incident of ownership
in the policy.

51 Sole owner of corporation enters into option agreement with key employee, permitting key employee to purchase stock
of owner upon his death. Key employee establishes irrevocable trust which is owner and beneficiary of life insurance on
owner's life. At owner's death, independent trustee of trust will distribute funds to key employee for purchase by him of
owner's stock. Option agreement terminates ifcorporation (controlled by owner) terminates employment ofkey employee,
and life insurance on owner will be distributed from key employee's trust to an irrevocable trust establish by owner for
his family. If corporation terminates key employee's employment without cause, option agreement ends and corporation
must provide severance pay to key employee who will no longer be subject to non-compete agreement with corporation.
The ruling notes that the loss of the key employee's beneficiary status-under the policy is collateral to any cancellation
of the option agreement or termination of his employment contract without cause. "Only as a collateral effect would the
[owner's] termination of [key employee's] employment change the beneficiary of the insurance policy. Accordingly, we
conclude that the [insured/owner] will not hold any incidents of ownership for purposes of § 2042 with respect to any life
insurance policies owned by the insurance trust by reason of his ability to terminate [key employee's] employment." Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 94-21-037.

52 In Rev. Rul. 79-129, 1979-1 C.B. 306, the proceeds of a life insurance policy were payable to a decedent's estate to the
extent of the policy's cash surrender value, less any outstanding indebtedness, and the balance was payable to the trustee
of an irrevocable funded insurance trust, which was created by the decedent and which owned the policy and paid that
portion of the annual premium that exceeded the annual increase in the cash surrender value. All contract rights under the
policy were exercisable by the trustee except for decedent's right, never exercised, to borrow against the cash surrender
value. The proceeds payable to the estate are includible in the gross estate under IRC § 2042(1) and the balance of the
death benefit paid to the irrevocable trust was includible in the insured's gross estate under § 2042(2).

Also, if the decedent "created the trust, such a power may result in the inclusion in the decedent's gross estate under
§ 2036 or § 2038 of other property transferred by the decedent to the trust it: for example, the decedent has the power to
surrender the insurance policy and if the income otherwise used to pay premiums on the policy would become currently
payable to a beneficiary of the trust in the event that the policy were surrendered." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(4).
53

54 In Rev. Rul. 84-17, 1984-2 C.B. 1949, the question was whether the insured/decedent possessed incidents of ownership
in an insurance policy where the decedent transferred all incidents of ownership to another person who, in an unrelated
transaction, transferred the policy in trust and, at death, the decedent/insured was a trustee with discretionary powers
which, although broad, could not be exercised for the decedent's personal benefit. The Service held that the decedent will
not be considered to possess incidents of ownership in the policy, provided that the decedent did not furnish consideration
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for maintaining the policy and could not exercise the trust powers for his personal benefit. The Service noted the result
would be the same where the decedent, as trustee, purchased the policy on his life with trust assets, did not contribute assets
to the trust or maintain the policy with personal assets, and could not exercise the powers for his personal benefit.
55 This position is consistent with decisions by several courts of appeal. See Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d
699 (2d Cir. 1972); Estate ofFruehaufv. Commissioner, 427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970); Hunter v. United States, 624 F.2d 833
(8th Cir. 1980). But see Terribeny v. United States, 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976); and
Rose v. United States, 511 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975), which held to the contrary.
56

This is consistent with the holdings Estate of Fruehauf and Estate ofSkifter, supra.

57 Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-2 C.B. 191, provides that a decedent-grantor's reservation of an unqualified power to remove a
trustee and appoint an individual or corporate successor trustee that is not related or subordinate to the decedent (within
the meaning ofIRC § 672(c)) is not considered a reservation of the trustee's discretionary powers of distribution over the
property transferred by the decedent-grantor to the trust. In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-07-008, the Service indicated that it will
apply the same rule to beneficiaries of a trust having the power to remove the trustee in determining whether they have a
general power of appointment over the trust.
58 See Andrew J. Fair, Planning With Plans: Qualified Plans and Life Insurance, 27 PRACTICAL TAX LAWYER 27 at
33-35 (Summer 1984); Budin, 826 T.M., Life Insurance at A-58.

59 The Jordahl court concluded: "We cannot imagine, and the Commissioner does not suggest, a way in which decedent
could have reacquired a policy in the trust without substituting an almost identical policy, for the requirement of equal
value would seem to demand equal.cash surrender and face value, comparable premiums, and a similar form of policy.
Decedent's power to reacquire was, in effect, a power to exchange at arm's length. Decedent could not have deprived
any beneficiary of an interest or have increased his own share in the trust or in the policies. Decedent may have had the
power to reacquire specific policies, but he did not, until reacquisition, possess incidents of ownership in them, for any
reacquisition would have required the surrender of nearly identical policies and of nearly identical incidents. To recover
any of the benefits of the policies, decedent would have had to surrender comparable benefits. Certainly such power, in
effect to purchase the policies, cannot be considered an 'incident ofownership.' And certainly the possession ofsuch a right
to substitute cannot be seen as a right to the 'economic benefits of the policy.' ... Accordingly, we hold that decedent's
power to substitute policies 'of equal value' cannot be considered an incident of ownership." Jordahl, 65 T.C. at 100.

60 The Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (UTMA) effectively superseded the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA)
on July 15, 1986. KRS 385.242. Any transfer prior to this date is validated not withstanding that there was no specific
authority in UGMA for the coverage of custodial property of that kind or for a transfer from that source at the time the
transfer was made. KRS 385.222(1).
61

Life insurance is a proper investment by custodians under UTMA if the life insurance policy is:

1)

on the life ofthe minor only ifthe minor or the minor s estate is the sole beneficiary, or

2)

on the life of another person in whom the minor the minor has an insurable interest only to the
extent that the minor, the minor s estate, or the custodian in the capacity ofcustodian, is the
irrevocable beneficiary. KRS 385.122(3).
62 The UTMA custodian may expend for the minor's benefit so much ofthe property as the custodian considers advisable
for the use and benefit of the minor, without court order and without regard to the duty of the custodian personally or of
any other person to support the minor or any other income or property of the minor which may be applicable or available
for that purpose. KRS 385.142(1). On petition of any interested person (or the minor ifthe minor has attained age 14), the
court may order the custodian to pay to the minor or expend on behalf of the minor so much of the property as the court
considers advisable for the use and benefit ofthe minor. KRS 385.142(2). Any payment under KRS 385.142 is in addition
to and not a substitution for and does not affect any obligation ofa person to support the minor. KRS 385.142(3).
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f), which addresses when the proceeds of certain life insurance policies shall be considered
in determining the value of the decedent's stock in a closely held corporation. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6).

63

64 Stock held by the decedent's spouse is not attributed to the decedent, unless the spouse was holding it as an agent or
nominee of the decedent. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-37-012.

Rev. Rul. 82-13, 1982-1 C.B. 132, notes that the employee reported the premium payments by the company as income
to the employee followed by a gift from the employee to the donee of the policy as required by Rev. Rul. 76-490, 1976-2
C.B. 300. In Rev. Rul. 76-490, life insurance premiums were voluntarily paid by an employer with respect to a group term
policy held by an irrevocable trust created by an employee; each time a premium was paid by the employer additional
compensation was conferred on the employee. By irrevocably assigning the insurance policy to the trust and continuing
participation in the group term life insurance contract, the employee caused the economic benefit of this additional
compensation to inure to the beneficiaries ofthe trust as each payment was made, which was subject to gift tax as indirect
transfers by the employee except to the extent they qualified as a gift of a present interest for purposes of the annual
exclusion.
65

66 However, only the death benefit amount should be included in the decedent's estate, since the cash value or interpolated
terminal reserve value of the policy otherwise included under § 2033 is part ofthe death benefit amount.

Under the Michigan Simultaneous Death Act, the proceeds of the policy were to be distributed as if the insured had
survived the beneficiary. The court noted that even ''though state property law governs the devolution of the proceeds, it
is not necessarily determinative of federal estate tax liability. Thus the fact that the Simultaneous Death Act treats Mrs.
Goodwin as having predeceased her husband is not decisive here. The economic realities, not state property law rules,
control. Cf Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 118 (6th Cir. 1970)."
67

68

The court pointed out that had husband died first, the value of the policy in wife's estate would have been it's death
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benefit; and had wife died first, the value of the policy in wife's estate. would have been its interpolated terminal reserve
value plus unearned premium, since the policy had been in force for some time and further premiums were to be made
(citing Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a)(2)). The district court had held that the value of the policy was zero, because at the
time of wife's death no one would have paid her anything for her interest in the policy since her interest had vested in her
children as alternate beneficiaries. Old Kent Bank & Trust Co., 430 F.2d 392.
69 In Wien, Georgia law provided that in the case of simultaneous death , the insured was deemed to have survived the
beneficiary of the policy.
70

The court in Wien further noted:

Moreover, we think the Supreme Court has rejected such individual ad hoc determinations. In
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Noel [discussed above], the decedent purchased insurance
policies on his own life and delivered them to his wife before embarking on afatal airplanefight. The
taxpayer argued that the proceeds should not be included in the decedents estate under LR.C. Section
2042 (2), since under the peculiar circumstances the deceased could not possibly have exercised his
ownership rights in the policies. The Court rejected this argument, saying:
Obviously, there was no practical opportunity for the decedent to assign the policies
or change the beneficiary between the time he boarded the plane and the time he
died That time was too short and his wife had the policies in her possession at home.
These circumstances disabled him for the moment from exercising those 'incidents of
ownership' over the policies which were undoubtedly his. Death intervened before
this temporary disability was removed But the same could be said about a man
owning an ordinary life insurance policy who boarded the plane at the same time or
for that matter about any man s exercise ofownership over his property while aboard
an airplane in the three hours before a fatal crash. It would stretch the imagination
to think that Congress intended to measure estate tax liability by an individual s
fluctuating, day-by-day, hour-by-hour capacity to dispose of property which he
owns. We hold that estate tax liabilityfor policies 'with respect to which the decedent
possessed at his death any ofthe incidents ofownership' depends on a general, legal
power to exercise ownership, without regard to the owner s ability to exercise it at a
particular moment. * * *
71 Section 2036(a) provides that the value of a decedent's gross estate shall include the value of all property of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in the case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for life or for any period not ascertainable
without reference to his death or for any period that does not in fact end before his death-(l) the possession of: enjoyment
ot: or the right to the income from, the property, or (2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate
the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property, or the income therefrom.

Section 2037(a) provides that the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of any interest therein
of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in the case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, where (1) possession or enjoyment of the property
can, through ownership of such interest, be obtained only by surviving the decedent, and (2) the decedent has retained a
reversionary interest in the property, the value of which (immediately before the decedent's death) exceeds five percent of
the value of such property.
72

73 Section 203 8(a)( 1) provides that the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in the case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date
of his death to any change through the exercise of a power (in whatever capacity exercisable) by the decedent alone or in
conjunction with any other person (without regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired the power) to alter,
amend, revoke or terminate, or where any such power is relinquished during the three year period ending on the date of
the decedent's death.

74 Alaska or Delaware trusts are self-settled trusts (i.e., the settlor names himself as a beneficiary), where the settlor/
beneficiary (by specially enacted statutes) is afforded creditor protection under the trust's spendthrift provisions. See Del.
Code Ann. tit. 12, §§ 3571 and 3572; Alaska Stat. § 34.40.110. Missouri, Nevada, and Rhode Island have enacted similar
statutes. Under Kentucky law (see KRS 381.180(7)), as in most states, self-settled trusts afford no protection to a settlor/
beneficiary from his creditors. While the Service has ruled that gifts to an Alaska trust are completed gifts, it has not ruled
on whether the trust assets would be includible in the settlor/beneficiary's gross estate at his death. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9837007.
Case law interpreting these statutory self-settled trusts is yet to evolve.
75 Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(3) provides that "if the decedent reserved the unrestricted power to remove or discharge a
trustee at any time and appoint himself as trustee, the decedent is considered as having the powers of the trustee."

Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) provides that "if the decedent had the unrestricted power to remove or discharge a trustee at
any time and appoint himself trustee, the decedent is considered as having the powers of the trustee. However, this result
would not follow if he only had the power to appoint himself trustee under limited conditions which did not exist at the
time of his death."
76

77 The term "related or subordinate party" means any "nonadverse party" who is (i) the grantor's spouse if living with the
grantor, or (ii) anyone of the following: the grantor's father, mother, issue, brother or sister; an employee of the grantor; a
corporation or any employee of a corporation in which the stock holdings of the grantor and the trust are significant from
the viewpoint of voting control; or a subordinate employee of a corporation in which the grantor is an executive. IRC §
672(c). A nonadverse party is a person who is not an adverse party. IRe § 672(b). An "adverse party" means any person
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having a substantial beneficial interest in the trust which would be adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise ofthe
power which he possesses respecting the trust. A person having a general power of appointment over the trust property
shall be deemed to have a beneficial interest in the trust. IRC § 672(a).
78 A "general power of appointment" is a power which is exercisable for the benefit of the power holder, his estate, his
creditors, or the creditors of his estate. See IRC §§ 2041(b)(1) & 2514(c)(1). The Regulations provide that:

A "power ofappointment" includes all powers which are in substance and effect powers ofappointment
regardless of the nomenclature used in creating the power and regardless of local property law
connotations. For example, if a trust instrument provides that the beneficiary may appropriate or
consume the principal of the trust, the power to consume or appropriate is a power of appointment.
Similarly, a power given to a decedent to affect the beneficial enjoyment of trust property or its
income by altering, amending, or revoking the trust instrument or terminating the trust is a power of
appointment. ... A power in a donee to remove or discharge a trustee and appoint himselfmay be a
power ofappointment. For example, if under the terms ofa trust instrument, the trustee or his successor
has the power to appoint the principal ofthe trust for the benefit of individuals including himself, and
the decedent has the unrestrictedpower to remove or discharge the trustee at any time and appoint any
other person including himself, the decedent is considered as having a power ofappointment. However,
the decedent is not considered to have a power of appointment if he only had the power to appoint a
successor, including himself, under limited conditions which did not exist at the time ofhis death, without
an accompanying unrestrictedpower ofremoval.

Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(b)(1).
Under IRC § 2056(b), the estate tax marital deduction is not allowed for an interest in property that passes to the surviving
spouse that constitutes a "nondeductible terminable interest." Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(a)2, 20.2056(b)-1. A ''terminable
interest" is an interest in property that terminates or fails on the lapse of time or on the occurrence (or the failure to occur)
of some contingency. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-1 (b). Examples of terminable interests include life estates, terms for
years, annuities, patents, and copyrights. Id. A nondeductible terminable interest is a terminable interest where (i) another
interest in the same property passed from the decedent to some other person (other than the estate ofthe surviving spouse)
for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, and (ii) by reason of its passing, the other
person (or his heirs or assigns) may possess or enjoy any part ofthe property after the termination or failure ofthe spouse's
interest." IRC § 2056(b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-1(c).
79

80 In Meyer v. U.S., 364 U.S. 410 (1960), the Court held that, where the settlement option was a life annuity with a
guaranteed term, you could not divide the spouse's interest into two separate interests (i.e., the value of the amount to
fund the payments to the spouse for life and the value of amount necessary to fund the payments for the term ofyears) and
deduct the amount necessary to fund the annuity for life, but not the other amount to fund the term of years. But see Rev.
Rul., 77-130, 1977-1 C.B. 289, where single policy offered two distinct benefits payable to the surviving spouse.
81
See also Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-3 (six month survivorship conditions); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5 (life estate
with general power of appointment); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-8 (spouse only non-charitable beneficiary of charitable
remainder trust). The marital deduction is not allowed for the payment of the death benefit to the surviving spouse when
the beneficiary designation provides that payment will be made to the spouse only if she is alive when proof of death is
provided to the insurance company. Rev. Rul. 54-121, 1954-1 C.B. 196 (insurance company may not receive proof of
death within six months of death ofthe insured).
82 Where the prescribed rights of the spouse only apply to a portion of the death benefit under the settlement option, the
marital deduction will be permitted only with respect to such portion. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-6(b).

T.D. 8522, 59 Fed. Reg. 9642 (Mar. 1, 1994) (inviting public comment on an annuity as a "qualifying income interest
for life").

83

84 Regarding whether the decedent's instructions are sufficiently clear, see U.S. Trust of N.Y. et al. v. Sears, 29 F. Supp.
643 (D. Conn. 1939); Emmertz v. Cherty, 520 S.E.2d 219 (Ga. 1999); Salyer v. United States, 194 F.3d 1313 (6th Cir.
1999).

If a life insurance policy is transferred to an irrevocable trust, the donor should obtain a Form 712 Life Insurance
Statement from the life insurance company, attach it to the gift tax return, and allocate GST allocation to the value of the
policy reported on the Form 712.
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[11.141 Allocation of Business Interests Among Family Members

I.

[11.11

Overview

These materials will discuss drafting trusts to hold S corporation stock, drafting with advisory committees, and
drafting to allocate business interests among family members. To the extent that an estate plan includes partnerships or
limited liability companies, no special drafting is typically required. However, specific drafting is required to ensure that
an S corporation's status is preserved through the estate planning process.

[11.21 Drafting Trusts to Own S Corporation Stock
Only certain kinds oftrusts are permitted by the Internal Revenue Code to hold S corporation stock. Those trusts
are set forth in §§ 1361(c) and 1361(d). Section 1361 (c) provides the following trusts (other than foreign trusts, which are
not permitted) are permitted as shareholders:
(i) A trust all ofwhich is treated ... as owned by an individual who is a citizen or resident ofthe United
States.
(ii) A trust which was described in clause (i) immediately before the death of the deemed owner and
which continues in existence after such death, but only for the 60-day period beginning on the day of
the deemed owner's death. Ifa trust is described in the preceding sentence and if the entire corpus
of the trust is includible in the gross estate of the deemed owner, the preceding sentence shall be
applied by substituting 2-year period for 60-day period.
(iii) A trust with respect to stock transferred to it pursuant to the terms of a will, but only for the 60-day
period beginning on the day on which such stock is transferred to it.
(iv) A trust created primarily to exercise the voting power of stock transferred to it.
(v) An electing small business trust.
Several ofthe permitted trusts are oflimited use in estate and tax planning. For example, a voting trust has limited
use today because of the development of other kinds of trusts which are more flexible.
A trust established by Will may hold S corporation stock for 60 days after the stock is transferred to it; an estate
may hold S corporation stock for the period of reasonable administration (which, in the event an election has been made
under § 6166, may last for the entire 15 year period). Rev. Rul. 76-23, 1976-1 CB 264. On the other hand, a revoeable
trust may be an S corporation shareholder for two years after the death ofthe grantor, but a trust which is a grantor trust for
reasons other than revocability may be an S corporation shareholder for only 60 days after the grantor's death. Effectively,
then, these provisions make it necessary for S corporation stock to be disposed of shortly after an owner's death, unless the
stock will pass into a trust which is a permitted long-term owner.
Section 1361(d)(3) describes the attributes ofa qualified subchapter S trust:
(3) QUALIFIED SUBCHAPTER S TRUST. For purposes of this subsection, the term qualified
subchapter S trust means a trust:
(A) the terms of which require that:
(i) during the life ofthe current income beneficiary there shall be only 1 income beneficiary of
the trust,
(ii) any corpus distributed during the life of the current income beneficiary may be distributed
only to such beneficiary,
(iii) the income interest of the current income beneficiary in the trust shall terminate on the
earlier of such beneficiary's death or the termination of the trust, and
(iv) upon the termination of the trust during the life of the current income beneficiary, the trust
shall distribute all of its assets to such beneficiary, and
(B) all of the income (within the meaning of section 643(b)) of which is distributed (or required to
be distributed) currently to 1 individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States.
II.

A substantially separate and independent share of a trust within the meaning of 663(c) shall be
treated as a separate trust for purposes of this subsection and subsection (c).
Section 1361(e) sets forth the requirements of an electing small business trust:
(e) Electing small business trust defined
(1) Electing small business trust
For purposes of this section(A) In general
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term "electing small business trust" means any
trust if(i) such trust does not have as a beneficiary any person other than (I) an individual, II
an estate, (1110 an organization described in paragraph (2), (3), (4), or (5) of section
170c, or (IV) an organization described in section 170(c)(1) which holds a contingent
interest in such trust and is not a potential current beneficiary,
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(ii) no interest in such trust was acquired by purchase, and
(iii) an election under this subsection applies to such trust.
(B) Certain trusts not eligible
The term "electing small business trust:" shall not include:
(i) any qualified subchapter S trust (as defined in subsection (d)(3)) if an election under
subsection (d)(2) applies to any corporation the stock of which is held by such trust,
(ii) any trust exempt from tax under this subtitle, and
(iii) any charitable remainder annuity trust or charitable remainder unitrust (as defined in
section 664(d)).
(C) Purchase
For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term "purchase" means any acquisition if the
basis of the property acquired is determined under section 1012.
(2) Potential current beneficiary
For purposes of this section, the term "potential current beneficiary" means, with respect
to any period, any person who at any time during such period is entitled to, or at the discretion
of any person may receive, a distribution from the principal or income of the trust. If a trust
disposes of all of the stock which it holds in an S corporation, then, with respect to such
corporation, the term "potential current beneficiary" does not include any person who first met
the requirements ofthe preceding sentence during the 60-day period ending on the date of such
disposition.
(3) Election
An election under this subsection shall be made by the trustee. Any such election shall
apply to the taxable year of the trust for which made and all subsequent taxable years of
such trust unless revoked with the consent of the Secretary.
(4) Cross reference
For special treatment of electing small business trusts, see section 641 (c).
Section 641 deals with the income tax treatment of an ESBT. Although an ESBT has one taxpayer identification
number and files one tax return, the portion of an ESBT that consists of S corporation stock is treated as one trust and the
portion consisting ofall other assets is treated as another trust. Either or both portions may be taxed as a grantor trust under
the normal grantor trust rules of subchapter J. The S portion, ifnot a grantor trust, is taxed under § 1366--generally rules
similar to the normal trust rules using the highest marginal trust rate. The non S portion may be one or more shares (under
§ 663(c)) and is taxed under the normal trust rules. Distributions from the S or non S portion reduce the income of the
non S portion, only, but not below zero. Further charitable contributions will not reduce the income of the S portion. No
protective ESBT election may be made.
The "potential current beneficiary" designation presents a significant drafting hazard. A person to whom a
distribution is or may be made under a power of appointment is a potential current beneficiary. Thus, if an inter vivos
power ofappointment allows distribution to be made to more than 75 persons, or to an ineligible shareholder, the Selection
will terminate.
In general, three kinds of trusts may be S corporation shareholders over a long period of time: the wholly grantor
trust, the qualified subchapter S trust (the QSST), and the electing small business trust (ESBT). Different kinds of estate
planning trusts either qualify or must be made to qualify as one of these trusts in order to preserve the S corporation
election. In most instances ESBT status is least desirable because of the high income tax rate.

A.

[11.31 Crummey Trust
A trust in which multiple beneficiaries have withdrawal rights and income and principal interests, a Crummey
trust, presents several complications in holding S corporation stock. A standard Crummey trust will not qualify as a
QSST because there is more than one income and principal beneficiary and the trust will not necessarily terminate when
any particular beneficiary dies. On the other hand, a Crummey trust which has only one beneficiary-one person with a
withdrawal right, with rights to income and principal-until the beneficiary's death will qualify as a QSST. Such a trust
would be a Crummey trust which is established for a grandchild for purposes of qualifying the trust for the direct skip
annual exclusion for generation skipping tax purposes as provided in § 2642(c)(2).
Under certain circumstances a Crummey trust may be a grantor trust. Typically, that requires giving the grantor a
power as described in § 675 of the Code to ensure that the trust is a wholly grantor trust. The most commonly used power
is the power ofthe grantor under § 675(4)(C) to substitute assets, in a non-fiduciary capacity, of equivalent value; however,
care must be taken because the Internal Revenue Service's current position is that whether such a power can be exercised
in a non-fiduciary capacity is a facts and circumstances analysis. IRS Letter Rulings 9437002 and 9437023.
If the trust owns life insurance on the life of the grantor or the grantor's spouse, the trust may be a grantor trust
under § 677(a)(3): however, some commentators believe that the trust would be a grantor trust only in part. The fact that
the income and principal of the trust may be paid to or for the benefit of the grantor's spouse would make the Crummey
trust a grantor trust, under § 677(a)(I), but for the presence ofthe withdrawal rights in the other beneficiaries. The Internal
Revenue Service position is that the withdrawal rights convert the Crummey trust into a grantor trust with respect to each
person having a power of withdrawal. IRS Letter Rulings 8142061, 8521060, and 8805032.
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An open issue is whether the provisions of §§ 671-677, which apply to tax the trust to the "real" grantor, and
trump the provisions of § 678, which applies to tax the trust to a donee with a withdrawal right.
Another issue which must be considered in drafting the Crummey trust is the presence of a divorce provision.
In many instances the spouse who has benefits in a Crummey trust will cease to be a beneficiary upon divorce. Such a
provision will cause the trust to fail to qualify as a QSST. On the other hand, the presence of a broad inter vivos power of
appointment will prohibit an ESBT election.

B.

r11.41 Section 2503(c) Trust
A properly drafted trust qualifying for the annual exclusion under § 2503(c) will normally qualify as a QSST.
C.
r11.51 Charitable Remainder Trusts
A charitable remainder trust may not, by regulation, be a grantor trust (Treas. Reg. § 1.671-1(d)) nor may it
qualify as a QSST because no one receives all of the income of the trust (charitable remainder trusts are either unitrusts,
which pay a set percentage of the trust assets each year to the noncharitable recipient, or annuity trusts). Section 1361 (e)
states that a charitable remainder trust may not be an ESBT.
A popular use of the charitable remainder trust is to enable closely-held stock to be sold without recognizing
capital gains (because a charitable remainder trust is not subject to the capital gains tax). This technique is effective only
for C corporations. A charitable remainder trust may not be used to sell or redeem S corporation stock.
D.
r11.61 Charitable Lead Trusts
Many charitable lead trusts are drafted as grantor trusts and those lead trusts may hold S corporation stock. ESBT
status is typically not attractive for a lead trust.
E.
r11.71 Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts (GRAT)
A GRAT is typically drafted to be a grantor trust, either because a specific power is given to the grantor to make
the GRAT a grantor trust (e.g. a § 675(4)(c) power as discussed in section A above), or because the grantor has a reversion
in the trust assets which causes the trust to be a grantor trust under § 673(a) (the reversion is the grantors right to receive
the GRAT assets back if the grantor dies within the GRAT term).
S corporation stock is a very popular asset to put into a GRAT because the earnings of the S corporation may be
used to make the GRAT payments, before the earnings are reduced by income taxes. Many S corporations have pre-tax
earnings of 15% to 25%; those earnings may almost always be used to fund GRAT payments. This enables the entire
value of the S corporation to be removed from the grantor's estate within a relatively few years (e.g. under 10 years). The
technique is particularly effective when combined with a recapitalization to produce voting and nonvoting stock and the
nonvoting stock, appropriately discounted, is transferred to the GRAT.
F.
r11.81 Lifetime QTIP Trusts
In order for basic marital deduction/equivalent exemption planning to be effective, it is necessary for each spouse
to have at least $1,000,000 in such spouse's individual name. In some instances, one spouse has most of the assets of the
couple and does not want to transfer $1,000,000 worth of assets to the other spouse's name. That could be because it is
a second marriage, because the transferee spouse is a spendthrift, or for other reasons. In such instances a lifetime QTIP
trust may be helpful.
The transferor spouse may create a trust which provides for the transferee spouse to receive the income from
the trust for life. The trust may also provide for the transferee spouse to receive discretionary principal encroachments or
can allow encroachments only under certain circumstances (e.g. the transferee spouse has not remarried). The transferor
spouse may make a QTIP election under § 2523(f) which will cause the trust assets to be included in the transferee spouse's
estate if the transferee spouse dies first. Those assets may return to the transferor spouse in the form of a trust which will
not be included in the transferor spouse's estate. The effect of the trust is to transfer assets into the transferee spouse's
name without providing the transferee spouse with much, or any, control over the assets.
A lifetime QTIP trust must be qualified as a grantor trust while the grantor is living (it cannot be a QSST) but after
the grantor's death may be a QSST. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-10)(4) provides the applicable rules:
(4) Qualified terminable interest property trust. Ifproperty, including S corporation stock, or stock of
a corporation that intends to make an S election, is transferred to a trust and an election is made to treat
all or a portion of the transferred property as qualified terminable interest property (QTIP) under section
2056(b)(7), the income beneficiary may make the QSST election if the trust meets the requirements
set out in paragraph O)(I)(i) and (ii) of this section. However, ifproperty is transferred to a QTIP trust
under section 2523(f), the income beneficiary may not make a QSST election even if the trust meets
the requirements set forth in paragraph O)(I)(ii) of this section because the grantor would be treated as
the owner of the income portion of the trust under section 677. In addition, if property is transferred to
a QTIP trust under section 2523(f), the trust does not qualify as a permitted shareholder under section
1361(c)(2)(A)(i) and paragraph (h)(I)(i) of this section (a qualified subpart E trust), unless under the
terms ofthe QTIP trust, the grantor is treated as the owner ofthe entire trust under sections 671 to 677. If
the grantor ceases to be the income beneficiary's spouse, the trust may qualify as a QSST if it otherwise
satisfies the requirements under paragraphs O)(I)(i) and (ii) of this section.
This is a significant trap for the unwary. Because a testamentary QTIP qualifies as a QSST, many practitioners
suppose, to their peril, that a QTIP created during lifetime also qualifies as a QSST. In such instances, an ESBT may be
required to preserve the Selection.
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G.
[11.9] Testamentary QTIP Trusts
A QTIP trust created upon the death of a spouse will qualify as a QSST as discussed above.
H.
[11.10] Exemption Equivalent Trusts
A trust which is established to be for the benefit of the surviving spouse and the issue of the deceased spouse
must be drafted specifically to qualify as a QSST. Typically the trust is established for the benefit ofnot only the surviving
spouse but also the surviving issue with the trustee being given discretion to distribute income and principal among them
in accordance with the standards specified in the trust. A trust drafted in such manner may qualify as an ESBT. In order
for the trust to be a QSST the surviving spouse must receive all of the income of the trust and must be the sole principal
beneficiary (of course the spouse need not receive any principal, but no one else must either while the spouse is living).
The rights of the surviving spouse to receive principal may be cut off in the event the surviving spouse remarries, but no
one else may be substituted as a principal beneficiary, and, of course, the surviving spouse's right to income may not be
cut oft:
I.
[11.11] Trusts for Issue
A trust for the benefit ofa child and a child's issue will not qualify as a QSST and instead must be redrafted to have
the child as the mandatory recipient of income and the sole potential beneficiary ofprincipal. ·The flexibility ofa so-called
spray trust for a child and the child's issue is incompatible with the S election, absent ESBT treatment.
J.
[11.121 Trust Division for Exemption Equivalent Trust and Trusts for Issue
If some but not all of the assets of an exemption equivalent trust or a trust for issue will consist of S corporation
shares, and it is undesirable to give up the spray provisions except to the extent required, S corporation stock could be
allocated to a special qualifying trust with other assets allocated to a more typical trust.
With respect to an exemption equivalent trust, called Fund B here, an example of such an allocation and the
parallel trusts would be for one item, here Item 6, to provide for assets other than S corporation stock and for the next item,
here Item 6A, to provide for the S corporation stock:
ITEM 6
Administration of Fund B
6.1 If Fund B holds S corporation stock, such stock will be held and administered as a separate
trust as provided in Item 6A herein, as Fund B-1. The remaining assets of Fund B will be held and
administered as provided in this Item 6.
6.2 Trustee will distribute to or for the benefit of my Spouse and my issue so much of the net
income ofFund B as Trustee deems advisable to provide for their health, education (including education
beyond the undergraduate level), maintenance and support. Primary consideration will be given to the
needs ofmy Spouse. Undistributed income will be periodically added to principal. Unequal distributions
of income will not be taken into account in the final distribution of assets.
Drafter:
Insert after Fund B income provision if desired
6.3 My Spouse has the right each year, by written notice to Trustee, to withdraw specific assets
from the principal of Fund B, the value ofwhich does not exceed 5% ofthe market value ofthe principal
of Fund B on December 31 of the year of withdrawal. This right to withdraw is noncumulative.
6._ Trustee will distribute from the principal of Fund B (even to its complete exhaustion) such
amounts as Trustee deems advisable to provide for the health, education (including education beyond
the undergraduate level), maintenance and support of my Spouse and my issue. Primary consideration
will be given to the needs ofmy Spouse but my Spouse's taxable estate will be considered when making
distributions from Fund B for my Spouse's benefit. Distributions from principal will be based on an
individual's needs and unequal distributions will not be taken into account in the final distribution of
assets.
Spouse s special Testamentary Power ofAppointment among descendants
Drafter:
6._ My Spouse may appoint, by specifically referring to this power in my Spouse's Will, part
or all ofthe assets of Fund B among my issue in such proportions and in such manner, outright or in trust
or otherwise, as my Spouse determines. Regardless of other provisions to the contrary, my Spouse may,
at any time and by written notice to Trustee, relinquish this power in whole or in part.
6._ If my Spouse remarries, my Spouse will not benefit from income or principal of Fund B
and will not be entitled to exercise any withdrawal right during the time my Spouse is married. During
the time ofmy Spouse's marriage Fund B will be administered for the exclusive benefit ofmy issue. My
Spouse will again be a beneficiary ofFund B during any subsequent times when my Spouse is unmarried
and under the same terms as if my Spouse never remarried.
6._ Ifmy Spouse remarries, Fund B will be administered as ifmy Spouse were deceased.
Always use 1 ofthe following 3 paragraphs. Add the word "unappointed" before the word "assets" in line
Drafter:
1 ofwhatever you select if spouse has a special Testamentary Power ofAppointment.
Drafter:
This gives you separate shares for each descendant.
Drafter:
Variation A.
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6._ Upon my Spouse's death, the remaining assets of Fund B and property transferred to it
from any source will be divided among my then living issue, per stirpes, and held or distributed as
provided herein.

Drafter:

This gives you separate shares for children and a single share for descendants ofa deceased child

Drafter:

Variation B.
6._ Upon my Spouse's death, the remaining assets of Fund B and property transferred to it
from any source will be divided, in equal shares, one for each then living child of mine and one for each
deceased child with issue then living, and held or distributed as provided herein.

Drafter:

This gives you 1 share F/B/O all descendants. This is not the best election for GSTpurposes.

Drafter:

Variation C.
6._ Upon my Spouse's death, the remaining assets of Fund B and property transferred to it
from any source will be held in trust for the benefit of my then living issue as provided herein.
ITEM6A
Administration of Fund B-1
6A.l
Trustee will distribute to or for the benefit of my Spouse the net income of Fund B-1
in quarterly or more frequent installments.
6A.2
Trustee will distribute from the principal ofFund B-1 (even to its complete exhaustion)
such amounts as Trustee deems advisable to provide for the health, education (including education
beyond the undergraduate level), maintenance and support of my Spouse.
6A._
My Spouse may appoint, by specifically referring to this power in my Spouse's Will,
part or all ofthe assets of Fund B among my issue in such proportions and in such manner, outright or in
trust or otherwise, as my Spouse determines. Regardless of other provisions to the contrary, my Spouse
may, at any time and by written notice to Trustee, relinquish this power in whole or in part.
6A._
If my Spouse remarries, my Spouse will not benefit from principal of Fund B-1 and
will not be entitled to exercise any withdrawal right during the time my Spouse is married. My Spouse
will again be a principal beneficiary of Fund B-1 during any subsequent times when my Spouse is
unmarried and under the same terms as if my Spouse never remarried.

Drafter:

Always use 1 ofthe following 3 paragraphs. Add the word "unappointed" before the word "assets" in line
1 ofwhatever you select ifspouse has a special Testamentary Power ofAppointment.

Warning:

Variation B creates non-qualifying S corporation shareholders at the grandchild level, and Variation C
creates a non-qualifying trust immediately.

Drafter:

This gives you separate shares for each descendant.

Drafter:

Variation A.
6A._
Upon my Spouse's death, the remaining assets of Fund B-1 and property transferred to it from
any source will be divided among my then living issue, per stirpes, and held or distributed as provided
herein.

Drafter:

This gives you separate shares for children and a single share for descendants ofa deceased child

Drafter:

Variation B.
6A._
Upon my Spouse's death, the remaining assets of Fund B-1 and property transferred
to it from any source will be divided, in equal shares, one for each then living child of mine and one for
each deceased child with issue then living, and held or distributed as provided herein.

Drafter:

This gives you 1 share F/B/O all descendants. This is not the best election for GSTpurposes.

Drafter:

Variation C.
6A._
Upon my Spouse's death, the remaining assets ofFund B-1 and property transferred to
it from any source will be held in trust for the benefit of my then living issue as provided herein.
With respect to a trust for issue, an example of such an allocation and the parallel trusts would be:
ITEM 7
Trusts for the Primary Benefit of My Children

Drafter:

Child's trust terminating at age[s] __.

Drafter:

Variation A or B.
7.1 Each share set aside for a living child of mine will be held by Trustee as follows. If such
share holds S corporation stock, such stock will be held and administered as a separate trust as provided
in Item 7Aherein. The remaining assets will be held and administered as provided in this Item 7.
7.2 Until such child becomes 21 years old, Trustee will distribute to or use so much of the
net income of the trust, as Trustee deems advisable for such child's health, education, maintenance and
support. Undistributed income will be added to principal. After such child becomes 21 years old, the net
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income of the trust will be distributed to or for the benefit of such child in quarterly or more convenient
installments. Trustee will distribute from the principal of the trust such amounts as Trustee deems
advisable to provide for the health, education (including education beyond the undergraduate level),
maintenance and support of such child and such child's descendants. Distributions will be based on an
individual's needs and unequal distributions will not be taken into account in the final distribution of
assets.
Drafter:
Child's 5% withdrawal right ifdesired
7.3 After attaining age _ , my child has the right each year, by written notice to Trustee, to
withdraw specific assets from the principal of my child's trust, the value of which does not exceed 5%
of the market value of the principal ofthe trust on December 31 of the year of withdrawal. This right to
withdraw is noncumulative.
Drafter:

Use next paragraph ifassets might be subject to a GST ifchild dies before termination oftrust.
7.4 My child may appoint, by specifically referring to this power in my child's Will, the assets
held in my child's trust that would incur a generation skipping tax at my child's death to my child's
estate, to the creditors ofthe estate, or to any person or entity. To the extent such power is not effectively
exercised the assets of the trust will be administered as otherwise provided herein. Unless my child
directs otherwise by specific reference to this paragraph, Trustee will pay directly, or to the Personal
Representative of my child's estate, the amount of incremental death taxes imposed on such estate by
reason of any assets of this trust being included therein.

Drafter:

Child's special Testamentary Power ofAppointment.

Drafter:

Review appointees for client's desires.
7.5 In addition, my child may appoint, by specifically referring to this power in my child's
Will, part or all of the assets of this trust among my descendants, or, if none, to any person or entity
(but in all instances, excluding such child, such child's estate, such child's creditors and the creditors of
such child's estate) in such proportions and in such manner, outright or in trust or otherwise, as my child
determines. Regardless of other provisions to the contrary, my child may, at any time and by written
notice to Trustee, relinquish this power in whole or in part.

Drafter:

Use next 3 paragraphs when trust is to be distributed to descendants ofa child who dies before termination
ofhis trust. Delete Hunappointed" in line 2 ofeach option ifthe word is inappropriate.
7.6 All unappointed assets remaining in the trust upon such child's death will be distributed
in fee and per stirpes to the child's then living descendants; but if there are none, to my then living
descendants, per stirpes. Provided, however, ifTrustee is then holding another trust under this instrument
for the primary benefit of any such descendant, the descendants interest in this trust will be consolidated
with such other trust and will be administered in accordance with this instrument.
7.7 Each share set aside for any descendants of my deceased children will be divided and
distributed in fee and per stirpes to them.
7.8 Notwithstanding the above, if a beneficiary is not 21 years old when Trustee is directed
to distribute to such beneficiary any portion of the principal of this trust, such portion will vest in such
beneficiary. However, Trustee may withhold possession of it and hold it under the provisions of this
instrument for such beneficiary until the beneficiary becomes 21 years old, at which time the remaining
assets will be distributed to the beneficiary or to the beneficiary's estate if the beneficiary dies before
age 21. In the meantime, Trustee will distribute to or for the benefit of the beneficiary as much net
income and principal as Trustee deems advisable for the beneficiary's health, education, maintenance
and support. Undistributed income will be added to principal.
ITEM7A
Trusts for the Primwy Benefit of My Children

Drafter:

Child's trust terminating at age[s]_.

Drafter:

Variation A or B.
7A.l
The net income of the trust will be distributed to or for the benefit of such child in
quarterly or more convenient installments. Trustee will distribute from the principal of the trust such
amounts as Trustee deems advisable to provide for the health, education (including education beyond the
undergraduate level), maintenance and support of such child.

Drafter:

Use next paragraph ifassets might be subject to a GST ifchild dies before termination oftrust.
7A.2
My child may appoint, by specifically referring to this power in my child's Will, the
assets held in my child's trust that would incur a generation skipping tax at my child's death to my child's
estate, to the creditors ofthe estate, or to any person or entity. To the extent such power is not effectively
exercised the assets of the trust will be administered as otherwise provided herein. Unless my child
directs otherwise by specific reference to this paragraph, Trustee will pay directly, or to the Personal
Representative of my child's estate, the amount of incremental death taxes imposed on such estate by
reason of any assets ofthis trust being included therein.

Drafter:

Child's special Testamentary Power ofAppointment if desired.

Drafter:

Review appointees for clients desires.
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7A.3
In addition, my child may appoint, by specifically referring to this power in my child's
Will, part or all of the assets of this trust among my descendants, or, if none, to any person or entity
(but in all instances, excluding such child, such child's estate, such child's creditors and the creditors of
such child's estate) in such proportions and in such manner, outright or in trust or otherwise, as my child
determines. Regardless of other provisions to the contrary, my child may, at any time and by written
notice to Trustee, relinquish this power in whole or in part.
Drafter:

Use next 3 paragraphs when trust is to be distributed to descendants ofa child who dies before termination
ofhis trust. Delete "unappointed" in line 2 ofeach option if the word is inappropriate.
7A.4
All unappointed assets remaining in the trust upon such child's death will be
distributed in fee and per stirpes to the child's then living descendants; but if there are none, to my then
living descendants, per stirpes. Provided, however, if Trustee is then holding another trust under this
instrument for the primary benefit of any such descendant, the descendant's interest in this trust will be
consolidated with such other trust and will be administered in accordance with this instrument.
7A.5
Each share set aside for any descendants of my deceased children will be divided and
distributed in fee and per stirpes to them.
7A.6
Notwithstanding the above, if a beneficiary is not 21 years old when Trustee is directed
to distribute to such beneficiary any portion of the principal of this trust, such portion will vest in such
beneficiary. However, Trustee may withhold possession of it and hold it under the provisions of this
instrument for such beneficiary until the beneficial)' becomes 21 years old, at which time the remaining
assets will be distributed to the beneficiary or to the beneficiary's estate if the beneficiary dies before
age 21. In the meantime, Trustee will distribute to or for the benefit of the beneficial)' the net income
of the trust and as much principal as Trustee deems advisable for the beneficiary's health, education,
maintenance and support. Undistributed income will be added to principal.

In many instances it may be reasonable to believe that S corporation stock will need to be held in trust
even though none is present in the estate ofthe client now. For this reason it may be desirable to use an S corporation stock
savings clause. The intent of such a clause is to transform a trust that would not be a QSST into a trust which is a QSST.
The cost of doing so is a dispositive change in the estate plan: spray provisions become mandatol)' income distribution
provisions with limits on the potential principal beneficiaries. Such a provision could be drafted as follows:
Item
Administration of Trusts Owning S
Corporation Stock
_.1 Regardless of any provisions in this Agreement to the contral)', if any stock in a
corporation: (A) which has in force an election to be treated as an S corporation pursuant to section 1361
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the Code; or (B) for which such an election is made
while such stock is held by Trustee, would otherwise be held in any trust administered hereunder which
would not qualify to be treated, pursuant to section 1361(d) of the Code, as a Qualified Subchapter S
Trust (QSST), then such stock will not be held in such trust, but instead will be held in a separate trust
with provisions identical to those of such trust, except as provided below. It is my intention that such
separate trust qualify to be treated as a QSST.
_.2Any such separate trust will have provisions identical to the trust in which such stock
would otherwise be held, except that: (A) all of the income of such trust (within the meaning of section
643(b) of the Code) will be distributed to the beneficiary of such trust (who will be called the current
income beneficial)' of the trust) at least annually; (B) no principal distributions may be made to, or for
the benefit of, any person other than the current income beneficiary during the life ofthe current income
beneficial)'; (C) during the life of the current income beneficiary, no one will have any power to appoint
any portion ofthe trust property to anyone other than the current income beneficial)'; (D) the remarriage
of the current income beneficial)' will not result in any termination of the current income beneficial)"s
rights to receive trust income as defined above; (E) a single trust for multiple income beneficiaries in
the same generation will be divided into separate shares, each of which will have only one current
income beneficiary; and (F) if any other requirements are imposed on a trust by section 1361(d) of the
Code in order to make such trust eligible for treatment as a QSST, such separate trust will meet those
requirements.
_.3A trust, prior to the separation provided for in the first paragraph of this Article, may
have beneficiaries in multiple generations as potential current recipients of income and/or principal.
In such case, the Current income beneficiary of the separate trust will be the beneficiary in the oldest
generation.
_.4 In addition, Trustee may make any elections or give any consents which are required to
achieve or maintain S Corporation status for stock held in any trust administered herein.

III.

[11.131 Advisory Committees
In many instances an advisory committee to the trustee is beneficial. If a closely-held business, whether in
corporate, partnership, or limited liability company form, is held in a trust having a corporate trustee, the trustee may
request that family members or other persons (attorneys, accountants, business managers) be appointed to advise the
trustee. However, that is very much a matter of local practice and custom. Currently, the author believes that most of the

F-7

corporate fiduciaries active in Kentucky prefer to have an advisory committee for closely-held business interests; however,
in Florida the author's experience has been the opposite with the corporate fiduciaries taking the position that the liability
for operating the business is its alone so it wants full authority.
An issue facing any advisor is the advisor's status. Kentucky is one of the few states with clear law stating that
an advisor is a fiduciary. Gathri2ht's Trustee v. Gaut, 124 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1939).
An advisory committee provision dealing with closely-held business interests could be as follows:

ARTICLE
Advisoty Committee
.1 During any time I am incapacitated or after my death,
,
and
_--=--:_-=--_ are appointed as the initial Advisory Committee (Advisor) to Trustee. Notwithstanding
anything herein to the contrary, Trustee will be subject to the powers and authority of Advisor as
hereinafter set forth.
A. Powers. Advisor has the following powers and authority:
(A. 1) Advisor has the following powers and authority with regard to any closely held
business or investment interest held by any trust administered hereunder: to advise Trustee, to approve
or disapprove any investment recommendation pertaining to such assets made by Trustee, to initiate
action and to direct Trustee concerning important matters pertaining to such investments of any trust
established hereunder, including, but not limited to the borrowing of money, the lease, sale, investment
and reinvestment of any such trust property and the making of tax elections applicable to a trust and the
voting of such stock;
(A.2) To advise Trustee, to approve or disapprove any investment recommendation made
by Trustee, to direct Trustee with respect to general investment policy, to initiate action and to direct
Trustee concerning important matters pertaining to investments of any trust established hereunder,
including, but not limited to the borrowing ofmoney, the lease, sale, investment and reinvestment of any
trust property and the making of tax elections applicable to a trust and the voting of stock;
(A.3) To approve, disapprove or direct discretionary payments or accumulations of income
or encroachments upon the principal of any trust established hereunder, subject to the standards herein
set forth. Provided, however, no such payments or encroachments may be made for the benefit (benefit)
will encompass any legal obligation) of a beneficiary, if such beneficiary for whom or for whose benefit
said payment or encroachment is to be made is a member ofAdvisor, unless Advisor certifies to Trustee
that such person in no way participated in voting for a payment or encroachment for such member's
benefit. The remaining member or members ofAdvisor have all authority with regard to such matter;
(A.4) To remove Trustee at any time, and from time to time, by prior written notice
delivered to Trustee (said notice stating a date when it is effective) and appoint a Qualified Trustee as
successor Trustee. IfAdvisor terminates or ceases to exist, the income beneficiary (or a majority ofthem
ifmore than one) of a trust may, by written notice delivered to Trustee (said notice stating a date when it
is effective) remove Trustee and appoint a Qualified Trustee as successor Trustee;
(A.5) To appoint an Investment Advisor to advise and direct Trustee regarding the
investment of trust assets. Advisor may remove the Investment Advisor at any time and appoint a
successor Investment Advisor. Any such Investment Advisor will be registered with the Securities
Exchange Commission under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, as amended. In the event that no
successor is appointed, or the Investment Advisor fails to serve as such, then Trustee will again become
responsible for the investment of trust assets (subject to any authority reserved to Advisor). Advisor
will determine the amount of the Investment Advisor's fee, and inform Trustee of the fee determination,
and the fee will be payable from the trust estate as an administration expense. Trustee will be relieved
from liability resulting from actions taken pursuant to the directions of the Investment Advisor. During
the period an Investment Advisor is acting hereunder, Trustee will act as a Custodial Trustee concerning
the trust property, and will have no duty to supervise investments made or to make investment
recommendations;
B. Acts of Advisor. Advisor will act through a majority of its membership unless
otherwise provided herein. Any action taken by Advisor respecting any matter within its power and
authority will be communicated in writing to Trustee and Trustee will be conclusively bound thereby. If
Trustee communicates in writing a proposed action to Advisor and it does not respond within 15 days,
or ifthe members are equally divided among themselves, Trustee may take the proposed action without
the necessity of further communication;
C. Successor Members. Advisor will be self-perpetuating for the duration of any trust
established hereunder. Successor members to those named or designated herein may be appointed by
Advisor to serve when appointed or upon the occurrence of a future event, or on a specified date. If
a successor member has not previously been appointed or designated, when a member dies, resigns,
becomes incapacitated or ceases to act for a period of six months, then the remaining member or
members will appoint a successor and Advisor will continue in this manner to perpetuate itselfduring the
continuation of any trust established hereunder. Advisor will inform Trustee of any successor member.
If the situation ever occurs where there are no duly appointed and acting members ofAdvisor, Trustee
will act alone for the duration of a trust or until Advisor again becomes active;

F-8

D. Compensation of Advisor. Trustee may pay members of Advisor reasonable
compensation as may be agreed upon between Advisor and Trustee. Any compensation paid will be
considered a cost of the administration of the trust concerned;
E. Advisor Liability. No member of Advisor will at any time be held liable for any
action taken or not taken (including any action taken or not taken in exercising a business judgment or
in making payments to or for the benefit of any beneficiary) or for any loss or depreciation of value of
any property in any trust created hereby, whether due to an error ofjudgment or otherwise, where such
member ofAdvisor has not acted in bad faith. In the case of the delegation of any discretionary power
hereunder, the member of Advisor so delegating will not be liable for the acts, omissions or defaults
of the agents, servants or employees to whom the delegation is made. The member ofAdvisor will be
entitled to recover from the trust assets (but only to the extent of the assets therein at the time a request
for such recovery is made) for any and all losses, damages, expenses (including attorney fees), claims,
lawsuits or judgments incurred or suffered by such member of Advisor, whether individually or in a
fiduciary capacity by virtue of, or in any way arising from, any action taken or not taken by, or allegedly
taken or not taken by such member of Advisor; except, that no member of Advisor will be entitled to
recover any such amount if it is established by a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction that
such person was acting in bad faith at such time;
F. Relation of Advisor. Members of Advisor will at all times act as, and have the
obligations of, fiduciaries. Nevertheless, family members, persons having a financial interest in a trust
asset, and professionals rendering services to this trust or any of its assets, are not disqualified from being
members ofAdvisor;
G. Trustee Liability. Trustee will incur no liability when acting at the direction ofAdvisor.
Further, no party dealing with Trustee has any duty to determine if Trustee is acting at the direction of
Advisor.

IV.

[11.141 Allocation of Business Interests Among Family Members

In many instances it is desirable that business interests be allocated to one or more family members and that other
assets be allocated to other family members. In general it is better for those family members who are active in the business
to have interests in the business and for other family members to receive other assets.
Suppose that there are three children and one is to receive business assets and the other two are not. There are
two ways to ensure the proper division of assets. One is for the business assets to be allocated to each child equally after
the surviving parent's death. There would be a stock restriction and purchase agreement among the three, and all trusts for
their benefit, which would require the one child to buy the interests from the other two children. The disadvantage of such
an arrangement is that any shares which have been given away by the parents may have a tax basis which is less than the
purchase price called for by the stock purchase agreement, thus causing the recognition of capital gain. The second way,
which may be more favorable, is to allocate the business interests among the family members directly when creating shares
for the children. This will be effective, of course, only to extent there are sufficient non-business assets.
One key issue is to create an appropriate definition of the business interests involved. Such a definition could
be:
_._ For purposes of this agreement, the term Business will include all shares of stock in ABC
Corporation, whether voting or non-voting, and any successor to any such corporations, partnerships,
and limited liability companies, and any real estate which is leased to such entities and is used in
connection with the business of such entities.
In some instances it may be desirable to exclude real estate from the definition because, for example, the real
estate can be allocated to family members who are not in the business.
Another issue which must be considered is the date ofvaluation ofthe business interests and other assets (e.g. date
of death values or date of distribution values). Using date of death values, typically tied to the value as agreed to by the
Internal Revenue Service on the form 706 after audit (if any), has the advantage of not requiring a revaluation after estate
administration. However, if values have changed during administration then using date of death values may produce a
different result than that intended.
A related issue is whether any discount for the size ofthe interest allocated (e.g. a minority interest) or for the lack
of marketability of an interest will be taken. One way to value business assets is to exclude any such discount. Such a
clause would provide either that business interests would be valued taking into consideration the size and marketability of
the interest, or that business interests would be valued by calculating the value ofthe business as a whole and determining
the pro rata value of the interest being transferred without regard to any discount for lack of marketability or minority
interest.
A clause which would effectively allocate business interests to one child could be as follows:
_._ When creating a share for
[a child], Trustee will first allocate from the trust property to
such share all interests in the Business to the extent reasonably possible. I recognize that all Business
interests may not be able to be so allocated because the value of such interests may exceed the share set
aside for
; in that event Trustee will allocate any excess interests to the share set aside for_ _
_ _ to the extent reasonably possible. When making any allocation hereunder Trustee will value all
assets at the date of allocation, and such values will be computed for the interests to be allocated taking
into consideration the size and marketability of the interest.
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I.

[16.11

Scope

This chapter discusses the use of life estates in inter vivos transfers and testamentary planning. Utilizing life
estate provisions in estate planning can be an effective way of preserving the client's assets for future generations while
minimizing estate and inheritance taxes. References hereinafter to the IRC are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended, and the Treasury regulations thereunder.

II.

[16.21

Inter Vivos Transfers with Retained Life Estates

The term "life estate" refers to a freehold interest in property, realty, or personalty, that lasts for the lifetime of one
or more individuals. A life interest created in a "non-trust" context is often referred to as a "legal life estate," whereas, a
life interest created through the use of a trust is sometimes referred to as an "equitable life estate."
One of the purposes for the inter vivos transfer of property to family members or other third parties while
retaining a life estate is the preservation of assets and reduction of estate taxes incurred upon the death of the grantor.
However, under IRC § 2036, transfers in which the client has retained the possession or enjoyment of the property for life
may be includible in the client's gross estate for tax purposes. See Lee v. U.S., 57 A.F.T.R.2d 86-1548, 86-1 U.S.T.C. ~
13,649 1985 WL 6351 (W.D.Ky. 1985) (holding that the entire value ofthe 100% stock interest in a corporation transferred
to decedent's son was includible in decedent's gross estate under IRC § 2036 because decedent had retained an income
interest in the corporation); Trotter v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 663, T.C.M. (RIA) 2001-250, 2001WL 1110360
(Sept. 21, 2001) (holding that where a decedent made a gratuitous transfer of a condominium to a trust, but continued to
live in the condo until her death, there was a retained life estate such that the value of the condo had to be included in her
gross estate at her death). See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200240020 (Oct. 4, 2002) (excluding a leasehold interest in a residence
from the decedent's gross estate where the decedent transferred the residence to his spouse two months before his death).
Inclusion of the property in the decedent's gross estate will tum on whether adequate and full consideration was
paid for the transfer. In the absence of such consideration, the value ofthe property is subject to estate taxes. See Magnin
v. Commissioner, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1126, T.C.M. (RIA) 2001-031, 2001 WL 117645 (Feb. 12, 2001) (holding that where
a father agreed to put stock in trust for his children in return for an income interest in the stock for life, the value of the
income interest did not constitute "adequate and full consideration" for the promise to give up the remainder interest, and
the value of both the income interest and the remainder interest were includible in the father's gross estate; holding also
that the value ofthe stock/remainder interest must be determined by using the actuarial tables and not by applying the "fee
simple" value). In addition, should the transferor die within three years ofthe transfer, IRC § 2035 may pull the transferred
property back into the gross estate of the transferor. See also KRS 140.020.
If a client is considering the acquisition of income producing property, the client may consider purchasing a life
estate while the children purchase the remainder interest. This estate planning technique would divide the sales price
between the value of the life estate and the actuarially valued remainder interest, as determined by IRS tables. See IRC
§ 7520. It is unclear, however, whether the consideration for the remainder interest determined under actuarial tables is
"adequate and full" consideration. In addition, if the consideration paid is equal only to actuarial values, the property will
have a low basis in the hands of the remainder beneficiaries and will not receive a "stepped-up basis" under IRC § 1014.
Therefore, the ramifications of this estate planning technique should be seriously considered before implementation.
When a transfer of an interest in a corporation, partnership, or trust occurs, and the transferor retains certain
interests in that business entity or trust, IRC §§ 2701-2704 has effectively replaced IRC § 2036(c) and governs the tax
treatment of these transactions on or after October 8, 1990. IRC §§ 2701-2704 operate to limit the transferor's ability to
reap the gift tax benefits of retaining a term interest in property when the transfer is to a member ofthe transferor's family.
Normally, the value of a transferred term interest is determined according to the valuation tables in IRC § 7520. But, under
§§ 2701-2704, ifthe transferred interest does not meet specific requirements, the retained interest will be valued at zero for
gift tax purposes. As a result, the value ofthe gift will be the value of both the retained and the transferred interest. An in
depth discussion of these provisions, however, is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Unexpected results can arise even when commonly-used language is inserted in instruments conveying property
interests. In Sanderson v. Saxon, 834 S.W. 2d 676 (Ky. 1992), the real property was transferred to the decedent and another
(Sanderson) 'jointly and to the survivor." Three years later, the decedent sold his one-half interest to two other individuals
(Saxon and Redden) as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. The issue raised was whether the sale of his interest in
the property by the decedent severed the joint tenancy with Sanderson, and thus Saxon and Redden owned one-half, or
whether Sanderson - who survived the decedent - owned 100% of the property as a result of surviving the decedent. The
court concluded that the decedent and Sanderson each acquired a life estate and a survivorship interest, and as a result, the
deed by the decedent to Saxon and Redden conveyed the decedent's life estate and survivorship right, and did not sever the
joint tenancy with Sanderson. Thus, the entire fee simple estate vested in Sanderson, being the survivor ofthe two original
grantees. The Court reached its conclusion not based on the prior common law, but rather on the exceptions to the right of
a joint tenant to partition the subject property. See KRS 381.130.

III.

[16.31

Life Estates in Wills

A.

[16.41

In General

One ofthe primary goals ofestate planning is to provide for the orderly transfer and management of assets passing
at death, while at the same tiqle reducing the taxes and other expenses associated with the transfer. The client will often
have a desire to leave certain assets to one person subject to their use and control by someone else during the other's
lifetime. Where a life estate has been created for the life of a person other than the owner ofthe life interest, an estate pur
autre vie, the resulting life estate is considered personal property in the estate of the decedent. See KRS 395.340.
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A myriad of problems can arise under a legal life estate-remainder arrangement. Issues concerning the payment
of taxes, maintenance and other expenses, including waste and the disposition ofthe property during the tenant's lifetime,
can make the arrangement less than desirable. The same objectives are usually achieved with less complications by the use
of a trust. Using either an outright gift or a trust should be considered before a legal life estate is established.
The creation of a life estate is statutorily presumed when certain language is used in a deed or will. See KRS
381.090 and East Ky. Energy Corp. v. Niece, 774 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989). The identity ofthe remaindermen class
is determined in accordance with the law in effect at the life tenant's death rather than at the testator's death. Conway
v. Childress, 896 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994). In Conway, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the illegitimate
children of the decedent, who created the life estate and remainder interest, could inherit as "heirs at law." At the time
of the testator's death, however, the statute then in effect, KRS § 391.090(2), would have prohibited their inheritance.
The Kentucky Supreme Court declared that statutory provision unconstitutional in 1977, and the statute has since been
repealed. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 560 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. 1977).
In determining whether a testator has devised a life estate or an estate in fee simple, courts rely on the language
of the will to construe the intention of the testator. Only when the language of the will is unclear will the court resort to
rules of construction. One such rule is a preference for recognizing fee estates over life estates. Where a testator devises
property to a beneficiary, and includes a detailed description of what should happen to the property at the death of that
beneficiary, a court may find that the beneficiary received only a life estate in the property. See Kentucky Revenue Policy
92P210 (Rev. 9/1/87).
Several recent Kentucky cases deal with this issue. In Williamson v. Williamson, -- S.W.3d --,2002 WL 1302473
(Ky. Ct. App. June 14, 2002) (opinion not final as of date of publication), the court was asked to decide whether Camilla
Williamson's holographic will devised a farm in a fee simple or whether the will devised a life estate followed by a
remainder interest. The will read in part, as follows:
I will my farm to Elias Williamson for his lifetime to use as he sees fit. Ifhe needs to sell it, he is to give
Zane or Rodney first chance at it. If anything happens to Elias, Zane and Rodney are to work the farm
as they have been doing if they want to. If neither of them want to work the farm, it is to be sold and
$20,000 be given to Hurricane Church to be put in a savings account and the interest each year to go to
the Lottie Moon Christmas offering.

Id at *1. The decedent's brother, along with some nieces and nephews, claimed that the will granted only a life estate to
Elias Williamson. The Trigg County Circuit Court, however, found that the testator had devised the farm in fee simple
absolute. Id. The Kentucky Court ofAppeals agreed, holding that "Camilla Williamson indicated her own wishes for the
ultimate disposition of her beloved farm, but she did so in terms expressing her preference. She left to Elias the right and
the power to use and to consume the property during his life without explicitly and mandatorily removing from him his
ultimate power to dispose of it at his death." Id at *4.
In determining that the will devised the farm in fee simple, the court cited several guiding principles. First, the
court recited the "polar star rule," which holds that
[i]n the absence of some illegality, the intention of the testator is controlling. To ascertain the
testator's intention, it is necessary to first examine the language of the instrument. If the language
used is a reasonably clear expression of intent, then the inquiry need go no further. If it is not such a
clear expression, then it is necessary to construe the language used according to appropriate rules of
construction.

Id at *1, quoting Clarke v. Kirk, 795 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Ky. 1990). The intention of the testator in this case, according to
the court, was to grant Elias Williamson a fee simple interest in the farm. In support ofthis conclusion, the court noted that
the testator left the farm to Elias to use "as he sees fit." Id. at *2 (Emphasis added.) Construing the will in this manner,
said the court, eliminates any contradiction in the first sentence of the will. Id. at *2.
Further, the court found that Elias held the power to make inter vivos gifts as well as testamentary bequests of
the farm. Both of these, said the court, are "necessary components of fee simple ownership." Id. at *2, citing Angel v.
McKeehan, 63 S.W.3d 185 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
The second guiding principle cited by the court was the preference for construing devises as fee simple rather than
as life estates. The court felt that Camilla's expression ofher wishes in connection with the farm were not "so mandatory as
to defeat the law's clear preference for a fee over a life estate." Id. at *2. The Angel case, discussed below, does not change
this preference in Kentucky law. When the testator uses precatory language, ''the case is more clear that a fee interest will
not be defeated." Id. at *3. See also Flynn v. Flynn, 469 S.W.2d 886 (Ky. 1971).
The court further stated that phrases such as "[I]t is my wish that" or "I desire that" indicate a testator's preference
and may even place a "burden on the conscience of the heir," but such words do not rise to the level of imposing a legal
duty. Id. at *3. The court stated that construing a will would be more certain iftestators would use the technical terms "fee
simple" and "life estate" in devises or bequests.
Interestingly, one judge wrote a dissenting opinion expressing the view that the intention of the testator, based on
that judge's reading ofthe will, was to give Elias a life estate in the farm. The sentences following the first line ofthe will,
said Judge Emberton, are meant to describe what should happen to the farm after Elias' death. Id. at *5.
Emberton argued that Kentucky precedents allow for the holder of the life estate to encroach upon the principal
as long as there is no power to make a testamentary gift. Id. at *5, citing Weakley v. Weakley, 237 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1951)
and Melton v. Wyatt, 517 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. 1974). In addition, the dissenter noted that the testator's direction as to what
should occur should Elias die is clearly a "gift over." Id. at *5.
In another recent Kentucky case, Angel v. McKeehan, 63 S.W.3d 185 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001), Luke Angel executed
a will devising all of his property to his wife, Thelma. His will read in part:
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I give bequeath and devise to my beloved wife, Thelma Angel, all ofthe property I may own or have the
right to dispose of at the time of my death, ... to be held, used or spent by her for any purpose she may
desire to spend or use the same, during her natural life, with the only limitations thereon, that should any
portion of said property remain in her hands at the death of my said wife that is over and above what
is needed to pay her debts and funeral expenses, then and in that event, I give bequeath and devise that
portion of said property that is so left, as follows:
Should we not have a child or children, then and in that event, said property from my estate not disposed
ofby my said wife, shall pass one halfto my brothers and sisters, and one halfto the relatives ofmy wife
as follows ...

Id. at 188. Thelma did not dispose of any of the property Luke devised to her before her death. She did, however, execute
a will that purported to devise all of the property that had been left to her by Luke. Id. Luke's family argued that Luke's
will had devised to Thelma only a life estate in the property, and that she therefore had no power to devise it in her will.
Thelma's family argued that the will had granted Thelma a fee simple interest in the property. Id. at 189.
The Kentucky Court ofAppeals agreed with the Angels that Luke had conferred upon Thelma only a life estate
in the property devised. According to the court, Thelma did not have an ''unlimited power to dispose of the property."
An unlimited power of disposition is the power to make testamentary and inter vivos dispositions. While Thelma had the
power to make an inter vivos gift, Luke's will provided for his own gifts of the property at Thelma's death. Id. at 19091.
In coming to this conclusion, the court looked to the intent ofthe testator based on the will as a whole. Id. at 191.
Specifically, Luke's language granting Thelma the property "'during her natural life'" and his very specific disposition of
the property after her death convinced the court of his intent that she receive only a life estate in the property. Id. at 192.
The court, in addition to the testator's intent, must determine if the devisee received an unlimited power of disposition;
anything less and it is not a fee interest.
At issue in Webb v. Maynard, 32 S.W.3d 502 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000) was whether Condor Webb granted his wife a
life estate or a fee simple interest in property he devised in his will. Believing herself to own the property in fee simple,
Condor's wife, Sadie, sold the property to two of her sons, John and Bill, who sold the mining rights to Addington
Enterprises. Id. at 502.
Condor's will granted "[a]ll ofmy real property, ofwhatsoever kind and description, wheresoever situated, which
I may own or have an interest in ... I do hereby give, bequeath and devise to my beloved wife, Sadie Webb, absolutely and
in fee simple." In a later paragraph, the will made the following devises: "Further, upon my wife's death, I give, bequeath
and devise all the rest and residue ofmy real property to my ten remaining children ... absolutely and in fee simple, share
and share alike." Id. at 503.
A daughter, Mary Ruth, challenged Sadie's right to convey the property to John and Bill. The circuit court
found that Condor's will had devised a life estate in Condor's real property to Sadie. The court relied in part on Hanks v.
McDanell, 210 S.W.2d 784 (Ky. 1948) which holds that "a Will bequeathing property to a designated person in language
which would otherwise be a fee with the further provision that any ofthe said property remaining at the death ofthe second
taker should be divided equally among named persons, gives the first taker a life estate only." Id. at 504-05.
The Court ofAppeals disagreed with the circuit court, holding that Sadie had in fact received the property devised
to her by Condor in fee simple. Id. at 508. The Court ofAppeals began its review of the lower court's decision by citing
the polar star rule: "In the absence of some illegality, the intention of the testator is controlling." In order to ascertain the
intention ofthe testator, said the court, one must look to the four comers ofdocument itselffirst. Ifthe document is unclear,
then a court may use rules of construction to interpret the intention of the testator. Id. at 505, citing Clarke v. Kirk, 795
S.W.2d 936, 938 (Ky. 1990).
The court first distinguished Hanks, explaining that in that case the testator had devised to his wife property
''to be used, enjoyed and disposed of by her in any way she may choose" (internal quotes omitted). This language was
followed by a devise of property remaining at his wife's death to specific beneficiaries. Id. at 505-06. On the other hand,
Condor's language specifically devised property to Sadie in fee simple. Id. at 507. Second, the court noted that, according
to Condor's will, the children would receive the personal property only if Sadie predeceased Condor. Id. Third, the court
pointed out that it was appropriate to "consider the conduct of parties as being admissions as to a position on a matter
pending in a judicial proceeding." Id. at 505. Upon Condor's death, all ofthe children (except Mary Ruth, John, and Bill)
conveyed quitclaim deeds to Sadie, implying that they believed Condor meant her to have the property in fee simple. Id.
at 507. Last, the court cited "[a] controlling principle" in interpretation of wills: "[a]n estate once given in fee will not
be defeated by a subsequent provision in the same instrument limiting it to a smaller estate, unless the language of the
instrument or the intention ofthe testator requires it, and when, upon the consideration ofthe whole instrument, the mind is
in doubt as to what estate was intended to pass, that construction will be adopted which passes the fee." Id. at 508, quoting
Clay v. Chorn's Ex'r, 153 S.W. 425, 426 (Ky. 1913). "[T]he law favors the vesting of a fee," said the court. Id. at 508.

[16.51 Powers of the Life Tenant
It is vital to delineate the rights and obligations of the life tenant and the remainder beneficiary. A major concern
of most remainder beneficiaries is the potential consumption or exhaustion of the property by the life tenant. If the life
tenant is given the power to consume or invade the principal by the express terms ofthe will and the will does not provide
the extent to which this power may be exercised, the life tenant's power to consume or invade the principal is limited to
amounts necessary to the tenant's health, education and support according to "his accustomed manner of living." KRS
391.160. Although the statute provides this limitation, the drafter should include specific language in the will governing
the power of invasion.
Sometimes a question arises as to whether a particular item or asset is considered income or principal. Kentucky
has adopted the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, in KRS 386.191, et. seq., which governs the determination
B.
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and allocation of principal and income between the life tenant and remainder beneficiary. The client can insert language
to override these statutory provisions.
The life tenant can be given the discretionary power to sell the property for necessary support and maintenance.
In fact, giving such a power to the surviving spouse is necessary to allow the life estate to meet the requirements ofIRC §
2056(b)(5). The regulations provide that the spouse must have the right to require that unproductive property be converted
to income-producing property. Treas. Reg.§ 20.2056(b)-5(f). If the marital deduction is not a consideration, then the
power to sell should perhaps be specifically eliminated.
The statutory procedure for a partition ofreal property (KRS 389A.030) can be used by a life tenant to require the
court-ordered sale of the property and division of the proceeds between the life tenant and the remaindermen. McKinney
v. McKinney, 888 S.W.2d 332 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994). In McKinney, the testator devised a 226 acre farm to his wife "...
for and during her natural life, and so long as she remains my widow ... or remarriage, whichever first occurs ..." with
remainder in fee to his three children. The court described the life tenant's interest in the property as a "life estate on
executory limitation." The court held that KRS 389A.030 permits the devisee/life tenant to partition the property.
Although the life tenant may want to generate current income from the farm or residence by entering into rental
agreements with third-parties, the life tenant cannot enter into a lease beyond the term of the life estate. However, if the
lease extends beyond the end ofthe current year, and the life tenant dies after March 1, the lessee can pay a reasonable rent
and remain on the land until December 31. KRS 383.190. If the life tenant is given broad powers or ifthe limitations on
the right to receive principal are vague, the potential tax savings that would otherwise be available to the surviving spouse
may be jeopardized. See Estate of Richard J. Hatchett v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 801, T.C.M. (P-H) ~ 89,637,
1989 WL 143136 (Nov. 29, 1989) (tax court denied marital deduction when the power given to the surviving spouse
was for the spouse's "convenience" because such power constituted a non-deductible terminable interest). To avoid this
potential result, language similar to that quoted in Section [16.19] should be used.

c.

[16.61 Duties of the Life Tenant
The life tenant has a duty to exercise reasonable care to preserve the property from injury or diminution. The
remainder beneficiary has a cause of action against the life tenant for unauthorized waste. KRS 381.350. The life tenant
would not only lose the property as a result of the waste, but is subject to liability for damages treble the amount wasted.
Id See also Adams v. Adams, 371 S.W.2d 637 (Ky. 1963).
D.
[16.71 Estate Tax Advantages
The tax advantages ofutilizing life estates will often override the practical problems resulting from the rights and
duties ofthe life tenant. By incorporating life estates in the will, the client can preserve the property for future generations
and simultaneously make full use ofthe estate tax marital deduction. IRC § 2056(b)(7); KRS § 140.080(1 )(a). A life estate
in the surviving spouse will generally qualify for the marital deduction if an election is made on the. estate tax return. See
Chapter 5, supra, for a more complete discussion of marital deduction planning.
If the property subject to the life estate is farmland, the executor may be able to elect special use valuation under
IRC § 2032A. One ofthe most difficult requirements to be satisfied is that all ofthe potential remainder beneficiaries must
be "qualified heirs." IRC § 2032A(b)(I) and (e)(I). A provision pertaining to the farm should be included in the will or
trust to cover the unlikely event that the life tenant outlives all of the client's descendants. The life tenant may be given
the remainder interest if such an event were to occur, or the remainder can be vested in the estate of the last descendant to
predecease the life tenant. See KRS 140.300 (defining "qualified real estate" and "qualified person" for inheritance tax
purposes). See also Revenue Cabinet v. Estate of Marshall, 746 S.W.2d 408 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) and Revenue Cabinet v,
Estate ofField, 864 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding the constitutionality ofKRS 140.300).
Granting a life estate to persons other than the surviving spouse can also reduce the inheritance taxes otherwise
attributable to the property. The values of the life interest and the remainder interest are determined by the United States
life mortality tables using a rate of4% as provided in KRS 140.100(2). The life expectancy table is contained in 103 KAR
7:025. See Estate of Irma M. Ligon Cone v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 137, T.C.M. (P-H) ~ 90,359, 1990 WL 96986
(July 16, 1990) (nephew who is lineal descendant of the decedent spouse's parents, not ofthe decedent's parents, does not
qualify as member of the decedent's family under IRC §2032A(e)(2)).
[16.81 Estate Tax Disadvantages
E.
If the power to sell or to invade the corpus is given to the life tenant pursuant to a standard not described in IRC
§ 2041(b)(I)(A), the property may be subject to estate taxes upon the tenant's death. A general power of appointment
over the corpus is includible in the gross estate ofthe decedent under IRC Section 2041(a). See Fontana v. Commissioner,
Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) 54,693, Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (RIA) 118.16 (Mar. 28,2002) (holding that stock owned outright by the
decedent at his death and stock over which the decedent held a testamentary general power of appointment should be
valued in the aggregate for federal estate tax purposes). Regardless ofIRC § 2041, ifthe life tenant is the surviving spouse
and ifthe asset qualifies under IRC Section 2056(b)(7), the property is nevertheless fully taxed, to the extent not consumed
by the spouse, in the spouse's estate under IRC § 2044. See also KRS § 140.220(4) (which provides the surviving spouse's
estate a right of recovery against the trust assets that are includible in the decedent's gross estate).
In Estate of Martha S. Holmes v. United States, 71A A.F.T.R.2d 93-5036, 90-2 U.S.T.C. ~ 60,029, 1990 WL
300670 (D. Minn. 1990), the Minnesota U.S. District Court held, under Kentucky law, that a will giving the life tenant the
power to use the property "in any way she may deem proper," gives an unlimited power of appointment over the property.
Therefore, the property was included in the decedent/life tenant's gross estate. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-44-081 (July 31,
1990) (the value of the residual estate of the predeceased spouse was included in the wife's gross estate because she had
discretionary power to invade the principal for an "emergency" if the income distributed was insufficient, thereby giving
her a general power of appointment).
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IV.
A.

[16.91 Sample Provisions
[16.10] Life Estate in Realty
"If my spouse is living at my death, my spouse shall be entitled during my spouse's life to the exclusive and
unrestricted right to use the real estate (including the right to continue to occupy the property as a personal residence or to
rent the property and receive the income) and to all the income therefrom, with remainder to my children, per stirpes. Upon
the death ofmy spouse, any accrued or undistributed income from the real estate shall be paid to the personal representative
of my spouse's estate."
Comment
The language in the first sentence is adapted from Prop. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7, Ex. 1. The regulations do
not require, however, that the undistributed income be paid to the surviving spouse's estate. Prop. Reg.
§ 20.2056(b)-7(d)(4). See Estate of Rose D. Howard v. Commissioner, 910 F.2d 633,90-2 U.S.T.C.
~ 60,033 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing decision of the U.S. Tax Court, 91 T.C. 329, Dec. 45,002 (1988)).
In Howard, the Ninth Circuit held that IRC § 2056 does not mandate to whom the accumulated but
undistributed income must go after death nor does it mandate that the accumulated income be paid
immediately to the spouse.
B.
[16.11] Legal Life Estate in Home with Limited Power ofAppointment
"I give and devise any interest I own in a personal residence at the time of my death to my spouse for and during
his/her natural life, without liability for waste, and I further grant to my spouse, alone and in all events, the power to appoint
by his/her will, the remainder of this property to one or more of the persons in the class comprised of my descendants;
provided, however, ifhe/she shall fail to make such appointment, or ifhe/she shall predecease me, then I give and devise
this property, in equal shares, per stirpes, to my descendants who survive me."
Comment
This provision establishes a life estate in the surviving spouse and allows the spouse to select the
remaindermen among a limited class of beneficiaries. The limitation can be more restrictive, or it can be
removed creating a general power of appointment in the surviving spouse. Under either scenario, the gift
should qualify for the unlimited marital deduction.
c.
[16.12] Responsibilities of Life Tenant
"My spouse shall hold the real property without surety on her bond; provided, however, that my spouse shall keep
the property adequately insured against fire loss or damage, shall pay all taxes and assessments levied upon this property
and all installments of principal and interest of any mortgage thereon, and all other carrying charges and maintenance
expense, and shall maintain and keep the real estate in good condition and repair."
Comment
The will or other instrument should define the life tenant's duties as to repairs, require him/her to prevent
damage to the property, and to satisfy carrying charges, such as taxes and insurance.
D.
[16.13] Preserving the § 2032A Election
"Upon the death of my spouse, the real estate (or the proceeds thereof) shall pass outright to my children, or if
no children survive me then per stirpes to my then living descendants. If at any time during the lifetime of my spouse, no
descendant of mine shall be living, the real estate (or the proceeds thereof) shall vest and pass outright to my spouse."
Comment
The special use valuation election requires that the property pass to a qualified heir as defined in IRC
§2032A(e)(I). This paragraph is included so that the property will meet this IRC §2032A requirement.
Alternatively, the remainder interest can be given to the estate of the last descendant of the client to
predecease the life tenant, rather than vesting in the spouse.
E.
[16.14] Power to Allocate
"The life tenant is directed to allocate to principal all capital gains, and all dividends and other distributions which
represent capital gains, realized from the sale of any principal."
Comment
If the property is sold during the life ofthe tenant, a question may arise as to whether the sales proceeds,
or some portion thereof, are to be characterized as principal or income. When the life tenant has only
the right to receive the income from the property, without a power to invade principal or only a limited
right of invasion, the interests of the tenant and the remainder beneficiaries in the sales proceeds will
be adverse to each other. In the absence of express language in the will regarding the ascertainment
of principal and income, the provisions of the Kentucky Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act
will govern. KRS § 386.325. The above provision will make certain that all capital gains, and other
distributions in the nature of capital gains, are characterized as principal.
F.
[16.15] Power to Invade
1.
[16.16] Unlimited Power of Invasion
"During my spouse's lifetime, my spouse shall have the right at any time and from time to time to withdraw or
appoint such amounts from the principal, even to the point of completely exhausting the same, as my spouse in his sole
discretion may determine."
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Comment
This broad language of invasion of principal constitutes a general power of appointment thereby making
the value of the property includible in the estate of the donee, whether or not the power to invade is
exercised. IRC § 2041; Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(I); see also Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g). If the
words "even to the point of completely exhausting same" were not included in this provision, then
KRS 391.160 would impose the ascertainable standard limitation on the power to invade.
Ifthe life estate property is included in the tenant's estate for tax purposes, IRC § 2207 gives the Executor
the authority to recover from the remainder beneficiaries a proportion of such taxes, unless otherwise
directed by the will. The ratio is a comparison of the value of such property to the total taxable estate.
In Sarosdy v. Johnson, 894 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) the surviving wife could withdraw "such
amounts thereof as she may request at any time." The court held that the trust assets, being subject to
such a broad power to invade, were includible in her estate, and thus subject to the recovery rule under
IRC § 2207.

2.

[16.171 Five and Five Power - Lapse

"During my spouse's lifetime, my spouse shall have the right in any calendar year to withdraw from the principal
an amount or amounts not exceeding $5,000 in the aggregate and, in addition, ifmy spouse shall be living on the last day
of such year to withdraw an amount, if any, by which 5% of the then market value of the principal exceeds the amount or
amounts previously withdrawn by my spouse in such year. This right of withdrawal is non-cumulative and shall lapse at
the end of said year to the extent not exercised."

Comment
The so-called "Five and Five" power is a frequently used estate planning technique. The holder of
the power to invade has an annual noncumulative right to demand the greater of $5,000 or 5% of the
principal. IRC § 2041(b)(2). By imposing these limitations on the amount subject to withdrawal each
year, the value of the power of appointment which is includible in the donee's estate is significantly
reduced. Ifthe client wishes for the unexercised portion ofthe withdrawal right to accumulate from year
to year, the above language should not be added.

3.

[16.181 Five and Five Power - Hanging

"As to any withdrawal right granted under this instrument, unless the donor shall specify in writing to the trustee
a different date at the time or in advance of (but never after) a contribution of Gift Property, any withdrawal right granted
under this instrument with respect to a contribution of Gift Property shall terminate wholly or partially in each calendar
year of the trust (i) as soon as and to the maximum extent that such termination does not result in a release of a general
power ofappointment under both §§ 2514(e) and 2041(b)(2) ofthe Code by my spouse, but no sooner than thirty days after
the date of the contribution, or (ii) on the day preceding the date of death ofthe beneficiary, whichever shall occur first. If
any beneficiary possesses powers ofwithdrawal created under this instrument which have not terminated and are related to
more than one transfer, then the powers shall terminate in the order in which they were created."

Comment
This variation of the "Five and Five" power is called the "hanging power." It provides that the power
to withdraw from principal will lapse only to the extent of $5,000 or 5% of the principal. The excess
amount "hangs" and continues into future years until it lapses as described above. If the withdrawal
power allows the spouse to withdraw more, the power will not lapse until that lapse will not be treated
as a taxable gift. See IRC § 2514(e). Its effectiveness in protecting the spouse from tax consequences
is uncertain as a result of the IRS reaction to a similar provision in Commissioner v. Proctor, 142 F.2d
824 (4th Cir. 1944), eert. denied, 323 U.S. 756 (1944). See Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-01-004 (September 16,
1988).

[16.191 Limited by Ascertainable Standard
"During my spouse's lifetime, my spouse shall have a right at any time and from time to time to withdraw from
the principal such amounts as may be required to provide for his health, education, support or maintenance in accordance
with the accustomed manner ofliving he enjoys at the time ofmy death, without regard to any income or any other property
which he may have."
Comment
The power to invade for the benefit of the life tenant which is limited by an ascertainable standard
relating to health, education, support, or maintenance ofthe tenant is not a general power of appointment.
IRC § 2041(b)(I)(A); Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(2). Thus, the subject property is not includible in the
gross estate of the life tenant. In determining whether a power is limited by an ascertainable standard,
it is immaterial whether the beneficiary must exhaust other income before exercising the power of
appointment.
G.
r16.201 Power to Sell
"My spouse shall have the power to sell, exchange, or otherwise dispose of the real estate at public or private
sale, for such purposes, and upon such terms, including sales on credit with or without security, in such manner and at
such prices as my spouse may determine, and to make, execute and deliver any and all deeds, conveyances, and other
instruments necessary or proper to transfer and convey sufficient title thereto."
4.
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Comment
The power of sale is necessary to meet the requirements of Regulation § 20.2056(b)-5(t) regarding the
disposition ofunproductive property and thus allowing the life interest to qualify for the estate tax marital
deduction. Ifthe marital deduction is not a consideration, however, this provision can be eliminated. See
also Lucas v. Mannering, 745 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987). The testator can also require the tenant
to reinvest the proceeds from the sale in other similar or like kind property.

H.

[16.211 Successive Legal Life Estates

"I give and devise any interest I own in that certain farm located on Farm Road, Lexington, Kentucky at the time
of my death to my husband and my children for and during their natural lives. The net income from said property shall
be divided equally among said individuals. Upon the death of any of said individuals the survivors shall receive the net
income in equal shares."

Comment
This provision creates multiple or successive life tenancies. It is important for the testator also to address
management and other issues, such as waste, maintenance, carrying charges, etc. in this provision or
elsewhere in the governing instrument. The testator should also specify the disposition ofthe property at
the death of the last surviving tenant or refer to an applicable residuary clause.
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I.

[18.1]

Introduction

A.

[18.2]

Scope of Chapter

This chapter will examine the concept of "agent" as is used in its capacity with a power of attorney. The
principal-agent relationship will be reviewed to determine both the authority and responsibilities that can be assumed by
the agent as that authority is transferred from the principal to the agent. This section will also look at the unique use ofthe
power of attorney and how that concept can be expanded to insure that the holder of the "power" will be able to continue
management of assets, provide a gifting program, and in many instances minimize both income and estate taxes. All of
these things can be accomplished even though the principal is incapacitated, either physically or mentally.

B.

[18.3]

Common Definitions and Terms

The review of some definitions is necessary in order to follow the content ofthis chapter:
1.

Principal: The individual grantor of a power;

2.

Agent: The individual or institution appointed by the principal to carry out requested activities;

3.

Attorney-in-Fact: The agent appointed under a power of attorney by a principal;

4.

General Power ofAttorney: Gives attorney-in-fact full control over assets of principal;

5.

Limited Power ofAttorney: Gives limited control of principal's assets;

6.

Durable Power ofAttorney: Either general or limited power of attorney that specifies its survival
even if principal is disabled;

7.

Springing Power ofAttorney: This attorney-in-fact relationship can either be general or limited,
and even though signed by the principal, does not come into legal existence until the happening of
an event not related to the execution of this document. This event could be upon the principal's
incapacity, upon the occurrence of a date certain, or any other standard that could be determined by
a third party. If this event is not defined in the document, the statute provides a standard. This is
authorized in KRS 386.093.

II.

[18.41

Law ofAgency - Power ofAttorney

A.

[18.51

Application to Power ofAttorney

In its purest sense, a power of attorney is a relationship between a principal and agent. This relationship is
established by a written document which authorizes and empowers the attorney-in-fact to perform certain acts for the
principal immediately or upon a subsequent event. Under normal circumstances, a relationship between a principal and
agent must terminate upon the death, incapacity, or inability of the principal to continue to give instructions to the agent.
The use of a durable power ofattorney can insure that the principal-agent relationship will continue beyond the incapacity
of the principal. It must terminate at death and in Kentucky, under the current statute, must terminate upon a "fiduciary"
being appointed by a court to handle the affairs of the principal. This provision is contained in KRS 386.093.

B.

[18.61

Fiduciary or Not?

The power of attorney is a relationship between the principal and the agent. This relationship is controlled by the
general law of agency, which spells out specific responsibilities ofthe agent:
1.

Duty of loyalty to principal;

2.

Obedience to principal's orders, provided they do not require actions that are illegal or contrary to
public policy;

3.

Exercise of ordinary care, diligence, and skill in the performance of its assigned duties;

4.

Account to the principal.

A fiduciary is defined as an individual or institution charged with the duty of acting for the benefit of another
party as to matters coming within the scope ofthe relationship between them. Restatement (Second) ofAgency section 13
says an "agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency." Many state statutes define fiduciary
to include an agent under a power of attorney. Kentucky in KRS 395.001 does not include either an agent or an attorneyin-fact in that definition of a fiduciary.
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The Restatement (Second) of Agency in section 17 provides that there are acts that cannot be delegated by a
principal to an agent. Many of these acts are construed in the statutes. In Kentucky, the power to sign a will under KRS
394.040 can only be delegated to another individual if the testator is both competent at the time of delegation and directs
the signing on his or her behalf: There are numerous other situations in which the principal cannot delegate authority to
the agent (e.g. expert testimony).
One ofthe agent's duties is to exercise ordinary care, diligence and skill in the performance of its duties. Since the
agent in Kentucky is not deemed to be a fiduciary, then its duty is less than in those states that define the agent or attorneyin-fact as a fiduciary. Those states that define the agent or attorney-in-fact as a fiduciary do provide liability against the
agent by the principal because of imprudent acts by the agent.
C.

r18.71

Who Should Act as Attorney-in-Fact?

Who should serve as agent or attorney-in-fact for the principal?
The most logical response to the question is whoever the principal has confidence in to carty out his wishes. In a
marital situation that probably means the other spouse. The problem with this is "what happens in the event of a separation
or dissolution of the marriage?" This can be anticipated by inserting language in the document appointing the agent with
the condition that legal separation or dissolution of the marriage serves as resignation of the appointed spouse as agent or
attorney-in-fact.
It may be appropriate to use a business partner as attorney-in-fact but there may be inherent conflicts because of
the economic interest of the parties. The appointment of one child as agent or attorney-in-fact to the exclusion of other
siblings may signal a family split.
Many professionals are asked to serve as an agent or attorney-in-fact for their client, patient, or parishioner. If
either the attorney or CPA is asked to serve, they must be concerned about potential liability and whether their malpractice
insurance will cover them in that capacity. The doctor may be a good choice in a health care situation but perfectly horrible
in an asset management situation.
The American BarAssociation Section ofReal Property, Probate and Trust conducted a survey in 1995 to determine
the use of durable powers of attorney. This survey was reported in the Probate and Property Journal of January/February,
1996. Approximately 38% ofthe questionnaires were returned and it is interesting to note the following results:
1.

The durable power of attorney has also become part of the standard estate planning package.
Approximately 49% of the respondents indicated that they prepare durable powers of attorney in
over 90% of their estate planning engagements. Seventy-one percent of those responding indicated
that they prepared durable powers of attorney in over half of such estate planning engagements;

2.

Forty percent of the respondents were aware of one or more durable power of attorneys that had
been misused. Sixty-two percent of the respondents concluded that misuse had occurred in 1% or
less ofthe cases and 91 % found that it had occurred in 5% or less;

3.

An area of special concern in the use of a durable power of attorney was in making gifts. The vast
majority did not favor mandatory court approval of gifts but did propose consideration for limits
on gifts made by an agent and, specifically, limitations on gifts to the individual agent. Sixty-nine
percent of the respondents concluded that gifts to the agent should only be allowed if specifically
authorized in the instrument or by court approval;

4.

Sixty percent ofthe respondents said that a power of attorney should be notarized and recorded;

5.

All respondents stressed the importance of emphasizing to clients the potential for abuse and the
need to counsel and advise on the selection of agent.

Prudent drafting may attempt to eliminate some of the provisions that have become onerous as it relates to a
power of attorney lapsing upon the appointment of a court fiduciary. It may be appropriate to consider that a direction in
the actual power of attorney document suggesting that if a court appointed fiduciary is required that the individual serving
as the attorney-in-fact would be the preference expressed by the principal for this appointment.
D.

r18.81

How Can Agents be Compensated?

The agent should be paid and this should be set out in the agreement or power of attorney. If an agent is defined
as a fiduciary under state law then there may be statutory authority for the fees of the agent. Fees should be paid currently
and not deferred to the principal's estate as a claim. The principal may find some portion of the agent's fee deductible for
income tax purposes.
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E.

[18.91

Settlement for the Attorney-in-Fact

One ofthe primary duties ofthe agent is to account to his principal for his actions. Some states define an agent as
a fiduciary and require court supervised accountings. As we have seen, this is not the case in Kentucky in that an agent is
not within the definition provided for fiduciaries in KRS 395.001. In drafting an agency agreement or power of attorney,
this issue should be considered. In KRS 386.093, the appointment by a court of a guardian or other fiduciary requires
the attorney-in-fact to account to that fiduciary prior to the departure from his office. Some states have allowed both a
court appointed agent and an attorney-in-fact to function in a dual capacity for the principal. This is especially true as it
may relate to the "guardianship" ofthe person where the management ofthe financial affairs ofthe principal exist under a
durable power of attorney. Many of these statutes require that the accountings by the attorney-in-fact be furnished to the
court appointed fiduciary.

F.

[18.101 What Authority Does Attorney-in-Fact Have and Will Third Parties Rely on the Attorney-inFact's Authority?

One of the more difficult tasks that an agent under a power of attorney must do is to get third party providers of
service to rely on the written document. In all honesty this may be easy to understand from the third party's point of view
since the document mayor may not be recorded and may have been signed by the principal many years before its use.
The principal's bank may be the most resistant to this endeavor because of the fiduciary relationship that the
bank has with the principal. The bank accepts liability to its depositor if it pays out over fraudulent instructions. Vendors
and merchants also have difficulty in dealing with the agent or attorney-in-fact unless they believe that the agent has the
authority to bind the principal. A way to minimize this difficulty is for the written instructions from the principal to the
agent to be specific as to the agent's authority. The specificity of the instruction will tend to make third parties more
comfortable in dealing with the agent. The down side of specific authority is that it makes for lengthy documents.
Some states have adopted language in sections of their statutes to attempt to deal with this concern. Kentucky
gives some support in the last portion ofKRS 386.093 as follows:
All acts done by the attorney-in-fact or agent, pursuant to the power during any period of disability or
incompetence or uncertainty as to whether the principal is dead or alive, have the same effect and inure
to the benefit of and bind the principal or his heirs, devisees and personal representative as ifthe principal
were alive, competent and not disabled.
The Kentucky statute could be more persuasive for a third party's benefit. Therefore, it may be appropriate to add
an insulating clause in the document to guard against this problem.
Some states have given the attorney-in-fact protection and also third parties dealing with that attorney-in-fact
when the attorney-in-fact does not have actual notice that the principal is either incapacitated, dead, or represented by a
court appointed fiduciary. If the power of attorney is not a durable power of attorney then incapacity of the principal is a
critical element because the document would fail without a "durability provision." If the principal had died, the power of
attorney is void but the attorney-in-fact may be performing an act without notice ofthe principal's death and should be given
sufficient protection in carrying out that act. Therefore, it would appear that statutory revisions to provide this insulation
for both the attorney-in-fact and third parties dealing with that attorney-in-fact would be appropriate considerations for our
legislators. This protection is provided for specific purpose power of attorney in KRS 384.010.

G.

[18.111 What Special Needs Should be Given Special Attention?
The desires and needs of the principal will dictate the powers and authorities that should be granted.

Kentucky is in the minority ofjurisdictions that subordinate the attorney-in-fact's power under a durable power
of attorney to a court appointed guardian. KRS 386.093. There is the potential non-desired effect for an incompetent
principal when his chosen attorney-in-fact under a durable power of attorney is replaced by a non-principal selected, and
court appointed, guardian. This could be drafted around by recommending the court appoint, ifnecessary, the attorney-infact under the durable power of attorney if such guardian is required.
Other specific authorities and powers may deal with health care, gifts, tax planning, insurance, real estate and all
other assets as desires of the principal.
The law of agency has grown up through statutory and case construction. The best advice that we can use in
representing our clients in an agency relationship is to be as specific as possible in dealing with special assets or special
directions from the principal to the agent.
As was pointed out above, Kentucky is inthe minority ofjurisdictions dealing with the survivability ofan attorneyin-fact after a court appointed fiduciary is selected. Rice v. Floyd (768 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1989)) provided that the powers of
the principal's attorney-in-fact were terminated upon the appointment of a court guardian. Additionally, the durable power
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of attorney is not a substitute for appointment of a guardian and cannot prevent instigation of guardianship proceedings.
The provisions contained in KRS Chapter 387 are deemed to be the appropriate protection for an individual who is found
to be incapacitated and, therefore, necessitate the appointment of a court "guardian." It is difficult to rationalize these
provisions when it would appear that one of the primary purposes of the durable power of attorney is to guard against the
appointment of a court fiduciary. A course that could be pursued to provide for this protection is the suggestion to a court
that the attorney-in-fact be appointed as the fiduciary and that all of the necessary powers for guardians be allowed in the
event of a detennination of incompetency on behalf of the principal.

III.

[18.121 Evolution of the Durable Power OfAttorney

A.

[18.131 How Did the Durable Power ofAttorney Evolve?

All fifty states, as well as the District of Columbia, have now adopted statutory recognition of the durable power
of attorney. The District of Columbia adopted such legislation on February 28, 1987.
A durable power of attorney is a special attorney-in-fact relationship that remains viable and effective even though
the principal later becomes incompetent. This is a modification of the common law where the typical principal-agent
relationship tenninates upon the death, disability or incompetence of the principal or agent. This relationship can survive
these tenninating events if the durable power of attorney and its statutory "magic words" or their equivalent are used in
the drafting of the document.
Unless the power of attorney has the "magic words" or their equivalent, the document becomes voidable when
the principal can no longer direct the actions ofthe agent (attorney-in-fact). The document is voidable because the agent's
action can bind the principal until the agent has actual notice. KRS 384.010.
In order to prevent this problem of lapse upon incompetency of the principal, the durable power of attorney
evolved and has now become the accepted nonn in protecting a principal against disability. It was an out-cropping ofwork
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Unifonn State Laws and their efforts with the Unifonn Probate Code.
The recognized problem was that the court appointed asset management alternatives had become expensive and
cumbersome. With the desire to simplify and unencumber this process, the durable power of attorney was born. This
proposed statutory alternative was to apply to both management of property, and care and custody of persons.
After many false starts the 1969 Unifonn Probate Code contained a section dealing with the durable power of
attorney. In 1979 the Unifonn Durable Power ofAttorney Act (UDPA) was promulgated.
The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) reports that in the year 2000 approximately 45% of those
over age fifty (50) had executed durable powers of attorney and approximately 70% of those over age seventy (70) had
durable powers of attorney. The AARP reports that only 23% of persons over the age of fifty (50) have living trusts
and approximately 30% of individuals over age seventy (70) have living trusts. Clearly, the elderly and their advisors
have chosen the durable power of attorney as the preferred method of planning for the management of the affairs of an
incapacitated elderly person. (Where There is a Will ... Legal Documents Among the 50+ Population: Findings from an
AARP Survey (AARP Research Group, Apri/2000)).

B.

[18.141 State Acceptance of Durable Power ofAttorney

All fifty (50) states, plus the District of Columbia, have adopted some fonn of durable power of attorney statute.
As recited previously, some states adopted the 1969 portion ofthe Unifonn Probate Code dealing with this and others have
revised or adopted the 1979 Unifonn Durable Power ofAttorney Act.
There were two alternatives originally proposed: "immediate power" or the "springing power." The immediate
power was similar to a non-durable power of attorney except that additional language was inserted to insure that the
power given to the attorney-in-fact was not void or voidable as a result ofthe principal's subsequent "mental or physical"
incapacity. The power was immediate because the principal delegated the power and authority to the attorney-in-fact when
the document was properly executed. There was no delay between the time in which the power was granted and when the
attorney-in-fact could exercise such delegated power.
The springing power is not an immediate delegation of authority to act. Here the authority to act is contingent
upon the happening of some subsequent event. This subsequent event is usually defined as the "disability ofthe principal."
Upon the happening of that event the power and authority is said to "spring" forward and invest the attorney-in-fact with
a mantel of authority to act for the principal. Most states have not taken the additional step to define how third parties can
rely on the fact that in a springing power the subsequent event has occurred.
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The difficulty with determining when a springing power of attorney comes into legal effect has presented many
problems for the attorney-in-fact in dealing with third parties. Therefore, it is appropriate for draftsmen to insure that
standards are spelled out in the power of attorney document and that these provisions would be "self-executing." If the
attorney-in-fact is proposing to use the document on behalf of the principal, it should be conclusively presumed by the
statute that the authority and the event triggering the springing has occurred.
Kentucky adopted a form ofthe durable power ofattorney in 1972 (effective 6-16-72) but had resisted subsequent
changes to further refine and expand the authority of both the principal and attorney-in-fact in this relationship as it deals
with asset management and health care alternatives, until 1998 and 2000. The Kentucky statute is set forth below.
KRS 386.093. Effect of Disability, Incapacity, or Death on Power ofAttorney, Durable or Otherwise.
(1) As used in this section, durable power of attorney means a power of attorney by which a principal
designates another as the principal's attorney-in-fact in writing and the writing contains the
words, "This power of attorney shall not be affected by subsequent disability or incapacity of the
principal, or lapse oftime", or "This power of attorney shall become effective upon the disability or
incapacity of the principal", or similar words showing the intent of the principal that the authority
conferred shall be exercisable notwithstanding the principal's subsequent disability or incapacity,
and unless it states a time of termination, notwithstanding the lapse of time since the execution of
the instrument.
(2) All acts done by an attorney-in-fact under a durable power ofattorney during any period ofdisability
or incapacity of the principal have the same effect and inure to the benefit of and bind the principal
and the principal's successors in interest as ifthe principal were competent and not disabled. Unless
the instrument states a time of termination, the. power is exercisable notwithstanding the lapse of
time since the execution of the instrument.
(3) The death of a principal who has executed a written power of attorney, durable or otherwise, does
not revoke or terminate the agency as to the attorney-in-fact or other person, who without actual
knowledge of the death of the principal, acts in good faith under the power. Any action so taken,
unless otherwise invalid or unenforceable, binds successors in interest of the principal.
(4) The disability or incapacity ofthe principal who has previously executed a written power of attorney
that is not a durable power does not revoke or terminate the agency as to the attorney-in-fact or other
person, who, without actual knowledge of the disability or incapacity of the principal, acts in good
faith under the power. Any action so taken, unless otherwise invalid or unenforceable, binds the
principal and the principal's successors in interest.
(5) If the power of attorney is to become effective upon the disability or incapacity of the principal,
the principal may specify the conditions under which the power is to become effective and may
designate the person, persons, or institution responsible for making the determination of disability
or incapacity. If the principal fails to so specify, the power shall become effective upon a written
determination by two (2) physicians that the principal is unable, by reason of physical or mental
disability, to prudently manage or care for the principal's person or property, which written
determination shall be conclusive proof of the attorney-in-fact's power to act pursuant to the
power of attorney. The two (2) physicians making the determination shall be licensed to practice
medicine.
(6) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a durable power of attorney may authorize an
attorney-in-fact to make a gift ofthe principal's real or personal property to the attorney-in-fact or to
others if the intent of the principal to do so is unambiguously stated on the face of the instrument.

HISTORY: 2000 c 27, § 1, eff. 7-14-00
1998 c 421, § 2, eff. 7-15-98; 1972 c 168, § 1, eff. 6-16-72
In KRS 382.370 and 386.095, the legislature provides both the requirements for recording and revocation of
durable power of attorney:
KRS 382.370. Power of attorney to conveyor release property Recording-Revocation. Powers of
attorney to conveyor release real or personal property, or any interest therein, may be acknowledged,
proved and recorded in the proper office, in the manner prescribed for recording conveyances. If the
conveyance made under a power is required by law to be recorded or lodged for record, to make the same
valid against creditors and purchasers, then the power must be lodged or recorded in like manner and no
such power so recorded shall be deemed to be revoked by any act ofthe party by whom it was executed,
except from the time when there has been lodged for record in the office in which the power is recorded
a written revocation, executed and proved or acknowledged in the manner prescribed for conveyances,
or a memorandum ofrevocation made on the margin ofthe record thereof: which memorandum is signed
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by the party executing the same, and attested by the clerk.
KRS 386.095. Execution and delivery of release of powers exercisable by deed, will or otherwise.
(1) Any power which is exercisable by deed, by will, by deed or will, or otherwise, whether general or
special, other than a power in trust which is imperative, is releasable by written instrument signed by
the donee of the power and delivered as hereinafter provided. A power which is releasable may be
released with respect to the whole or any part ofthe property subject to such power and may also be
released in such manner as to reduce or limit the persons or objects, or classes ofpersons or objects,
in whose favor such favor would otherwise be exercisable. No release of a power shall be deemed
to make imperative a power which was not imperative prior to such release, unless the instrument of
release expressly so provides.
(2) Such release may be delivered to any of the following:
(a) any person specified for such purpose in the instrument creating the power;
(b) any trustee ofthe power to which the power relates;
(c) any person, other than the donee of the power, who could be adversely affected by an exercise
of the power; or
(d) the recorder of deeds of the county in which the donee of the power resides or has a place
of business, or in which the deed, will or other instrument creating the power is recorded.
(Effective 7-13-84).
Kentucky has special purpose provisions to protect an attorney-in-fact for individuals in the armed forces or
serving in an area outside the United States, but has consistently failed to consider and adopt the meaningful support for
health care provisions and more stringent asset management provisions. KRS 384.010 protects the attorney-in-fact from
liability in the event the principal dies but the agent is not aware of the factual circumstances:
KRS 384.010. Power of attorney given by member of armed forces or person outside United States
in war activity, when revoked by death. No agency created by a power of attorney in writing given by
a principal who is at the time of execution, or who, after executing such power of attorney, becomes,
either
(a) A member of the armed forces of the United States, or
(b) A person serving as a merchant seaman outside of the limits of the United States, or
(c) A person outside said limits by permission, assignment or direction of any department or official of
the United States government, in connection with any activity pertaining to or connected with the
prosecution of any war in which the United States is then engaged shall be revoked or terminated
by the death of the principal, as to the agent or other person who, without actual knowledge or
actual notice of the death of the principal, shall have acted or shall act, in good faith under or in
reliance upon such power of attorney or agency, and any action so taken, unless otherwise invalid
or unenforceable, shall be binding on the heirs, devisees, legatees, or personal representative of the
principal. (Enact. Acts 1944. ch. 100 § I. efT. 3-20-44).
The American College of Probate Counsel conducted a study on state differences and published its report on
June 1, 1986, concerning durable powers of attorney and the state variations. A more current analysis of state statutes is
contained in Francis J. Collin, Jr., et aI., (2d ed.) of Shepard's-McGraw Hill's edition of Drafting the Durable Power of
Attorney: A Systems Approach.

C.

[18.151 Conflict of Laws

When the literature is reviewed, especially Collin's Drafting the Durable Power of Attorney, one comes away
with the distinct impression that the only thing uniform about state statutes dealing with the durable power of attorney is
the lack of uniformity. The American College of Probate Counsel's study gives additional credibility to this statement
through its liberal use of "not clear," "no law," "common law," and "common law of conflicts applies" in its completion
of state comparisons.
Some significant differences between states must require that the attorney review with his client the geographic
areas in which the durable power of attorney will be used. A list of some significant differences compiled in a very cursory
review are as follows:
1.

Does the state statute recognize the durable power of attorney without specific statutory language in
the document;

2.

Does the state statute authorize a springing power;
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3.

Some states limit who can be appointed as attorney-in- fact;

4.

Many states have adopted the "model form" power of attorney provisions and form ofthe document
in their statutes;

5.

Some states require court approval of the power of attorney's appointment;

6.

A minority of states (Kentucky included) provide that a court appointed guardian replaces the
attorney-in-fact;

7.

Other states limit the power of the attorney-in-fact to deal with specific assets.

Specifically, there is no federal law dealing with durable powers of attorney and therefore state law will control
this area. Both common law and state statutes must be consulted in advising our clients. Most cases that have dealt
with this special area have been considered in light of the law of contract and generally the law of the principal ~ state of
domicile controls. The attorney-in-fact must be concerned about different states that may have contacts with the principal.
This consideration is vital in dealing with real estate transactions. Basically, the state where enforcement of an action is
sought becomes the critical link to resolving the conflict of law question.

I~

[18.161 Asset Management and Tax Planning with the Durable Power ofAttorney

A.

[18.171 What Is Involved in Property Management?

A primary reason for a principal appointing an attorney-in-fact is the management ofthe principal's assets. Assets
that have been accumulated over a lifetime can be extremely divergent: real estate, stocks, bonds, retirement plans, tangible
personal property, oil and gas interests, and closely held business interests.

B.

[18.181 Investment Management

Whenever an attorney-in-fact takes over management of assets for his principal, the first thing to accomplish is an
inventory ofthose items. Ifthe principal is competent, then the principal's assistance is vital to successfully assembling the
assets. If the principal is not able to assist, then the attorney-in-fact must have sufficient authority to carry this endeavor
to conclusion. This may mean gathering all the principal's records such as bank accounts, safe deposit boxes, brokerage
accounts, trust relationships, business interest and other valuable assets. The durable power of attorney must enhance the
attorney-in-fact's ability to conduct this search.
Secondly, the attorney-in-fact must safeguard and control these assembled assets. This involves a review of
insurance on items of value including house, personalty, and other special assets (horses, etc.). It also involves redirecting
mail and the custody of assets. The attorney-in-fact must determine the principal's needs for income from the asset. The
agent must consider whether the current makeup of assets will accomplish this purpose and ifnot, there must be alterations
in the investment portfolio. The attorney-in-fact must determine what the principal's investment objective may have been
and whether that objective continues to be appropriate in light of any changed circumstances of the principal.
Thirdly, there must be active management of the principal's assets in order to meet expectations. This may mean
the negotiation of property leases or sales, the management of the principal's business interest by performing these items
personally or by supervising others in this regard, or adjustment in the principal's investment portfolio to meet both current
income and growth projections.
Finally, the attorney-in-fact has to maintain books and records sufficient to advise the principal. The attorney-infact has to deal with all authorities who may have an interest in the principal's assets.

c.

[18.191 Use in Estate Planning

If the principal can participate in this effort, then a lot of concern is removed from the attorney-in-fact. The
attorney-in-fact must review wills, trusts, deeds and any other documents conveying a property interest to or from the
principal during the initial control and inventory process.
There is a vast majority of opinions that the attorney-in-fact cannot vary testamentary instruments because the
principal cannot delegate this authority. The attorney-in-fact can alter the scheme of disposition by independent acts
involving assets or other items involved in the principal's estate. This may involve the sale of all ''tax free" bonds because
ofthe change in the principal's investment objectives and reinvestment ofthose assets in stocks. This could affect a general
bequest in the principal's will, of"tax free" bonds, if any, to be given to a named individual. If the attorney-in-fact has the
duty to modify assets, they should be insulated from liability by expectant heirs, legatees or devisees.
The principal's attorney-in-fact must be aware of the testamentary disposition of the principal's assets. A
consideration of gifts to minimize the principal's estate must insure that property intended to pass to a beneficiary through
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the estate is not thwarted by gifting that property to another person. The attorney-in-fact has limited ability to change any
type of testamentary disposition such as the execution of a will or codicil. The only way that this can be accomplished
under Kentucky law is via KRS 394.040, which states that "the name of the testator subscribed thereto by himself: or by
some other person in his presence and by his direction." Therefore, the attorney-in-fact does not have the ability to sign
a testamentary document on behalf of the principal unless that principal is both present and directs the individual on his
behalfto accomplish that task. The existence ofthe power of attorney does not add further validity to that act. This should
also apply to a revocable trust with testamentary disposition.

D.

[18.201 Gift Planning

The idea ofmaking a gift can accomplish a number ofgoals for the principal: reduce size ofestate, remove taxable
income from principal's liability picture, and continue a gift program started by the principal.
There are practical problems involved in gifting techniques and these should be discussed by principal, attorney,
and attorney-in-fact. They should also be dealt with in the durable power of attorney with specific authority. As pointed
out above, a gift may alter the principal's estate plan and subsequently put the attorney-in-fact in a liability situation with
an expectant heir. If the principal wanted to continue a gift program by the attorney-in-fact, can that attorney-in-fact
continue such gifts without creating a conflict of interest? This conflict can only be resolved by the principal and should
be specifically authorized in the instrument. The specific authority is necessary because ofthe common law prohibition of
an agent diminishing assets of the principal.
Some draftsmen have limited gifts by the attorney-in-fact to both those amounts and donees begun before the
attorney-in-fact assumed control of assets of the principal. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) has usually
acknowledged these gifts ifthere is a specific authority vested in the attorney-in-fact. The Service has attacked gifts made
without specific authority in the instrument. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-35-007.
The ability of the attorney-in-fact to execute a valid "Qualified Disclaimer" is a form of gifting because it is a
refusal on behalf of the principal to accept the benefits of the gift. This specific authority is allowed in KRS 394.610 for
either the person, "or the representative of an incapacitated or protected person" to disclaim an interest to be received
by the principal. This is a form of indirect gifting without the tax implication if the conditions of a qualified disclaimer
are met. Changes in KRS 394.610 in 1998 insure that an attorney-in-fact is treated as a "legal representative ofa living
person." The actual power of attorney document must give the attorney-in-fact the power to disclaim. This has been
confirmed on the Federal level in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-15-017.
Some states have included authority for the attorney-in-fact to make gifts. The IRS also recognizes the gifting
capability if there is specific mention of such authority. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-23-004; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-35-007. Gifts from
revocable trusts have presented unique sets of circumstances for both the principals and their attorneys-in-fact. The
Service has taken the position that gifts from revocable trusts by either the grantor or his agent may be pulled back into
the grantor's estate if death occurs within three years of the gift. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-15-001; Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-16002). This is especially true where the revocable trust has a testamentary disposition and the beneficiaries of that trust
include individuals other than the grantor. This is shown by such cases as Estate of Casey, 98 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1991),
where the power of attorney contained no specific provision authorizing the attorney to make gifts or to convey without
consideration. There was a broad authority to do, execute and perform all and every other act or acts. Likewise, in Estate
of Sylvia P. Goldman v. Commissioner (T.C.M. 1996-29, Jan. 25, 1996), the Tax Court found that gifts drawn on the
decedent's checking account by her daughter as her attorney-in-fact were not to be excluded from the estate ofthe decedent
because the power of attorney did not contain specific language authorizing the gifts. Kentucky now authorizes gifts as
provided in KRS 386.093(6) under specified conditions.

E.

[18.211 Income and Tax Planning: Pre and Post Incapacity

A review of the principal's assets must consider the tax impact on those investments and the "after tax" effect on
the principal. The attorney-in-fact probably possesses the implied authority to minimize the principal's tax liability as long
as the long-term objectives can be met.
There may be consideration ofhow a retirement benefit is to be received so as to generate the greatest tax benefit.
It may be appropriate to consider the income tax effect of making a gift or continuing a gift program.
Additional problems that revolve around the income tax impact are as follows:
1.

Borrowing of funds;

2.

Dealing with taxing authorities even to the point of settling or litigating potential tax questions;

3.

Purchase of "flower bonds;" and

4.

Considering tax issues of special assets like paid up life insurance and interests or powers in trusts
or estates.
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F.

[18.221 Durable Powers ofAttorney and Elderly Clients

The use of the durable power of attorney with elderly clients takes on special significance versus the use of
the durable power of attorney with younger clients for estate planning purposes only. For the practitioner, this special
significance occurs in the initial interviews in order to substantiate that the elderly client does understand the authority
being granted by the durable power of attorney and also is comfortable with the selection ofthe agent to act for that elderly
client. There very well may be competing interest within the family and therefore, the selection of the attorney-in-fact is
critical in order to insure that the client gets the best representation and the best care.
There are special needs that must be considered for the elderly client as follows:
1.

Should there be multiple agents appointed with the same authority and capacity in order to be used
as a "checks and balance system"?

2.

Should the agent be compensated because the elder client may use more services from that agent
than mere safekeeping or bill paying? In many instances, there may be the necessity to apply for
Medicaid or other medical assistance programs and to take aggressive approaches regarding care
and institutionalization.

3.

There may be specific powers and authorities required in the elder's power of attorney:

4.

to change the principal's residence or domicile
to change the designated beneficiary of the principal's life insurance, annuities, IRAs, 401k
plans, etc. with Court supervision and approval
to amend or revoke the principal's Revocable Trust or to add assets to or withdraw assets from
the trust with Court approval
to redirect the principal's mail in order that the U.S. Postal Service will comply with the use of
a power of attorney
to provide and pay for caregivers to permit the principal to remain at home, even if this care is
more expensive than care provided in a skilled or unskilled nursing facility
to dispose of the principal's tangible personal property and pets if the principal is unable to
remain at home
Gifting authority is critical for the elders but must be prudently decided and granted, if at all.

5.

Since there may be competing interests, should the attorney-in-fact be required to furnish
accountings showing receipts and disbursements on behalf ofthe principal?

v:

[18.231 Drafting the Durable Power ofAttorney

A.

[18.241 What Does the Client Intend?

As discussed in the Estate Planning sections of this handbook, the client's input is vital in recognizing goals and
objectives of the plan. It is even of greater importance when making decisions about who should handle the clients' asset
management needs and the clients' health care needs. As a result, the client interview process is extremely important from
the practitioner's point of view to determine the client's needs and desires. Such questions as these need answers:

B.

1.

Who should act as attorney-in-fact and should there be a substitute appointed?

2.

Would you want the power to be effective immediately or only upon a subsequent event?

3.

What type of health care do you desire?

4.

Would you want the attorney-in-fact to remove life sustaining care if you had no chance of
recovery?

5.

Should there be a direction for the attorney-in-fact to make gifts?

[18.251 Drafting Differences
The instrument must clearly state the client's desires.

In drafting a springing power of attorney, there is a greater need for specificity than drafting a non-springing
power of attorney. Some states have adopted criteria for determining when a springing power comes into being, but most
states have not taken this approach. The draftsman must set out some standard for determining when the power springs
into being. The biggest problem is not only defining incapacity but also getting third parties to rely on the attorney-in-fact's
actions as a result ofthat incapacity.
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Many draftsmen have chosen to define incapacity as when the principal can no longer carry on his or her normal
affairs. This can also be signified by the principal certifying that the power of attorney is to be treated as being effective
from the date of certification forward. Some documents provide that the principal's attending physician must certify such
incapacity. This would require some instrument to be signed by the physician. The client should have a clear understanding
with the physician concerning incapacity.
It may be necessary to draft other documents besides the durable power of attorney. Many clients have used
the tool of a "standby trust" which is prepared and signed during the client's life. There is a "limited" durable power of
attorney prepared in conjunction with this standby trust. The only function of the attorney-in-fact is to take steps that are
necessary to fund the trust with the principal's assets upon the occurrence of a contingency. It may be necessary for the
attorney-in-fact to sign deeds or mineral division orders to accomplish this task. In many instances, this standby trust
continues after the principal's death to carry out a testamentary disposition.

C.

[18.261 Signing and Recording the Durable Power ofAttorney

In most states there are specific requirements concerning the signing of documents that convey title to either real
or personal property. There are additional requirements concerning the recording of the documents. Furthermore, some
entities that deal with the attorney-in-fact will require an "original, signed copy" for their files. This is especially true of
banks and insurance companies.
The following is a partial checklist that should be followed in executing a durable power of attorney:
1.

Insure that the instrument is prepared and signed so that it can be recorded in all jurisdictions where
the principal has contacts.

2.

The document should be executed in multiple original copies.

3.

If separate durable powers are used for both Health Care and Asset Management, insure that signing
these separate powers of attorney would not revoke the other.

If health care provisions are contained in the durable power of attorney and if the state has a Living Will statute,
insure that the execution of the durable power of attorney for Health Care is in conformance with these provisions. A
recorded power of attorney shall be deemed valid until a revocation of the power is recorded or a marginal release of the
power is made on the recorded power of attorney duly signed by the principal and attested by the clerk. KRS 382.370.

VI.

[18.271 Forms And Commentary

A.

[18.281 General Durable Power ofAttorney
POWER OF ATTORNEY
(EXCLUDING HEALTH CAREl

I,
of Fayette County, Kentucky, appoint
of
County,
ney-in-Fact ("Attorney-in-Fact") and grant to Attorney-in-Fact full powers for me and in my name to:

, my Attor-

i.

draw, make and sign any and all checks, contracts or agreements, and vote all shares of stock in
person or by proxy;

ii.

receive any money that may be due me;

iii. enter any safety deposit box leased to me individually or jointly with another person;
iv. purchase, sell (including on installments), lease, mortgage, pledge or convey any real or personal
property that I may now or hereafter own or have an interest in;
v.

retain and/or release all liens on any real or personal property that I may now or hereafter own or
have an interest in;

vi. endorse, purchase, sell, assign and transfer stocks, bonds and other securities in my name or
belonging to me;
vii. borrow or lend money on my behalf;
viii. sign, with power of substitution and revocation, all tax returns or reports that I may be required or
elect to file with any Federal, state or other governmental body, to make tax elections and to pay
taxes;
IX.

pay my expenses, including but not limited to: household, living, medical, hospital and nursing;
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x.

institute or defend legal actions concerning me or my property;

xi. convey any real or personal property to the Trustee of any trust agreement between said Trustee and
me and entered into either before or after the date of this instrument;
xii. disclaim, under applicable state law, in whole or in part the right of transfer to me, or my right of
succession, to any property or interest therein, including a future interest;
xiii. renounce or contest a testamentary disposition;
xiv. exercise all options available to me regarding policies which insure my life or the life of another
including, but not limited to changing the owner or beneficiary, and cancelling policies;
xv. elect methods of payment for any retirement plans (including lRAs, tax sheltered annuities, and
Keogh plans), change beneficiaries of said plans, elect to rollover distributions from said plans,
alter contributions made by me to said plans, make contributions on my behalf: and waive my nonemployee spousal rights;
xvi. to make gifts, including adjusted taxable gifts, on my behalf in trust or otherwise; and
xvii.

to do and perform in my name all that I might individually do.

I adopt and ratify all the acts ofAttorney-in-Fact which are done in pursuance of this power. Further, this power shall not
terminate if I become disabled.
[ALTERNATIVE PROVISION - SPRINGING POWER]
Third parties to whom this Power ofAttorney is presented may rely upon photocopies of the original document.
Further, they may rely upon a written statement or affidavit ofAttorney-in-Fact as to the then current effectiveness of this
document.
Witness my signature on this _ _ day of

_

[Type-written Name]
STATE OF KENTUCKY
COUNTY OF FAYETTE
I hereby certify that the foregoing instrument of writing was this day produced to me and was acknowledged to
be the act and deed of and delivered by
_
Witness my signature on this _

day of

_

My Commission Expires:
Notary Public - State at Large
THIS DOCUMENT PREPARED BY:
Jack R. Cunningham
Frost Brown Todd LLC
250 W. Main Street, Suite 2700
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
(859) 231-0000

B.

[18.291 General Commentary

The preceding form contains language to make this document a durable power of attorney in accordance with
KRS 386.093. Kentucky requires language indicating that the document would survive subsequent disability. This form
contains language that "This Power shall not terminate if I become disabled."

C.

[18.301 Commentary Concerning Springing Power

Kentucky also, in KRS 386.093, allows for a springing durable power of attorney, and language similar to, "This
Power ofAttorney shall become effective upon the disability of the principal." The difficulty with a springing power of
attorney is getting third parties to rely upon the fact that the event of disability has occurred. Some third parties would
require independent verification that a disability has occurred. Some drafters have proposed that language indicating
that if the attorney-in-fact is attempting to use the springing power of attorney that it is an absolute presumption that the
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attorney-in-fact has the authority and that the event of disability has occurred. There are statutory attempts to accomplish
this also.

D.

[18.31] Commentary Concerning Gifts

This draft does have provision for gifts. The gift language includes not only annual exclusions but also allows
adjusted taxable gifts. This type of gift authority may be too broad and could be limited by the following:

E.

1.

To make gifts or transfers all without consideration to anyone or more of my descendants and/or
their spouses and my spouse provided that the attorney-in-fact can only make gifts that qualify for
the annual exclusion under the Federal Gift Tax Law.

2.

In connection with such transfers, the agent has authority to execute in my name all documents to
effect these transfers.

3.

To authorize the attorney-in-fact to indemnify such third parties to these transfers and their reliance
on the authenticity of these transfers.

4.

To allow the attorney-in-fact to make gifts to that attorney-in-fact, but only within the annual
exclusion limits of the Federal Gift Tax Law.

[18.321 Limited Durable Power ofAttorney
LIMITED POWER OF ATTORNEY

I,
.......,,-__ of
County,
full powers for me and in my name to:

, of Fayette County, Kentucky, appoint ~_ _----:-_ _-::---~
, my attorney-in-fact ("Attorney-in-fact") and grant to Attorney-in-fact

transfer all of my assets and properties, real and personal, wherever situated, to
---=-~--=
::;---_ __;:_ of
, as Trustee under the terms of that Revocable Trust which I
have established under the date of
between myself as Grantor and
_
of
as Trustee.
---_----='....".-

At such time as my Attorney-in-fact shall determine, in consultation with my physician, that by reason of physical or
mental disability, impairment or other circumstance affecting my ability.to manage my affairs, it is appropriate and in my
best interest to transfer my properties and assets to be held by said Trustee under the terms of said Trust, I give and grant
of
to my said Attorney-in-fact full power to make such transfer of my properties in
as Trustee under the terms of said Trust.

----------

I give and grant to my said Attorney-in-fact full power and authority to execute all deeds, bills of sale, transfers,
assignments, and other instruments as may be desirable or necessary in order to effectuate the transfer of my properties
and assets to said Trustee to be held under the terms of said Trust. I do hereby give and grant my said Attorney-in-fact full
power and authority to do and perform all and every act and thing whatsoever requisite, necessary and proper to be done
in and about the premises as fully to all intents and purposes as I might or would do if personally present, hereby ratifying
and confirming all that my said attorney shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.
This Power ofAttorney shall not be affected by the disability of the principal.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this _ _ day of

, 19_.

STATE OF KENTUCKY
COUNTY OF FAYETTE
The foregoing Power ofAttorney is acknowledged before me this _ _ day of
My Commission Expires:

_
Notary Public - State at Large

THIS DOCUMENT PREPARED BY:
Jack R. Cunningham
Frost Brown Todd LLC
250 W. Main Street, Suite 2700
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
(859) 231-0000
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., 19_ _, by _ _

F.

[18.33] Commentary to Limited Durable Power ofAttorney

The above-mentioned form is a springing durable power of attorney limited to the Attorney-in-fact pouring assets
into an existing trust and having legal effect upon the disability of the disability ofthe principal.

If a limited durable power ofattorney is to be used, insure that the limiting condition is set out
with attention to detail. Also insure that agent has power to carry out the condition. If the agent is to
convey real estate, insure that they have the power to sign deeds, release restrictions, pay liens, sign and
amend contracts for sale or purchase and combine the principal in such transactions.
G.

[18.341 Special Purpose Durable Power ofAttorney
SPECIAL PURPOSE DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY

1. Health Care

DESIGNATION OF HEALTH CARE SURROGATE
I,
, domiciled in Lexington, Fayette County, Kentucky, hereby designate _ _
_ ~_~_~~~~~_~~~_~~myh~~c~s~~~~m~e~~~ilicared~~~~~me~mI
no longer have decisional capacity. Any prior designation is revoked.
If my health care s~ogate is deceased or disabled, then I hereby designate
____, as my successor health care s~ogate.

_

The use ofthe term "health care s~ogate" in this Designation ofHealth Care Surrogate shall be a reference to the
health care s~ogate first above named and any substitute or successor health care s~ogate as provided herein.
As used herein, the term "disabled," for purposes of this Designation of Health Care S~ogate, shall be (a) that
point in time in which a legal guardian is appointed for the health care s~ogate, or (b) a successor or substitute health care
s~ogate has in his or her possession affidavits of two (2) licensed and practicing physicians and/or psychiatrists stating
that the health care surrogate is unable to m~e informed decisions with respect to ilie health care surrogate's financial
resources to such an extent that the health care surrogate lacks the capacity to effectively manage obtain, administer, or
dispose of real or personal property.
If, at any time, it appears that I am unable to care for myselfand that it is appropriate that I be placed in a long-term
care facility, before placing me in such a facility, my health care s~ogate shall obtain statements from my attending and
one (1) other physician to the effect that, in their professional medical opinions, the condition of my health is ofthe nature
and duration that I should be placed in a long-term care facility which is certified to administer the proper care over my
health. Ifmy attending and one (1) other physician, in their professional medical opinions, iliereafter make a determination
that the condition of my health has improved so that I can care for myself, then, in such event, my health care surrogate
shall assist me in being removed from the long-term care facility and returned to a residential setting.
In addition to the rights given my health care surrogate above, I grant my health care surrogate the following:
1.

My health care s~ogate shall have the ability to control and provide for my personal care needs as
follows:
a.

2.

To do all acts to maintain my customary standard of living, to provide for my living place
through purchase, lease, or other method, to provide domestic help with either skilled or nonskilled help and to compensate, hire, and dismiss such persons;
b. To provide for me opportunities for recreation, physical exercise, therapy, and to arrange travel
in accordance with such needs;
c. To provide for my spiritual care; and
d. To take care of my person in case of sickness or disability of any kind, including the removal
from or placement in any such institution or place as may be deemed best by my health care
surrogate for my personal care and comfort.
My health care surrogate is authorized to provide for my health and medical care needs. My health
care surrogate will receive my instructions if I am able to participate in those decisions; and if I
cannot participate, in my health care surrogate's sole discretion, then my health care surrogate shall
carry out my instructions as follows:
a.

To receive and review proposed medical treatment and to make sole decisions concerning such
treatment;
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b.

To authorize and consent to any medical treatment and/or surgical procedure, irrespective ofthe
degree of risk or danger involved; and
c. To employ and discharge such health providers, including but not limited to any physicians,
nurses, psychiatrists, dentists, and therapists.
I further direct that this designation shall take effect as below provided and shall be irrevocable except as
hereinafter otherwise expressly stated.
This designation shall become effective on the date of execution hereof and shall continue effective until it is
revoked by me in writing. This designation, as between said health care surrogate and me, may be revoked at any time by
prior written notice to said health care surrogate stating the date on which such revocation shall be effective; BUT, with
regard to any revocation by me or by operation of law, including death, anyone else in good faith relying upon the exercise
ofthese powers by said health care surrogate may rely upon this instrument for its continuing validity. This instrument may
be recorded in a public office but need not necessarily be so recorded.
THIS DESIGNATION SHALL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE DISABILITY OF THE PRINCIPAL.
My health care surrogate shall not be liable for any loss sustained through error ofjudgment made in good faith,
but said health care surrogate shall be liable for willful misconduct or breach of good faith.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand the _ _ day of
Fayette County, Kentucky.

, at Lexington,

NAME

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
COUNTY OF FAYETTE

)
)

Before me, the undersigned authority, came the grantor,
, who is of sound mind and
eighteen (18) years of age, or older, and acknowledged that he voluntarily dated and signed this writing or directed it to be
signed and dated as above.
Witness my signature on this _

day of

_

My Commission Expires:

_
Notary Public - State at Large

THIS INSTRUMENT PREPARED BY:
Jack R. Cunningham
Frost Brown Todd LLC
250 W. Main Street, Suite 2700
Lexington, KY 40507-1749
(859) 231-0000
ALTERNATIVE PROVISION: Re Effective Date
This designation shall become effective on the date of the determination of my incompetency or
incapacity to make my health care decisions, and shall continue effective until it is revoked by me in
writing or until I am determined to no longer be incompetent. My incompetence or my reinstatement of
competence shall be determined by the written opinions of at least two (2) practicing physicians. This
designation, as between said health care surrogate and me, may be revoked at any time by prior written
notice to said health care surrogate stating the date on which such revocation shall be effective; BUT,
with regard to any revocation by operation of law, including death, anyone else in good faith relying
upon the exercise of these powers by said health care surrogate may rely upon this instrument for its
continuing validity. This instrument may be recorded in a public office but need not necessarily be so
recorded.
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[18.351 Commentary to Health Care Provisions
Health care provisions should be specific, but there should be a provision dealing with "general authority" of the

agent.
The authority to s1.!spend or withdraw life sustaining methods when there is no chance of recovery must be
detailed and must be executed in accordance with the state statutes that provide for the "Living Will Directive and Health
Care Surrogate appointment." The agent should comply with any other statutes, rules, and regulations ·to effect the
principal's desire.

I.

[18.361 Asset Management
The agent may need specific powers when dealing with a principal's assets.
ALTERNATIVE PROVISION:
(1) To buy and sell securities, including without limit, stocks, bonds, debt instruments, options, units
of mutual funds, commodity contracts and futures, units of limited partnerships, and any similar
investment;
(2) To exercise all rights in regard to my intangible personal property; and
(3) To buy and sell, lease, contract to purchase or sell any real property owned in my portfolio.
All persons relying on these representations and authorities granted to my agent shall be held harmless
in the event of disagreement.

J.

[18.371 Commentary to Asset Management Provisions

Assets vary from one person's portfolio to another. There should be specific power to deal with all assets of the
principal.
The agent needs authority to sign and bind the principal through documents to carry the powers out.
K.

[18.381 Revocation of Durable Power ofAttorney
REVOCATION OF GENERAL POWER OF ATTORNEY

I, --=-_--=
Attorney in favor of
its entirety.

, of _-:=-----=-_ _
, executed on the _ _ day of

- - - : : - _ - - : = -_ _.,

have hereinbefore executed a General Power of
, 19 _ , and 1 do revoke that document in

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, witness my signature this _ _ day of _ _, 19__.

STATE OF KENTUCKY
COUNTY OF FAYETTE
I,
, a Notary Public in and for the State of Kentucky, do certify that ~_----:::--:~__
-----,,-----.,,-- personally appeared before me in said state, produced the foregoing Revocation of General Power ofAttorney
and acknowledged said instrument.
Witness my signature on this _

day of

_

My Commission Expires:

_
Notary Public - State at Large

THIS INSTRUMENT PREPARED BY:
Jack R. Cunningham
Frost Brown Todd LLC
250 W. Main Street, Suite 2700
Lexington, KY 40507-1749
(859) 231-0000
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L.

[18.39] Commentary to Revocation of Durable Power ofAttorney

In order to revoke a durable power of attorney, there should be the same requirement fulfilled as when the durable
power of attorney was executed. KRS 382.370.
a.

It must recite the attorney-in-fact appointed and date of durable power of attorney.

b.

It must be a "recordable instrument" in accordance with the state(s) where document is to be
recorded.

c.

It must signify that it is a complete revocation of the document.
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I.

[19.11

Advance Directives Relating to Medical Care

A.

[19.21

Constitutional and Common Law Underpinnings of the Kentucky Statute

Any document that includes directions about medical care in the event of the grantor's incapacity may qualify as
an "advance directive" under the Kentucky Living Will Directive Act, KRS 311.621-.641 (hereafter, ''the Act"). The Act,
passed in 1994, is the second generation of laws relating to advance directives, and replaced the Kentucky Living Will Act
(formerly KRS 311.622 et seq.) and the Health Care Surrogate Act (formerly KRS 311.970 et seq.), which had been on the
books only four years. The General Assembly further updated the Act in 1998 .
The new Act is more flexible and realistic than previous law. It allows a grantor to give directions about who
should make medical decisions for him if he is incapacitated and to state what medical decisions should be made under
specified circumstances in one form, whose completion can be as simple as checking off items from a checklist set forth
in the statute.
The new Act is also more consistent with judicial decisions under constitutional and common law recognizing
that a person's right to direct the course of his own medical treatment is an inherent right that exists independent of any
statutes, and that living will statutes are helpful primarily because they provide a recognized set ofrules to govern exercise
ofsuch rights. In the landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990), the majority opinion noted that "[t]he principle that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our
prior decisions." Justice O'Connor's concurring decision was even more explicit:
Requiring a competent adult to endure [intrusive medical] procedures against her will burdens the patient's
liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine the course of her own treatment. Accordingly, the liberty guaranteed
by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject
medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289, 110 S. Ct. at 2857.
The Kentucky Supreme Court readily accepted this basic principle of individual rights in the landmark Kentucky
case concerning withdrawal oftreatment from an incompetent patient. In DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1993),
the court recognized that a person's right to refuse medical treatment survives a finding that he or she is incompetent, even
though incompetency gives rise to questions about how to interpret and implement the wishes of the person. Specifically
addressing Kentucky's previous Living Will Act (the 1990 version), the court noted that such statutes do not provide the
exclusive method of implementing a person's wishes, and do not supersede common law rights. DeGrella, 858 S.W.2d at
706. Accordingly, the court held that artificial nutrition and hydration provided to a comatose woman could be discontinued
in accordance with directions of her guardians, since the oral evidence of the woman's wishes as related by family and
friends was clear and convincing that she would not have wanted such life-prolonging treatment.
For this reason, in interpreting the Living Will Act and drafting advance directives, the author believes it is
appropriate to think of the advance directive as, more than anything else, an opportunity to express the grantor's wishes
regarding medical care, whatever they may be. Following the statutory rules for executing the advance directive is
helpful because doing so will give family members and health care providers comfort that the document is reliable and
authentic and may be followed without fear of liability, but otherwise the drafter should emphasize substance over fonn.
Remembering that expressing the desire ofthe grantor is paramount and recognizing that the language used in the statutory
form is awkward, practitioner should nonetheless exercise discretion in straying from the statutory form for purely stylistic
purposes.

B.

[19.31

The Kentucky Living Will Directive Act

KRS 311.623 provides that an adult with decisional capacity may make a written directive that does any of the
following:
(a) Directs the withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment; or
(b) Directs the withholding or withdrawal of artificially provided nutrition or hydration; or
(c) Designates one (1) or more adults as a surrogate or successor surrogate to make health care decisions on
behalf ofthe grantor; or
(d) Directs the giving of all or any part of the adult's body upon death for any purpose specified in KRS
311.185.
Additionally, section (2) ofthe statute states that except as provided in KRS 311.633, a living will directive made pursuant
to this section shall be honored by a grantor's family, regular family physician or attending physician, and any health care
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facility of or in which the grantor is a patient. The exception in KRS 311.633, discussed below, deals with situations where
the physician or health care facility is not comfortable in complying with the provisions of the living will directive.
KRS 311.625 states that a living will directive made pursuant to KRS 311.623 shall be "substantially" in the form
thereafter provided and may include other specific directives which are in accordance with accepted medical practice and
not specifically prohibited by any other statute; the form is reproduced in Appendix A, Section [19.25] infra. The statutoI)'
form contains both positive and negative statements about (1) life-prolonging treatment, (2) artificial nutrition and
hydration, and (3) gifting for organ donation or scientific purposes, with blanks provided next to each statement to indicate
which statements the grantor adopts. It also contains language by which the grantor may name a health care surrogate to
make decisions for him in the event of incapacity. Finally, it contains boilerplate language indicating that the living will
directive becomes effective upon incapacity of the grantor and other recitations relating to the factual predicate necessary
for it to become effective (e.g., competence ofthe grantor at the time of execution and intent that the directive be followed
as the "final expression of my legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment").
"Life-prolonging treatment," as used in the statutory form, is defined as any medical procedure, treatment, or
intervention that
(a) Utilizes mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, prolong, restore, or supplant a spontaneous vital
function; and
(b) When administered to a patient would serve only to prolong the dying process.
"Life-prolonging treatment" does not include the administration ofmedication or the performance of any medical
procedure necessary to alleviate pain. KRS 311.621 (11).

c.

[19.41

Effect of a Living Will Directive

The term "living will directive" is not defined in the Act, but the term is used throughout, apparently to refer to
any document following the new statutory form. KRS 311.623 states that an adult may execute a living will directive that
directs the withholding of life-prolonging treatment or artificial nutrition or hydration and designates one or more health
care surrogates to make medical decisions on the individual's behalf in the event of incapacity. (In the event two or more
surrogates are appointed to act simultaneously, their actions must be unanimous, unless the directive states otherwise.)
Ifan individual has a living will directive, it "shall be honored" by the grantor's family, physicians and health care
facilities. KRS 311.623(2). KRS 311.6231 was added in 1998 to provide that a court appointed fiduciary for the care of
the grantor's person shall be bound by the grantor's advance directive and that ifthe grantor's advance directive designates
a surrogate to make health care decisions, the surrogate may continue to act. So, compliance with a living will directive
is mandatory, except in the case of a health care provider who advises the patient of a refusal to comply with the directive
and arranges for a transfer to another appropriate provider who will honor, discussed below.

D.

[19.51

Variations from the Statutory Form; Other Advance Directives

Although KRS 311.625 states that the living will directive must be in "substantially" the form provided in the
statute, it goes on to provide that the living will directive may include other directions that are in accordance with accepted
medical practice and not specifically prohibited by any statute, and that any such directions thereafter found by a court to
be improper will not invalidate the entire directive. Similarly, as noted earlier, the definition of"advance directive" in KRS
311.621 includes, in addition to directives executed according to KRS 311.625, any living wills or health care surrogate
designations executed before the effective date of the Act, and any other document that provides directions relative to
health care to be provided to the person executing the document. So the Act appears to allow flexibility for a grantor to
state his wishes in his own words and in other forms besides the living will directive form, and will give effect to, for
example, a document titled "durable power of attorney for health care" naming someone to make medical decisions on
behalf ofthe grantor in the event of incompetence.
Except in KRS 311.623, discussed above, the sections in the Act that discuss the effect of a directive apply to an
"advance directive," rather than a "living will directive." But it is doubtful whether the distinction apparently intended
has any effect. The drafters may have intended a living will directive to be mandatory upon health care providers whereas
other directives would carry less compulsoI)' force; the statute stating that a directive "shall be honored" by family and
physicians refers only to "living will directives." But the provisions and procedure in KRS 311.633 relating to transfer of
a patient in the event of a health care provider's refusal to comply with a directive are both available and required in all
cases where a provider feels he or it cannot follow an "advance directive," which suggests that a provider's latitude to opt
out of following a directive is the same whether the directive follows the current statutoI)' form or not. Importantly, the
immunity provisions for providers who comply with directives in KRS 311.635 apply to "advance directives," so it is clear
the provider's authority to follow the directive is the same regardless of its form.

E.

[19.61

Effectiveness ofAdvance Directives

Although the intent of the Act appears to have been to expand the situations in which an advance directive may
comfortably be honored by health care providers, it contains no language indicating when a living will or other advance
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directive springs into effect, beyond the determination of decisional capacity. The statutory living will directive itself
contains language that indicates it applies if the grantor no longer has decisional capacity, has a terminal condition, or
becomes permanently unconscious. KRS 311.625. "Decisional capacity," "terminal condition," and "permanently
unconscious" are terms defined by KRS 311.621:
(5) "Decisional Capacity" means the ability to make and communicate a health care decision.

***
(12)"Permanently unconscious" means a condition which, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, as
determined solely by the patient's attending physician and one other physician on clinical examination,
is characterized by an absence of cerebral cortical functions indicative of consciousness or behavioral
interaction with the environment.

***
(16) "Terminal condition" means a condition caused by injUl)', disease, or illness which, to a reasonable degree of
medical probability, as determined solely by the patient's attending physician and one (1) other physician, is
incurable and irreversible and will result in death within a relatively short time, and where the application of
life-prolonging treatment would serve only to artificially prolong the dying process.
It seems clear that the intent of the Act is to provide statutory assurance that an advance directive expressing
preferences about life-prolonging treatment and nutrition and hydration will be honored in the case of a terminal condition
or permanent unconsciousness of the grantor, and that a duly-named surrogate may make decisions for the incompetent
patient in other circumstances. This gives the law much broader applicability than the previous Kentucky Living Will
Act, which did not apply in the case of permanent unconsciousness (including a persistent vegetative state, or "PVS") and
did not cover artificial nutrition and hydration situations where the need for a set of rules about withdrawal of treatment
decisions has been particularly great.

F.

r19.71

Artificial Nutrition and Hydration

The Kentucky Living Will Directive Act still contains some limitations on such decisions. The statutory form
allows the grantor to adopt a statement, intended to be self-executing, that the grantor directs the withholding or withdrawal
of artificial nutrition and hydration. (It also allows the grantor to indicate that he refuses such authorization, in effect
directing that the treatment be provided.) In addition, the form provides an option for the grantor to allow a surrogate to
order such treatment to be withheld ifthe surrogate determines it is in the grantor's best interest, but the option states "I do
not mandate that withholding or withdrawing [of such treatment]."
If the latter option is chosen, the surrogate's freedom to make decisions has some limitations. KRS 311.629(3)
provides that a health care surrogate may authorize the withdrawal or withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration only
under the following circumstances, listed as follows:
(a) When inevitable death is imminent, which for the purposes of this provision shall mean when death is
expected, by reasonable medical judgment, within a few days; or
(b) When a patient is in a permanently unconscious state if the grantor has executed an advance directive
authorizing the withholding or withdrawal of artificially-provided nutrition and hydration; or
(c) When the provision of artificial nutrition cannot be physically assimilated [metabolized] by the person; or
(d) When the burden of the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration itself shall outweigh its benefit. Even
in the exceptions listed in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of this subsection, artificially-provided nutrition and
hydration shall not be withheld or withdrawn if it is needed for comfort or the relief of pain.
Literally, the limitations on withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration set forth above apply only to decisions
by surrogates. An advance directive which simply gives the instruction that such treatment be withheld and one which
does not give the surrogate discretion in the matter apparently is not subject to the same limitations. In any event, the four
circumstances where withdrawal of such treatment by a surrogate is authorized are broad enough to encompass most any
medical situation where such treatment might be in issue.
It may be significant that language in the previous Health Care Surrogate Act stated that the benefitslburdens
analysis in subparagraph (d) above could not include any judgment about the patient's quality of life, but such language
was not repeated in the new Act. Apparently, then, with the grantor's authorization, a surrogate may find that the grantor's
life is a burden to him. However, this should not ignite the ethical debate about the wisdom of allowing one person to
judge the quality of another's life. The existence of an advance directive naming the surrogate and authorizing a decision
to withhold artificial nutrition and hydration provide some assurance that a decision to refuse treatment is in accordance
with the patient's wishes, rather than the result of unfettered subjective judgment of the surrogate decision maker.
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G.

[19.81

Limitations of the Statutory Form; Drafting Considerations

With the statutory authority to combine within one form three types of instructions-specific instructions that
apply in the event the grantor is in a terminal condition or permanently unconscious, designation of a health care surrogate,
and any other instructions to a surrogate or health care provider that apply in case of incompetency-the legislature has
obviously recognized that issues relating to refusal oftreatment arise in a wide variety ofcontexts. In this light, attempting
to limit the use or applicability of an advance directive to specific medical conditions, specific types oftreatment or specific
forms may serve to frustrate the exercise of recognized rights. Despite a continued, if somewhat reduced, emphasis on
form, the new Kentucky Living Will Directive Act does a far better job than its predecessor statutes in recognizing the role
of advance directives in giving effect to a patient's right to make decisions about life-prolonging treatment.
But in the laudable effort to expand the law and simplify advance directives simultaneously, the legislature has
prescribed a statutory form that is not very precise in expressing either the legislature's intent or that of most grantors. By
its express language, it appears to treat incompetence, terminal condition and permanent unconsciousness as equivalent
conditions, anyone of which may bring the directive into effect, but without suggesting how the very different medical
consequences of incompetence on one hand and permanent unconsciousness and terminal condition on the other will
influence the expressed treatment preferences.
To make it more meaningful and more effective at expressing a grantor's likely intent, the drafter of the directive
may wish to make one or more changes along the following lines:
1.

Amend the first sentence as follows:

My wishes regarding life-prolonging treatment and artificially provided nutrition and hydration to
be provided to me if I no longer have decisional capacity, hale a tenninal condition, 01 become l'elmcmentl,
tllleon~eiotl~ have been indicated by checking and initialling the appropriate line below.
Then, after the paragraph designating a health care surrogate, amend the statutory language as follows:
"ifI have designated a surrogate, my surrogate shall comply with my wishes as indicated below if I have
a terminal condition or become permanently unconscious [and add any other specific situations the grantor wishes
to address] ...
This will make clear that the directive itselftakes effect in the event ofincompetence for any reason, and will make
clear that appropriate directions, such as the naming of a surrogate or designation of treatment choices that do not involve
life and death, are effective even ifthe patient is not in a terminal condition or permanently unconscious. The grantor may
specifically limit decisions to terminate life-prolonging treatment to situations of permanent unconsciousness or a terminal
condition if desired, but doing so in the context of particular treatment decisions rather than via introductory language
in the directive, will increase the likelihood that the directive expresses the grantor's precise desires. Alternatively, the
drafter may consider separating the designation of a health care surrogate to a separate document, or drafting an additional
document also naming the designated health care surrogate (if there are two documents, the grantor's choices should be
reconcilable), to make clear that the designated health care surrogate has the authority to act anytime the grantor lacks
decisional capacity, including in the absence of a terminal condition or permanent unconsciousness.

H.

2.

Add specific directions about other medical conditions or treatments not covered in the statutory form. If a
person has strong beliefs about, for example, amputation or cardiopulmonary resuscitation, it makes sense to
reflect that in an advance directive. The Act does not make all directions stated in an advance directive selfexecuting or require them to be followed without qualification in all cases, but the grantor's chance ofhaving
his wishes honored will still be greater if they are expressed in an advance directive than if they are not.

3.

Delete the language stating that the directive has "no force or effect" if the grantor is pregnant, since this
is inconsistent with the only express provision of the Act regarding pregnancy. (KRS 311.629(4), provides
that artificial nutrition and hydration cannot be withdrawn from Jl pregnant woman unless there has been a
determination that the woman cannot sustain the fetus to viability or the treatment is physically harmful or
will prolong severe pain which cannot be alleviated by medication). The boilerplate language in the statutory
form may also be inconsistent with the intent of the grantor. It is reasonable to expect that most female
grantors would want the directive to have at least limited effect during pregnancy, if for no other reason than
to give effect to the designation of a surrogate decision maker.

4.

Note any religious beliefs or other values systems that influence the grantor's treatment preferences, to assist
the surrogate decision maker or health care provider in interpreting a directive in difficult cases.

f19.91

Decisions by a Surrogate

A health care surrogate designated in any advance directive is empowered to act only while the grantor is lacks
decisional capacity. When the grantor lacks such capacity, the surrogate may make any decision on behalf of the grantor
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that the grantor could make for himself if able, except that decisions to terminate nutrition and hydration are limited as set
forth above. In making decisions, the surrogate is directed to consider the recommendation of the attending physician and
to honor the preferences expressed by the grantor in any advance directive.
If the grantor appoints two or more surrogates to act simultaneously, their decision must be unanimous unless the
advance directive specifies majority vote or some other method of resolving such disputes. KRS 311.623(1)(c).
A person designated as a surrogate may resign the role at any time by giving written notice to the grantor, to his
successor surrogate if one has been named in an advance directive, to the attending physician and to any health care facility
that is awaiting a decision. KRS 311.625(3). If the surrogate is unavailable or refuses to make a decision, the attending
physician should proceed as if there were no surrogate designated for the grantor. KRS 311.629.
Employees, owners, directors and officers of a health care facility may not act as surrogates on behalf of a patient
of that facility unless they are also related to the grantor within the fourth degree by consanguinity (blood) or affinity
(marriage), or are a member of the same religious order as the grantor. KRS 311.625(4).

I.

[19.101 Formalities ofAdvance Directives

To be valid, an advance directive must be in writing, dated and signed by the grantor or someone acting at his
direction. It must be either witnessed by two adults signing in the presence ofeach other and in the presence ofthe grantor,
or acknowledged before a notary public or other person authorized to administer oaths. Certain people are ineligible to
act as witnesses, serve as notary public or other person authorized to administer oaths for an advance directive, including
blood relatives of the grantor; beneficiaries under the laws that dictate how property will be distributed if the grantor dies
intestate; employees ofhealth care facilities treating the grantor (note that employees of a health care facility may notarize
an advance directive; they simply cannot be witnesses); the grantor's attending physician; and any person financially
responsible for the grantor's health care. KRS 311.625(2).
An advance directive that complies with these requirements is presumed to have been voluntarily made and
validly executed, unless the attending physician or health care facility where the grantor is a patient has actual knowledge
to the contrary. KRS 311.635(4).
It is the responsibility of the grantor and the "responsible party" of the grantor (Le., surrogate acting pursuant to
KRS 311.631, discussed below) to advise the grantor's attending physician and any health care facility treating the grantor
that an advance directive exists. KRS 311.633(1). If the grantor is unable to communicate, any person may alert the
attending physician to the existence of the directive, and the physician is then required to make the directive (or a copy of
it) a part of the grantor/patient's medical record.

J.

[19.111 Revocation of an Advance Directive

An advance directive may be revoked several ways. These include (1) a writing signed and dated by the grantor
declaring the grantor's intention to revoke the directive; (2) an oral statement revoking the directive made in the presence
of two adults, including at least one health care provider; or (3) destruction of the document by the grantor or someone
acting at his direction and in his presence. KRS 311.627(1).
Any revocation is immediately effective, although the law contains the practical limitation that a health care
provider is not bound by the revocation until it receives notice of the revocation. When notice of revocation is received,
it must be documented in the medical record, including the time, date and notice of receipt. Physicians and health care
facilities are relieved of any liability for acting in good faith where they have not received notice of the existence or
revocation of an advance directive. KRS 311.627(3).
A grantor may revoke his advance directive at any time the grantor has decisional capacity. The designation of
a health care surrogate may be revoked, in whole or in part, or the surrogate's powers reduced or limited, at any time the
grantor has decisional capacity. A new designation of health care surrogate revokes the prior designation of health care
surrogate, unless an intent to negate it only in part is clear. KRS 311.627(4). The intent of this subsection appears to be to
allow a surrogate designation to be revoked or amended without invalidating the entire directive.

K.

[19.121 Opting Out ofAdvance Directives

The Act specifies what a physician or health care facility must do in the event he or it refuses to comply with
an advance directive, and provides that health care workers may opt out of participating in compliance with an advance
directive based on moral, religious or professional objections. KRS 311.633(2), (3).
KRS 311.633(2) mandates that any physician or health care facility refusing to comply with the advance directive
made by a patient or a decision made by a surrogate or responsible party, shall immediately inform the patient or the
patient's responsible party and shall not impede the transfer ofthe patient to another physician or health care facility which
will comply with the advance directive. Such physician or health care facility shall supply the patient's medical records
and any other information medically necessary for the continued care of the patient to the receiving physician and health
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care facility. A health care worker who states in writing his moral, religious or professional objection to complying with
the advance directive of a patient or with the decision of the health care surrogate or responsible party is protected from
disciplinary action by the health facility and from civil liability, as long as he follows the transfer provisions of KRS
311.633(2). KRS 311.633(4).

L.

[19.13] Immunities

Any health facility, physician or other person under the direction of a physician, acting pursuant to an advance
directive to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging treatment from a patient in a terminal condition is immune from criminal
prosecution, civil liability or charges of professional misconduct. (It seems likely that the failure to include cases where
the patient is permanently unconscious was an oversight.) A "person who authorizes" such decisions-presumably the
grantor, the surrogate and, or the responsible party-is also immune from criminal prosecution and civil liability. KRS
311.635(1 ).
No physician or health care facility is required to make an independent investigation of a surrogate's authority to
act unless he or it possesses information to indicate that the surrogate may be disqualified.
The immunities provisions also protect any person who gives instructions as a surrogate or responsible party,
carries out a surrogate's or responsible party's instructions, or refuses to cart)' out a surrogate's or responsible party's
decision pursuant to the "conscience clause" in KRS 311.633. KRS 311.635(2).
The immunities set forth above apply unless it is shown by a preponderance ofthe evidence that the person whose
actions are in question did not act in good faith. KRS 311.635(3).

M.

[19.141 Effect on Other Rights

As under prior law, the Act declares that it does not affect common law or statutory rights of adults to make
decisions concerning life-prolonging treatment and the withholding or withdrawal of care, and that it does not create
any presumption about the intention of an adult who has not executed an advance directive. KRS 311.637(4), (5). It
expressly does not preclude or restrict the right of persons to make advance directives beyond the scope of the Act or the
ability of health care personnel and facilities to follow advance directives consistent with accepted medical practice. KRS
311.637(6).
The Act may not be construed to condone or authorize mercy killing or euthanasia or any other affirmative or
deliberate act to hasten the end of life. KRS 311.639.
N.

[19.151 Not Suicide; Effect on Contracts

Withholding or withdrawing treatment in accordance with the Act may not be deemed to result in suicide for any
purpose, and the making of an advance directive cannot affect the grantor's status under or eligibility for any life insurance
policy. Similarly, exercise of an advance directive to decline a medical procedure "which would serve only to prolong
artificially the dying process" may not impair the grantor's rights under any insurance policy. KRS 311.637(1). Neither
execution of an advance directive nor implementing a particular decision as a responsible party under KRS 311.631 may
be a condition to the effectiveness of any contract for the provision of services. KRS 311.637(2).

O.

[19.161 Penalties

Any person who tampers with an advance directive or misrepresents or conceals its existence may be subject to
substantial penalties. If concealment, cancellation, defacement or other tampering with an advance directive causes lifeprolonging treatment to be provided to one who has declined such treatment, the tamperer may be subject to civil liability
to the grantor or his estate. KRS 341.641 (1). It is a Class B felony to intentionally falsify, forge or conceal the revocation
of an advance directive if the result is the withholding or withdrawing of care contrmy to the grantor wishes and death is
hastened. KRS 341.641(2).

II.

[19.171 Patient Self-Determination Act

Laws affecting medical treatment decisions have generally been the domain of the states, but Congress entered
the fray in 1990. The Patient Self-Determination Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f), requires hospitals, nursing
homes, home health agencies, hospices, health maintenance organizations and competitive medical plans, as a condition of
Medicare and Medicaid participation, to:
(1) provide written information to adult patients regarding their rights under state law to make decisions about
medical care, including the right to accept or refuse treatment and the right to make advance directives;
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(2) provide written information to adult patients concerning the institution's policies on implementation of
such rights, including an explanation of any limitations on the provider's ability to comply with an advance
directive based on conscience;
(3) document in the patient's medical record whether he has an advance directive;
(4) refrain from discrimination against a patient based on whether or not he has an advance directive;
(5) observe state law relating to advance directives; and
(6) educate staff and community about advance directives.
As a result of this law, hospital patients frequently are confronted with information about advance directives for
the first time (or at least, pay attention for the first time) upon admission to an institution. Of course, a person's interest in
completing an advance directive may very well be at its greatest at that time, which leads to logistical difficulties in having
an appropriate directive prepared and executed. Although hospital admissions clerks can distribute copies ofthe statutory
form, they generally cannot advise a patient about the legal implications of signing the form without modification. The
fact that hospital employees cannot be witnesses to advance directives under the Act adds to the logistical problems. These
issues illustrate the benefit of discussing advance directives with clients at the same time other life and estate planning
documents are prepared, which will ideally be before the need takes on urgency.

III.

[19.181 Decision-Making in the Absence of an Advance Directive

Despite the increasing ease of executing advance directives, the vast majority of Americans have not executed
one. Fortunately, the Kentucky Living Will Act also makes it easier to reach and implement decisions on behalf of
patients lacking decisional capacity who have not executed advance directives and will thus minimize the necessity to
seek guidance from the courts before implementing a refusal of treatment decision. KRS 311.631. The constitutionality
of KRS 311.631 was upheld by the Kentucky Court ofAppeals in Woods v. Commonwealth, 1998-CA-000295-DG (Ky.
App. 1999). However, the Kentucky Supreme Court has granted discretionary review of Woods and deemed the case not
for publication.
The Woods case involved a situation where an adult who was never competent to issue an advance directive
became in a state of permanent unconsciousness. The court appointed guardian, supported by the patient's attending
physicians, petitioned the court for approval to remove artificial nutrition and hydration. Mr. Woods' guardian ad litem
argued that KRS 311.631 is not in accordance with the constitutional parameters set out in DeGrella, violates the Due
Process clause and the right to privacy expressed in the Constitution, and violates public policy and modem medical
ethics standards. The court found that Degrella did not speak to the situation where an incompetent fails to leave an
advance directive and the Kentucky Supreme Court specifically left this question up to the legislature. Further the court
found that Cruzan does not mandate that states require a showing of a patient's wish by clear and convincing evidence.
"Therefore, just because Matthew Woods' wishes as to the termination ofmedical treatment cannot be determined by clear
and convincing evidence, or even by a preponderance of the evidence for that matter, does not prevent KRS 311.631 from
being in compliance with the United States Constitution." Id. The court also stated that "To allow life-long incompetents,
and for that matter, those who had never thought to issue an advance directive, to waste away against the better judgment
of a guardian or other surrogate would have the effect of depriving such persons of their right to privacy." Id. The court
stated it believed that legislative safeguards included in KRS 311.631 sufficiently protect against incorrect or uniformed
decisions. Thus, KRS 311.631 is not contrary to the Due Process clause and the right to privacy of the Constitution. In
addressing the public policy argument, the court concluded that ''the preservation of biological life is not always in the
best interest of the patient, even if that patient has not made an advanced directive or was a life-long incompetent." How
the Kentucky Supreme Court finally addresses these issues will be interesting and important in the counseling of clients
on expressing their desires in advance.
KRS 311.631 provides that a person or persons who have an appropriate relationship to an adult who has lost
decisional capacity without executing an advance directive that covers the decision at hand, may make medical treatment
decisions on behalfof such adult. The responsible party may make "health care decisions," which is defined as "consenting
to, or withdrawing consent for, any medical procedure, treatment or intervention." KRS 311.621(8). Although it is not
explicit in the definition, it is reasonably clear that the power to make decisions also includes the power to refuse initial
consent to a treatment as well as the power to withdraw consent once given.
The only limitation on the type ofdecision that can be made by a responsible party acting pursuant to KRS 311.631
relates to withholding or withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. KRS 311.631(4) incorporates the language of
KRS 311.629(3) allowing a surrogate to make a decision to withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration only in
certain circumstances.
There are five classes of responsible party decision-makers recognized in KRS 311.631; a person (or group of
persons) in anyone class is an appropriate decision-maker ifno person in a prior class is "reasonably available, willing and
competent to act." This realistic and flexible standard appears to provide some protection for health care providers from,
for example, the whims of far-flung siblings who do not participate in patient care or register their opinions until after a
difficult decision has been made.
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Three standards govern decisions made by a responsible party acting pursuant to KRS 311.631. The actions must
be (1) in good faith; (2) in accordance with any advance directive executed by the patient; and (3) in the best interest of
the patient. KRS 311.631(3).
These standards could probably have been better articulated; the use of the conjunctive "and" creates some
problems because the second and third prongs might not always be able to be applied, or applied simultaneously. If there
is an advance directive that covers the decision, then KRS 311.631 by its terms is inapplicable. Of course, the reference
to advance directives in KRS 311.631(3) can reasonably be construed to mean that, even ifthe advance directive does not
cover the particular decision, it might provide a basis to extrapolate what the patient's choice would be in the particular
situation. The effect of the second and third items combined is probably to require consideration of all of the expressed
wishes of the patient. Either of these intentions could be accomplished better if the statute stated them expressly, and it
might be helpful if the statute specified whether oral statements may be considered. Furthermore, some surrogates and
responsible parties may be reluctant to judge what is in the best interest of another, as in the case ofa patient in a permanent
vegetative state who cannot feel pain.
However, these theoretical flaws do not significantly impair the tremendous value of the statute. The wording of
KRS 311.631(3) simply does not lend itself to lawyerly dissection. Nonetheless, the intent of the statute to provide that a
responsible party who is well-informed about the medical aspects of a decision, acts in good faith, attempts to determine
the wishes ofthe patient and to reach a decision that best serves the patient's best interests and known wishes, is reasonably
clear and extremely helpful.

A.

[19.19] Guardians

The highest priority of decision-maker under KRS 311.631 is a judicially-appointed guardian whose power
includes the power to make health care decisions. The power granted by KRS 311.631 to make "any health care decision"
clarifies that the powers of guardians under KRS chapter 387 may include decisions about life-prolonging treatment.
As the DeGrella case demonstrated, there are decisions that are not expressly covered by the guardianship statutes that
guardians historically have had difficulty making or implementing without court guidance.
KRS 311.631 clearly eases the guardian's dilemma in the case not specifically governed by the guardianship
statutes. However, there is an arguable conflict between KRS 311.631 and the guardianship law. KRS 387.660(3)
specifically requires a guardian to seek further approval from the court for specific treatment decisions, such as amputation
of a limb, sterilization, removal of an organ and psychosurgery. The specific directives in KRS 387.660(3) to seek judicial
approval for certain decisions probably control over the more general authority given to guardians in KRS 311.631. It is
reasonable to infer that there has been a specific legislative determination that a court's help should be sought in such cases,
and KRS 311.631 says nothing to suggest it supersedes the guardianship statute.
Apparently, though, the legislature has made a judgment that a well-informed guardian is capable of assessing the
desires and best interests of his ward in other cases involving life-prolonging treatment, and court intervention should not
routinely be necessary even when life-prolonging treatment is at issue.
KRS 311.631 appears to provide a legislative answer to a question that was raised in the case of Rice v. Floyd,
768 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1989). In Rice, a woman had executed a durable power of attorney giving her husband authority to
make decisions about her medical care in the event of her disability. She was thereafter disabled and her daughter sought
to have a guardian appointed for her. The lower courts were of the opinion that the woman's appointment of her husband
as attorney-in-fact eliminated the need for appointment of a guardian. On discretionary review, the Kentucky Supreme
Court reversed, holding that a durable power of attorney is not a substitute for appointment of a guardian and that a power
of attorney so granted terminates upon appointment of a guardian with the appropriate powers.
Now, KRS 311.631 implicitly suggests that a person designated in a durable power of attorney, living will
directive or other document in which the grantor names a surrogate decision-maker for health care matters will have
priority over guardians. Although the statute lists guardians as the first priority decision-maker, its provisions apply only
if there is no applicable advance directive in effect. "Advance directive" is broadly defined as a living will directive made
in accordance with the Kentucky Living Will Directive Act (which may include a designation of a health care surrogate,
as discussed below), a living will or health care surrogate executed prior to July 15, 1994, "and any other document that
provides directions relative to health care to be provided to the person executing the document." KRS 311.621(2). So, to
the extent that the patient has left written instructions in any form naming a person to make decisions for him in the event
of incapacity, other provisions of the Kentucky Living Will Directive Act giving effect to such advance directives appear
to control over KRS 311.631.
As a practical matter, the discussion about the relative priority between a surrogate named in an advance directive
and a guardian acting pursuant to KRS 311.631 should be academic. Ifa guardian is appointed for someone who has named
a surrogate health care decision-maker in an advance directive, the advance directive should influence the guardianship
proceedings several ways. Since the law now expressly recognizes that appropriately named health care surrogates may
make medical decisions for incompetents (which was not true when Rice was decided), it may not be necessary for a court
to give the guardian complete power to make medical decisions. The guardianship law is flexible and allows the court to
outline the scope of the guardian's duties to conform to the need. Further, KRS 387.600(2) requires the court to consider
the preferences of the ward in selecting a guardian; therefore, the health care surrogate and guardian will often be the
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same person. Finally, the standards for medical decision-making that govern guardians point in favor of honoring wishes
expressed in an advance directive to the extent possible. KRS 387.640 requires a guardian to act diligently and in good
faith to protect the personal, civil and human rights of the ward, and the right to have one's previously expressed desires
concerning life-prolonging medical treatment honored is now recognized as such a right in Kentucky. And, as explained
above, a guardian acting pursuant to KRS 311.631 is required to give effect to any wishes expressed by the ward in an
advance directive and to the best interest of the patient. KRS 311.361(3).
So, ifthere is a conflict between a decision proposed by a surrogate named in an advance directive and a guardian
named pursuant to KRS chapter 387, there is probably a factual dispute between two or more persons important to the
decision-making process about the patient's desires or what is in the patient's best interests. In such a case, resolving the
factual dispute will be more important than the technical issue about whose decision gets priority legally.

B.

[19.201 Other Classes of Responsible Party Decision-Makers

If no guardian has been appointed for the patient, the next person on the priority list in KRS 311.631 is the
patient's spouse. If the patient does not have a spouse but has adult children, then a majority ofthe spouse's adult children
who are reasonably available for consultation may make treatment decisions for the patient. Next on the priority list is
"parents of the patient." (The statute does not suggest any method of breaking the tie if both parents are alive and they
disagree about a decision). If none of the above is available, then the patient's nearest living relative or a majority of the
"nearest living relatives" reasonably available for consultation may act as responsible parties.

C.

[19.21] Limitations ofKRS 311.361

Although KRS 311.631 literally applies to any decisions on behalf of adult patients lacking decisional capacity, it
is inevitable that limits will be read into it.
As noted above, guardianship statutes that require a guardian to seek court approval for certain decisions on behalf
of a ward probably control over the more permissive language of KRS 311.631. In addition, the state Cabinet for Health
Services takes the position that the statute does not apply to the admission of incompetent adult patients to psychiatric
institutions. The Cabinet's Office of Inspector General, Division of Licensing and Regulation has stated its position
that all admissions of incompetent persons to psychiatric institutions must be made in accordance with the standards for
involuntary psychiatric admissions including the requirement of a judicial hearing, set forth in KRS chapter 202A. (This
position assumes that a person who is legally incompetent but does not resist hospitalization is nonetheless an involuntary
admission, although nothing in KRS 202A defines "involuntary.")
Of course, there will always remain the possibility that a person with the appropriate relationship to the patient
to act as responsible party decision-maker is available, and the applicability of the law is clear, but the appropriate
decision nevertheless remains unclear, because there is doubt whether the responsible party is acting in good faith, there
is a disagreement about the decision between persons who qualify as responsible parties or there is a conflict in medical
opinions about, for example, the possibility of recovery. Even in cases where the statute appears to allow the parties to act
without consulting the court, the DeGrella case suggests the courts will entertain requests for judicial assistance in making
a treatment decision.
I~

[19.22] Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders

A slightly different species of decision to forego treatment is the "do not resuscitate" or DNR order. A DNR
order reflects a decision not to employ cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) when a patient suffers cardiac arrest. CPR
in a health facility includes the use of defibrillators and injection of stimulants, and absent a DNR order, is administered
in hospitals in all cases of cardiac failure. CPR is therefore a potential option for most dying patients, although it was
developed primarily to revive patients with acute illnesses or injuries who have a chance of recovery.
The electrical and chemical stimulation used in CPR can be violent and traumatic to a frail patient who is in the
advanced stages of chronic illness. In such a case, successful resuscitation may revive the patient, but cardiac failure may
recur in a few days, necessitating another decision whether to employ CPR or not.
So, unlike decisions to withdraw a respirator or feeding tube, decisions whether to administer CPR arise in
emergencies; they do not allow time for reflection and calm discussion; and they involve infliction of physical trauma
on patients, often without any long-term medical benefit. Accordingly, DNR orders have not presented the same ethical
problems for health care providers and the courts. For many years, it has been well-accepted that a physician attending a
hospital patient may, after consultation with the patient or his family, enter "DNR" in the chart of the patient.
The few reported decisions on DNR orders have upheld them. See e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741
P.2d 674 (1987); In re Dinnersteih, 6 Mass. App. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978). In a case in Massachusetts, ajury decided
that a hospital was not liable for negligence or infliction of emotional distress when it entered a DNR order for an elderly
woman who was terminally ill despite the instructions of the patient's daughter to provide all available care. Gilgunn v.
Massachusetts General Hospital, No. 92-4820-H (Mass. Super., April 21, 1995), reported at CCH Health Care Facility
Management Guide ~ 14,771 and 4 BNA Health Law Rptr. 698.
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A 1992 Georgia case was somewhat unusual in ruling that a hospital could not enter a DNR order for a
permanently comatose child. In re Doe, 262 Ga. 389,418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992). However, the result was due to a Georgia
statute allowing "any parent" to revoke consent to a DNR order. Since the parents of Baby Doe disagreed whether the
order should be entered, the statute gave effect to the wishes of the parent who objected. In general, however, the court
recognized the potential appropriateness ofDNR orders in such cases.
The various advance directive forms set forth in Kentucky statutes have not focused on CPR or the desirability
of DNR orders. Presumably that is because an advance directive has generally not been considered necessary for
implementation ofa DNR order. The new law acknowledging family members' authority to make decisions for incompetent
patients makes it even more clear that an advance directive is not a prerequisite for a DNR order. Of course, it is always
possible to use an advance directive to express one's preferences concerning CPR, but since CPR is potentially applicable
in many different situations, including both cases in which CPR is desirable and cases where it is not, it may be difficult to
formulate and express one's preferences clearly. KRS 311.623 in section (3) revised in 1998, stafes that notification to any
emergency medical responder or paramedic of a person's authentic wish not to be resuscitated shall be recognized only if
on the standard form or identified approved by the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure, in consultation with the Cabinet
for Health Services.
A physician who has entered a DNR order on a patient's chart should review it at intervals specified by the facility,
to assure that it remains consistent with the needs and desires ofthe patient and his family. If a patient is transferred from
a hospital to a nursing home or other institution, the receiving institution should not simply accept the transfer of a DNR
order entered at the hospital, but should require entry of a new DNR order in its own charts and in accordance with its own
policies.

~

[19.231 Assisted Suicide

Kentucky now has a law making it illegal to assist a suicide. KRS 216.302, passed in 1994, makes it a Class C
felony to knowingly force someone to commit suicide, and a Class D felony to knowingly and intentionally do one of the
following ifthe purpose is to assist another person in committing suicide:
(1) provide the physical means to commit or attempt suicide; or
(2) participate in an act by which another attempts or commits suicide.
Although assisting a suicide is illegal, suicide itself, whether assisted or unassisted, is not.
It is not illegal for a health care professional to prescribe or provide medicine to relieve pain that may also
hasten death, as long as the medicine is not prescribed or provided with the intention of causing death. KRS 216.304(1).
Similarly, a licensed health care professional who withholds or withdraws a life-sustaining procedure in compliance with
the Living Will Directive Act will not be considered to have forced or assisted a suicide.
An imminent effort by a person to assist a suicide may be enjoined by the spouse, parent, child, or sibling of the
person who would commit suicide, any person entitled to inherit from that person, a health care provider of a person, or a
public official with appropriate jurisdiction to enforce the laws. KRS 216.306.

In addition to criminal sanctions, a health care professional who assists in a suicide may have his license revoked
on a showing of a conviction or plea of guilty to a felony, or a judgment of contempt of court for violating an injunction
under KRS 216.306.
The constitutionality of the Kentucky statute has not been challenged. Historically, court cases and statutes have
drawn a distinction between withdrawal of treatment, which was seen as a passive form of death that allows illness to
run its course, and euthanasia. See, e.g., KRS 311.639. The Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997), held that Washington's prohibition against causing or aiding a suicide does not violate the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment ofthe Constitution. The court emphasized the long history ofprohibiting assisted suicide, and
concluded that the asserted "right" to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by
the Due Process clause. The Court also found that the Washington statute rationally related to legitimate governmental
interests. In a decision delivered on the same day as Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court held that a New York
prohibition on assisted suicide did not violate the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment ofthe Constitution
in Vacco v. Ouill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). In Vacco v. Quill, the Court stated "that the distinction between assisting suicide
and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, a distinction widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profession and in
our legal traditions, is both important and logical; it is certainly rational." Consistent with the distinction between allowing
death to occur and causing death, the courts of Michigan have sustained that state's laws prohibiting assisted suicide
despite Dr. Jack Kevorkian's various challenges to those laws. See People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 527 N.W.2d 714
(1994), cert. denied sub nom., Hobbins v. Kelley, 115 S. Ct. 1795,131 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1995); People v. Kevorkian, 210
Mich. App. 601; 1995 Mich. App. Lexis 192 (1995), People V. Kevorkian, 248 Mich. App. 373 (2001). The American
Medical Association (AMA) believes that physicians should commit themselves to relieve the suffering of terminally ill
patients through pain control and compassionate care, and that it is never appropriate to assist a suicide. Code of Medical
Ethics, Current Opinions with Annotations, Opinion 2.21, (AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 1994). Although
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the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of state statutes banning assisted suicide, there continues to be debate
over whether competent adult terminally ill patients should be allowed the right to take affirmative actions to hasten death
and whether such patients should be allowed the assistance of physicians or others in taking such action.

VI.

[19.241 Appendix

A.

[19.251 Statutory Living Will Directive
LIVING WILL DIRECTIVE
My wishes regarding life-prolonging treatment and artificially provided nutrition and hydration to be provided to me
if I no longer have decisional capacity, have a terminal condition, or become permanently unconscious have been
indicated by checking and initialing the appropriate lines below. By checking and initialing the appropriate lines, I,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, specifically:
Designate
as my health care surrogate(s) to make health care decisions
for me in accordance with this directive when I no longer have decisional capacity. If-----,::--:-----,,.--,-_ refuses or is not able to act for me, I designate
as my health care surrogate(s).
Any prior designation is revoked.
If I do not designate a surrogate, the following are my directions to my attending physician. If I have designated a
surrogate, my surrogate shall comply with my wishes as indicated below:
Direct that treatment be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally with only the
administration of medication or the performance of any medical treatment deemed necessary to alleviate
pain.

DO NOT authorize that life-prolonging treatment be withheld or withdrawn.
Authorize the withholding or withdrawal of artificially provided food, water, or other artificially provided
nourishment or fluids.

DO NOT authorize the withholding or withdrawal of artificially provided food, water, or other artificially
provided nourishment or fluids.
Authorize my surrogate, designated above, to withhold or withdraw artificially provided nourishment or
fluids, or other treatment if the surrogate determines that withholding or withdrawing is in my best interest;
but I do not mandate that withholding or withdrawing.
Authorize the giving of all or any part of my body upon death for any purpose specified in KRS 311.185

DO NOT authorize the giving of all or any part of my body upon death.
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of life-prolonging treatment and artificially provided
nutrition and hydration, it is my intention that this directive shall be honored by my attending physician, my family,
and any surrogate designated pursuant to this directive as the final expression of my legal right to refuse medical or
surgical treatment, and I accept the consequences of the refusal.
If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is known to my attending physician, this directive shall have
no force or effect during the course of my pregnancy.
I understand the full import of this directive, and I am emotionally and mentally competent to make this directive.
Signed this

day of

, 199_

Signature of Grantor
Address
In our joint presence, the grantor, who is of sound mind and eighteen years of age, or older, voluntarily dated and
signed this writing or directed it to be dated and signed for the grantor.
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Signature of Witness

Signature of Witness

Address

Address

OR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

)
)SS

COUNTY OF

)

Before me, the undersigned authority, came the Grantor, who is ofsound mind and eighteen (18) years of age or older,
and acknowledged that he/she voluntarily dated and signed this writing or directed it to be signed and dated as
above.
Done this

day of

, 199_.

My commission expires

_
Notary Public, State at Large

Execution of this document restricts withholding and withdrawing of some medical procedures. Consult Kentucky Revised Statutes or your attorney.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

SECTIONH
DURABLE POWERS OF ATTORNEY
&

ADVANCE DIRECTIVES

Melissa R.P. Palmer
The Rigsby Law Group, PLC
Lexington, Kentucky

Drafting consideration for Health Care Surrogate:
language to authorize records release and comply with HIPAA regulations
I authorize my health care surrogate to request, receive, obtain and review,
and be granted full and unlimited access to, and consent to the disclosure of complete
unredacted copies of any and all health, medical and financial information and any
information or records referred to in 45 C.F.R. Sec. 164.501 and regulated by the
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information found in 65 Fed. Reg.
82462 as protected private records or otherwise covered under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). I understand that the information
contained in my health and medical records may include information relating to sexually
transmitted diseases, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), AIDS-related complex
(ARC) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), behavioral or mental health services, and
treatment for alcohol or drug abuse or addiction. I understand that I may have access to
or receive an accounting of the information to be used or disclosed as provided in 45 C. F. R.
Sec. 164.524 et seq. I further understand that authorizing the disclosure of this health
information is voluntary and that I can refuse to sign this authorization. I further understand
that any disclosure of this information carries with it the potential for an unauthorized further
disclosure of this information by third parties and that such further disclosure may not be
protected under HIPAA. In order to induce the disclosing party to disclose the aforesaid
private and/or protected confidential information, I forever release and hold harmless said
disclosing party who relies upon this instrument from any liability under confidentiality rules
arising under HIPAA as a consequence of said disclosure. I authorize my health care
surrogate to execute on my behalf any releases or other documents that may be required
in order to obtain this information.
I authorize my health care surrogate to execute on my behalf any documents
necessary or desirable to implement the health care decisions that my health care
surrogate is authorized to make pursuant to this document, including without limitation all
documents pertaining to a refusal to permit medical treatment, or authorizing the leaving
of a medical facility against medical advice, or any waivers or releases from liability
required by a physician or health care provider.
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